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MILITARY HISTORY
OF
ULYSSES S. GRANT,

FROM APRIL, 1861, TO APRIL, 1865.

BY
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TO THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF.

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VOLUME I.

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PREFACE TO VOLUME I.

THE fact that I became a member of General Grant's personal staff, before he assumed command of the armies of the United States, and that I have since remained with him, is the voucher that I offer for the correctness of this history. I have not meant to state one fact, unless it came under my own personal observation, or has been told me by the general of the army, or one of his important officers, or unless I know it from official papers. When I deviate from this rule, I make the deviation known.

The correspondence, telegraphic and written, of the headquarters of the armies, is accessible to me. I have also been allowed to examine all papers under the control of the War Department; and, as many of the rebel archives are now in the possession of the government, I have seen the original reports made by the rebel generals, of every battle but two, which I have attempted to describe.

Those two are Corinth and Iuka, at neither of which General Grant was present in person. The original rebel field returns have also been closely examined by me. No statement of rebel movements or strength is made in this volume, unless taken from these sources; or, if otherwise, the source is named.

Generals Sherman, Sheridan, Ord, and Wilson, and the officers of General Grant's staff, as well as Admiral Porter, have afforded me much valuable information, and given me all the assistance in their power, that I have desired. The Honorable Edwin M. Stanton has also furnished me with information which I could not otherwise have obtained.

The present volume brings my narrative down to the period when General Grant was made Lieutenant-General, and assumed command of all the national armies. It refers to scenes and events, many of which I did not personally witness, as I first reported to him, in person, in February, 1864. His private as well as official correspondence, and daily conversation for years with himself and the officers who accompanied him in his earlier campaigns, are my principal authority. I have his permission now to make known whatever I have learned from these various sources.

My opinions, however, have not been submitted to General Grant. For them I alone am responsible. But, those opinions are based exclusively on the facts

presented to the reader, and, unless supported by the evidence I offer, must fall to the ground.

I have striven to avoid unnecessary personality, but the occasional danger of this fault has been an insignificant consideration, when compared with the importance of historical truth. In matters of so much importance as those of which I write, there should be no secrecy, when the emergency which demanded secrecy is past.

WASHINGTON, 1867.



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INTRODUCTION.

THE original thirteen states that composed the American Union had grown in the course of eighty years to thirty-four; the territory, which had at first been limited to a narrow strip along the Atlantic coast, had spread to the Pacific ocean, and embraced a region as wide as the mightiest empires of the Old World; from the chain of great lakes on the north, to the Gulf of Mexico on the south, the republic stretched out a thousand miles across. This land abounded in untold agricultural and mineral wealth; commerce enriched the portions bordering on the sea, manufactures thrived; the taxes were inconsiderable, and a national debt almost unknown, and a degree of material prosperity was attained entirely without precedent. Education was more widely diffused than in any country since the invention of letters, the influence of religion was universally acknowledged, the rich and the poor were equal before the law, and every male citizen had a share in the government. The nation was powerful abroad as well as prosperous at home; the title of American citizen was a passport that secured protection in every foreign land; peace

had smiled on the territory of the Union for more than half a century, and a generation had grown up unused to war. The future of this people was even more brilliant in promise than the present in fruition. Made up, indeed, of different populations, with various characters, and of separate origin, yet with so much unity of interest and homogeneity of feeling; allied by so many memories of the past, and so many aspirations for the future; with the numerous peculiarities of passion, and condition, and race, apparently so harmoniously adjusted, it seemed as if no serious disaster could ever occur to mar its greatness or interfere with its prosperity.

But questions of a subtle political character arose, about which the Northern and Southern states differed widely and antagonistically. The institution of African slavery existed at the South, but had been abolished at the North; and the destiny of four millions of slaves, as well as the extension of slavery itself, was violently discussed. The independent rights of the states, and the supremacy of the general government, were asserted and denied by turns; politicians, for personal or party reasons, promoted the discord and exaggerated the antagonisms; and, after years of controversy, the quarrel was referred to the decision of the polls. A presidential election ensued, which resulted in the elevation of a Northerner to power, who had received no electoral vote from any Southern state, and who was pledged to resist, by all lawful means, the extension of slavery. He was also pledged to allow no interference with the institution, where it already existed; but his success was looked upon by the South as the inauguration of a direct attack upon slavery, and became the signal for an

attempt to destroy that Union which the South had done as much to establish and defend as the North. Eleven Southern states claimed the right to secede from what they called the federal alliance; but the Northern states maintained that the bond of union was indissoluble, and that secession was rebellion; and each party was ready to fight for the maintenance of its views.

The Southerners began the war, without waiting for any overt act from the North: they not only assumed to secede, and set up a government for themselves, which they called a Confederacy, but they seized the national forts and arsenals within their territory; and at Fort Sumter, in South Carolina, before resistance was offered, they fired on the national flag and compelled the surrender of the fort. This circumstance united the North. Hitherto, there had been many Northerners who thought that the South had grievances, and who were anxious to redress them; many, who were willing to compromise all the questions at issue, save only that of union; and some, who were even willing to allow the Southern states to depart in peace. But the gun fired at Sumter put an end to all such sentiments; the government at once determined to maintain its authority, and the people unanimously seconded the government; or, rather, the people determined, and the government executed their will.

The standing army of the United States, at this time, numbered fifteen thousand, four hundred and thirty-three men; or ten regiments of infantry, four of artillery, and five of cavalry. It was officered by Southerners as well as Northerners; men educated by the national government, at the national schools,

and sworn to support the national authority; out of one thousand and seventy-four officers, two hundred and seventy were of Southern birth, embracing a fair share of the talent and distinction of the army. Two hundred and two of these espoused the Southern cause. When it became apparent that war was inevitable, they resigned their commissions, and offered their swords to their own section, holding the authority of a state paramount to that of the Union.* They were followed into secession by fifty others from Northern or border states, most of whom had married Southern wives or acquired Southern property.

This defection of course greatly disorganized the small force at the disposal of the government. But even had these officers remained firm in their allegiance, the military power of the United States at this time was insignificant. The President therefore at once issued a proclamation, declaring the existence of an armed rebellion, and calling for seventy-five thousand volunteer troops to suppress it. They came instantly, from every quarter of the North, more than he called for. But the proclamation had an equally remarkable effect upon the people of the South. Many of these had been bitterly opposed to disunion, although all concurred in deprecating any interference by the North or by the general government, with the peculiar institution of the South; but when President Lincoln announced his intention of coercing the states which attempted to secede, the unanimity of the South in resistance became a parallel to that of the North in restraining. Advantage of this was taken at once by the Southern leaders, many

* One hundred and eighty resigned; twenty-two were dismissed, or dropped from the rolls.

of whom had long been preparing for the very emergency which now occurred; armies were organized with extraordinary diligence and energy by the self-styled Confederate government, and the American civil war began.

From the intestine nature of the struggle and the geographical formation of the continent, the principal theatre of the war, it was evident, must lie in the states bordering on both sections. The belt of territory reaching from the Atlantic westward, and comprising Maryland and Virginia east of the Alleghanies, and Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri west of those mountains, constitutes this border region, and was the stage on which the first acts of the drama were performed. The Potomac and the James, at the east; the Ohio, the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Mississippi, at the west, are the great streams, the control of which, and of the populations and regions that lie in their valleys, is indispensable to a mastery of the continent. The Ohio flows westward from Pennsylvania to Missouri, a thousand miles; the prolific States of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois lie along its northern bank, while Virginia and Kentucky form the southern shore; it was the natural line of demarcation at the west between the slave states and the free, the boundary between disaffection and loyalty. The Tennessee and Cumberland, rising in the recesses of the Alleghany mountains, flow southward into the state of Tennessee, and then run west for hundreds of miles, the larger river making a wide detour into Alabama and Mississippi; when, turning to the north again, they traverse Kentucky side by side, and empty into the Ohio, near the point where that still greater stream becomes itself a tributary, and pours

the waters of its hundred affluents into the Mississippi. The Mississippi, recipient and greatest of them all, divides the continent for four thousand miles; bounds ten different states, and enriches all the region between the Rocky and the Alleghany mountains.

In these regions, and for the mastery of these rivers and states, the earliest battles of Ulysses S. Grant were fought; from this field, he was taken to command the national armies. It will be my endeavor to show—first, why he was selected to command those armies, and afterwards how he performed the task.

CHAPTER I.

Birth and parentage of Grant—His name—West Point—His army life—The Mexican War—He marries—Leaves the army—Enters the leather trade—Galena—Grant drills a company—Takes it to Springfield—Organizes volunteer troops—Visits Cincinnati to see McClellan—Becomes colonel of the Twenty-first Illinois regiment—Marches it to Missouri—Is made brigadier-general of volunteers—Takes command of the District of Southeast Missouri—Seizes Paducah—Sends a force to drive rebels into Arkansas—Makes a demonstration upon Belmont—The demonstration converted into an attack—Battle of Belmont—Grant's success—Enemy reinforced—Grant cuts his way out—Results of Belmont.

HIRAM ULYSSES GRANT was born on the 27th of April, 1822, at Point Pleasant, Clermont county, Ohio. His father was of Scotch descent, and a dealer in leather. Ulysses was the eldest of six children. He entered the Military Academy at West Point at the age of seventeen, the congressman who procured his appointment giving his name by mistake as Ulysses S. Grant. Simpson was the maiden name of his mother, and was also borne by one of his younger brothers: this doubtless occasioned the error. Young Grant applied to the authorities at West Point and to the Secretary of War, to have the blunder corrected, but the request was unnoticed; his comrades at once adopted the initials U. S. in his behalf, and christened him Uncle Sam, a nickname that he never

lost in the army; and when he graduated in 1843, twenty-first in a class of thirty-nine, his commission of brevet second lieutenant and his diploma, both styled him Ulysses S. Grant, by which name he has since been known.

His regiment was the Fourth infantry; he remained in the army eleven years, was engaged in every battle of the Mexican War, except Buena Vista, receiving two brevets for gallantry, and was afterwards stationed at various posts on the Canada frontier, and finally in California and Oregon. In 1848, he married Julia T. Dent, eldest daughter of Frederick Dent, a merchant of St. Louis; and in 1854, having reached the grade of captain, he resigned his commission in the army, and removed to Gravois, near St. Louis, where he owned and worked a farm. Afterwards, in 1860, he entered the leather trade, with his father and brother, at Galena, Illinois.

Thus, when the civil war broke out, Grant was a private citizen, earning his bread in an insignificant inland town. He was of simple habits and tastes, without influence, and unambitious. Having never been brought in contact with men of eminence, he had no personal knowledge of great affairs. He had never commanded more than a company of soldiers, and although he had served under both Scott and Taylor, it was as a subaltern,* and without any opportunity of intercourse with those commanders. He had never voted for a President but once; he knew no politicians, for his acquaintance was limited

* In 1864, General Scott told me that he thought he recollected a young officer named Grant, who behaved gallantly in the Mexican War; and General Robert E. Lee said to Grant at Appomattox Court-House, that he remembered their having met before. Grant must have been a brevet second lieutenant at the time, and Lee a staff-officer of Scott.

to army officers and Western traders; even in the town where he lived, he had not met the member of Congress who represented the district for nine successive years, and who afterwards became one of his most intimate personal friends. Of his four children, the eldest was eleven years old. He lived in a little house at the top of one of the picturesque hills on which Galena is built, and went daily to the warehouse of his father and brother, where leather was sold by the wholesale and retail. He was thirty-nine years of age, before his countrymen became acquainted with his name.

Fort Sumter fell on the 13th of April, 1861, and the President's call for troops was made on the 15th. On the 19th, Grant was drilling a company of volunteers at Galena, and four days afterwards went with it to Springfield, the capital of Illinois. From there, he wrote to the adjutant-general of the army, offering his services to the government, in any capacity in which he could be of use. The letter was not deemed of sufficient importance to preserve: it stated that Grant had received a military education at the public expense, and now that the country was in danger, he thought it his duty to place at the disposal of the authorities, whatever skill or experience he had acquired. He received no reply; but remaining at Springfield, his military knowledge made him of service in the organization of the volunteer troops of the state; and at the end of five weeks, the governor, Honorable Richard Yates, offered him the Twenty-first regiment of Illinois infantry.

Before receiving his coloneley, Grant went to Cincinnati to visit Major-General McClellan, then in command of Ohio volunteers. The two had known

each other in the old army, and although Grant had no intention of making any application, he still hoped that McClellan might offer him a place on his staff. He went twice to headquarters, but did not find McClellan there, and returned to Illinois, without mentioning his aspirations to any one.

Early in June, he took command of his regiment, and marched at once to Missouri, reporting to Brigadier-General Pope, by whom he was stationed at Mexico, about fifty miles north of the Missouri river.

On the 7th of August, he was commissioned by the President, brigadier-general of volunteers, to date from May 17th, his first knowledge or suspicion of this rank coming to him from the newspapers of the day. He had been unanimously recommended for the promotion by the members of Congress from Illinois, no one of whom had been his personal acquaintance.*

During the war, the entire country was divided by the United States authorities, into military departments, whose boundaries and organization were repeatedly changed. The state of Illinois, and the states and territories west of the Mississippi river, and east of the Rocky mountains, constituted at this time the Western Department, of which Major-General Fremont was in command. On the 8th of August, Fremont transferred Grant to Ironton, Missouri, and a fortnight afterwards to Jefferson City, in the same state. At both these places, he was occupied in watching the movements of partisan forces. On the 1st of September, by direction of Fremont,

* The Honorable Elihu B. Washburne, of Galena, who had never spoken to Grant until after the fall of Fort Sumter, suggested the nomination.

he assumed command of the District of Southeast Missouri, and on the 4th, made his headquarters at Cairo, at the mouth of the Ohio. The district included not only the region from which it takes its name, but the southern part of Illinois, and so much of western Kentucky and Tennessee as might fall into the possession of national forces; it comprised the junction of the four great rivers, Tennessee, Cumberland, Ohio, and Mississippi.

Grant's first act was the seizure of Paducah, at the mouth of the Tennessee. The governor of Kentucky was at this time insisting that the state should maintain a position of armed neutrality, and all Kentuckians who sympathized with the rebels, took the same ground. This neutrality had never been recognized by the United States authorities, but was first violated by General Polk, the rebel commander in that region. He seized Columbus and Hickman, on the Mississippi, and threatened Paducah, within three days after Grant assumed his new command. All these places were of military importance, and Paducah completely commands the navigation of both the Tennessee and the Ohio. Fremont had previously ordered a movement in Missouri, which Grant was to superintend, and had directed the construction of Fort Holt on the Kentucky shore; but on the 2d of September, Grant arrived at Cairo, and on the 5th, heard of the advance of Polk, which had occurred the day before. He at once notified his commanding officer, as well as the Kentucky legislature at Frankfort, and later in the same day, having received additional information, he telegraphed to Fremont at St. Louis: "I am getting ready to go to Paducah. Will start at six and a half o'clock." Still later on

the 5th, he wrote: "I am now nearly ready for Paducah, should not telegram arrive preventing the movement."

Getting no reply, he started at ten and a half o'clock that night, with two regiments and a light battery; he also took two gunboats, the naval force in that neighborhood being under his control. He was delayed at Mound City, by an accident to one of his transports, but arrived at Paducah at half-past eight on the morning of the 6th. The city was seized without a gun being fired, Brigadier-General Tilghman and his staff, of the rebel army, with a company of recruits, hurrying out of the town by the railroad, south, while Grant was getting ashore. A force of thirty-eight hundred rebels was reported to be sixteen miles off, and rebel flags and stores were found in the town; but this movement saved Paducah and the control of the Ohio river. Grant stayed in town only until noon, when, leaving a sufficient garrison, he returned to Cairo, where he received Fremont's permission to take Paducah "if he felt strong enough." The next day, Brigadier-General C. F. Smith was put in command of the place, with orders to report direct to Fremont, at St. Louis, and Grant was rebuked for corresponding with the legislature;* but that body at once passed resolutions favorable to the Union,

" * HEADQUARTERS WESTERN DEPARTMENT, {
ST. LOUIS, September 6, 1861. }

Brigadier-General U. S. GRANT, Cairo, Illinois:

I am directed by Major-General Fremont to inform you that brigade and other commanders are not to correspond with state or other high authorities, in matters pertaining to any branch of the public service, either in initiating such correspondence or replying thereto.

All such subjects are to be submitted to the major-general commanding the department, for his information and action."

and the political position of the state was secured: no more was heard of the neutrality of Kentucky. The seizure of Paducah was violently criticised by those whom it disappointed, and furnished an illustration of traits destined afterwards peculiarly to characterize the generalship of Grant.

For two months afterwards, Grant was occupied in holding the country at the junction of the great rivers, near which his headquarters were established, and in organizing and disciplining his forces, which by the 1st of November, were increased to nearly twenty thousand men. He was kept strictly subordinate by Fremont, and allowed to make no movement of importance by that commander; Smithland, however, at the mouth of the Cumberland, was occupied by C. F. Smith without opposition, a few weeks after Paducah. Several times Grant suggested the feasibility of capturing Columbus, an important position on the east bank of the Mississippi, about twenty miles below Cairo; and, on the 10th of September, he even asked permission to make the attempt: "If it was discretionary with me, with a little addition to my present force, I would take Columbus." No notice was taken of this application. Belmont, on the west bank, was a small post, fortified only by a rude sort of abatis, and lying directly under the guns of Columbus. The rebels were constantly crossing troops between these points, and in time made Columbus one of the strongest works on the Mississippi river, and one of their great depots of men and supplies. It of course completely barred the navigation of the stream, and was a constant menace to every point in Grant's command.

On the 1st of November, Fremont ordered Grant

to make demonstrations on both sides of the Mississippi, in the direction of Norfolk, Charleston, and Blandville, points a few miles north of Columbus and Belmont. He was not, however, to attack the enemy. On the 2d, Fremont informed him that three thousand rebels were on the St. Francis river, in Missouri, about fifty miles southwest of Cairo, and ordered him to send a force to assist in driving them into Arkansas. Grant accordingly sent Colonel Oglesby, on the night of the 3d, with four regiments (three thousand men), from Commerce, Missouri, towards Indian Ford, on the St. Francis river. On the 5th, however, Fremont telegraphed him that Polk, who commanded at Columbus, was sending reinforcements to Price, in southwest Missouri, by way of the Mississippi and White rivers. Fremont had a force at that time confronting Price, and it was of vital importance to him that these reinforcements should cease. Grant was accordingly directed to make at once the demonstration towards Columbus which had been previously ordered. He immediately instructed Oglesby to turn his column in the direction of New Madrid, on the Mississippi, below Belmont, and sent him an additional regiment. General C. F. Smith, commanding at Paducah, was also requested to move out from that place towards the rear of Columbus, and "to keep the enemy from throwing over the river much more force than they now have there;" Grant informing him that "the principal point to gain, is to prevent the enemy from sending a force to fall in the rear of those now sent out from this command." Two other and smaller demonstrations for the same purpose, were ordered at the same time, from Bird's Point and Fort Holt, near

Cairo, the commanders being instructed to return the day after moving out.

On the evening of the 6th, Grant started down the river in person, with thirty-one hundred and fourteen men on transports, and under convoy of two gunboats. The force included a section of artillery, two squadrons of cavalry, and five regiments of infantry, to some of whom arms had been issued for the first time only two days before. Grant had but one general officer in his command, McClelland, who at that time had never heard a hostile shot; Logan, who afterwards became so distinguished, also accompanied him, but as a colonel. Grant proceeded nine miles, and made a feint of landing at a point on the Kentucky shore, where he lay till daybreak, with a view to distract the enemy, and, in conjunction with Smith's demonstrations, to give the idea that an attack on Columbus was contemplated.

At two o'clock on the morning of the 7th, he received intelligence that the rebels had been crossing troops from Columbus to Belmont, the day before, with the purpose of cutting off Oglesby. He at once determined to convert the demonstration against Belmont into an attack, as it was now necessary to be prompt in preventing any further effort of the rebels either to reinforce Price or to interrupt Oglesby. He still, however, had no intention of remaining at Belmont, which is on low ground, and could not have been held an hour under the guns at Columbus. His idea was simply to destroy the camps, capture or disperse the enemy, and get away himself before the rebel garrison could be reinforced.

At six o'clock, the transports moved down the river, and the troops were debarked at Hunter's

Point, on the Missouri side, just out of range of the Columbus batteries. They marched direct towards Belmont, about three miles off. Here, in an open space, protected by fallen forest timber, the rebels had pitched their camp. Grant moved by a flank, for about a mile, then drew his troops up in line, and ordered forward the whole force as skirmishers. On the road, he met with serious opposition, and by nine o'clock, his entire command was hotly engaged, except one battalion held in reserve near the landing, as a guard to the transports; the gunboats, although wooden, occasionally engaged the batteries at Columbus, many of which had a plunging fire; this action, however, was without result. The country on the Belmont side was partially wooded, and cut up with sloughs and swamps, and the rebels took advantage of these difficulties. There was heavy fighting for nearly four hours; during all this time Grant was with the skirmish line; his own horse was shot under him, McClermand lost three horses, and every colonel set an example of gallantry to his command. Stimulated by this behavior, the green soldiers fought like veterans, and finally drove the rebels foot by foot, through sloughs and fields, and from tree to tree, to the river bank, charged through the abatis, took several hundred prisoners, captured all the artillery, and broke up the camp.

They became, however, at once disorganized by their victory, and instead of pursuing the enemy, as he huddled and crouched under the river bank, set about plundering, while their colonels, equally raw, shouted and made stump speeches for the Union. Grant, meanwhile, had observed the rebel transports crossing the river from Columbus, and crowded with

troops on their triple decks. He was anxious to get back to his own steamers before these reënforcements could arrive, and strove to re-form his men, but in vain; they behaved like so many schoolboys, until, finally, to stop the plundering, he ordered his staff officers to set the camps on fire. This drew the attention of the artillerists at Columbus, who speedily opened on the national troops, when, perceiving the necessity of discipline, the men returned to the ranks, and the march to the transports began. Meanwhile, the defeated rebels, finding no notice was taken of them, had re-formed under the bank, and in the woods on the point of land just above Belmont; three fresh regiments from Columbus had also arrived, and the combined force, passing along under the bank, interposed between Grant and his transports. It was instantly cried: "We are surrounded!" and at first some confusion prevailed. An officer of Grant's staff, lately from civil life, rode up, a little flustered, with the intelligence. "Well," said Grant, "*if that is so, we must cut our way out as we cut our way in.*" The men were brave enough, but it had not occurred to them before, that being surrounded, there was any thing to do but surrender. Grant, however, remarked: "*We have whipped them once, and I think we can do it again;*" and as soon as the troops found that their leader meant to fight, the confusion was past; they promptly charged and dispersed the rebel line, which made but a faint resistance, not half so vigorous as that of the morning, and disappeared a second time over the banks.

It was necessary, however, to lose no time, for reënforcements were still crossing the river in large numbers. Grant pushed on to the landing, and

getting most of his force aboard, sent a detachment to gather up the wounded. He was occupied thus for an hour, without disturbance, but owing to the inexperience of his officers, not one of whom was a professional soldier, he had nearly every thing to do in person, and was obliged to superintend the execution of his own orders. The main body was nearly embarked, when he rode back with a single staff officer, to withdraw the battalion he had posted in the morning, as a guard to the transports, and which he supposed still covered the men who were bringing in wounded. But the reserves were as raw as the rest of the troops, and when the others were drawn in, they too had thought proper to retire. Without any orders, and without reporting their action, they had returned to the transports, not in alarm, for their position was protected by the gunboats, but simply out of ignorance and inexperience.

Grant was therefore completely outside of his own troops. At this moment, he rode up on a knoll, and discovered immediately in his front, the whole rebel force, now greatly augmented, and advancing upon him in line of battle. The enemy had formed a third time, nearly parallel to the bank, and was extending his own left so as to cut off the national transports, by getting to their rear, higher up the river. The bend in the stream just here, makes a peninsula of the Missouri shore, and rendered this manœuvre easy to execute. The rebel line was in a corn-field, not fifty yards from Grant, and already firing on his transports. He sat still for a moment to observe the situation, and presented an easy mark to the rebel rifles; but the morning had been damp and chilly, and he wore a private's overcoat, and was not recog-

nized for an officer. He saw at once that it was impossible to save the parties who were still out in search of the wounded, and completely cut off; so he turned his horse, riding back to the transports slowly, in order not to attract a fire. Getting nearer, however, he put spurs to his horse, and galloped hard to the bank, the animal sliding over the brink on his haunches. The rebel fire was now hot, and the transports were about pushing off, leaving Grant ashore; he however rode rapidly up, and a plank was put out for him, over which he trotted his horse aboard, under a heavy musketry fire. The convoy of gunboats then opened on the rebel ranks, which had by this time approached within fifty or sixty yards. Grape and canister were poured into them with good effect, mowing the men down in swaths.* The enemy fortunately fired too high, and a storm of shot passed over the hurricane deck, but wounded only three men, and killed none. By five o'clock, the last transport was out of range, officers and men equally elated with the idea of having gained a victory.

The next day, under a flag of truce, Grant met an old West Point comrade, who had become a rebel, and was serving on Polk's staff. Grant mentioned having ridden out and met the rebel line. "Was that you?" said the other; "we saw you, and General Polk called to some of his troops: 'There, men, is a Yankee, if you want to try your aim;'" but all

* "After nearly all the troops had reëmbarked, and were about ready to start, a sudden attack was made upon the transport vessels by an apparently large reënforcement of rebels. Our boats being in good position, we opened fire with our grape and canister, and five-second shells, and completely routed them, we learn, with great slaughter."—*Report of Lieutenant Walker, commanding naval force.*

were intent on hitting the transports then, and nobody fired at Grant.

At Belmont, Grant lost four hundred and eighty-five men in killed, wounded, and missing; one hundred and twenty-five of his wounded fell into the hands of the rebels; he carried off one hundred and seventy-five prisoners and two guns, and spiked four other pieces: three of these last were left behind, because drawn by hand, and the other had an inefficient team. About seven thousand rebels were engaged, and Polk sustained a loss of six hundred and forty-two men. By their own showing, the rebels had twice as many troops as Grant, and lost one-third more.* If any reënforcements were to be sent to Price, they were by this operation detained, and the movement of Oglesby was entirely protected. The enemy also remained concentrated thereafter at Columbus, lest another and more serious attack should follow.

This battle confirmed Grant in the belief on which he always afterwards acted, that when neither party is well disciplined, there is nothing to gain in the matter of discipline, by delay. The enemy organizes

* Pillow reported that, at the beginning of the fight, he had five regiments on the ground, but that these were greatly reduced by sickness, and, in consequence, numbered only twenty-five hundred men. Besides these, he had a battery of artillery and a squadron of cavalry. Polk reported reënforcing Pillow with five more regiments, whose numbers are not said to have been reduced by sickness. This entire force, at that period of the war, could hardly have been less than seven thousand men. The rebel reports greatly overestimate Grant's strength and exaggerate his loss. Otherwise they differ but in one essential point from the statements in the text. They all declare that Grant's troops broke and fled to the transports in great disorder, and were hotly pursued. The captured guns and the prisoners carried off by Grant, and the fact that men were sent back to gather up his wounded, disprove these assertions. The hot pursuit was after the national troops had got aboard.

and improves as rapidly as yourself, and all the advantages of prompt movement are lost.

The strategic results accomplished by Belmont might perhaps have been attained, had the original design been carried out, and only a demonstration made; but the troops, who had volunteered with the idea of active campaigning, were getting restive during the long delay at Cairo. When they found that they were really starting out, the blood of officers and men was up; had they been taken back then without a fight, their confidence in themselves and in their commander, would have been impaired. Grant noticed this, and even if he had not received the information on which his attack was based, would nevertheless have made the assault. The influence of the fight upon the troops engaged was of the happiest sort. It gave them a confidence and a fortitude which they never lost, and long afterwards the "Belmont men" were known as among the stanchest soldiers in the army of the Tennessee.

The country, however, knowing none of the objects of the movement, and seeing only the fact that troops had advanced and then retired, regarded the affair as a disaster, while the enemy, of course, heralded it for a rebel victory. Long after, many who looked upon Grant as one of the greatest of soldiers, declared that he should be forgiven for Belmont, and remained ignorant, not only that he accomplished more than he was sent to do, but that the very traits which contributed most materially to his later successes, were displayed as signally at Belmont as on any occasion during the war.*

* See Appendix for Grant's instructions and various papers relating to the Belmont affair.

CHAPTER II.

Rebel strategic line from Columbus to Bowling Green—Halleck in command of Department of the Missouri—Gunboats at the West—Demonstration in favor of Buell—Smith reports capture of Fort Henry feasible—Grant visits St. Louis to suggest the operation—Movement against Fort Henry sanctioned by Halleck—Attack by the fleet—Disposition of Grant's forces—Fall of Fort Henry—Grant proposes capture of Fort Donelson—Halleck directs strengthening of Fort Henry—March to the Cumberland—Position and strength of Fort Donelson—The siege—Unsuccessful attack by the fleet—Assault by the rebels on the 15th of February—Counter-assault of national forces—Scene at Floyd's headquarters on the night of the 15th—Escape of Floyd and Pillow—Buckner proposes surrender—The capitulation—Buckner's headquarters—Halleck's dispatches after the victory—Results of the capture of Fort Donelson.

SHORTLY after the battle of Belmont, the rebels established a strong and well-selected line, reaching from the Mississippi to the Big Barren river, in middle Kentucky. On their extreme left was Columbus, where they soon collected one hundred and forty guns,* and a force sufficient to cover Memphis, and hold the great Western river; on the right was Bowling Green, at the junction of the Louisville and Nashville, and the Memphis and Ohio railroads, and the northernmost point then held by the rebels west of the Alleghany mountains; at this place, one of their largest and best-appointed armies was concentrated,

* See Polk's report of evacuation of Columbus.

threatening northern Kentucky and protecting Nashville and middle Tennessee. At the centre of this important strategic line, the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers formed the natural avenues into all the disputed territory north of the cotton states. About fifty miles from the Ohio, and near the boundary between Kentucky and Tennessee, these two great streams approach within twelve miles of each other, and here, at a bend in each river, the rebels had erected their strongholds. Fort Henry, on the Tennessee, and Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland, completely commanded the navigation, and stood like great barred gateways against any advance of the national armies. Their sites had been selected with care; they had been elaborately fortified, and large garrisons were stationed to defend them. They covered the great railroad line of communication from east to west, through the border states, and their possession determined the fate of Kentucky and Tennessee; for Nashville and Memphis were not fortified, and Bowling Green and Columbus would both be turned, whenever the national arms subdued these forts.

The battle of Belmont was fought on the 7th of November, and on the 9th, Major-General Henry W. Halleck, superseding Fremont, took command of the new Department of the Missouri, including Arkansas and the portion of Kentucky west of the Cumberland. The Department of the Ohio, consisting of that part of Kentucky east of the Cumberland, and the state of Tennessee, as well as certain portions of the loyal states, was assigned to Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell, with headquarters at Louisville.

In all the operations at the West, during the first

two years of the war, the naval forces bore a conspicuous part. A new species of gunboat was improvised for inland navigation, out of the river steamers in use before the rebellion, and whose occupation had of course been interrupted by the breaking out of hostilities. Many of these steamers were sheathed with iron, and rendered in a great degree impervious to the heaviest rebel artillery. Other vessels, built especially for this service, were speedily added to the Western fleet, all of them of the lightest possible draught, as the rise and fall in all the Western rivers frequently leaves only a few feet of water in the channels. Thus strangely constructed, and armored as completely as a knight of the middle ages, manned in general by inland crews, who skilfully piloted them through the shallow but familiar streams, and commanded by officers of the national navy, these irregular flotillas were of great importance. They conveyed transports carrying troops and stores; they drove out guerillas from the river banks, and made the landing of forces practicable; they covered many important movements of troops on shore, which otherwise would have been impossible; they steamed up rivers and penetrated regions that fancied themselves secure against invasion; they shared direct assaults on fortified places, and sometimes secured a victory that could not have been won without their aid. The novelty of their appearance added to the terror they inspired, and these iron-clad monsters, rushing rapidly along the interior, and sweeping the level shores for miles with their heavy guns, were for a long while more dreaded by the rebels, even than their achievements warranted. In order to secure a more effectual coöperation with the army, this gun-

boat force at the West, was placed under General Halleck's orders.

Halleck confirmed Grant in the command to which Fremont had assigned him, but changed its designation to the District of Cairo, and placed Paducah also within his jurisdiction. He kept Grant organizing and disciplining his troops for nearly two months, allowing no forward movement in all that time. But in the early part of January, 1862, in pursuance of orders from McClellan, then general-in-chief, Halleck sent directions to Grant, and the latter at once moved a force of six thousand men under McClernand, from Cairo and Bird's Point, towards Mayfield and Murray, in west Kentucky; he also sent C. F. Smith, with two brigades from Paducah, in the same direction, threatening Columbus and the rebel line between that place and Bowling Green. These movements were made in favor of certain operations of Buell in the Department of the Cumberland. "The object," said Halleck, "is to prevent reinforcements being sent to Buckner," who was then in command at or near Bowling Green.* Halleck ordered the movement on the 6th, but, on the 10th, he telegraphed directions for its delay; Grant, however, had already started, and the expedition was not recalled.

The troops were out for more than a week, and suffered greatly from cold and the effects of a violent storm of rain and snow. There was no fighting, but the object of the demonstration was accomplished, for

* See Appendix for McClellan and Halleck's instructions for this movement, in full. They demonstrate very clearly the object of the expedition, and that it had no connection whatever with any ulterior operations.

during its continuance, rebel reënforcements were detained at Columbus, Nashville was threatened, and Brigadier-General George H. Thomas, one of Buell's subordinates, fought and won the battle of Mill Spring, in east Kentucky.

Smith, on his return, reported that the capture of Fort Henry was feasible: "Two guns would make short work of the fort." Grant received this report on the 22d of January, and forwarded it at once to Halleck; the same day he obtained permission to visit St. Louis, the headquarters of the department. He had asked this leave as early as the 6th of the month, before the recent demonstration had been ordered, and again on the 20th, before Smith's report was made. On the 23d, he started for St. Louis. The express object of his visit was to procure Halleck's permission to take Forts Henry and Donelson; but when he attempted to broach the subject, Halleck silenced him so quickly and sharply, that Grant said no more on the matter, and went back to Cairo, with the idea that his commander thought him guilty of proposing a great military blunder.*

* On the 6th of January, McClellan wrote to Buell: "Halleck, from his own accounts, will not soon be in condition to support properly a movement up the Cumberland;" and again on the 13th: "Halleck is not yet in condition to afford you the support you need, when you undertake the movement on Bowling Green."

January 6th, McClellan wrote to Buell: "My own general plans for the prosecution of the war, make the speedy occupation of east Tennessee and its lines of railway, matters of absolute necessity. Bowling Green and Nashville are in that connection of very secondary importance, at the present moment." Again, January 13th: "It seems absolutely necessary to make the advance on eastern Tennessee at once. I incline to this as a first step, for many reasons." It is evident from these extracts, that on the 13th of January, neither McClellan nor Halleck intended, or at any rate was ready for, the movement up the Tennessee. Doubtless the propriety of the campaign was apparent to all

On the 28th of January, however, the idea being still prominent in his mind, Grant telegraphed to St. Louis: "With permission, I will take and hold Fort Henry on the Tennessee, and establish and hold a large camp there;" and on the next day, he wrote: "In view of the large force now concentrating in this district, and the present feasibility of the plan, I would respectfully suggest the propriety of subduing Fort Henry, near the Kentucky and Tennessee line, and holding the position. If this is not done soon, there is but little doubt that the defences on both the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers will be materially strengthened. From Fort Henry, it will be easy to operate either on the Cumberland (only twelve miles distant), Memphis, or Columbus. It will, besides, have a moral effect upon our troops to advance thence towards the rebel states. The advantages of this move are as perceptible to the general commanding as to myself, therefore further statements are unnecessary."

Commodore Foote, commanding the naval force in this region, also wrote to Halleck on the 28th, recommending the movement,* and on the 30th of January, that officer gave the desired permission, and sent detailed instructions.† These arrived on the 1st of February, and on the 2d, Grant started from Cairo, soldiers, but nobody ever ordered or suggested it to Grant, except C. F. Smith, in his report.

*

CAIRO, January 28, 1862.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK, St. Louis, Mo. :

Commanding General Grant and myself are of opinion that Fort Henry, on the Tennessee river, can be carried with four iron-clad gun-boats and troops to permanently occupy. Have we your authority to move for that purpose when ready?

A. H. FOOTE, *Flag-Officer.*

† See Appendix for Halleck's instructions in full.

with seventeen thousand men on transports. Foote accompanied him with seven gunboats, and on the 4th, the debarkation began, at Bailey's ferry, on the east bank, three miles below Fort Henry.

McClelland commanded Grant's advance, and had selected a point for the landing, about eight miles below the fort; he even had his troops ashore at this place, but Grant made a reconnoissance in person on one of the gunboats, steaming up under the guns of the fort, in order to draw their fire. In this he succeeded, for a shot passed through the steamer; and having thus ascertained the range of the rebel batteries, he reëmbarked his troops, and brought them up to Bailey's ferry, just out of reach of fire.

The rebels had erected works on both sides of the river, and had a garrison in and around the two forts, of nearly twenty-eight hundred men,* under command of Brigadier-General Tilghman. The main fortification was on the eastern bank; it was a strong field-work, with bastioned front, defended by seventeen heavy guns, twelve of which bore on the river; † embrasures also had been formed, by placing sandbags on the parapets, between the guns; on the land front there was an intrenched camp, and still outside of this, an extended line of rifle-pits, located on commanding ground. The outworks covered the Dover road, by which alone communication could be had with Fort Donelson and the rest of the so-called Confederacy. The heights on the west side completely command Fort Henry, but the works on that bank

* Two thousand seven hundred and thirty-four.—*Tilghman's Report*.

† See report of Colonel Gilmer, rebel engineer. General Tilghman's report says eleven guns; but the engineer is of course the more reliable authority in a matter of this sort.

were unfinished. As soon as Grant's movements became known to the rebels, skilful and diligent preparations were made to resist him; new lines of infantry cover were established, and additions to the fortifications on both sides of the river, commenced. Tilghman at once ordered up reënforcements from Danville and the mouth of Sandy river, as well as reserves from Fort Donelson; these last being directed to remain at the Furnace, half way to Fort Henry, on the Dover road.

The country was at this time almost entirely under water, from the overflow of the Tennessee, the fort itself being completely surrounded; and the movements of both rebel and national troops were very much impeded. The rain, too, fell in torrents on the night of the 5th, and Grant having an insufficiency of transports, his steamers were obliged to return to Cairo, to bring up a part of his command. He did not, therefore, get his whole force ashore until eleven o'clock on the night of the 5th. The original plan was to invest Fort Heiman on the west bank simultaneously with Fort Henry, and not only prevent further reënforcements, but all chance of the escape of either garrison. The rebels, however, perceived the impossibility of holding both works against such a force as had been brought from Cairo, and on the 5th, before Grant had completed his landing, they evacuated Fort Heiman. Ignorant of this withdrawal, Grant, the same night, ordered two brigades, under General C. F. Smith, to seize the heights on the western bank in the morning. The remainder of the national forces, under McClelland, were to move at eleven on the 6th, to the rear of Fort Henry, to "take position on the roads to Fort Donelson and

Dover," where they could intercept either reënforcements or fugitives, and "to hold themselves in readiness to charge and take the work by storm, promptly on the receipt of orders." *

Dispatches from Halleck, and corroborating information received on the ground, that the rebels were rapidly reënforcing, made it imperatively necessary, in Grant's opinion, for the fort to be carried on the 6th; otherwise he would have delayed another day, to make the investment complete. His forces were not up from Cairo in sufficient numbers to set an earlier hour for the march: the orders were made at ten o'clock at night, when the whole command had not arrived, and McClelland was informed in writing, that "success might depend very greatly upon the celerity" of his operations.

Promptly at eleven o'clock, on the 6th, the march began; the gunboats moved at the same hour, and shortly before noon attacked the water-batteries, at a distance of six hundred yards. After a severe and rapid fire of an hour and a half, every gun was silenced by the naval force, no vessel receiving serious damage, except the *Essex*; she was struck in the boiler by a shot which disabled her, killing and wounding twenty-nine men by scalding. Her commanding officer, Porter, was among the wounded. Nineteen soldiers were also injured on the same ship, several of whom afterwards died.

The fort surrendered at discretion. Tilghman was captured, with his staff, and sixty men who had been retained to work the heavy guns in the fort. The rest of the garrison had been stationed at the outworks, about two miles off, to avoid the fire

* See Appendix for Grant's field order of the 5th.

of the gunboats; and before the fight began, Tilghman sent them orders to retreat upon Fort Donelson, which they obeyed.

Grant's advance arrived in the rear of the place about half an hour after the surrender, when the fort and the prisoners were turned over to the army, but the main rebel force had escaped. Pursuit was at once made by the cavalry towards the Cumberland, but the rebels had already got too far for this to avail, and the troops were recalled. Two guns were found, abandoned by the rebels in their retreat, and thirty-eight prisoners were taken, probably stragglers.

Neither Grant nor Foote had anticipated so rapid a reduction of the fort, but if they had foreseen the event, the movement of the national forces could not have been hastened. There were eight miles to march; roads had to be cut through the woods, on account of the overflow, and several streams to be bridged, the rains having rendered them too deep to ford. During the delay of an hour or two thus occasioned, the garrison had time to escape.* But even had the attack been deferred another day, in order first to complete the investment, the result would not have been changed; for Tilghman had no idea of holding the place longer than to enable his main force to get away.† He posted his troops on the outer

* "The plan of the attack, so far as the army reaching the rear of the fort, to make a demonstration simultaneous with the navy, was frustrated by the excessively muddy roads and the high stage of water, preventing the arrival of our troops until some time after I had taken possession of the fort."—*Foote's Report*.

† "My infantry, artillery, and cavalry removed of necessity, to avoid the fire of the gunboats, to the outworks, could not meet the enemy there. My only chance was to delay the enemy every moment possible, and retire the command, now outside the main work, towards Fort Donelson, resolving to suffer as little loss as possible. I retained

line, where they could start for the Cumberland at a moment's notice, and they did start, before the fate of the place was determined. After this, he fought only for time. The defence, though short, was gallant and soldierly. Tilghman staid with his guns to the last, and even worked one himself, when the endurance of his men began to fail. His casualties were five killed and sixteen wounded. Foote lost two men killed and thirty-seven wounded, besides the nineteen soldiers already mentioned. The Cincinnati was struck thirty-one times, and the Essex fifteen; the other two armored boats received, one six, the other seven shots.*

Grant at once telegraphed to Halleck: "Fort Henry is ours. The gunboats silenced the batteries before the investment was completed. * * * *

only the heavy artillery company to fight the guns, and gave the order to commence the movement at once. * * *

"The enemy, ignorant of any movement of my main body, but knowing that they could not engage them behind an intrenched camp, until after the fort was reduced and the gunboats retired, without being themselves exposed to the fire of the latter, took a position north of the forks of the Dover road, in a dense wood (my order being to retreat by way of Stewart road), to await the result. At 11 A. M. the flotilla assumed their line of battle. I had no hope of being able, successfully, to defend the fort against such overwhelming odds, both in point of numbers and in calibre of guns. My object was to save the main body by delaying matters as long as possible, and to this end I bent every effort. * * *

"I ordered Colonel Heiman to join his command, and keep up the retreat in good order, whilst I would fight the guns as long as one was left, and sacrifice myself to save the main body of my troops."—*Tilghman's Report*.

The report of Colonel Heiman, who commanded the rebel troops that escaped, is to the same effect.

* I have availed myself very fully in this chapter, of the rebel reports of the battles of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson. Whatever statement I make of the rebel strength or movements is taken from these sources, unless otherwise stated.

I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th, and return to Fort Henry." This was the first mention of Fort Donelson, whether in conversation or dispatches, between the two commanders. Halleck made no reply, but notified Buell on the 7th, "General Grant expects to take Fort Donelson, at Dover, to-morrow." *

On the 7th, Grant's cavalry penetrated to within a mile of Fort Donelson, and all the rebel pickets were driven in, but no definite information was obtained of the numbers of the enemy. It was ascertained, however, that the force from Fort Henry had joined the garrison on the Cumberland, and Grant informed Halleck: "If any reënforcements were on the way for this place, no doubt they have gone or will go there also." On the same day, in pursuance of his intention to take Fort Donelson on the 8th, all the infantry and cavalry on the east bank of the Tennessee were notified to be prepared to move at an early hour on the 8th, with two days' rations in their haversacks, and "without encumbrances." "Owing to the impassable state of the roads," said Grant, "it is entirely impracticable to move the baggage or artillery."

But the heavy rains, and an unusually high stage of water in the Tennessee, so flooded the country, that he was prevented from acting offensively for several days. "At present," he wrote, "we are perfectly locked in." "The banks are higher at the water's edge than further back, leaving a wide margin of low land to bridge over, before any thing can be done

* Halleck congratulated Foote in these words: "I have this moment received the official report of your capture of Fort Henry, and hasten to congratulate you and your command for your brilliant success."

inland." On the 8th, he wrote: "I contemplated taking Fort Donelson to-day with infantry and cavalry alone; but all my troops may be kept busily engaged in saving what we now have from the rapidly rising water." During this delay, every exertion was made to secure reënforcements. These were brought from Buell's command, and from that of Major-General Hunter, in Kansas. Halleck also sent Brigadier-General Cullum, his chief of staff, to Cairo, to superintend the transportation of troops to the front, and to do whatever should be necessary to facilitate Grant's movements.

General Halleck, however, indicated to Grant no wish that the latter should advance. His orders were solely of a defensive character. On the 8th, he telegraphed: "If possible, destroy the bridges at Clarksville. Shovels and picks will be sent you to strengthen Fort Henry. The guns should be transferred and arranged so as to resist an attack by land. The redan on south bank should be arranged for same object. Some of the gunboats from Fort Holt will be sent up. Reënforcements will reach you daily. Hold on to Fort Henry at all hazards. Impress slaves, if necessary, to strengthen your position as rapidly as possible. It is of vital importance to strengthen your position as rapidly as possible." On the 10th, he continued in the same strain: "If possible, destroy the bridges at Clarksville. Run any risk to accomplish this. Strengthen land side of Fort Henry, and transfer guns to resist a land attack. Picks and shovels are sent. Large reënforcements will soon join you."

Grant, however, did not wait for the reënforcements, and on the 10th, while Halleck was writing

about picks and shovels, he informed Foote that he was only delaying for the return of the gunboats, which, after the fall of Fort Henry, had gone up the Tennessee as far as Florence, Alabama. "I have been waiting very patiently for the return of the gunboats under Commodore Phelps to go around on the Cumberland, whilst I marched my land forces across, to make a simultaneous attack upon Fort Donelson. I feel that there should be no delay in this matter, and yet I do not feel justified in going, without some of your gunboats to coöperate. Can you not send two boats from Cairo immediately up the Cumberland?" To expedite matters, he offered Foote any steamers that might be at Cairo, to tow the fleet; and, "should you be deficient in men, an artillery company can be temporarily detached to serve on the gunboats." "Start as soon as you like," he said; "I will be ready to coöperate at any moment." News had now come in that the rebels were reënforcing Fort Donelson, in anticipation of an attack, and this promptness which Grant urged, was a matter of vital importance. If he delayed in order to strengthen Fort Henry "on the land side," and to "arrange the redan," Fort Donelson might never be taken. On the 11th, Foote, with his fleet, started by the Ohio and Cumberland rivers. Six regiments of troops (all the reënforcements which had yet arrived) were sent by the same route without being debarked. They were to follow the gunboats up the Cumberland, to effect a landing below Fort Donelson, and as near the fort as practicable, to establish a base for supplies in the new campaign, and to be in readiness to coöperate with the force that should go across by land.

On the 11th, troops under McClelland moved out

three or four miles on the two roads leading to Fort Donelson, and early on the morning of the 12th, the main column, fifteen thousand strong, marched from Fort Henry, leaving a garrison of twenty-five hundred men; eight light batteries accompanied the expedition. Neither tents nor baggage was taken; there were but few wagons, and no rations save those in haversacks, all supplies having been ordered direct from Cairo to the Cumberland. Brigade and regimental commanders, however, were instructed to see that all their men were supplied with forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes. The foremost brigade was ordered to move by the telegraph road, directly upon Fort Donelson, halting for further orders at a distance of two miles from the fort. The other brigades were to move by the Dover road, halting at the same distance, and form a continuous line with the other wing. In order to cut off all retreat by the Cumberland, one brigade was ordered to be thrown into Dover, about two miles south of Donelson. The strength of the enemy was so variously reported, that it was impossible to give exact details for the attack, but Grant promised: "The necessary orders will be given on the field."* The distance between the two forts was only twelve miles, and soon after mid-day, Grant's little army appeared in front of the rebel lines. No obstacle was opposed to the march, although nothing would have been easier than to prepare obstructions.

Donelson was one of the strongest works then established in the entire theatre of war; it was situated on the west bank of the Cumberland, north of the town of Dover, on a peculiarly rugged and in-

* See Appendix for Grant's field order in full.

accessible series of hills, some of them rising abruptly over a hundred feet; every advantage had been taken of the character of the ground; the country was densely wooded, but the timber had been felled far out in advance of the breastworks, the smaller trees chopped till they stood about breast-high, and the limbs left attached to the stumps, forming an unusually difficult abatis. Two streams set back from the Cumberland, whose waters were now high, and these streams formed the right and left defences of the rebel line, which extended nearly three miles, and was strongly intrenched. At intervals inside, were secondary lines and detached works, commanding the outer intrenchments, which were more than two miles from the river, and covered the town of Dover. The slashing was continued between the rifle-pits and the main fortification; streamlets, gullies, and ravines added to the strength of the place, and light batteries were posted on commanding heights, as well as along the advanced line.

The main fort itself was built on a precipitous height, or rather range, cloven by a deep gorge opening to the south; it was about three-quarters of a mile from the breastworks, and overlooked both the river and the interior. It covered a hundred acres of ground, and was defended by fifteen heavy guns and two carronades. Water batteries, admirably located to control the river navigation, were sunken on the hillsides towards the Cumberland, and the entire amount of rebel artillery, including the light batteries, was sixty-five pieces. The garrison numbered, as nearly as can be ascertained, twenty-one thousand men* a great part of whom had been recently thrown

* See note to page 51 for my authority for this estimate.

into the works, from Bowling Green and Cumberland City; for the rebels appreciated the importance of the position as fully as the national commander, and strained every nerve to retain it.* As soon as Fort Henry fell, they began to enlarge and strengthen the fortifications at Donelson, working day and night to be ready for the attack which they foresaw was at hand; reënforcements were poured in, and Buckner, Pillow, and Floyd were successively sent to command, each ranking his predecessor, who remained to serve under the new superior.

About noon of the 12th, the rebel pickets were met by Grant's advance, and rapidly driven in; and the fortifications were from this time gradually approached and surrounded, with occasional skirmishing. The first line was formed in open fields opposite the enemy's centre. Grant threw up no intrenchments, for at this period of the war the science of earthworks had not been brought to such a degree of perfection as was afterwards attained. "As yet," he said, "I have had no batteries thrown up, hoping with the aid of the gunboats to obviate the necessity." His left that night rested at a point on Hickman creek, and the line ran around well towards Dover on the right; on account of the overflow, it did not, however, quite extend to the river on either side, but Donelson was practically invested. The advance to the right had to be made with extreme caution, for the ground was very much broken, without roads, and covered with an almost impenetrable growth of small oak. On the left, however, Grant

* Pollard, a rebel historian, says, the rebel generals held a conference, and decided to fight for Nashville, at Donelson, and accordingly sent thither every thing they could spare from Bowling Green.

was able to communicate by the creek, with his transports and gunboats, while the enemy was completely cut off from escape in that direction. When the siege began, General C. F. Smith had the left, and McClelland the right, of the national line. Grant's headquarters were in the rear of Smith's division, on the Fort Henry road. There were but three professional soldiers in the entire command—Grant himself, Smith, and Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, of Grant's staff.*

The 13th was occupied in selecting and still further reconnoitring the ground, and getting into position; owing to the non-arrival of the gunboats and of the reinforcements sent by water, no attack was made, but the investment was extended on both flanks of the enemy, and drawn closer to his works. Skirmishers were thrown out actively in front, and several smart fights occurred, but with no result of importance. They were in no case intended for real assaults, but simply as attempts to discover the force and position of the enemy, and to establish the national line. An attempt was made by McClelland to capture a battery commanding the ridge road on which Grant moved, but this was without orders, and unsuccessful, though gallantly made; three regiments were engaged in the affair. On the first two days, Grant lost about three hundred men, in killed and wounded. The enemy, notwithstanding his great superiority in numbers, made no effort to molest Grant, allowing him to continue the investment at his leisure, a blunder almost equal to that of opposing no obstacle to the march from Fort Henry.

By the night of the 13th, Grant was established

* McPherson was at this time really on Halleck's staff, but detailed as chief engineer for Grant during this campaign.

on a line of heights, in general parallel with the enemy's outworks, and extending for a distance of over three miles. Various spaces and elevations afforded positions for artillery, and from these he annoyed the enemy, but they were not of such a commanding character as to enable him to achieve decided results.

At sunset on this day no reënforcements of importance had yet arrived, and the gunboats were not in sight. That night the weather became intensely cold, the thermometer falling to ten degrees above zero (Fahrenheit), and the troops, who were mostly raw, and not yet inured to the hardships of war, suffered extremely in consequence. They were obliged to bivouac in line of battle, and with arms in their hands, for they lay within point-blank musket-range of the enemy's breastworks. The rebel pickets were out in strong force, and no fires could be built; many of the men had thrown away their blankets on the march; they had insufficient rations, having been careless of what they brought in their haversacks, and the new supplies had not arrived. There were no tents, and towards morning a driving storm of snow and hail set in. Not a few of the soldiers on both sides were frozen. An incessant firing was kept up by the rebel pickets, and the groans of the wounded, who lay shivering between the two armies, and calling for help and water, were heard all night through the storm. The force of the enemy at this time was largely superior to Grant's, and that commander sent across to Fort Henry for the garrison which had been left there.

Before daylight of Friday, the 14th, however, Commodore Foote came up the river, and the troops

from Fort Henry were landed, their advance having arrived in the night. These, commanded by Brigadier-General Lewis Wallace, were at once put into line. Grant added to them the other reënforcements, now coming up the river, and gave them the centre, between Smith and McClernand; but one brigade (McArthur's) of Smith's division was moved to the extreme right of the line. This day Grant, who had received no word from Halleck, except orders to fortify Fort Henry, sent back a dispatch to his chief, dated: "In the field, near Fort Donelson. We will soon want ammunition for our ten and twenty-pound Parrott guns. Already require it for the twenty-four pound howitzers. I have directed my ordnance officer to keep a constant watch upon the supply of ammunition, and to take steps in time to avoid a deficiency." General Cullum replied from Cairo: "The ammunition you want is not here, and scarcely any ordnance." Cullum, however, wrote encouragingly, "You are on the great strategic line;" and prophesied speedy success. During the whole of the 14th, a rambling and irregular fire of sharpshooters was kept up, varied with occasional discharges of artillery; the rebel shells and round shot fell at times thickly within the national lines, but the casualties were few. This day, Grant ordered Colonel Webster, of his staff, to make a reconnoissance, with a view to sending a force above the town of Dover, to occupy the river bank.

At three o'clock on Friday, six gunboats, four of which were iron-clad, attacked the fort at a distance of four hundred yards. The elevation of the rebel batteries was at least thirty feet, and gave them a fine command of the river. Traverses secured them against an enfilading fire, and the task of attacking

them in front, was both dangerous and difficult. One vessel alone received fifty-nine shots, and the others about half that number each. The crash of heavy iron falling on the metal armor, produced an unusual and ringing sound, never heard in battle before. The wheel of one iron-clad and the tiller of another, were shot away, rendering the two boats unmanageable, and they drifted down the stream. The two other armored vessels were greatly damaged between wind and water; and, during the attack, a rifled gun burst aboard of one of them. The commodore was wounded, fifty-four men were killed or wounded; and, after an engagement of an hour and a half, Foote was obliged to withdraw, the enemy pouring a hot fire from all the water batteries, while the fleet could reply with only twelve guns. The gunboats were so disabled as to be unfit to take any part of importance in the succeeding operations. Had this attack been successful, Grant was to have assaulted on the land side; but as it failed, he remained in his lines. That day he wrote: "Appearances now are that we shall have a protracted siege here. * * * I fear the result of an attempt to carry the place by storm with new troops. I feel great confidence, however, of ultimately reducing the place."

Another night of intense cold, and a furious storm of sleet and snow came on, and the sufferings of the night before were renewed. At two A. M. of the 15th, Grant was sent for by the wounded commodore,* who could not get ashore; and before daylight

*

FLAG-SHIP ST. LOUIS, *February 14, 1862.**General GRANT, commanding United States Forces:*

DEAR GENERAL: Will you do me the favor to come on board at your earliest convenience, as I am disabled from walking by a contu-

he went aboard the flag-ship, where Foote declared that the condition of his fleet compelled him to put back at once to Cairo, for repairs. He urged Grant to remain as quiet as possible, until the gunboats could return and assist him, either by a new bombardment, or in a protracted siege. But Grant's reënforcements had by this time begun to come in heavily, and on the night of the 14th, his army amounted to twenty-two thousand men. The rebels had observed this increase of his strength, and felt that his lines were being drawn closer around them each hour; they determined not to wait for the completion of the investment.

Accordingly, at early dawn on the morning of Saturday, the 15th, massing heavily on their own left, they came out of their works and made a fierce assault on the right of the national line, where it did not quite extend to the river. Grant had been aboard the flag-ship but a short time, when McArthur's brigade, which held the extreme right, was attacked; all of McClernand's division, on McArthur's left, was also soon engaged. The men fought stubbornly, and maintained the unequal struggle for hours, but McArthur was finally obliged to give way with heavy loss, and McClernand's command showed signs of wavering. It held on, however, till Lewis Wallace came up to the support from the centre, and made the rebels pay dear for what they had gained. McClernand's men had not retreated until their ammunition gave out, and then passing through the ranks of the fresher troops, they halted within range

sion, and cannot possibly get to see you about the disposition of these vessels, all of which are more or less disabled.

A. S. FOOTE, *Flag-Officer.*

of the enemy's musketry, to refill their cartridge-boxes. They had been obliged, however, to leave a battery in the hands of the rebels. The assault was renewed upon Lewis Wallace with great vigor, and he too was compelled to fall back, though slowly and fighting hard; and after several hours of incessant combat, with both artillery and infantry, he was able to check the rebel advance, but not until the whole right wing had been pushed back upon his division, and very nearly turned.* The behavior of the troops in both McClelland and Lewis Wallace's command was all that could be desired. They only gave way when their cartridge-boxes were empty, and after long hours of fighting that extorted unwilling praise from their foes.†

Grant was returning to his headquarters from the flag-ship, at about nine o'clock, when he met an aide galloping up to inform him of the assault. This was the first information he had of the battle: he next met C. F. Smith, who had not yet been engaged, and learning from him the position of affairs on the right, at once directed him to hold himself in readiness to assault the rebel right with his whole command. Riding on, he soon reached the point where the hardest fighting had occurred. The rebels had failed to make their way through the national lines, and were doggedly retiring. Still, the national troops were very much disordered; most of them had never been in battle before, and not a few were yet unfamiliar

* All the rebel reports explain the intention in the assault to have been to destroy Grant's right wing, rolling it back on his left, and to open a way for themselves to Nashville. Pillow says: "We had fought the battle to open the way for our army, and to relieve us from his investment."

† See rebel reports, *passim*.

with the use of their muskets. The giving out of the ammunition in the cartridge-boxes, and the unusually heavy loss in field officers, had created great confusion in the ranks. There was no pursuit, and the battle was merely lulled, not ended. The men, like all raw troops, imagined the enemy to be in overwhelming force, and reported that the rebels had come out with knapsacks and haversacks, as if they meant to stay out, and fight for several days. Grant at once inquired: "Are the haversacks filled?" Some prisoners were examined, and the haversacks found to contain three days' rations. "Then they mean to cut their way out; they have no idea of staying here to fight us;" and looking at his own disordered men, not yet recovered from the shock of battle, Grant exclaimed: "Whichever party first attacks now, will whip, and the rebels will have to be very quick, if they beat me."

Putting spurs to his horse, he rode at once to the left, where the troops, not having been engaged, were still fresh, and ordered an immediate assault. As they rode, the general and his staff reassured the men with the news that the rebels were getting desperate, and that the attack of the morning was an attempt to cut their way out, not an ordinary and confident assault. As soon as the troops caught this idea, they took new courage. Scattered, until now, in knots all over the field, they at once re-formed, and went towards the front. At this time, Grant sent a request to Foote, to have all the gunboats make their appearance to the enemy. "A terrible conflict," he said, "ensued in my absence, which has demoralized a portion of my command, and I think the enemy is much more so. If the gunboats do not appear, it

will reassure the enemy, and still further demoralize our troops. I must order a charge to save appearances. I do not expect the gunboats to go into action." Two of the fleet, accordingly, ran up the river, and threw a few shells at long range. McClermand and Lewis Wallace were informed of Smith's orders to assault, and directed to hold themselves in readiness to renew the battle in their front, the moment Smith began his attack. To McClermand, the order was, "to push his column to the river if possible, otherwise to remain in statu quo, maintaining his present position."

Smith's assaulting column was formed of Lauman's brigade, the Second Iowa infantry having the lead. Smith formed the regiment in two lines, with a front of five companies each, thirty paces apart. He told the men what they had to do, and took his position between these two lines. The attack was made with great vigor and success. The ground was broken and difficult, impeded with underbrush, as well as extremely exposed; but Smith, at the head of his troops, charged directly on the rebel works. The enemy, having massed on his own left, earlier in the day, for the morning's assault, could not get reënforcements around, in time to repel the national column, which carried the rebel lines at the point of the bayonet, and forced its way under a galling fire and up a steep hill, inside the intrenchments, thus securing the key to Fort Donelson. McClermand and Lewis Wallace, on the right and centre, supported Smith by attacks on their immediate front. The troops of these two officers, although so hotly engaged earlier in the day, were still able to act vigorously in the afternoon. They found the enemy in position near his works, and, after

a short and spirited contest, drove him into them, obtaining possession of the ground and the guns that had been wrung from themselves in the morning. They thus did important service, detaining a large rebel force in their own front, and subtracting from the enemy's strength at the key-point of the fight. Night came on before the battle was decided, but Smith maintained his position inside the rebel works, and a half an hour more of daylight would have sufficed to carry the fort.* Grant perceived this, and declared that the rebels were fighting only for darkness.†

Grant slept in a negro hut that night, and Smith, with his troops, on the frozen ground they had won; while inside the fort occurred one of the most remarkable scenes of the war. Floyd summoned his highest officers, to consult them about the propriety of a surrender. The opinion was greatly in favor of such a course; Buckner, whose troops were opposite Smith's, and certain to be attacked at dawn, asserting that he could not hold out half an hour after the fight began. Floyd then announced his determination to desert the troops who had fought under him so well; he declared, however, that he had doubts of the military propriety of this conduct, and asked the advice of his inferiors, most of whom intimated very plainly their disapprobation of his recreancy. Buckner told him every man must judge for himself in such matters; but Pillow

* See Buckner's report.

† "Having carried the advanced works on the enemy's right, and effected a lodgment in his intrenchments, we had secured a key to his position; we had obtained a front having about as great an elevation as any portion of his works, and where we could plant our artillery to silence his, and enfilade a portion of his defences, at the same time making use of his rifle-pits to cover our men."—*McPherson's Report*.

declared that he would follow Floyd's example, as "there were no two men in the Confederacy the Yankees would rather capture than themselves." Accordingly, Floyd turned over the command to Pillow, and he in his turn transferred it to Buckner. The last-named general was a soldier, by education and feeling, and did not consider it consonant with his military honor to avoid the fate reserved for his troops; but Floyd and Pillow confessed in so many words, that "personal reasons controlled them."

Buckner at once sent a bugler and note to Grant, asking terms. In the interim before receiving a reply, he allowed Floyd to escape across the river, with as many troops as could get aboard of two steamers lying at the wharf. The men crowded to the shore in the cold and darkness, and in great confusion, filling the steamers to their utmost capacity, those who remained cursing and hissing the officers who were leaving them to their fate. In all about three thousand were ferried off on the transports; finally, at daybreak, one of Buckner's staff announced that the capitulation had been concluded, and no more departures could be allowed, and Floyd pushed off.* Pillow escaped on a hand-flat, and Colonel Forrest, commanding the cavalry, took his own men and about two hundred more, and with these waded the stream on the south side of the fort; the water was too deep

* "Such was the want of all order and discipline by this time on shore, that a wild rush was made at the boat, which the captain said would swamp her unless he pushed off immediately. This was done, and about sunrise the boat on which I was, the other having gone, left the shore, and steered up the river. By this precise mode I effected my escape, and after leaving the wharf, the Department will be pleased to hear, that I encountered no dangers whatever from the enemy."—*Floyd's Supplementary Report.*

for infantry, and intensely cold; many of the fugitives were frozen in crossing, but most of them found their way to Nashville.* †

Grant was preparing to storm the intrenchments, when Buckner's messenger arrived, and the white flag was hoisted on Fort Donelson. The rebel commander proposed an armistice till twelve o'clock, and the appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, "in consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station;" but Grant replied: "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works." Whereupon Buckner made haste to answer: "The disposition of forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unchivalrous terms which you propose." ‡

Grant mounted his horse, and rode direct to Buckner's headquarters. He told that general that

* The rebel official reports set forth these proceedings very fully, and the opinion entertained by the junior officers, of Floyd and Pillow's behavior is clearly expressed. After their flight, these individuals were called upon by their superiors for explanations, which were pronounced unsatisfactory; a decision in which history will concur. See Appendix for a message of Mr. Jefferson Davis to the rebel Congress, on this subject.

† "It is unbecoming in soldiers to criticise the conduct of superiors, but, when, after rejecting the counsels of *juniors*, the condition of affairs is placed beyond the power of human nature to retrieve, the *senior* endeavors to escape responsibility by throwing the same upon the *former*, comment is unnecessary."—*Report of Major Brown, Twentieth Mississippi.* (The italics are his own.)

‡ See Appendix for Grant and Buckner's correspondence in full.

he had no desire to humiliate his prisoners, but would allow the officers to retain their side-arms. Horses and all public property must be given up, but the officers and men might keep their personal baggage. Grant and Buckner had been schoolmates at the West Point Academy, and comrades afterwards, and they breakfasted together at Buckner's quarters. The latter acknowledged that it had been the intention of the rebel commanders to cut their way out, the day before, but that Grant's operations had foiled them. In the course of the conversation, he alluded to Grant's inferior force at the beginning of the siege, and remarked: "If I had been in command, you wouldn't have reached Fort Donelson so easily:" to which Grant replied: "If you had been in command, I should have waited for reënforcements, and marched from Fort Henry in greater strength; but I knew that Pillow would not come out of his works to fight, and told my staff so, though I believed he would fight behind his works." *

Sixty-five guns, seventeen thousand six hundred small-arms, and nearly fifteen thousand troops, fell into the hands of the victor. On the morning of the 16th, as Grant was writing his report, aboard one of the transports, Buckner entered his cabin, and the former inquired how many troops had been surrendered. Buckner declared he could not exactly tell, for his men had been deserting the fort all night, after it became known that a surrender would occur, and no restraint had been placed on any who chose to leave, until the capitulation had actually been proposed. "You will not find," he said, "fewer than

* Pillow was in command of Fort Donelson until the 13th, the day after the siege began.

twelve thousand men, nor I think more than fifteen thousand."

A few days afterwards, as the rebel prisoners were leaving for the North, on transports, it was announced that General Buckner's steamer was ready. His own brigade of troops was aboard, and he invited Grant to go with him and look at his soldiers, of whom he was proud. Grant went with him, and the rebel prisoners crowded around their captor, curiously but respectfully. Buckner spoke to them, and told them that General Grant had behaved with kindness and magnanimity, and bade them remember this, if ever the fortune of war allowed them to show him, or any of his soldiers, the same treatment which they now received.

On the last day of the fight, Grant had twenty-seven thousand men, whom he could have put into battle; some few regiments of these were not engaged. Other reinforcements arrived on the 16th, after the surrender, swelling his number still further. Of artillery, he had but the eight light batteries which started with him from Fort Henry, not near so many guns as he captured. His entire losses during the siege were two thousand and forty-one, in killed, wounded, and missing; of these, four hundred and twenty-five were killed. No exact account of the rebel loss, other than in captures, can be given; but rations were issued at Cairo, to fourteen thousand six hundred and twenty-three prisoners, captured at Fort Donelson; and Grant estimated that at least twenty-five hundred rebels were killed or wounded during the siege.*

* There were rations issued at Cairo, to fourteen thousand six hundred and twenty-three prisoners, captured at Fort Donelson. Buckner, in his report, estimates that three thousand rebels got away with

On the 16th, the day of the surrender, General Halleck's chief of staff cautioned Grant "not to be too rash," and Halleck's first dispatch after the fall of Fort Donelson was in these words: "Don't let gun-boats go higher up than Clarksville. Even then, they must limit their operations to the destruction of the bridge and railroad, and return immediately to Cairo, leaving one at Fort Donelson. Mortar-boats to be sent back to Cairo as soon as possible." Halleck's whole share in the design or execution of this campaign, was confined to forwarding reënforcements, a duty which he performed with vigor and alacrity.*

The rebels, in official reports, again and again declared, that it was the assault on their right, ordered at the crisis of the battle, when both sides were so nearly exhausted, which turned the scale, and prevented them from cutting their way through the

Floyd; and Pillow also says that several thousand infantry escaped during the night of the 15th. According to Forrest's account, two hundred got away with him besides his own cavalry, making at the least one thousand with Forrest. Pillow reckons the rebel losses during the siege at two thousand, which is doubtless an under estimate, as the successful party lost two thousand one hundred and forty, and the heavy fighting was all done outside of the works, where the rebels could have had no advantage of cover. The calculation is therefore simple:

Captured,	14,623	
Escaped with Floyd,	3,000	
Escaped with Forrest,	1,000	(A low estimate.)
Killed and wounded,	2,500	(At least.)
<hr/>		
Total rebel force at beginning of siege,	21,123	

* It has been alleged that General Halleck planned the Donelson campaign, and is entitled to the credit of its conception; but it is only just to say that I never heard that General Halleck himself put forth any such claim.

national lines.* General Cullum, Halleck's chief of staff, wrote to Grant on the 20th: "I received with the highest gratification your reports and letters from Fort Donelson, so gallantly captured under your brilliant leadership. I, in common with the whole country, warmly congratulate you upon this remarkable achievement." Halleck, however, who was at St. Louis throughout the siege, and received all his reports of the campaign and capture, through General Cullum, or direct from Grant, wrote no congratulations to the victor.† On the contrary, on the 19th of February, three days after the fall of Fort Donelson, he telegraphed to Washington: "Smith, by his coolness and bravery at Fort Donelson, when the battle was against us, turned the tide and carried the enemy's outworks. Make him a major-general. You can't get a better one. Honor him for this victory, and the whole country will applaud." ‡

On the morning of the surrender, when General Buckner congratulated Smith on the gallant charge which had carried the works the night before, the old hero replied: "Yes, it was well done, considering

* Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, as well as their subordinates, agree in this.

† He sent, however, the following dispatch to General Hunter, at Fort Leavenworth: "To you, more than any other man out of this department, are we indebted for our success at Fort Donelson. In my strait for troops to reënforce General Grant, I applied to you. You responded nobly, placing your forces at my disposition. This enabled us to win the victory. Receive my most heart-felt thanks."

‡ On the 20th of February, the day after this dispatch was sent, Halleck telegraphed to McClellan: "I must have command of the armies in the West. Hesitation and delay are losing us the golden opportunity. Lay this before the President and Secretary of War. May I resume (assume?) the command? Answer quick."

Compare these remarks about "hesitation and delay" with Halleck's dispatch to Grant, of two days before, "limiting operations." p 53

the smallness of the force that did it. No congratulations are due me. I simply obeyed orders." *

Neither did the government agree with Halleck, that Smith should receive the honors of this victory. The Secretary of War at once recommended Grant for a major-generalcy of volunteers, and the President nominated him the same day. The Senate was in session, and confirmed the nomination instantly, and "the whole country applauded." † This was on the 19th of February, the day that Halleck recommended C. F. Smith for the same grade. Mr. Stanton, who had recently assumed the portfolio of the Secretary of War, wrote a letter for print which was published on the 20th of February, and in which the following passage occurs: "We may well rejoice at the recent victories, for they teach us that battles are to be won now, and by us, in the same and only manner that they were ever won by any people, or in any age, since the days of Joshua—by boldly pursuing and striking the foe. What, under the blessing of Providence, I conceive to be the true organization of victory and military combination to end this war, was declared in a few words, by General Grant's message to General Buckner: 'I propose to move immediately on your works.'" This was the beginning of a support bestowed by the Secretary of War on the Western general, which was never intermitted, while the need of that support remained.

The consequences of the capture of Fort Donelson

* See speech of Brevet Major-General Rawlins, chief of staff to General Grant, before the Society of the Army of the Tennessee, November 15th, 1866. This speech has afforded me much assistance. Its record of dates is especially invaluable.

† Grant immediately recommended Smith for a major-generalcy, for his behavior during the campaign.

were greatly superior to any good fortune which had at that time befallen the national arms, and were hardly surpassed, in a purely military point of view, by the result of any operations of the war. The great rebel line being penetrated at the centre, its extremities were both turned, while the region behind was uncovered. The whole of Kentucky and Tennessee at once fell into the possession of the national forces; the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers were opened to national vessels for hundreds of miles; Nashville, the capital of Tennessee, and a place of immense strategic importance, fell; Bowling Green had become untenable as soon as Donelson was attacked, and was abandoned on the 14th, the day before the rebel works on the Cumberland were carried; while Columbus, at the other end of the line, was evacuated early in March, thus leaving the Mississippi free from the rebel flag, from St. Louis to Arkansas.

The country was unacquainted at this time with the principles of military science; and as city after city fell, and stronghold after stronghold was abandoned, all legitimate consequences of the capture of Fort Donelson, the national amazement and gratification knew no bounds. The effect on the spirits of the soldiers and of the people, was indeed quite equal to the purely military results. This was the first success of any importance since the beginning of the war. An inferior force had marched boldly up to a strongly fortified post, and for three days besieged an army larger than itself; then, after being reënforced, it had not only defeated the enemy in the open field, converting what had nearly been disaster into brilliant victory, but compelled the unconditional surrender

of one of the largest garrisons ever captured in war. These were considerations which naturally enough elated and cheered the country, and absolutely inspired the army, depressed before by long delays and defeats on many fields. The gratitude felt towards Grant was commensurate with the success. He stepped at once into a national fame.

CHAPTER III.

Grant and Sherman—Beginning of their friendship—Grant goes to Nashville—Is relieved from command by Halleck—Smith placed in charge of expedition up the Tennessee—Grant supplies Smith from Fort Henry—Grant reinstated in command—Removes his headquarters to Savanna—Buell ordered to reënforce him—Buell's delay—Skirmishing at Pittsburg Landing—The Battle of Shiloh—Furious attack of the rebels—The national forces prepared—Grant arrives on the field—Sherman's line breaks—Sherman's skill and personal gallantry—Terrible fighting all over the field—The national troops everywhere forced back—Grant's anxiety for Nelson and Lewis Wallace's support—Those commanders repeatedly ordered up, but do not arrive—Capture of Prentiss—Buell's arrival in person—His conversation with Grant—The last attack of the rebels repulsed—Grant at Sherman's front—The situation at close of Sunday—Arrival of Buell's army in the night—Also of Lewis Wallace—Attack by Grant on Monday—The rebels everywhere repulsed—Grant leads a regiment—Rebels ask permission to bury their dead—Results of the battle of Shiloh—Reflections.

On the 15th of February, Grant was assigned to the new military district of West Tennessee, with "limits not defined,"* and Brigadier-General William T. Sherman to the command of the District of Cairo. Sherman had been at West Point with Grant, but graduated three years earlier, and they had not since

* HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, }
FORT DONELSON, February 17, 1862. }

General Orders, No. 1.

By virtue of directions from headquarters, Department of the Missouri, dated February 15, 1862, the undersigned has been assigned to the command of the new military district of West Tennessee. Limits not defined.

(Signed)

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General Commanding.*

been intimate; their first official intercourse occurred during the siege of Fort Donelson, when Sherman forwarded troops and supplies to Grant with extraordinary dispatch. Sherman was the senior, but, on the 13th of February, he wrote: "I will do every thing in my power to hurry forward your reënforcements and supplies; and if I could be of service myself, would gladly come, without making any question of rank with you or General Smith." After the fall of Fort Donelson, Sherman congratulated Grant warmly on his success, and Grant replied: "I feel under many obligations to you for the kind terms of your letter, and hope that should an opportunity occur, you will earn for yourself that promotion which you are kind enough to say belongs to me. I care nothing for promotion so long as our arms are successful, and no political appointments are made."

This was the beginning of a friendship destined thereafter never to flag, to stand the test of apparent rivalry and public censure, to remain firm under trials such as few friendships were ever subjected to, to become warmer as often as it was sought to be interrupted, and in hours of extraordinary anxiety and responsibility and care, to afford a solace and a support that were never lacking when the need arose.

On the 21st of February, General C. F. Smith, by Grant's direction, took possession of Clarksville, about fifty miles above Fort Donelson, and Grant wrote to Cullum announcing the fact, and proposing the capture of Nashville, but said, "I am ready for any move the general commanding may suggest." On the 24th, he reported that Smith was at Clarksville, with four small regiments, and added: "I do not purpose sending more, until I know the pleasure of General Halleck

on the subject." On the 25th, he said: "I wrote you that General Nelson's division (of Buell's army), had been sent to Nashville; since then, I have learned that the head of General Buell's column had arrived, on Monday evening. The rebels have fallen back to Chattanooga, instead of to Murfreesboro, as stated in a former letter. I shall go to Nashville immediately after the arrival of the next mail, should there be no orders to prevent it. I am getting anxious to know what the next move is going to be." He went to Nashville, accordingly, on the 27th. His object was to consult with Buell about the disposition of their troops, the jurisdiction of the two commands having become somewhat confused during the recent movements. On the 28th, he wrote: "I have just returned from Nashville this morning. My impression is, from all I can learn, the enemy have fallen back to Decatur or Chattanooga. I have informed General Cullum that General Buell ordered General Smith from Clarksville, to join him at Nashville." On the 1st of March: "I have informed the general commanding the department, generally through his chief of staff, every day since leaving Cairo, of my wants, what information was obtained of the enemy," etc. The same dispatch contained a detailed declaration of the needs of the command, for the information of General Halleck. Up to this time, no hint of dissatisfaction had been received by Grant.

The same day Halleck, with his usual caution, wrote: "It will be better to retreat than to risk a general battle. Avoid any general engagement with strong forces." He then gave detailed instructions to move the whole command from the Cumberland back to the Tennessee, with a view to an expedition

up the latter river to Eastport, and even to Corinth, Mississippi.* Grant received these instructions on the 2d, and on the 4th, the army was in motion for the Tennessee, and he himself was again at Fort Henry. On the 3d of March, without a syllable of previous explanation or intimation to Grant, Halleck sent the following dispatch to the general-in-chief, at Washington. "I have had no communication with General Grant for more than a week. He left his command without my authority, and went to Nashville. His army seems to be as much demoralized by the victory of Fort Donelson as was that of the Potomac by the defeat of Bull Run. It is hard to censure a successful general immediately after a victory, but I think he richly deserves it. I can get no returns, no reports, no information of any kind from him. Satisfied with his victory, he sits down and enjoys it, without any regard to the future. I am worn out and tired by this neglect and inefficiency. C. F. Smith is almost the only officer equal to the emergency." The next day, having probably received authority from Washington, he telegraphed to Grant: "You will place Major-General C. F. Smith in command of expedition, and remain yourself at Fort Henry. Why do you not obey my orders to report strength and position of your command?"

Grant replied on the 5th: "Your dispatch of yesterday is just received. Troops will be sent under command of Major-General Smith, as directed. I had prepared a different plan, intending General Smith to command the forces which should go to Paris and Humboldt, while I would command the

* See Appendix for Halleck's instructions in full for this expedition.

expedition upon Eastport, Corinth, and Jackson, in person. . . I am not aware of ever having disobeyed any order from your headquarters—certainly never intended such a thing. I have reported almost daily the condition of my command, and reported every position occupied. . . In conclusion, I will say that you may rely on my carrying out your instructions in every particular to the best of my ability.”

On the 6th, Halleck telegraphed to Grant: “General McClellan directs that you report to me daily the number and position of the forces under your command. Your neglect of repeated orders to report the strength of your command, has created great dissatisfaction, and seriously interfered with military plans. Your going to Nashville without authority, and when your presence with your troops was of the utmost importance, was a matter of very serious complaint at Washington, so much so that I was advised to arrest you on your return.”

On the 6th, Grant again telegraphed: “Your dispatch of yesterday just received. I did all I could to get you returns of the strength of my command. Every move I made was reported daily to your chief of staff, who must have failed to keep you properly posted. I have done my very best to obey orders, and to carry out the interests of the service. If my course is not satisfactory, remove me at once. I do not wish in any way to impede the success of our arms. I have averaged writing more than once a day since leaving Cairo, to keep you informed of my position, and it is no fault of mine if you have not received my letters. My going to Nashville was strictly intended for the good of the service, and not to gratify any desire of my own.

"Believing sincerely that I must have enemies between you and myself, who are trying to impair my usefulness, I respectfully ask to be relieved from further duty in the department."

After another rebuke from Halleck, of exactly the same tenor, Grant replied, on the 9th: "You had a better chance of knowing my strength, whilst my command was surrounding Fort Donelson, than I had. Troops were reporting daily by your order, and were immediately assigned to brigades. There were no orders received from you till the 28th of February, to make out returns; and I made every effort to get them in as early as possible. I renew my application to be relieved from duty." On the 11th, Grant wrote again to Halleck: "There is such a disposition to find fault with me, that I again ask to be relieved from further duty, until I can be placed right in the estimation of those higher in authority." Other censures were administered for alleged marauding allowed by Grant, in answer to which he said: "I refer you to my orders to suppress marauding, as the only reply necessary." He had arrested officers for violation of these orders, and sent them to St. Louis to report to Halleck, more than a week previous.

On the 13th, Halleck replied: "You cannot be relieved from your command. There is no good reason for it. I am certain that all which the authorities at Washington ask, is that you enforce discipline, and punish the disorderly. . . . Instead of relieving you, I wish you, as soon as your new army is in the field, to assume the immediate command, and lead it on to new victories." Grant replied on the next day: "After your letter, enclosing copy of an anonymous letter, upon which severe censure was based, I felt as

though it would be impossible for me to serve longer without a court of inquiry. Your telegram, of yesterday, however, places such a different phase upon my position, that I will again assume command, and give every effort to the success of our cause. Under the worst circumstances, I would do the same."

A few days later, Halleck transmitted to Grant copies of the following correspondence:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, }
WASHINGTON, March 10, 1862. }

Major-General H. W. HALLECK, U. S. A.,

Commanding Department of the Mississippi, St. Louis:

"It has been reported, that soon after the battle of Fort Donelson, Brigadier-General Grant left his command without leave. By direction of the President, the Secretary of War directs you to ascertain, and report, whether General Grant left his command at any time without proper authority, and if so, for how long; whether he has made to you proper reports and returns of his forces; whether he has committed any acts which were unauthorized, or not in accordance with military subordination or propriety, and if so, what.

L. THOMAS, *Adjutant-General.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
ST. LOUIS, March 15, 1862. }

Brigadier-General L. THOMAS,

Adjutant-General of the Army, Washington:

In accordance with your instructions of the 10th instant, I report that General Grant and several officers of high rank in his command, immediately after the battle of Fort Donelson, went to Nashville, without my authority or knowledge. I am satisfied, however, from investigation, that General Grant did

this from good intentions, and from a desire to subserve the public interests. Not being advised of General Buell's movements, and learning that General Buell had ordered Smith's division of his (Grant's) command to Nashville, he deemed it his duty to go there in person. During the absence of General Grant, and a part of his general officers, numerous irregularities are said to have occurred at Fort Donelson. These were in violation of the orders issued by General Grant before leaving, and probably under the circumstances, were unavoidable. General Grant has made the proper explanations, and has been directed to resume his command in the field; as he acted from a praiseworthy although mistaken zeal for the public service in going to Nashville, and leaving his command, I respectfully recommend that no further notice be taken of it. There never has been any want of military subordination on the part of General Grant, and his failure to make returns of his forces has been explained as resulting partly from the failure of colonels of regiments to report to him on their arrival, and partly from an interruption of telegraphic communication. All these irregularities have now been remedied.

H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General*.

General Halleck, however, neglected to furnish General Grant with a copy of the telegram of March 3d to Washington, and Grant replied to Halleck, on the 24th of March: "I most fully appreciate your justness, General, in the part you have taken, and you may rely upon me to the utmost of my capacity for carrying out all your orders." In the same letter he remarked: "I do not feel that I have neglected a

single duty;" and on the 31st of the month, Halleck informed him: "General McClellan directed me to place General Smith in command of the expedition, until you were ordered to join it." *

It will be remembered that the limits of Grant's command had never been defined, and it was thus for overstepping the unknown boundaries of his district, while in the legitimate discharge of his duties, that on Halleck's report, the general-in-chief advised that officer to place Grant in arrest. Smith took command of the expedition, and while the captor of Donelson remained in disgrace at Fort Henry, the troops were pushed forward as far as Eastport on the Tennessee. Grant, however, made every effort to secure the success of the expedition, and on turning over the command to Smith, congratulated him on his "richly deserved promotion:" "No one" he said, "can feel more pleasure than myself." On the 9th of March, he wrote: "Any thing you may require, send back transports for, and if within my power you shall have it." On the 11th, referring to reënforcements that were daily expected: "General Halleck telegraphs me . . . when they arrive, I may take the general direction. I think it exceedingly doubtful whether I shall accept; certainly not until the object of the expedition is accomplished." Smith replied: "I wrote you yesterday, to say how glad I was to find, from your letter of the 11th, that you were to resume your old command, from which you were so uncer-

* General Halleck's telegram of the 3d of March was not left on file in the War Department, but was obtained by me after long research and repeated efforts. I have not, however, been able to find General McClellan's reply. The Honorable Edwin M. Stanton assured me that he never heard that General Halleck had been authorized to place Grant in arrest.

emoniously, and, as I think, so unjustly stricken down." *

Halleck, meanwhile, continued his cautions to Grant. On the 13th, he telegraphed: "Don't bring on any general engagement at Paris. If the enemy appear in force, our troops must fall back." And on the 16th: "As the enemy is evidently in strong force, my instructions not to advance, so as to bring on a general engagement, must be strictly obeyed. General Smith must hold his position without exposing himself by detachments, till we can strongly reënforce him." The operations, however, were without result, and Smith returned to Pittsburg Landing, on the western bank of the Tennessee. It had been expected, that after cutting the railroad near Eastport or Corinth, he would establish himself at Savanna, a point about nine miles lower down than Pittsburg Landing, and on the opposite side of the river; he, however, selected the spot where the battle of Shiloh afterwards occurred.

The object of the concentration of troops at these places, was to secure positions which would command the navigation of the Tennessee, and, at the same time, form bases for operations in northern Alabama and Mississippi; Corinth, especially, where the two

* The relations between Grant and Smith were of a peculiar character. When Smith was commandant at the Military Academy, Grant was there as a cadet; he often told me of the awe he felt for his old commander, and how difficult it was at first to give him an order. Smith, however, perceived this, and with great delicacy said to his chief: "I am now a subordinate, and I know a soldier's duty. I hope you will feel no awkwardness about our new relations." Grant never had a more subordinate officer, nor one more gallant, despite his age. But Smith was sixty years old, and the exposure he underwent at Fort Donelson produced an illness, which proved fatal before the next summer.

great railroads meet, that traverse the South, and connect the Gulf of Mexico and the Mississippi with the eastern part of the region then in rebellion, was a position of the first strategic importance, sure to be obstinately defended by the rebels, and the objective point of any operations of the national commanders. It was the key to the whole railroad system of communication between the great states of Tennessee and Mississippi, and, consequently, to the possession of Tennessee itself, covering Memphis and the Mississippi river from the national armies. Pittsburg Landing is nineteen miles from Corinth.

The Tennessee, at this time, flooded all its shores, except the two or three bluffs where landings had been established (Savanna, Hamburg, Crump's, and Pittsburg), so that no foothold could be obtained at any point on the river near Corinth, except at these localities. The obvious advantage which the west bank of the river presented was, that a rapid movement could at any time be made from this base, without the need of pontoons or transports for crossing the troops; of course, the same situation was proportionately exposed to attack, but Smith was a good soldier, and his selection of the site of Pittsburg Landing, has been approved, under the light of all succeeding circumstances, by both Grant and Sherman.

On the 13th of March, Grant was relieved from his disgrace; and on the 17th, he removed his headquarters to Savanna, and wrote to Sherman from that place: "I have just arrived, and although sick for the last two weeks, begin to feel better at the thought of being again with the troops." The attention of the rebels in this part of the country had now become

concentrated upon Grant's forces, which threatened to obtain possession of the entire Southwest, unless speedily opposed. Troops in great numbers were accordingly hurried to Corinth, and the enemy was evidently preparing in his turn to assume the offensive. To counteract this, General Buell's command, was included in that of Halleck, and Buell himself, with five divisions, numbering nearly forty thousand men, was ordered from Nashville, to the support of Grant. And there was imminent need of such support.

The movements of Buell, however, were seldom expeditious. As early as the 16th of March, Halleck had informed Grant: "General Buell is marching in this direction;" and on the 20th, "Buell is at Columbia, and will move on Waynesboro with three divisions." On the 19th, Grant wrote to Buell: "There is every reason to suppose that the rebels have a large force at Corinth, and many at other points on the road towards Decatur." On the 26th, he informed Halleck: "My scouts are just in with a letter from General Buell. The three divisions coming this way are yet on east side of Duck river, detained bridge-building." On the 27th: "I have no news yet of any portion of General Buell's command being this side of Columbia." On the 31st: "Two soldiers from the head of McCook's command (of Buell's army), came in this evening. Some of this command crossed Duck river on the 29th, and established guards eight miles out that night." On the same day (the 31st), he sent word to McCook: "I have been looking for your column anxiously for several days." On the 3d of April, he was finally able to inform Halleck that "a dispatch from the

telegraphic operator is just in. He states that General Nelson " (commanding Buell's foremost division), "is in sight. The advance will arrive probably on Saturday " (April 5th). The distance Buell had to march from Columbia, was ninety miles ; it took him from the 19th of March to the 6th of April, seventeen days ; he was delayed, bridge-building, and by bad roads, and he had no knowledge that Grant was in any extraordinary danger, or had any immediate intention of attacking the enemy. His usual deliberation was not more liable to criticism at this crisis, than upon all other occasions.

When Grant reassumed immediate command, the rebels were in force at Corinth, their strength variously estimated, sometimes as high as a hundred thousand men ; this, however, was an exaggeration. Grant's army consisted of five divisions, under Major-Generals McClelland and C. F. Smith, and Brigadier-Generals Lewis Wallace, Sherman, and Hurlbut. The last two were at Pittsburg Landing, and Lewis Wallace at Crump's Landing, on the left bank of the river, about five miles below ; while McClelland and Smith, with about half of the entire command, were in camp at Savanna, or on transports near that landing. The Tennessee river thus separated the two portions of the army. Within an hour after his arrival, Grant issued orders for the concentration of the whole force, sending Smith and McClelland's divisions as fast as boats could carry them, up to Pittsburg. Lewis Wallace was considered to be within supporting distance, at Crump's Landing, on the same side of the river as the bulk of the command, and he was therefore left to guard the Purdy road. McClelland was detained a day or two, by

lack of transportation, and Grant himself remained at Savanna, to superintend the organization of troops constantly arriving from Missouri, and because from there he could communicate more readily with Buell, whose deliberate movements had not yet brought him within supporting distance of the Army of the Tennessee. But although his headquarters were thus retained at Savanna, Grant visited the forces at Pittsburg Landing daily.

Brigadier-General Prentiss was ordered to report to Grant at this time, and another division was organized for him, out of the new troops constantly arriving. Six regiments were thus assigned, and sent at once to join the main army, at Pittsburg. But a question of rank was raised at the front, by McClelland, who claimed command in the absence of Grant. The latter was unwilling to trust McClelland with this responsibility; and as the relative rank of the division generals was unsettled, he determined to move his own headquarters to Pittsburg, and obviate the difficulty by assuming command in person.* He had made his arrangements to this effect, when a message was brought him from Buell, dated the 4th of April, requesting Grant to remain at Savanna, on the 5th, as he would arrive there on that day. "I shall be in Savanna myself to-morrow, with perhaps two divisions," said Buell; "can I meet you there?"

*

March 27, 1862.

"I visited the different divisions at Pittsburg to-day. . . . News having arrived of the promotion of General McClelland to the rank of major-general, without the date of promotion of either him or General Smith being known, makes it necessary for me to move my headquarters from this place to Pittsburg. I will not go up, however, until something further is heard from General Buell's command, and until full directions are given for their transfer to this place."—*Grant to Halleck,*

Grant replied on the 5th: "Your dispatch just received. I will be here to meet you to-morrow. The enemy, at and near Corinth, are probably from sixty to eighty thousand." Buell, however, did not arrive till the 6th, or if otherwise, did not make it known to his superior, and Grant remained to meet him.*

Halleck's instructions to Grant had continued very positive, not to bring on a general engagement until Buell should arrive; and several expeditions, some suggested by Halleck, and others by Grant, were countermanded or forbidden by the former, lest a battle should be provoked. In accordance with these directions, Grant remained strictly on the defensive, although he did not concur with the views of his superior. On the 23d of March, he wrote to Smith: "Carry out your idea of occupying, and particularly, fortifying, Pea Ridge. I do not hear one word from St. Louis. I am clearly of the opinion that the enemy are gathering strength at Corinth, quite as rapidly as we are here, and, the sooner we attack, the easier will be the task of taking the place. If Ruggles is in command, it would assuredly be a good time to attack."

There was skirmishing daily after the 2d of April, and on the 4th, the enemy felt Sherman's front in force, but nothing serious came of it, and the opinion of that commander was decided that no probability of an immediate engagement existed. Grant rode out on the day after, to Sherman's lines, and concurred with him in this judgment. They were both mistaken, for the skirmish was the reconnoissance

* General Buell's official report states that he arrived at Savanna on the 5th, but Grant was not notified of this, and consequently had no suspicion of the fact.

of the enemy, preliminary to the battle of Shiloh. This affair, however, awoke attention, and put both officers and men on the alert.* As Grant was riding back from the front to Pittsburg Landing, after dark on the 4th, the night being rainy, his horse slipped in crossing a log, and fell on his rider, who received in consequence a severe contusion. This lamed him for over a week, and also occasioned him acute pain for several days.†

The same day, Lewis Wallace reported eight regiments of rebel infantry, and twelve hundred cavalry at Purdy, and an equal if not larger force at Bethel, four miles further from the river. Grant, accordingly, notified W. H. L. Wallace (in command of Smith's division), to hold himself in readiness to move his entire command to the support of Lewis Wallace. "Should you find danger of this sort, reënforce him at once with your entire division." To Sherman he wrote: "Information, just received, would indicate that the enemy are sending a force to Purdy, and, it may be, with a view to attack General Wallace at Crump's Landing. I have directed W. H. L. Wallace, commanding Second division temporarily, to reënforce General L. Wallace, in case of an attack, with his entire division, although I look for nothing of the kind; but it is best to be prepared. I should advise, therefore, that you advise your advance guards to keep a sharp lookout for any movement in that direction, and, should such a thing be attempted, give all the support of your division, and General Hurlbut's,

* There were several prisoners taken, who threatened that "the Yankees would catch hell soon."

† This circumstance probably originated the newspaper report that Grant was drunk and thrown from his horse at the battle of Shiloh.

if necessary. I will return to Pittsburg Landing at an early hour to-morrow, and ride out to your camp."

On Saturday, April 5th, the enemy's cavalry was again very bold, coming well down to Sherman's front. This day, the head of Nelson's column arrived at Savanna, and Nelson himself reported to Grant, who in person directed him to march his command to a position south of Savanna, and about five miles from the point opposite Pittsburg Landing; there, he was to hold himself in readiness to reënforce the army on the left bank, in case of need. The order was obeyed, and Grant having made all his preparations for removing his headquarters to Pittsburg on the morrow, remained to meet Buell, as that officer had desired.

The battle-field of Shiloh is a thickly-wooded and broken country, interspersed with patches of cultivation, and reaching back from the bluffs at Pittsburg Landing, from two and a half to three miles. Snake creek on the north, and Lick creek on the south, run almost at right angles with the Tennessee, and empty into it about three miles apart. These were the right and left defences of the national line, and between them the battle was fought. Owl creek, a small stream running north, and nearly parallel with the Tennessee, empties into Snake creek, about three miles from the river, and covered part of the right front of the national army. All these streams were flooded. The line faced mainly to the south and southwest; and the enemy, coming from Corinth, was thus compelled to attack almost wholly in front. Sherman was posted on the right, in advance of the rest of the army, and near a log chapel, known as Shiloh meet-

Grant stopped at Crump's Landing, to see Lewis Wallace, and notified him in person of the undoubted fact, which had not yet been officially reported, that a general engagement had begun, and that Wallace must hold himself in readiness to march to the support of the main army at Pittsburg, or if the attack there should prove a feint, to defend himself against a probable movement upon him, from the direction of Purdy, his situation being isolated, and somewhat exposed. Wallace replied that he would be in readiness for any orders which he might receive. This interview took place on the transport. Grant then hurried on to the landing at Pittsburg, arriving there at about eight o'clock. He rode at once to the front.

The rebel onset had begun in force, and with tremendous vigor. Prentiss was first attacked, and then Sherman; but Prentiss having been warned, had doubled his grand guards the night before, and pushed out his pickets a mile and a half; he formed his division in advance of its camps, and there it received the first assault.* Sherman, too, having been skirmishing since the 4th, was promptly under arms; and the other division commanders, admonished by the movements of the last few days, had their horses saddled, and were breakfasting early to be ready in case of an attack.† They at once put their com-

* See Prentiss's report and rebel reports.

† "It was well known the enemy were approaching our lines, and there had been more or less skirmishing for three days preceding the battle. The consequence was our breakfasts were ordered at an early hour, and our horses saddled to be ready in case of an attack."—*Report of Major-General McPherson, dated Lake Providence, La., March 26, 1863.*

McPherson at this time was on Grant's staff; he was at W. H. L. Wallace's headquarters on the night of the 5th, and on the morning of the 6th.

mands into line. The entire national force on the ground at the time of the assault, was thirty-three thousand effective men. Lewis Wallace had about five thousand more, at Crump's landing, making Grant's whole force between fifty and sixty regiments. Grant estimated the enemy's strength at sixty-five thousand men, or one hundred and sixty-two regiments and battalions. Beauregard afterwards reported it at forty thousand, three hundred and fifty-five.* The troops, though so furiously attacked, as yet held their original ground. Word was instantly sent to Nelson and Lewis Wallace, of the state of affairs, and imperative orders given them to advance at once, and with all speed. To Nelson, the order was in writing: "You will hurry up your command as fast as possible. The boats will be in readiness to transport all troops of your command across the river. All looks well, but it is necessary for you to push forward as fast as possible." A staff officer was dispatched to General Wallace, with verbal directions for him to march by the nearest road parallel to the river.

The engagement soon spread along the whole line, from Sherman's right to the brigade of Stuart on the extreme left. Prentiss's division being raw, was driven at once from its first position, but took a new line inside its camps. Sherman's troops were also new, and soon gave way; but McClernand promptly moved up a portion of his division to support Sherman's wavering left. Hurlbut, too, was marched forward to the support of Prentiss; and W.

* Grant's estimate was made up from the reports of spies, deserters, and prisoners, who, without exception, set the figures as high as sixty or seventy thousand.

H. L. Wallace was taken out of position in the rear of Sherman, and moved to the support of the centre and left of the line, where the assault was most determined. Lewis Wallace was directed to come up and connect with Sherman's right, but never came; and after several hours of as desperate fighting as was ever seen on the American continent, the national troops were slowly pushed back from point to point, the distance of one entire mile. Early in the battle, part of Sherman's left brigade broke entirely, and fled to the rear, in great confusion; but the rest of his command stood firm; and he swung what was now his left, around to the rear, moving on his right as a pivot, so that his new line stood almost at right angles with its original direction; and; as the remainder of the whole line was forced back, Sherman connected with McClelland on the left, leaving his own right far advanced, beyond any other portion of the national front. The enemy was never able to get around this flank, but it was eventually withdrawn; still maintaining, however, its relative position to other parts of the command, and always covering the important crossing of Snake creek bridge.

The men who behaved badly were on Sherman's left and Prentiss's right; most of them were entirely raw, and not a few came on the field without cartridges. Prentiss's division had only been organized since the 26th of March, eleven days; and none of it had ever been in battle before. It was Sherman and Prentiss's divisions which were most advanced, and their breaking so easily, gave the enemy a confidence early in the day, which inspired him for after-efforts. Some of the regimental commanders were cowards; and one colonel marched his regiment de-

liberately off the field ; but, in other instances, gallant officers were unable to re-form their yielding battalions. These created a panic, which extended to as many as six thousand or eight thousand men, who fled, not retreated, to the landing, a distance of between two and three miles. Sherman's efforts to restrain them were unceasing but unavailing ; he was repeatedly wounded, yet remained at the front. His exertions, however, were not confined to exhibitions of gallantry ; his eminent qualities as a general, were never more conspicuous than in this battle. He, in reality, commanded McClelland's division, as well as his own ; for McClelland, who possessed both energy and courage, was a novice at soldiering, and with great good sense, sought and followed the advice of the man who was his junior in rank, but his superior in all military knowledge and experience ; and Sherman, without stopping for any considerations of jealousy or pique, advised McClelland constantly and efficiently.

At ten A. M., when the battle was raging fiercest, Grant was at Sherman's front, and commended him for so stubbornly opposing the enemy. When Sherman asked for cartridges, Grant replied that he had anticipated this want, and given orders accordingly. It was well that this precaution had been taken so soon ; for everywhere on the line, the cartridges gave out early in this furious fight, and amid the confusion and heat of battle, the division generals could organize no means of supplying their commands ; but all day long, a train of wagons was passing from the landing to the front, carrying ammunition over the narrow and crowded road.*

* Colonel Pride, of General Grant's staff, organized this important train, and forced a way for it along the single narrow road that leads

At intervals all day, Grant was engaged in sending deserters back to their commands, and in forming new lines out of those who had straggled too far to rejoin their own regiments. This furnished a species of reënforcement badly enough needed at the front: the only use made of cavalry during the battle was in urging stragglers back into the fight. Grant was on every part of the field in person, constantly under fire, and making unwearied exertions to maintain his position, until Nelson and Lewis Wallace should get up, but the national forces were slowly losing ground each hour. In no place, had the line been pierced, but in no place, had its original position of the morning been retained. The rebels were stunned and retarded, here and there, and the battle raged zigzag for a while, parts of the line being held with more tenacity than others, brigades here, giving way, and there, holding the enemy's advance. Still, if only Nelson and Lewis Wallace would come up, the day might even yet be saved. Messengers were again sent to these delinquent commanders, but although Nelson had been ordered to march at seven in the morning, he did not start till half-past one, P. M.,* while the sound of the enemy's cannon was constant in his ears; a reason for this delay has never been assigned. Lewis Wallace, one of Grant's own division commanders, was equally remiss; but he, who had been a month on the ground, excused himself by stating that he had taken the wrong road, marching towards Purdy instead of to Pittsburg; yet, his troops had helped build the bridge over Snake creek, for to the landing, swarming, as it was, with fugitives and wounded men, and choked up with artillery and the mass of material that accumulates in the rear of every battle-field.

* See Nelson and Buell's reports.

just such emergencies as had now occurred. He was, however, set right by Captain (afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel) Rowley and Colonel (afterwards Major-General) McPherson, both at the time on General Grant's staff; they put him in the right direction at one o'clock, and it took him till seven that night, to march five miles in the direction of battle, though the cannonading was heard at Nashville, a hundred miles away.*

During the morning, Grant sent the following order to General Wood, another of Buell's division commanders, who, he learned, had arrived at Savanna: "You will move your command with the utmost dispatch to the river at this point, where steamboats will be in readiness to transport you to Pittsburg;" and still later, another dispatch was sent: "Commanding officer, advance forces, Buell's army, near Pittsburg: The attack on my forces has been very spirited from early this morning. The appearance of fresh troops in the field now, would have a powerful effect, both by inspiring our men and disheartening the enemy. If you will get upon the field, leaving all your baggage on the east bank of the river, it will be more to our advantage, and possibly save the day to us. The rebel forces are estimated at over one hundred thousand men. My headquarters will be in the log building on the top of the hill,

* In a letter on this subject to the War Department, dated April 13, 1863, General Grant says: "Had General Wallace been relieved from duty in the morning, and the same orders communicated to Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, who would have been his successor, I do not doubt but the division would have been on the field of battle and in the engagement by one o'clock of that eventful 6th of April. There is no estimating the difference this might have made in our casualties." When Wallace was finally set right, he absolutely countermarched his entire column, instead of facing it about.

where you will be furnished a staff officer to guide you to your place on the field."

Midway in the afternoon, General Buell arrived in person. He had reached Savanna with another division, and finding Grant had left, and a violent battle was raging, came on at once to the front, in advance of his troops. Buell was the junior of Grant, but had hitherto enjoyed a more important command; his directions did not make him subordinate to Grant, except in the actual presence of the enemy. He probably felt somewhat chagrined at being obliged to receive orders from one whom he had previously regarded as an inferior; his manner was cold and formal, but he spared no exertions to carry out Grant's directions, and displayed commendable alacrity and earnestness for success. All around the Landing, lay the cravens who had swarmed in from the front, as many do in nearly every battle; these, however, were not stragglers nor laggards, but the panic-stricken mob, who had fled from that danger which so many of their fellows seemed to court. As the two generals were conversing at the Landing, Grant explained the situation of affairs, then apparently at the worst; and Buell inquired: "What preparations have you made for retreating, General?" His remark may not have been concluded, for Grant interrupted him at once, exclaiming: "*I haven't despaired of whipping them yet.*" Buell, perhaps, was no more despondent than Grant, but, at that moment, his own forces were a long way off, and his mind naturally turned to considerations of a defensive sort, while Grant's characteristic mode of defence was the offensive. Buell then busied himself with hurrying up his own army.

Hurlbut's command, on the left, was repeatedly compelled to fall back, but raked the rebels well, each time when they charged. On Hurlbut's right, W. H. L. Wallace made a gallant stand, repelling four separate assaults, but was finally forced to give ground. These two divisions, for a while, stood between the whole army and destruction. All portions of the line were not constantly engaged, but there was no time, from seven in the morning until dark, without heavy firing in some quarters of the field. The fierceness of the fight knew little variety; no splendid tactical science was displayed, but a grim determination on each side to stand up to the last; the rebels steadily driving in the national front, till, by four or five o'clock, the left was within half a mile of the Landing. But only in one instance, was the line really pierced during all the eventful day. Hurlbut and W. H. L. Wallace, being forced to give way, connected on their outer flanks with the other portions of the command; but Prentiss, whose division lay between theirs, was more stubborn, and, although the line had retreated on each side of him, refused to yield his ground. His obstinacy was not good generalship, for he was thus left exposed, his two flanks in the air; and the enemy quickly seeing this, surrounded him; he was taken prisoner himself, along with four regiments. The men had behaved excellently all day, and their misfortune reflects no discredit on their gallantry. This happened at about four o'clock in the afternoon.

A little later, a desperate attack was made on the national left, now crowded back to cover the Landing; the enemy had carried point after point, and ridge after ridge, had reached the river and crossed Lick

creek, and the ravine formed the last defence; but, driven to bay, the national troops here offered a superb resistance, and though the enemy flung his lines again and again upon the barrier, again and again they broke, like the sea when it strikes the shore. Had the national soldiers given way now, all would have been lost; but, with their backs to the river, and no cover but the gunboats, discouraged doubtless with the ill success of the day, but grim and resolute still, they made here an unconquerable stand. The rebels, flushed with their triumph, and maddened at the sight of their expected prey, at times almost leaped the ravine, but their fury was all in vain; the assault was finally repulsed, and the disappointed column withdrew, shattered and torn, from the fruitless struggle, like a wounded tiger, whose last fierce onslaught has failed.

A battery of artillery, well posted by Colonel Webster, of Grant's staff, did good service at this juncture, and the gunboats also were of importance, as they had been for some time previous, in checking the advance of the enemy on the extreme left. Both sides were now crippled and both fatigued, the extraordinary efforts of the day telling hard on either army. The rebel commander had fallen, and been succeeded by Beauregard; W. H. L. Wallace had been mortally wounded, on the national side; Sherman was slightly wounded; Grant had been struck, but not hurt, and at least ten thousand men in each army were either killed or wounded. It was nearly five o'clock, when the head of Nelson's column crossed the river; but, after once starting his troops, this commander was prompt in marching them, and the men themselves were eager to get into battle and assist

their hard-pushed comrades. Two of Nelson's regiments were put in position by Grant, on the extreme left; and as a final spasmodic attack was made by the rebels, these regiments fired two or three volleys, and lost three men, but it was too late then to affect the fortunes of the day. The exhaustion consequent upon their earlier efforts told upon the rebels, as well as upon the national troops, and no heavy fighting occurred after the arrival of Buell's advance.*

When it was apparent that the battle was waning, Grant was at Sherman's front, and gave orders to renew the attack on the morrow. He considered that the strength of the enemy was nearly spent, and, with his usual tactics, determined in consequence to be the first to assault. I have often heard him declare, that there comes a time, in every hard-fought battle, when both armies are nearly or quite exhausted, and it seems impossible for either to do more; this he believed the turning-point; whichever after first renews the fight, is sure to win. He could not urge his jaded troops that night into any further assault, but his resolution was unshaken, and although Buell's advance was not yet across the river, he gave positive orders to take the initiative in the morning. To Sherman, he told the story of the Donelson battle; how, at a certain period, he saw that either side was ready to give way, if the other showed a bold front; and he determined, in consequence, to do that very thing—to advance at once on the enemy; when, as he had foreseen, the enemy surrendered. At four P. M., on the 6th of April, he thought the appearances the same.†

* See Appendix for extracts from reports of Buell's subordinates, corroboratory of this statement.

† See Appendix for letter of General Sherman.

When night closed in, Grant's line was in part perpendicular to the river; his left protected by the ravine at the Landing, and his right covering Snake creek bridge, by which it was still hoped that Lewis Wallace might arrive. All the camps originally occupied by the national troops were in the hands of the enemy, but the rebel advance had been checked at every point. The division organization was, however, greatly broken up. Sherman had lost thousands by desertion and straggling; Prentiss had been captured, with twenty-two hundred men; while W. H. L. Wallace's command was nearly destroyed, by casualties and the loss of its chief. The line, as constituted on Sunday night, was simply a mass of brave men, determined to hold their own against the enemy; those who fought, fought wherever they found a commander. The rebel line was equally confused,* the battle having become one where brilliant manoeuvres were impossible. It was the personal qualities of officers and men on both sides that told, for soldierly traits are of more importance than tactical skill, even in commanding officers, when ten thousand men on a side are straggling.

In the night, the whole of Nelson's column, and nearly all of McCook and Crittenden's divisions, of Buell's army, were ferried across the river, and put in position on the left of the line, relieving the shattered battalions that had borne the brunt of Sunday; this was a reinforcement of at least twenty thou-

* "Such was the nature of the ground over which we had fought, and the heavy resistance it had met, that the commands of the whole army were very much shattered. In a dark and stormy night commanders found it impossible to find and assemble their troops; each body or fragment bivouacking where night overtook them."—*Bragg's Report.*

sand troops; they were commanded next day by Buell, who received his orders from General Grant. All night long, the gunboats dropped shells inside the rebel lines, and the woods caught fire; no attempt could be made to care for the wounded, who lay on the blazing battle-field, a mile away, and in possession of the enemy; only a merciful storm of rain allayed the anguish of those whom no human help could reach, and relieved them from the danger of being burned alive. The troops slept on their arms, beneath the tempest, but the labor of re-forming some commands, and posting those newly arrived, continued all night. Grant visited each division commander, including Nelson, after dark, directing the new position of each, and repeating in person his orders for an advance at early dawn. He told each to "attack with a heavy skirmish line, as soon as it was light enough to see, and then to follow up with his entire command, leaving no reserves." Before midnight, he returned to the Landing, and lay on the ground, with his head against the stump of a tree, where he got thoroughly drenched by the storm, but slept soundly, confident of victory on the morrow.

The violent rain rendered the ground extremely unfavorable for the movements of Monday, but early on the morning of the 7th, the attack was made by Grant, along his entire front, now newly composed. W. H. L. Wallace and Prentiss's divisions, having been so much broken up by the events of Sunday, what was left of them was divided among the other commanders of the Army of the Tennessee. Lewis Wallace, too, was put in line on the second day, on the extreme right, where he should have been, eighteen hours before. Sherman, McClelland, and Hurl

but were posted next, from right to left; and McCook, Crittenden, and Nelson's divisions of Buell's army, in the same order, had the left of the new national line.

The battle began on Grant's left and centre, Nelson first striking the enemy, and the great accession to the national strength told at once. The rebels had not known of Buell's arrival,* but nevertheless had not ventured to attack; Beauregard could bring only twenty thousand men into action on Monday,† and these became disheartened at the discovery of the national reënforcements; they were fatigued, too, with the tremendous exertions of the day before. Still they fought well; the odds were turned, but they displayed nearly the same desperate obstinacy which had been so marked a trait of many of the national troops of yesterday. Ground was lost and won several times, and the rebel and national dead lay side by side; but the enemy was pushed steadily back, till every inch that had been lost on Sunday

* "I accordingly established my headquarters at the church of Shiloh, in the enemy's encampments, with Major-General Bragg . . . hoping, from news received by a special dispatch, that *delays had been encountered by General Buell* in his march from Columbia, and that his main force, therefore, could not reach the field of battle, in time to save General Grant's scattered fugitive forces from capture or destruction on the following day. . . . About six o'clock on the morning of the 7th of April, however, a hot fire of musketry and artillery opened from the enemy's quarters on our advanced line, *assured us of the junction of his forces.*"—*Beauregard's Report.*

† "Our troops, exhausted by days of incessant fatigue, and want of rest, and ranks thinned by killed, wounded, and stragglers, amounting in the whole to nearly half our force, fought bravely, but with the want of that animation and spirit which characterized them the preceding day."—*Bragg's Report.*

Every statement made in this chapter in regard to the force of the rebels, or such of their dispositions as were not from their very nature apparent to the national commanders, is taken from the reports of either Beauregard or Bragg.

was regained. Lewis Wallace's men fought well, on the extreme right, relieving themselves from any responsibility for the laggard movements of the preceding day. Sherman renewed the fight for Shiloh church, where Beauregard had slept on Sunday night, and the camps and trophies won from the national troops, were all reclaimed. Buell was constantly and conspicuously engaged, and handled his troops with great ability, as he always did in the presence of the enemy; his forces behaved in every way worthy of their great reputation as disciplined soldiers. There was but little straggling anywhere on Monday. Still, with the exception of one or two severe struggles, the fighting of April 7th was light, when compared with that of Sunday.

As the day wore on, the national victory became more decisive; the enemy was repulsed more vigorously, and his retreat became less orderly, although it was not at any time converted into a rout. By two o'clock, however, the repulse was general, and before night, Beauregard had withdrawn nearly five miles beyond the front which Grant had maintained previous to the battle of Sunday.*

Near the close of the day, Grant met the First Ohio regiment marching towards the northern part of the field, and immediately in front of a position which it was important to take at that particular juncture; another regiment to the left was fighting hard, but about to yield—had, in fact, given way. Grant saw

* "Brigadier-General Breckenridge was left with his command as a *rear guard*, to hold the ground we had occupied the night preceding the first battle, just in front of the intersection of the Pittsburg and Hamburg roads, about four miles from the former place, while the rest of the army passed in the rear."—*Beauregard's Report*.

the emergency, and instantly halted the passing force on the brow of a hill, the enemy lying in a wood at its base; he changed the direction of the First Ohio, and himself ordered it to charge, in support of the yielding battalion. The men recognized their leader, and obeyed with enthusiasm, and Grant rode along with them in the line of battle, as much exposed as any private in the ranks. The retreating troops on the left took courage at this sight; they stopped their backward movement, closed up their wavering ranks with cheers, and the two regiments swept the enemy at once from the coveted spot, thus capturing one of the last important positions in the battle of Shiloh.

Grant rode along in the piece of woods, towards the left, where he met Generals McCook and Crittenden. The day was far spent, the rebels effectually repulsed, and still retreating. Grant was anxious to press their broken legions further, and so told the two division commanders of Buell's army. But those officers at once protested. It must be their forces which should pursue, for the men who had been disorganized so greatly, as Sunday's fight would have disorganized the finest soldiers, were in no condition to follow, even in the elation of victory. But McCook and Crittenden declared that their troops, also, were exhausted; they had marched, if they had not fought, the day before, and the two generals assured their commander that the weariness of his reënforcements allowed no pursuit. A heavy rain was falling; it was difficult to follow in the darkness and wet, and the army, fatigued with its exertions, went into camp. Two brigades of Wood's division, of the Army of the Ohio, which had just arrived, and a portion of Sher-

man's command, were sent out to ascertain the direction of Beauregard's retreat, which did not cease till the rebels got back to Corinth; but the pursuit was short and desultory, and the weary hosts, that had been engaged in battle more than twenty hours, rested from their labors. The national army encamped on substantially the same ground it had occupied before the fight.

The rebels, in this encounter, had intended to overwhelm Grant before the arrival of Buell's reinforcements, and their calculations were well made. Only the tremendous obstinacy and determination with which they were opposed on that first terrible day, frustrated their hopes. As it was, they gained nothing but defeat for their enterprise. They wasted thousands of lives, and gave the prestige of victory to their opponents, retreating to Corinth along the same roads they had marched out on, not one week before, and leaving their dead to be buried by their enemy. Beauregard made application to Grant, on the 8th, for permission to bury his own dead, but Grant had already performed that duty for his fallen foes.*

Grant's loss, including that in Buell's army, was twelve thousand two hundred and seventeen; of these seventeen hundred were killed, seven thousand four hundred and ninety-five wounded, and three thousand and twenty-two missing.† Two thousand one hundred and sixty-seven of the losses were in the Army of the Ohio. Beauregard reported a total loss of ten

* See Appendix for correspondence between Grant and Beauregard.

† In consequence of the loss or destruction of their rolls, no complete report could be prepared of the losses in McClelland and Prentiss's divisions. The above is as nearly exact as can now be furnished. The other statements are as officially reported to Grant at the time.

thousand six hundred and ninety-nine:* seventeen hundred and twenty-eight killed, eight thousand and twelve wounded, and nine hundred and fifty-seven missing.

Grant had not anticipated the attack of the rebels on Sunday; on the contrary, he had fully intended to move against them, as soon as Buell should appear; for although Halleck had cautioned him repeatedly against bringing on a general engagement until he was strong enough to beat the enemy, he had also told Grant to go on and "win new victories," when reënforcements should arrive. On this Grant meant to act, and so informed his subordinates. The delay of Buell, although not absolutely inexcusable, was undoubtedly greater than any necessity existed for. A dozen commanders in the national army would have built bridges, and moved their force with double the rapidity and energy that Buell displayed, especially with troops who knew so well how to march, and were so eager to get into battle, as the Army of the Ohio. But Buell, in his whole career, never got rid of his excessive deliberation. His ordinary characteristics are sufficient explanation of his tardiness in this instance, without attributing it to any unwillingness to serve under one who had hitherto been his junior.

There can be no doubt, however, of the immense advantage that Buell's arrival, when it did occur, afforded to Grant; no doubt that Grant looked long and anxiously for Buell's advance, on that memorable

* Grant's estimate of Beauregard's loss was much larger. The burial parties estimated Beauregard's dead at four thousand, which, according to the usual calculation, would make his entire casualties, at least, twenty thousand; but this authority is not sufficiently reliable.

6th of April; nor is it now possible to say what result might have followed, had Buell still longer delayed. But this much is certain: the rebels were repelled in their last attack, on Sunday, without any assistance from Buell that turned the scale. They did not attack, on Monday, although they were ignorant of Buell's arrival; while Grant gave his orders to renew the fight, before he was aware that the long-looked-for reinforcements had come.

A part of the Army of the Tennessee undoubtedly misbehaved at Shiloh; this, however, occurred only in Sherman and Prentiss's divisions, where the troops were entirely raw. These commands were the most advanced, and received the first shock of the assault. It probably would have been better had the older troops been put in the advance. Still, Sherman's presence at the key-point of the fight, almost compensated for the conduct of his men. No other division commander in Grant's army was a professional soldier, and upon no other did Grant so rely as upon Sherman. The army took tone from them both, and the ignominy of a part only rendered more conspicuous the gallantry and determination of those who remained firm.*

The battle, however, decided little, except the fighting qualities of both combatants. It was the fiercest fight of the war, west of the Alleghanies, and, in proportion to the numbers engaged, equalled any contest during the rebellion. I have heard Sherman

* It is probable that the straggling on the rebel side was quite as great. Beauregard states in his report, that his strength was forty thousand on Sunday, and gives a loss of ten thousand on both days. But he declares that, on Monday, he could put only twenty thousand men into line. This leaves fifteen thousand, at least, for deserters and stragglers on that day, unless he lost many more than he reported.

say that he never saw such terrible fighting afterwards, and Grant compared Shiloh only with the Wilderness. The ground remained in the hands of Grant, and, with the reënforcements that Buell brought, the national army was doubtless in vastly better condition than the rebels, after the battle. But Halleck arrived on the 9th, and at once took command of all the national forces, and he restrained any advance except behind breastworks; so that, whatever immediate results might have been reaped from the repulse of Beauregard, were lost. The moral effect of the fight was also impaired by this course. In the battle, each party was forced to respect the fighting qualities of the other; the Northerners recognized the impetuous vigor and splendid enthusiasm of the rebels, and the latter found all the tenacity and determination of the North in those who opposed them. This mutual respect remained, but the bad effect of Halleck's policy was, that it caused in the army a depression which should have been known only to the defeated, while it gave to the country an idea that the army had suffered an overthrow. But, whatever injury the spirit of the troops sustained, was the result of the distrust manifested by Halleck, and not of the victory of Shiloh.

Until this battle, Grant had supposed, as nearly every one else did at the North, that one or two victories for the Union would induce the South to return to its allegiance; but, when the rebels recovered so soon from the crushing defeat of Donelson to make the prodigious effort of Shiloh; when even the loss of Nashville, and Bowling Green, and Columbus, and nearly all of Kentucky and Tennessee, appeared not to lessen their energy or overcome their determina-

tion, he became certain that the contest was to be prolonged and intense, beyond any thing that had yet been seen. This belief developed his peculiar views of the manner in which the war should be carried on. He thought then, and remained firm in the conviction ever afterwards, that it was not extended territory, nor capital cities, nor fortified places, that should be the prime object of any commander's strategy; for it had been proven that all these could be dispensed with by heroic and determined foes; but that armies and men must become the points of attack; that these should be pursued wherever they moved, regardless, comparatively, of positions and forts; that the armies must not only be defeated, but destroyed; and that, therefore, the policy of merely outwitting or outmanœuvring the enemy, or forcing the evacuation of strongholds and the abandonment of territory, and allowing him thus to concentrate his real force, was unwise; that every effort should be made to find and fight the rebel armies again and again, and that only when those armies were either subdued or annihilated, would the rebellion end. Upon this idea he thereafter acted, so far as he had control. He did not underrate the value of places, but he was always willing to sacrifice them for armies. He did not depreciate the value of life, but he thought that even life should be freely spent, if so the great object of the war could be attained. He believed, indeed, that life rapidly expended in a vigorous campaign, would prove an economy of life in the end.

This war, too, was fought with a degree of determination and unanimity on the part of the rebels, rarely shown in the history of the world. They themselves rendered necessary the terrible nature of

the blows which alone could overcome them. They refused to yield because they had lost their fortresses, or because they had abandoned their cities, or even because one army was surrendered and, here and there, other armies were repelled. There was no course left, if the rebellion was to be suppressed, but to annihilate its strength, and root out the resources that supplied that strength.

From this time, therefore, Grant gave up the idea of saving the resources and sparing the property of the South; the South had made the war avowedly one of the people, and the people being a party must suffer, until the people as well as the soldiers were conquered. Henceforth, he gave his subordinates orders to live upon the resources of the country without stint, whenever their necessities compelled; and he abandoned all desire to protect the institution of slavery, although he himself had been a slaveholder, and had no sympathy with the merely political idea of abolition. Whatever opposed the effort to maintain the unity of the country, must be destroyed.

Until these views were adopted and carried out firmly and persistently, in every part of the theatre of war, the country was not saved. Whatever permanent successes were anywhere achieved, were achieved by acting on these principles.*

* It has been repeatedly asserted that Grant was surprised at Shiloh, but the evidence to the contrary is incontrovertible. The preliminary fighting of the 3d and 4th of April, necessarily put division and army commanders on the alert. The movements reported by Lewis Wallace, on the 4th, had a similar effect. Sherman had been skirmishing for several days; Prentiss had doubled his pickets the day before, and had a reconnoissance of a regiment out, at three o'clock on the morning of the 6th; he received the earliest assault outside of his camps. W. H. L. Wallace also breakfasted early and had his horse saddled, "to be ready in case of an attack." These are

not the indications of a camp that is surprised. Yet Prentiss, who fought till four o'clock in the afternoon, is said to have been captured at daylight and in his bed. Grant's dispatches of March 28th, 30th, and 31st, as well as those of the 4th and 5th of April, all furnish proof that he was intently watching the enemy. The fall that lamed him on the 4th, was got in returning from the front, whither he had gone to investigate the rumor of an attack, after Sherman's fight. On the 5th, he sent three dispatches to Halleck, reporting the skirmish of the day before, and with one of them enclosed the following note to himself from Sherman: "April 5th. I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day more than some picket firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our pickets far. I will not be drawn out far unless with certainty of advantage, and I do not apprehend any thing like an attack upon our position." Grant remarked to Halleck on the same date: "Our outposts had been attacked by the enemy, apparently in considerable force. I immediately went up, but found all quiet. . . . I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, *but will be prepared should such a thing take place.*"

Private soldiers and inferior officers, very probably, could not read the signs that told so plainly to their commanders the necessity of readiness; such may, very likely, have been surprised at what occurred; but Grant and his division generals, although of course they could not know at what hour or place the rebels might choose to assault, nor indeed that they certainly would assault at all, although they did not really expect an attack, yet knew the propinquity of a great army, and, so far as could be, were prepared to receive it—except in the matter of defensive intrenchments. Up to this time the Western troops had not availed themselves of the spade in war; but after Shiloh, both generals and men, severely taught, resorted to the old Roman tactics, and never failed to intrench themselves after every day's march. Some, indeed, already over-cautious, were schooled into absolute timidity: and in their anxiety to become secure against the enemy, forgot that the first object in war is not safety to one's self, but destruction to the foe. Those who wish to be entirely safe, should stay at home.

In connection with this question of surprise, it is curious to note that Beauregard not only does not claim to have surprised Grant, but says in his official report: "At five A. M., on the 6th inst., *a reconnoitring party of the enemy having become engaged with the advanced pickets*, the commander of the forces" (A. S. Johnston) "gave orders to begin the movement." Bragg, also, thought the rebels were attacked on Sunday, for speaking of the first day's fight, he says: "The enemy did not give us time to discuss the question of attack, for *soon after dawn he commenced a rapid musketry fire on our pickets.*"

Again: "The enemy was encountered **IN FORCE** *at the encampments*

of his advanced positions." And still again: "In about one mile, we encountered him *in strong force along almost the entire line. His batteries were posted on eminences, with strong infantry supports.*" Now, Bragg was in front of Sherman and McClelland, and it is Sherman who is said to have been surprised. (See Appendix for Grant's correspondence with Halleck, on the 5th, entire.)

CHAPTER IV.

Incorrect reports of the battle of Shiloh—Halleck assumes command in the field—Disagreeable position of Grant—Siege of Corinth—Evacuation of Corinth by the rebels—Ineffectual operations of Halleck—Halleck made General-in-Chief—He offers command of Army of the Tennessee to Colonel Allen—Allen declines it—Grant then placed again in command—Military situation in September, 1862—Grant's force depleted—Enemy threatening—Price seizes Iuka—Grant's preparations to fight—Orders to Rosecrans and Ord—Battle of Iuka—Rosecrans neglects Grant's orders—Rebels escape in consequence—Grant's headquarters at Jackson—Rebels threaten Corinth—Strategy of Grant—Battle of Corinth—Rebels drive Rosecrans into Corinth—Final victory of Rosecrans—Enemy struck in flank by Ord—Rosecrans does not follow up his success, although repeatedly ordered by Grant to pursue—He finally obeys—Pursuit ineffectual—Return of Rosecrans—Results of Iuka and Corinth—Rosecrans relieved and promoted—Relations of Grant with other officers—Reflections—Grant suggests movement against Vicksburg.

THE results of the battle of Shiloh were not all military. Incorrect accounts were circulated throughout the North; those who had seen only what occurred at the rear, misrepresented the actions at the front; others, who were in a single part of the field, attempted to give accurate descriptions of the whole, which they had no opportunities of knowing. General Buell and some of his officers, arriving late and seeing only the fugitives at the Landing, thought and said that the entire Army of the Tennessee was overwhelmed and disgraced; and for a long while the

country was ignorant whether or not a great disaster had occurred. Rumors^a were industriously spread that Sherman had been surprised, that Prentiss was captured early in the morning, and in his shirt; that Grant was drunk, and that Buell was purposely dilatory. The country believed many of these rumors, and in the West especially, the outcry was fierce. The newspapers took up the theme; congressmen and politicians, some of them doubtless with pure intentions, and believing that they were seeking the best interests of the country, beset the President to relieve Grant entirely from command, and the fame that arose from Donelson was obscured by the unmerited odium of Shiloh.

Even Grant's military superiors seemed affected by the clamor. General Halleck, removing his headquarters to the field, superseded Grant, who was left second in command, it is true, but was quite ignored in all the operations of the next two months. The army was reënforced and divided into three corps, the right, left, and centre, of which Thomas, Pope, and Buell were placed in immediate command, while McClelland had the reserve. Grant still ostensibly commanded the District of West Tennessee, including his old army, which, however, was broken up into the right wing and reserve, and was therefore directly under Thomas and McClelland. Although the corps commanders were his subordinates, orders were constantly sent direct to them without Grant's being made acquainted with their contents, and movements were even executed by his own troops without his knowledge. In the army his situation was universally regarded as one of disgrace.* This

* I joined the army before Corinth, in May, 1862, as aide-de-camp

was by very far the most disagreeable period in his entire career.

The national army moved slowly up towards Corinth from the battle-field of Shiloh, after Halleck arrived, making no advance except when protected by intrenchments. This was greatly to the dissatisfaction of both officers and men, to whom such operations were new, and seemed to savor of timidity. But Halleck had derived a lesson from the assaults of Shiloh, and the outcry in consequence; he was determined not to be attacked unawares, and collected his forces from every quarter of his immense department, concentrating a hundred and twenty thousand bayonets; * yet it took him six weeks to advance less than fifteen miles, the enemy in all that while making no offensive movement; on the contrary, the rebels constructed defences still more elaborate than those behind which Halleck advanced. Beauregard's strength was estimated at seventy thousand; he himself reported it at forty-seven thousand, and the officers and men of the national army were anxious to avail themselves of their vast superiority in numbers. They believed, correctly, as was afterwards proved, that Beauregard was moving his troops from Corinth with a view to divide, and not to concentrate them. Grant shared this belief, and expressed it. Late in May, he was at Halleck's headquarters, when the probability of an evacuation of Corinth was discussed, and then made the only suggestion he ventured to offer during the siege. He recommended that an attack should be made on the extreme right of the

to a division commander, and at once noticed the general impressior among officers that Grant was under a cloud.

* See field returns of Halleck's forces at Corinth.

national line, west of W. T. Sherman's division. The enemy's defences in front of this point, he deemed defective, and urged an assault with a view of turning the rebel line, and then moving to the left and sweeping the entire field. But Halleck scouted the idea, intimating that Grant's opinions need not be expressed until they were called for. In accordance with this intimation, Grant did not again obtrude them.

On the 30th of May, Halleck announced to his command: "There is every indication that the enemy will attack our left this morning,"* and the largest army ever assembled west of the Alleghanies, was accordingly drawn out in line of battle, awaiting an assault. But the rebels had already slipped out of Corinth, on the southern road, leaving wooden guns† and barren defences to impose as long as possible on their enemy. Early in the day, however, the nakedness of the works and the silence of the batteries were discovered, and the national forces marched unmolested into the town. Beauregard's movement had begun several days before; his orders for the evacuation were dated the 20th of May, and his plans for the retreat, picked up among the wrecks of his camps, disclosed the fact that he had been striving to elude Halleck since the 9th of the same month.‡ Soon

* "There is every indication that the enemy will attack our left this morning, as troops have been moving in that direction for some time. It will be well to make preparation to send as many of the reserves as can be spared of the right wing in that direction, as soon as an attack is made in force. At any rate be prepared for an order to that effect."

† I saw many wooden guns in the works at Corinth, when Beauregard abandoned the place.

‡ On one of the first days of June, 1862, a paper was forwarded by Brigadier-General Speed S. Fry, a brigade commander, to his imme-

after entering the works, Grant rode to the rebel left, and satisfied himself beyond all doubt, that had an assault on Sherman's front been ordered, a good general could have demolished the rebel army. This was by far the weakest point of Beauregard's line, and in exactly the position to be susceptible to such an attack as Grant had recommended, in vain.

A great battle, which had been expected as the result of the collection of two vast armies at an important strategic point, was thus avoided—a battle which, if fought, could not have failed to prove fatal to the rebels. The enemy, however, abandoned the object of the campaign without the hazard of a fight, not choosing to risk the position and the army too. Shiloh had, indeed, been fought for the salvation of Corinth—fought and lost by the rebels, two months before, and the march of the national army from Pittsburg, was nothing more nor less than the pursuit of the rebel forces, beaten and demoralized during the second day's fight at Shiloh. The enemy, how-

diately superior, Brigadier-General T. W. Sherman, commanding a division in the Army of the Tennessee. General Sherman the same day sent it by me, to General Pope's headquarters in the field. It read as follows:

“(Confidential.)

“HEADQUARTERS, CORINTH, May 9, 1862.

“GENERAL: In case we have to retire from this position, your army will follow the best road in the direction of Kossuth, *via* the Female College; and when about two or three miles from that town, a part of your forces, say a corps, will move to Danville, and another corps will move on the road to Kossuth, until it meets the one to Rienzi, when it will move on to the latter place. Depots of provisions, etc., have been made at Okolona and Columbus.

“One of your divisions or corps can continue to Ripley, thence to Oxford, and thence to Grenada, for the protection of that depot.

“—————, General Commanding.

“To General B. BRAGG, Commanding Army of the Mississippi. (For the information of Major-General Van Dorn.)”

ever, being unmolested in his retreat, had rallied in a concentrated manner at Corinth, and in an order agreeable to the best rules of the art. He was followed by an army very materially reënforced after the victory of April 7th. All the time was taken that a new and unexplored country required, to develop its facilities for successful combat; every precaution was observed, to avoid the evil results of any suddenly offensive movement which the rebels might at any moment be inspired to make; miles and miles of intrenchments were successively thrown up and occupied; roads were cut in every conceivable direction, to facilitate the combined movements in the attack of a large army, or to secure a safe retreat in case of reverse.

In the mean while, the enemy surrounded his point of defence with an immense show of intrenchments and fortifications, and vaunted his readiness to receive combat at any moment; when, in fact, his parade of batteries, artillery, and magazines was little more than counterfeit, and his immense lines of earth-work remained as a mockery to his ability and his industry, unless the alternative is accepted that he never intended to defend them; for the moment he discovered Halleck ready to strike, he resumed his retreat, more demoralized than when he commenced it. The plan of his withdrawal seemed expressly calculated to facilitate the national forces in a successful pursuit: the roads were in admirable condition, and the country abounded in water; the troops were as anxious now to follow as they had been to fight during the siege. But the demoralized condition of the rebels, and the separation of their retreating forces, seemed not to be comprehended. The reports

of deserters and prisoners, daily coming inside the national lines, were apparently set at naught;* nothing but a vast offensive power seemed to loom up before the magnified vision of the commander of this grand army; and an attack from the rebels was apparently the one thing apprehended by Halleck, from the time he set out from Pittsburg up to the final point of the pursuit.†

To cap the climax, Pope and Buell were successively sent out after the enemy. Buell was the ranking officer, and eventually took command. He formed a solid defensive line of battle, seventy thousand strong, reaching across the country from the vicinity of Booneville towards Blackland, at a moment when

* In a report of the operations of his division during the siege of Corinth, Brigadier-General T. W. Sherman speaks thus of a reconnoissance in force made by his command on the 15th of May: "The result of this reconnoissance was reported to your headquarters" [those of Major-General Thomas, commanding right wing], "together with the information obtained from the prisoners, among which was the important fact that the rebel commander had issued orders the day before, that all baggage of the troops, except what could be carried in knapsacks, was to be immediately sent by the Mobile and Ohio railroad to Okolona."

A private note from General Sherman, of October 18, 1866, states: "My report is not sufficiently strong in the case of the information obtained in my reconnoissance on the 15th of May. All the men who were taken equally declared that General Beauregard had issued an order the day before, for all property at Corinth, except the contents of the knapsacks and a certain amount of provisions, to be sent down to Okolona. A written report was made to me of this fact, and the prisoners were sent forward to confirm the statement."

† Many of the points in the criticism of this campaign were suggested to me at the time by a report of Brigadier-General T. W. Sherman, on whose staff I was then serving in Halleck's army. The report was forwarded through the regular channel, but returned to its author, with a rebuke for indulging in criticism of his commanding officer. If the rebuke was just, the criticism is equally so, and proves that from various points of view the same conclusion was reached, in regard to this campaign.

it was obvious to his entire command that the bulk of the enemy's force had passed on, leaving a river behind, protected by an insignificant rear-guard. The seventy thousand remained two days, awaiting an assault from the retreating twenty thousand, and then, as it was discovered that the enemy had again escaped, the command was ordered back to Corinth, having marched out about thirty miles. During all these operations, Grant had been left in camp.

The ineffectual pursuit was terminated by the 10th of June, and Buell was then sent towards Chattanooga, the great strategic point in East Tennessee. Grant retained command of the District of West Tennessee, and made his headquarters at Memphis, which had fallen into the hands of the national forces, on the 6th of June, as the result of a fierce naval fight on the Mississippi river. At about the same time, Beauregard was relieved by Bragg, who soon afterwards started with a large force for Chattanooga, to intercept Buell.

And thus the great and tangible success, which was thrown so directly in General Halleck's path that it seemed impossible for any one even to avoid a victory, was allowed, nay, compelled, in his unskilful grasp, to dissolve away, like a shadow in the hands of him who stretches out to embrace what is not. Even after the rebels had eluded him at Corinth, it was possible, with Halleck's immense preponderance of force, to follow up and destroy the retreating enemy; and when this opportunity was also lost, by his subordinate and counterpart, the army that had been concentrated with so much care and labor, was still available for a concentrated campaign. Vicksburg was within reach, and comparatively de-

fenceless; a force might easily have been sent direct to its rear, and found no enemy of importance on the road; and the long expenditure of time and blood, the weary months spent in the amphibious siege, the unsuccessful assaults, might all have been saved. If Chattanooga was deemed the more important objective, Halleck had forces at his control sufficient to secure its possession, besides retaining every rood he had already acquired. He might have sent with Buell, men enough to place the seizure of that key to Eastern Tennessee beyond a doubt, and so have prevented the disasters both of Buell and Rosecrans's Chattanooga campaigns, and forestalled those other events, which, nearly two years later, made Grant, Halleck's own successor in supreme command.

But the great army was broken up, without having achieved any thing besides the occupation of a single town, which was indeed a strategic and important point; but none of the positive strategic advantages which its possession promised, were obtained. For a while, Halleck interrupted the rebel communications, and warded off attacks on his own rear; but Corinth, having once been acquired, never afterwards presented a single offensive advantage, which the general who captured it suggested or procured.

In July, Pope was ordered to Virginia, and on the 17th of that month, Halleck was assigned to the command of all the armies, superseding McClellan. He repaired at once to Washington, and Grant was directed to establish his headquarters at Corinth. Grant's jurisdiction was not, however, enlarged by the promotion of Halleck: on the contrary, the new general-in-chief first offered the command of the Army of the Tennessee to Colonel Robert Allen, a quarter-

master, who declined it, whereupon it was allowed to remain under Grant.* He was, however, left somewhat more independent than while Halleck had been immediately present in the field.

Four divisions of his army (including Thomas's command), were within the next two months ordered to Buell, who was stretching out slowly, like a huge, unwieldy snake, from Eastport to Decatur, and from Decatur towards Chattanooga. This subtraction put Grant entirely on the defensive. He had possession of Corinth,† the strategic point, but was obliged to hold the railroads from that place and Bolivar, north to Columbus, which last, on account of the low water in the Tennessee, he had made his base of supplies. His task was a difficult one, in the face of an enemy nearly his equal in numbers, and who, having no fear of Grant's advance, was able to concentrate his own forces so as to threaten either of three important points, Corinth, Bolivar, or Jackson, in Tennessee.

* A letter from General Allen, dated July 9th, 1866, says: "I had joined General Halleck a short time subsequent to the fall of Corinth, and was attached to his immediate command, when he received his appointment of general-in-chief, with orders to repair at once to Washington. Shortly after he came to my tent. . . . After a somewhat protracted conversation he turned to me and said: 'Now what can I do for *you*?' I replied that I did not know that he could do any thing. 'Yes,' he rejoined, 'I can give you command of this army.' I replied: 'I have not rank.' 'That,' said he, 'can easily be obtained.' I do not remember exactly what my reply was to this, but it was to the effect that I doubted the expediency of such a measure, identified as I was with the enormous business and expenditures of the quartermaster's department, from which it was almost impracticable to relieve me at that time. Other reasons were mentioned, and he did not press the subject. It is true that I was congratulated on the prospect of succeeding to the command, before I had mentioned the subject of this interview."

† The map of Operations in Kentucky and Tennessee illustrates this position.

Memphis was safe enough under Sherman, but Grant had to keep open his communication with that officer, by way of Columbus and the Mississippi. I have heard him describe his situation at this time, as quite as difficult and annoying as any that he held during the war. This was, indeed, the only period during the war, when he was for any length of time obliged to act on the defensive.

Jackson, in Tennessee, is at the junction of the Mississippi Central and the Mobile and Ohio railroads, and forms the apex of an irregular triangle, of which Corinth may be considered another angle, while Bolivar, to the west, is the third. After leaving a sufficient force for the defence of Memphis, Grant concentrated at these three points, as many of his troops as he could spare from guarding the rivers and railroads in his command. He remained himself eight weeks at Corinth, narrowly watching the enemy, who, commanded by Van Dorn and Price, harassed and threatened him continually. During this time, he directed the strengthening and remodeling of the fortifications of Corinth, which, although incomplete towards the west and north, were yet too extensive for defence by any but an enormous garrison. New works, closer to the town, were accordingly erected, under the supervision of Captain Prime, Grant's engineer officer, Major-General Ord being in command of the troops. Events rendered these works of great importance before many weeks had passed.

The attention of the country was, at this period, turned almost exclusively and with painful interest, to operations further east. In Virginia, McClellan and Pope were superseding each other and losing

battles and campaigns by turns, under Halleck's supreme command; while in Tennessee, Bragg, who had outmarched and outmanœuvred Buell, reaching Chattanooga first, though starting last, was now racing with the same rival for Louisville and the Ohio. The North was thus threatened with invasion in Maryland and in Ohio at the same time. Every man that it was thought possible to take from Grant, had been sent to Buell, and the former was left to shift for himself, almost without troops, and (fortunately for the country), almost without orders.

Van Dorn at last determined to move part of his force (under Price), east of Grant, apparently with a view to crossing the Tennessee, and reënforcing Bragg in the Kentucky campaign. Grant notified Halleck of the probability of such a movement, and of his intention to prevent it, and was immediately warned by his chief to leave nothing undone to avert the catastrophe. Grant's dispatches at this time bear witness to the constant anxiety the rebels occasioned him, and to the necessity for a sleepless and stubborn vigilance. On the 9th of September, he said: "Should the enemy come, I will be as ready as possible with the means at hand. I do not believe that a force can be brought against us at present that cannot be successfully resisted."

On the 13th, Price advanced from the south and seized Iuka, twenty-one miles east of Corinth; Colonel Murphy, who was in command, making no resistance, but evacuating the place on the approach of the enemy. Grant telegraphed to Halleck on the 15th: "If I can, I will attack Price before he crosses Bear creek. If he can be beaten there, it will prevent the design either to go north, or to unite forces

and attack here." Grant had called in his forces some days before to the vicinity of Corinth, had repeatedly cautioned all his commanders to hold their troops in readiness, and when the enemy's cavalry moved towards Iuka, and cut the railroad and telegraph wires between that place and Burnsville, seven miles to the westward, Grant began his operations. Price was at Iuka, and Van Dorn four days off, to the southwest, threatening Corinth. Grant's object was to destroy Price, before the two could concentrate, and then to get back to Corinth and protect it against Van Dorn.

He accordingly ordered Brigadier-General Rosecrans, whose troops were posted south of Corinth, to move by way of Rienzi, along the south side of the Memphis and Charleston railroad, and attack Iuka from that direction; while Major-General Ord, with a force brought hurriedly from Bolivar and Jackson, was to push towards Burnsville, and from there take roads on the north side of the railroad, attacking Iuka from that quarter. Ord had eight thousand men, and Rosecrans reported nine thousand, a greater force combined than Price had, according to Grant's estimate. Rosecrans suggested that his force should move northward from its eastern march in two columns, one on the Jacinto, the other on the Fulton road, in order to occupy Price's only line of retreat. To this Grant assented, and remained himself at Burnsville, where he could direct both wings of his army. He also kept Ord's troops at Burnsville as long as possible, with a train of empty cars, ready to hurry them back to Corinth, in case Van Dorn should attack that place, where all the national supplies and munitions were stored.

On the 18th of September, Ord was pushed forward to within four miles of Iuka, where he found the enemy in force, on the north side of the town; and the same day, Rosecrans reported to Grant his readiness "to move up as close as we can to-night. . . Ord to advance from Burnsville, commence the attack and draw their attention that way, while I move in on the Jacinto and Fulton roads, massing heavily on the Fulton road, and crushing in their left, cutting off their retreat eastward. I propose to move in ten minutes for Jacinto." Grant ordered him to advance rapidly, and "let us do to-morrow all we can; it may be necessary to fall back the day following." The falling back was in the event of Van Dorn's attacking Corinth. This dispatch was dated fifteen minutes before seven p. m.; but, after midnight, Rosecrans sent word that he had been detained, and was still twenty miles from Iuka, and could not "be in," before one or two o'clock the next afternoon, the roads being in bad condition and the country thickly wooded. This greatly disappointed Grant, who had expected to fight on the morrow, early, and had supposed Rosecrans to be by this time far on his way to Iuka. He consequently directed Ord, who was quite ready to bring on an engagement in an hour's time, not to attack from the north until Rosecrans arrived, or until he should hear firing to the south. Rosecrans was notified, by his return messenger, of this change in Ord's instructions; but owing to the density of the forests and the difficulty of crossing the small streams and bottoms, all communication between Grant and Rosecrans was circuitous and delayed.

By half-past four, on the afternoon of the 19th, Rosecrans, making a forced march, had arrived within

two miles of Iuka, moving only on the Jacinto or western road. A little north of Barnett's, the rebels were posted in force, and, unexpectedly to Rosecrans, they attacked the head of his marching column, driving it in, and checking his advance. The front was narrow, interrupted by ravines, and covered with a dense undergrowth; the enemy's position, on a hill, commanded the road by which the national forces were moving, and Rosecrans, not being able to develop his troops, lost a battery of artillery, the only one he got into action, besides seven hundred and thirty-six men in killed and wounded. The fighting was heavy, though confined almost entirely to Hamilton's division. Rosecrans, however, held his own until dark; but at ten and a half that night, he sent word to Grant, who was still at Burnsville, that it would be necessary to "attack in the morning and in force." "Push in on to them," he said, "until we can have time to do something." *

Owing to the difficulties in communication, Grant did not receive this dispatch until thirty-five minutes past eight, on the morning of the 20th, but the same moment he sent word to Ord, to attack as soon as possible, saying: "Unless you can create a diversion in Rosecrans's favor, he may find his hands full." The wind had blown heavily to the south

* "HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, TWO MILES }
SOUTH OF IUKA, September 19, 1862—10½ P. M. }

"Major-General U. S. GRANT:

"GENERAL—We met the enemy in force just above this point. The engagement lasted several hours. We have lost two or three pieces of artillery. Firing was very heavy. You must attack in the morning and in force. The ground is horrid, unknown to us, and no room for development. Couldn't use our artillery at all; fired but few shots. Push in on to them until we can have time to do something. We will try to get a position on our right which will take Iuka.

"W. S. ROSECRANS, *Brigadier-General*."

and east the day before, and no sound of the firing had reached Ord; during the night, however, he had got word of the battle from negroes, and so pushed on towards the town, in the morning, in advance of Grant's order. Soon afterwards, Grant himself learned that the enemy was in full retreat; had in fact left Iuka during the night, on the Fulton road, which it had been expressly arranged that Rosecrans was to occupy with Hamilton's division. Getting up late, however, he had failed to do this, and the rebels discovering how nearly they were surrounded by the concentration of Grant's forces, held Rosecrans in check on one road and escaped by night on the other, taking with them every thing except their wounded, and the artillery they had captured the day before. When Grant arrived at Iuka, at nine o'clock A. M., the pursuit was not yet begun. He at once gave orders to follow, but the enemy had already got so far that it was found impossible now to overtake him. This of course defeated Grant's plan of capturing or destroying Price's entire force. The Fulton road was the only avenue left open to the rebels, and had it also been closed, the result would have been complete. But if Price had intended to make his way across the Tennessee, or to hold his own until Van Dorn could come up, and then make a simultaneous attack on Corinth, he was foiled.*

* Since the close of the war, Colonel Thompson, late of the rebel army, has stated to General Ord, his brother-in-law, that the movement of Rosecrans on a single road, his strength and the condition of his force, and the fact that the Fulton road, south, was left open, were betrayed to Price, on the afternoon of the fight, by Dr. Burton, a rebel assistant surgeon of Claiborne's regiment. This doctor informed Colonel Thompson that he had secured the confidence of Rosecrans, and been employed by him as a scout and spy; had remained with him on the 19th, until he saw the route pursued by Rosecrans towards Iuka,

Rosecrans reported the rebel loss at Iuka at fourteen hundred and thirty-eight.*

By the battle of Iuka, the enemy was simply checked in his plans, not seriously crippled in his force. Price moved around by a circuitous route and joined Van Dorn, and the same state of affairs continued, which had annoyed Grant for so many weeks. He put Rosecrans in command at Corinth, and Ord at Bolivar, and on the 23d of September, removed his own headquarters to Jackson, from which point he could communicate more readily with all points of his district, including Memphis and Cairo. The rebels were in force at La Grange and Ripley, and threatened both Bolivar and Corinth, and Grant was obliged to be in readiness at either place. Troops were still being detached from his command, notwithstanding these emergencies, and, on the 1st of October, he telegraphed to Washington: "My position is precarious, but I hope to get out of it all right."

At last, it was rendered certain, by the removal of Price's cavalry from La Grange to Ripley, that Corinth was to be the place of attack. Grant thereupon directed Rosecrans to call in his forces, and sent Brigadier-General McPherson to his support from Jackson, with a brigade of troops hastily got together. The enemy evidently intended to attack on the northern side of the town, facing east and south, and cutting off Rosecrans from all reinforcements ;

and the condition of his column. He then left the national army, and hurried into town to give the information to Price. That general at once withdrew all his force from Ord's front, and attacked and held Rosecrans, coming up from the south on one road, while the rebels evacuated the town, passing within a mile and a half of Rosecrans, on the other.

* I have seen no rebel official statement of Price's loss.

so Grant hurried Ord and Hurlbut by way of Pocahontas from Bolivar, forty-four miles away, to be ready to strike Van Dorn in flank or rear, as he advanced, and at least to create a diversion, if they could not get into the town.

On the 2d of October the rebel array, under Van Dorn, Price, Lovell, Villepigue, and Rust, appeared in front of Corinth. There was some preliminary skirmishing on that day, and, on the 3d, the fighting began in earnest. Rosecrans had about nineteen thousand men, and the enemy had collected thirty-eight thousand* for this important movement, which was to determine the possession of northern Mississippi and West Tennessee. Rosecrans pushed out about five miles, towards Chewalla, Grant having ordered him to attack, if opportunity offered; but the enemy began the fight, and, on the afternoon of the 3d, the battle turned in favor of Van Dorn. Rosecrans was driven back to his defences on the north side of Corinth, and it was now found how important was the labor bestowed on these fortifications, by Grant's order, a month previous. The enemy was checked until morning; but, early on the 4th, the whole rebel army, flushed with the success of the day before, assaulted the works. The fighting was fierce; the rebels charging almost into the town, when an unexpected fire from the forts drove them back in confusion. Again and again, they advanced to the works, but each time were received with a determination equal to their own. Once, the national troops came near giving way entirely, but Rosecrans rallied

* Rosecrans states the enemy's force to have been thirty-eight thousand "by their own accounts." I am unable to say how he learned this.

them in person, and the rebels were finally repulsed before noon, with a loss admitted by themselves to be double that of Rosecrans.*

The national loss was three hundred and fifteen killed, eighteen hundred and twelve wounded, and two hundred and thirty-two prisoners and missing. Rosecrans reported the rebel dead at fourteen hundred and twenty-three, and took two thousand two hundred and twenty-five prisoners, representing sixty-nine regiments and thirteen light batteries; many of the prisoners were wounded. The disparity in losses was doubtless occasioned by the fact that a portion of the national troops fought behind intrenched batteries.

McPherson arrived from Jackson during the fight, coming up in the rear of the enemy; and, being unable to get to the support of the garrison in any other way, made a brilliant march around the rebel flank, bringing in his brigade, at the close of the battle, on the right of Rosecrans. His presence, then, was too late to have more than a moral effect, but the enemy knew of his approach, and had also encountered the advance of Hurlbut's column, the day before. The knowledge of these reënforcements, however, seemed only to stimulate Van Dorn to a more desperate effort. The repulse was complete, by eleven o'clock in the morning, but unfortunately was not followed up by Rosecrans, till the next day. The rebels, however, started off in haste and disorder immediately after the fight; and on the 5th, while in full retreat, were

* In Van Dorn and Lovell's commands alone, the rebels lost five thousand four hundred and twenty-eight men; of whom more than three thousand were killed or wounded. I can find no return of Price's loss; and no complete rebel report of the battles of Iuka or Corinth is in possession of the government.

struck in flank, as Grant had planned, by Hurlbut and Ord, and the disaster was rendered final.

This occurred early on the morning of the 5th, at the crossing of the Hatchie river, about ten miles from Corinth. The retreating force fell in with Ord's column, four thousand strong, just beyond Davis's bridge. The rebel advance got across the river without resistance, but was speedily driven back, and with loss; a battery of artillery and several hundred men were captured, and the advance was dispersed or drowned. Ord pushed on in pursuit, passed over the bridge, and met the whole of Van Dorn's column, on the other side; but, though not strong enough to attack the entire rebel army even in retreat, Ord held the crossing, and obliged the enemy, who had no time to spare, to make a detour of six or seven miles, before he could reach another bridge. Ord was seriously wounded in the fight, and the command then devolved on Hurlbut, who did not attempt a pursuit.

Grant had notified Rosecrans, in advance, of the movement of Hurlbut and Ord, and, anticipating the victory at Corinth, had directed that commander to push on instantly after his success, if necessary, even to Bolivar; for, if Ord's little force encountered the whole rebel army, the danger would be great, unless Rosecrans followed up rapidly. But the troops were fatigued by two days' fight, and Rosecrans contented himself with riding over the field to announce in person his victory. At noon of the 4th, he gave directions to rest that day, and move in pursuit on the morrow.* When he reported his action to Grant,

* "I rode all over our lines announcing the result of the fight in person, and notified our victorious troops that after two days' fighting, two almost sleepless nights of preparation, movements, and march, I

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U. S. Grant
General

the latter, greatly disappointed at the delay, again issued peremptory orders to push on at once after the enemy.

Rosecrans started out on the morning of the 5th, but was misinformed or misled, and took the road towards Chewalla, instead of that further south, by which the enemy had moved. After marching about eight miles out of the way, he discovered his blunder, and turned his column towards the Hatchie. Meanwhile, the fight with Ord for the crossing had occurred, and the rebels had been driven six miles away, to a second bridge higher up the stream. This bridge, at Crum's mills, was narrow and long, and stretched over a wide and swampy bottom, impassable for troops. It, in fact, formed a defile, along which the entire rebel army was obliged to march. Had Rosecrans moved promptly the day before, he would have come up in the rear of Van Dorn, either as he was fighting Ord, or while attempting to pass this defile. In either event, the destruction of the rebels must have been complete; but the national forces arrived at the Hatchie, just as the rear-guard of the enemy had crossed. Rosecrans, from here, sent word again to Grant of the condition of affairs, and Grant decided that the favorable opportunity had been lost; Rosecrans, however, now urged that he should be permitted to advance, but Grant declined to allow it. He considered that Van Dorn had got too much of a start to leave any well-founded hope of overtaking him, especially as heavy rains had set in, rendering the roads almost impassable. The

wished them to replenish their cartridge-boxes, haversacks, and stomachs, take early sleep, and start in pursuit by daylight."—*Rosecrans's Report.*

troops were without supplies, and, at that time, the secret of living from an enemy's country had not been learned. Rosecrans was therefore recalled, having marched out from Corinth about thirty miles, but not caught up with the enemy.*

In both the battles of Iuka and Corinth, Grant directed the movements, until the troops arrived in the actual presence of the enemy, although in the former, he was about eight miles from the field, and in the latter, nearly forty. As has been shown, he was not always obeyed.

These two fights relieved the command of West Tennessee from all immediate danger, and recalled the attention of the country and the government to this portion of the theatre of war. The disasters at the East were in a measure retrieved, by the Western successes, and the public feeling was improved. Grant, however, did not receive the credit which was his due for conceiving and directing the movements; but Rosecrans was made a major-general of volunteers, and ordered to the command of the Army of the Cumberland. This change, though not suggested by Grant, gave him great relief, as the subordinate had disappointed the expectations of his superior.

The truth is, that Grant's extreme simplicity of behavior and directness of expression imposed on

* An intercepted letter from a spy of Van Dorn, a young woman named Burton, residing in Corinth, was written before the reconstruction of the fortifications in September. This communication described the weakness of the northwest front, and declared, what was then true, that the principal works were too far out for defence, and that the troops were all on the southern side. The letter was copied, and forwarded by General Ord to its original destination, and great pains were taken thereafter to prevent the transmission of further information. The rebel attack, on the front indicated by Miss Burton, suggests that Van Dorn may have acted on her reports, to his own destruction.

various officers, both above and below him. They thought him a good, plain man, who had blundered into one or two successes, and, who, therefore, could not be immediately removed; but they deemed it unnecessary to regard his judgment, or to count upon his ability. His superiors made their plans invariably without consulting him, and his subordinates sometimes sought to carry out their own campaigns, in opposition or indifference to his orders, not doubting, that, with their superior intelligence, they could conceive and execute triumphs which would excuse or even vindicate their course. It is impossible to understand the early history of the war, without taking it into account, that neither the government nor its important commanders gave Grant credit for intellectual ability or military genius.

His other qualities were also rated low. Because he was patient, some thought it impossible to provoke him; and because of his calmness, it was supposed that he was stolid. In battle, or in campaigning, he did not seem to care or consider so much what the enemy was doing as what he himself meant to do; and this trait, to enthusiastic and even brilliant soldiers, appeared inexplicable. A great commander, it was imagined, should be nervous, excitable, inspiring his men and captivating his officers; calling private soldiers by their names, making eloquent addresses in the field, and waving his drawn sword in battle. Great commanders had done all these things, and won; and many men, who could do all these things, fancied themselves therefore great commanders. Others imagined wisdom to consist in science alone; they sought success in learned and elaborate plans, requiring months to develop when the enemy

was immediately before them; they manœuvred when it was the time to fight; they intrenched when they should have attacked, and studied their books when the field should have been their only problem.

Grant was like none of these. If he possessed acquirements, he appeared unconscious of them; he made no allusion to the schools, and never hesitated to transgress their rules, when the occasion seemed to him to demand it. So, he neither won men's hearts by blandishments, nor affected their imaginations by brilliancy of behavior; nor did he seem profound, to those who are impressed only by a display of learning. All these things should be appreciated by those who seek to understand his character or career.

In the latter part of October, reënforcements having been sent him from the Northwest, he suggested to Halleck a movement into the interior of Mississippi, with a view to the capture of Vicksburg.

CHAPTER V.

Military importance of the Mississippi river—Grant proposes movement into interior, against Vicksburg—Campaign begun—McClelland endeavors to obtain command of an expedition against Vicksburg—Grant moves to Holly Springs—Enemy retreats—Rebels desert their fortifications on the Tallahatchie—Co-operative movement from Helena—Grant advances to Oxford—Sherman sent to Memphis—McClelland assigned to command of river expedition by the President—Sherman moves by river against Vicksburg—Grant's communications cut and Holly Springs captured—Grant lives off the country—Re-opens his communications—Sherman's assault on Vicksburg—Repulse of Sherman—McClelland takes command of river expedition—Capture of Arkansas Post—Grant falls back to Memphis—Extraordinary behavior of McClelland—Grant takes command of river expedition—Protest of McClelland.

THE transcendent importance of the Mississippi river had been manifest from the beginning of the war, to both belligerents. Fertilizing an area of thirteen hundred thousand square miles, or six times as large as the empire of France, receiving the waters of fifty-seven large, navigable streams, washing the shores of ten different states, to one of which it gives its name, forming at once the boundary and the connecting link between territory both free and slave, the natural outlet through which the products of the Northwest find their way to the sea—in a word, the grandest water-course on either continent—its possession was by far the most magnificent prize for which

the nation and the rebels were contending. It completely divides the great region that formed the battle-ground of the rebellion, and was indispensable alike to the political or military success of the enterprise. Without it, the so-called Confederacy was cut in twain; with it, the rebellious states were allied by a bond that must be broken, or the North was crippled almost to its ruin.

During the progress of the war, the Mississippi acquired additional importance; it afforded the rebels, blockaded by sea, and shut in by a cordon of armies on the north, their only constant medium of communication with the outside world (across their southwestern frontier); and, more important still, the only avenue by which supplies of cattle for their immense armies, could be obtained. Texas is the only beef-growing country of the entire Southwest, and had thus far proved to the rebels an inexhaustible resource; from no other portion of the attempted Confederacy, could supplies of such consequence be procured. This tangible and practical advantage would be entirely lost, when the control of the Mississippi river was gone; and no consideration had greater weight with the rebel leaders than this, in the long and gallant defence they made for their main artery of supply.

Accordingly, the insurgents early seized the most important positions along the river, and, with a keen appreciation of their natural advantages, fortified Columbus, Fort Pillow, Island Number Ten, Vicksburg, and later, Port Hudson. The first three of these places had fallen, in the spring of 1862; but Vicksburg, situated at a remarkable bend in the river, and on one of the few bluffs that mark its

course, was rendered one of the strongest fortified places in America. In June, 1862, after the capture of New Orleans, a combined expedition moved up the river, under Commodore Farragut and Brigadier-General Thomas Williams, who found no difficulty in making their way as far as Vicksburg, five hundred and thirty miles from the sea; there, however, they were checked. A bombardment by the naval force proving ineffectual, part of the fleet ran by the batteries. The troops did not attack the town, but were occupied for several weeks opposite Vicksburg in cutting a canal across the peninsula, formed by the bend in the stream. It was hoped by this canal to divert the waters of the Mississippi from their ordinary channel, and leave the town several miles inland. The attempt was unsuccessful; and the troops and seamen suffering greatly from heat and the diseases incident to the climate, the expedition returned to New Orleans. Since then, the rebels had strengthened the fortifications of the place, both on the land and water sides, until they finally came to believe that Vicksburg was impregnable; and so indeed it proved, to every actual assault.

When General Halleck was ordered to Washington, in July, 1862, to assume command of all the armies, he told Grant that he would prefer to remain in the Department of the Mississippi; that he had been working on a definite plan ever since he had commanded the department; that all he had done had been in pursuance of this plan, and if permitted, he would return to fulfil it. What the plan was he did not disclose. Until after the battles of Iuka and Corinth, Grant was too constantly on the defensive, to undertake any movement of an aggressive

character. Those battles occurred in September and October; and, on the 25th of the latter month, he assumed command of the Department of the Tennessee, which included Cairo, Forts Henry and Donelson, northern Mississippi, and the portions of Kentucky and Tennessee west of the Tennessee river.

The next day he wrote to Halleck: "You never have suggested to me any plan of operations in this department. . . . As situated now, with no more troops, I can do nothing but defend my positions, and I do not feel at liberty to abandon any of them, without first consulting you." He then proposed the abandonment of Corinth, the destruction of all the railroads branching out from that place, the reopening of the road from Humboldt to Memphis, and the concentration of the troops from Corinth and Bolivar, and "with small reënforcements at Memphis, I think I would be able to move down the Mississippi Central road, and cause the evacuation of Vicksburg." This was the first mention, in the correspondence of the two commanders, of the place destined afterwards to become so renowned. Grant continued: "I am ready, however, to do with all my might whatever you may direct, without criticism."

The plan here proposed implied relying exclusively on the Mississippi, and the railroads leading east from that river, for all communication and supplies. It involved, also, the abandonment of lines and places that had been carried and maintained only by a lavish expenditure of time, and labor, and lives. But General Halleck's strategy was always based on a great appreciation of the value of places, while Grant, as has been seen, made armies rather than places the objects of his campaigns. The minds

of the two soldiers were differently constituted; they looked at most military matters with different eyes. Halleck set so high a value on what had already been obtained, especially after sacrifice, that he seemed unwilling to risk the actual prize for the sake of securing another. Grant believed that, in war, what is won is only a fulcrum on which to rest the lever for another effort. One was essentially a defensive, the other an offensive general; one always prepared for defeat, the other always expected to win. So, the day after Grant's suggestion of an advance, Halleck telegraphed: "Be prepared to concentrate your troops in case of an attack."

This caution, however, was not in reply to Grant's letter; and receiving no answer, the latter announced from Jackson, on the 2d of November: "I have commenced a movement on Grand Junction, with three divisions from Corinth and two from Bolivar. Will leave here to-morrow and take command in person. If found practicable, I will go to Holly Springs, and, may be, Grenada, completing railroad and telegraph as I go." Holly Springs is on the Mississippi Central railroad, twenty-five miles from Grand Junction, and about half way to the Tallahatchie river. The distance to Grenada from Grand Junction is one hundred miles. General Pemberton, having superseded Van Dorn, who remained to serve under him, was at this time in command of the forces opposed to Grant, and had fortified strongly on the Tallahatchie, his advance, however, reaching as far north as La Grange and Grand Junction. When Halleck received word that Grant had absolutely started south, he telegraphed: "I approve of your plan of advancing upon the enemy as soon as you are strong

enough for that purpose;" but he did not authorize the abandonment of any of Grant's positions, and the latter was therefore obliged to hold them all.

On the 4th of November, he had seized La Grange and Grand Junction, and announced: "My moving force will be about thirty thousand men." McPherson commanded his right wing, and C. S. Hamilton the left, while Sherman moved out from Memphis to attract attention in that direction. Grant's headquarters were with the main body. On the 8th, he informed Sherman that he estimated the rebels at thirty thousand, and felt "strong enough to handle that number without gloves;" so the demonstration from Memphis was countermanded.

At this time, Major-General McClelland, who had been a subordinate of Grant since the battle of Belmont, was at Washington, making every effort to obtain an independent command in the West. He had been a politician, and a member of Congress from Illinois, as well as an old acquaintance and legal associate of the President; he was a man of moderate ability, of energy and courage, but ignorant of the meaning of military subordination. Ambitious and vain, he expected to step at once to the highest positions in the army, without the knowledge or experience which alone could fit him for important command. He had political and personal influence, however, and made ample use of it. Having served at Belmont, Donelson, and Shiloh, he declared he was tired of furnishing brains for the Army of the Tennessee, and so claimed the command, which he announced, and very possibly believed, was his right. His claims were supported by not a few individuals of consideration at the West; the President favored,

and McClernand was promised, if not that he should supersede Grant, at least that he should be allowed to raise troops for an independent expedition, whose object was the opening of the Mississippi river and the capture of Vicksburg. He made his plans, and submitted them to the President, who approved, and directed McClernand to lay them before the general-in-chief.*

But Halleck was a soldier purely, and had not a particle of sympathy with the personal or political schemes of the ambitious aspirants who swarmed into Washington from every quarter of the North; he was solely and sincerely anxious for military results, and refused to consider McClernand's plan. He told that general that he had not time to waste on such matters, and if he had the time he had not the inclination. So he fought the whole scheme as long and as hard as he could. At this time, too, General Halleck had more consideration with the government than a year later, after his long series of defeats had occurred; he was therefore better able to carry out his own views. The President, however, was the warm friend of McClernand, and was accustomed to dictate in purely military matters as often as in civil ones. It must be said, that the civilians, who controlled military movements, had at this time no warrant for supposing that, even in military matters, their judgments were not as reliable as those of any soldiers who had been prominent. The generals who had enjoyed almost arbitrary power had failed; and it is not surprising that members of the government, who were in a great measure responsible in the eyes of the country

* These assertions of fact are all based on statements capable of verification, but not exclusively derived from official sources.

for whatever occurred, took it upon themselves to decide questions which, for aught that had been proven, they were as capable of deciding as any officer of the army. So the President indorsed McClelland, and the Secretary of War told him to go out West and get his troops together.

Grant as yet knew nothing of all this, except from the gossip of the newspapers; but, on the 5th of November, Halleck asked, evidently referring to the river expedition: "Had not troops sent to reënforce you better go to Memphis hereafter? I hope to give you, twenty thousand additional men in a few days." About the same time, he also informed Grant: "I hope for an active campaign on the Mississippi, this fall; a large force will ascend the river from New Orleans." On the 9th, Grant telegraphed: "Reënforcements are arriving very slowly. If they do not come in more rapidly, I will attack as I am." On the 10th, he got more restive, and inquired: "Am I to understand that I lie here still, while an expedition is fitted out from Memphis, or do you want me to push as far south as possible? Am I to have Sherman subject to my orders, or is he and his force reserved for some special service?" Halleck replied promptly: "You have command of all troops sent to your department, and have permission to fight the enemy when you please." This was on the 12th, and on the 13th, Grant's cavalry entered Holly Springs, driving the enemy south of the Tallahatchie. On the 14th, he informed Sherman: "I have now complete control of my department," and accordingly ordered him to "move with two divisions of twelve full regiments each, and, if possible, with three divisions, to Oxford, or the Tallahatchie, as soon as possible. I

am now ready to move from here (La Grange), any day, and only await your movements." Sherman was to notify Grant when he could march, and to which of the places mentioned, and Grant promised to move so that they might arrive simultaneously. "I am exceedingly anxious," said Grant, "to do something before the roads get bad, and before the enemy can intrench and reënforce." He was evidently not aware of the rebel works on the Tallahatchie. The campaign now contemplated, was in pursuance of Grant's original plan to advance along the Mississippi Central railroad, until, by getting near enough to threaten Vicksburg, he should compel the evacuation of that place. A coöperative movement, by troops from Helena, in Arkansas, which Halleck ordered, was intended to cut the railroad in Pemberton's rear and threaten Grenada.

On the 23d, Halleck again broached the subject of the river expedition, doubtless urged on by the President, who was beset by McClernand's political friends, and who, in fact, was frequently unable to withstand political or personal solicitations. Now, although Halleck fully agreed with Grant and every other soldier, as to the impropriety of intrusting a man like McClernand with important commands, he was, of course, obliged to be subordinate; and, when directed by his superiors, inquired of Grant how many men he had in his department, and what force could be sent down the river to Vicksburg. Grant replied that he had in all seventy-two thousand men, of whom eighteen thousand were at Memphis, and sixteen thousand of these could be spared for the river expedition. He announced, on the 24th, that he had given his orders for the advance of his entire

force, including Sherman; had written to Steele, in Arkansas, to threaten Grenada; and had asked Admiral Porter, commanding the Mississippi squadron, to send boats to coöperate at the mouth of the Yazoo. "Must I countermand the orders for this move?" The reply was: "Proposed move approved. Do not go too far." Apparently, Halleck and Grant both strove to expedite the movement, so that, if possible, it might get too far advanced to be recalled. Nothing in war is more painful, than the spectacle of soldierly men obliged to give up movements that they know to be for the best interests of the country, and coöperate in others planned by ignorant minds, and committed to unskilful hands. Yet, their soldierly principles and instincts compelled them to coöperate heartily. So far, however, the soldiers had it their own way.

On the 29th, Grant's cavalry crossed the Tallahatchie, and his headquarters were at Holly Springs; Sherman, too, was up, and would cross the Tallahatchie, at Wyatt. Grant telegraphed: "Our troops will be in Abbeville" (on the Tallahatchie) "tomorrow, or a battle will be fought."

Meanwhile the movement of troops from Helena was made, under Generals Hovey and Washburne. They marched across from the Mississippi, to cut the railroad in Pemberton's rear, and accomplished that object; but the damage done was slight and readily repaired, and the operation had but little effect upon the campaign, unless, indeed, it hastened the evacuation of the rebel works on the Tallahatchie. For on the 1st of December, the enemy deserted his fortifications on that river, which were too strong to have been stormed: Grant was making preparations to

flank them, when the evacuation occurred. Pursuit was made to Oxford: there was no fighting other than skirmishing; but delays were indispensable, as supplies for the entire army were brought along a single line of railroad, which had to be repaired and reconstructed as the troops advanced. The country roads, too, were in bad condition, and rendered rapid marches impossible. But on the 3d, Grant informed Admiral Porter: "Our move has been successful, so far as compelling the evacuation of the Mississippi Central road as far as Grenada." Shortly after, he reported taking twelve hundred prisoners.

Grant, however, had already begun to think that the difficulty of supplying his army would be too great to overcome, and on the same day that he wrote to Porter, he asked Halleck, from Abbeville: "How far south would you like me to go? Would it not be well to hold the enemy south of the Yallabusha" (the next important stream south of the Tallahatchie), "and move a force from Helena and Memphis on Vicksburg? With my present force it would not be prudent to go beyond Grenada, and attempt to hold present line of communication." On the 5th, he was at Oxford, twenty-eight miles beyond Holly Springs, with his cavalry at Coffeeville, only eighteen miles from Grenada. This whole advance was made without serious fighting, as the enemy fell back rapidly before any show of pursuit. On the 5th, he again suggested to Halleck: "If the Helena troops were at my command, I think it would be practicable to send Sherman to take them and the Memphis forces south of the mouth of Yazoo river, and thus secure Vicksburg and the state of Mississippi."*

* I beg the careful attention of the reader to the above extract,

The plan here sketched, and which was eventually adopted, had a double chance of success. Either Sherman, going down the Mississippi to the mouth of the Yazoo, could present a new base for Grant, from which the latter could supply himself, when he also struck the Yazoo, in the interior; or, if this should be found impracticable or less desirable, Grant could hold the main body of the enemy at, or near Grenada, confronting him, while Sherman might step in and take Vicksburg. By this strategy, Grant assumed what seemed the more ungrateful part of the undertaking, leaving the prize of the campaign to be secured by his subordinate. The same peculiarity was also conspicuous in some of his later programmes, but in each instance, Fortune overruled his arrangements and brought about her own conclusions, apparently resolved to dispose of her own favors.

On the 5th of the month, in reply to Grant's suggestions, Halleck directed him not to attempt to hold the country south of the Tallahatchie, but to collect twenty-five thousand troops at Memphis, by the 20th, for the Vicksburg expedition. On the 7th, Grant answered that he would send two divisions to Memphis in a few days, and asked: "Do you want me to command the expedition to Vicksburg, or shall I send Sherman?" To which Halleck replied: "You may move your troops as you may deem best to accomplish the great object in view. . . . Ask Porter to coöperate. Telegraph what are your present plans." Grant answered at once, on the 8th:

and to all that is quoted in reference to Sherman's movement and Grant's promised coöperation. There has been a misunderstanding of this matter by some writers, which I shall endeavor to rectify.

"General Sherman will command the expedition down the Mississippi. He will have a force of about forty thousand men, will land at Vicksburg, up the Yazoo if practicable, and cut the Mississippi Central road, and the road running east from Vicksburg, where they cross the Black river. I will coöperate from here, my movements depending on those of the enemy. With the large cavalry force at my command, I will be able to have them show themselves at different points on the Tallahatchie and Yallahusha, and where an opportunity occurs, make a real attack. "After cutting the two roads, General Sherman's movements, to secure the end desired, will necessarily be left to his judgment. I will occupy this road to Coffeeville."

Written instructions conformable to the above dispatch were on the same day given to Sherman ; *

* "HEADQUARTERS THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, DEPARTMENT OF THE }
TENNESSEE, OXFORD, MISSISSIPPI, December 8, 1862. }

"Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, *commanding Right Wing* :

"You will proceed, with as little delay as possible, to Memphis, Tennessee, taking with you one division of your present command. On your arrival at Memphis, you will assume command of all the troops there, and that portion of General Curtis's forces at present east of the Mississippi river, and organize them into brigades and divisions in your own army. As soon as possible move with them down the river to the vicinity of Vicksburg, and, with the coöperation of the gunboat fleet under command of Flag-Officer Porter, proceed to the reduction of that place, in such manner as circumstances and your own judgment may dictate.

"The amount of rations, forage, land transportation, etc., necessary to take, will be left entirely with yourself. The quartermaster at St. Louis will be instructed to send you transportation for thirty thousand men ; should you still find yourself deficient, your quartermaster will be authorized to make up the deficiency from such transports as may come into the post of Memphis.

"On arriving in Memphis, put yourself in communication with Admiral Porter, and arrange with him for his coöperation.

"Inform me at the earliest practicable day of the time when you

and Grant having been authorized, in compliance with his request, to assume command of all the troops then in Mississippi, belonging to the Department of Arkansas, directed them to report to Sherman, whom he dispatched on the 8th, to Memphis. Porter was informed of the plan, and was requested to coöperate. Sherman was instructed to move with all celerity, and informed, that "I will hold the troops here in readiness to coöperate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary." This was the extent of Grant's promise of coöperation. It was, however, understood in conversation, that in case Pemberton retreated, Grant would follow him up, between the Yazoo and the Big Black rivers, to the Mississippi.

Grant was still anxious lest McClelland should obtain the command of the river expedition, and therefore had hurried Sherman to Memphis, on the very day that he received the authority, so that, if possible, the latter might start before McClelland could arrive. Halleck, too, sent the permission to Grant to dispatch Sherman, without that deliberation which he sometimes displayed; but on the 9th, he telegraphed: "The President may insist upon sending a separate commander. If not, assign such officer as you deem best. Sherman would be my choice as the chief under you." Nothing could be more genuine than the support which in this and

will embark, and such plans as may then be matured. *I will hold the forces here in readiness to coöperate with you in such manner as the movements of the enemy may make necessary.*

"Leave the District of Memphis in the command of an efficient officer, and with a garrison of four regiments of infantry, the siege guns, and whatever cavalry may be there.

"U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*"

nearly every other matter, Grant received from his chief, after Halleck once assumed command of all the armies. If any jealousy or unkindness had once been apparent in Halleck's behavior to his subordinate, neither was displayed again under relations of extraordinary delicacy and difficulty. And, at this time, Grant had not begun to regain his position in the public esteem.

On the 14th, Grant informed Sherman, who was still at Memphis, that "it would be well if you could have two or three small boats suitable for navigating the Yazoo. It may become necessary for me to look to that base for supplies, before we get through." On the 18th, came at last the unwelcome word from Washington: "It is the wish of the President that General McClellan's corps shall constitute a part of the river expedition, and that he shall have the immediate command under your direction." The first part of this dispatch was an order to divide all the troops in Grant's command, including those from Arkansas, into four corps.

And thus a political general was foisted on Halleck and his subordinate; the influences brought to bear on the President were too strong for the soldiers. There was of course nothing to do but obey; and Grant wrote on the same day to McClellan, who was at Springfield, Illinois: "I have been directed this moment, by telegraph from the general-in-chief of the army, to divide the forces of this department into four army corps, one of which is to be commanded by yourself, and that to form a part of the expedition on Vicksburg. I have drafted the order, and will forward it to you as soon as printed. . . . Written and verbal instructions have been given to

General Sherman, which will be turned over to you on your arrival at Memphis."

On the 20th, however, the enemy's cavalry, under Van Dorn, made a dash into Holly Springs, twenty-eight miles in Grant's rear, and captured the garrison, with all its stores. Forrest, another rebel raider, at the same time pushed his cavalry into West Tennessee, and cut the railroad to Columbus, at several points between that place and Jackson. This completely severed Grant's only line of communication with the North, and even with most parts of his own command. It was a catastrophe which he had foreseen as possible, and had striven hard to avert. He had received timely notice of the advance of Forrest, and taken every precaution to meet it. General Sullivan, who commanded at Jackson, was reënforced rapidly, and directed to move out towards the enemy. All of the available cavalry of the Army of the Tennessee was also sent after the raiders, and all commanders between Oxford and Bolivar were notified of the rebel movements, and directed to hold their respective posts "at all hazards." Men and commanders everywhere did their duty, except at Holly Springs; and the enemy was repulsed at Coldwater, Davis Mills, Bolivar, and Middleburg; but Holly Springs was captured while the troops were in their beds. The commanding officer of the post, Colonel Murphy, of the Eighth Wisconsin volunteers, had taken no steps to protect the place, not notifying a single officer of the command, of the approaching danger, although he himself had received early warning from Grant. The troops were blameless, for the first intimation they had of an attack, was when they found themselves surrounded; and notwithstanding the surprise, many

of them behaved admirably, refusing to be paroled, and after making their escape from the enemy, attacking him without regard to their relative strength. Colonel Murphy was dismissed the service for his conduct on this occasion. He was the same officer who had abandoned Iuka to Price so readily. Fifteen hundred prisoners were taken, and four hundred thousand dollars' worth of property was reported destroyed. The enemy estimated the loss of property at four millions. The actual damage probably amounted to a million of dollars.

Holly Springs, Grant had made a secondary base of supplies, and the destruction of the ordnance, subsistence, and quartermasters' stores there, was a serious though temporary annoyance. The railroad, however, was not seriously damaged between La Grange and Oxford, except at Holly Springs, and the enemy had possession of that place only long enough to complete the destruction of the stores; but the cutting of the line between Jackson and Columbus at once demonstrated what Grant had foretold, the impossibility of maintaining so long a line of supply through hostile territory. He commenced the next day to fall back north of the Tallahatchie, and at the same time expressed a wish to Halleck, to send two divisions to Memphis, and join the river expedition with them in person. Since Sherman was not to command it, he was anxious to do so himself, especially as he knew its difficulties would now be enhanced by his own inability to advance, or even to remain on his present line. The promptness with which he came to this conclusion was not inspired by any apprehension of the force in his front, for he telegraphed the same day: "The enemy are falling back from Grenada."

General Grant has told me, when discussing this campaign, that had he known then, what he soon afterwards learned—the possibility of subsisting an army of thirty thousand men without supplies, other than those drawn from an enemy's country—he could, at that time, have pushed on to the rear of Vicksburg, and probably have succeeded in capturing the place. But no experience of former wars, nor of the war of the rebellion, warranted him in supposing that he could feed his army exclusively from the country. The rainy season was setting in, when the roads would naturally very much impede his progress, of course increasing the difficulty of subsistence, and he determined at once to return.

He was, however, obliged from sheer necessity to subsist on what he could find. For over a week, he had no communication whatever with the North, and for two weeks, no supplies. But the country was found to be abundantly stocked. Every thing for the subsistence of man or beast, for fifteen miles east and west of the railroad, from Coffeeville to La Grange, was appropriated to the use of the army. The families of the farmers suffered, but the soldiers were fed; and the lesson was taught which Grant afterwards applied in the rear of Vicksburg, and which Sherman, having seen the application, practised on a still larger scale, in the marches through Georgia and the Carolinas—the lesson that an army may live, though its communications are destroyed.

It was a sorry day for the rebels when they burnt Holly Springs, and broke up Grant's communications with Columbus; not only sorry in those grander results to which allusion has been made, but in the more immediate effects, extending only to the people

of northern Mississippi. The women came with smiling faces to Grant's headquarters, to see how he bore the loss of Holly Springs. They asked him civilly, but exultingly, what he would do, now that his soldiers had nothing to eat. But their exultation and smiles were of short continuance, when the quiet general informed them that his soldiers would find plenty in their barns and storehouses. They looked aghast at this, and exclaimed: "You would not take from non-combatants!" But a commander's first necessity is to provide for his troops; so the country was stripped bare, and the army was supplied.

Although the soldiers found all that was necessary, Grant was anxious until he discovered the success of the experiment. It was one hitherto untried, and, while uncertain as to its results, he moved his army back to La Grange, abandoning the campaign, which had been pressed to a distance of fifty or sixty miles. On the 23d of December, the headquarters were again at Holly Springs. Forrest was speedily chased out of West Tennessee, but the damage he had done could not be so readily repaired.

Various reasons had induced Grant to select this line of operations against Vicksburg, rather than that of the Mississippi river. First of all, was a desire to fight Pemberton. He appreciated fully the importance of Vicksburg, and was anxious enough to secure its possession; but, as has already been shown, he was always more anxious to destroy rebel armies than to capture rebel cities, believing that, if the armies were destroyed, the cities were sure to fall. So, if Pemberton had by any possibility got around towards Columbus, Grant would undoubtedly have moved in that direction, and let Vicksburg alone,

until he had beaten the enemy in the field. When he started from La Grange, he indeed meant and hoped to threaten Vicksburg, but his prime object was the defeat of Pemberton. As soon as he discovered that Pemberton would not fight, on the very day that the national troops got inside the rebel works on the Tallahatchie, and found the enemy again disappearing, Grant suggested the movement direct against Vicksburg; determined to secure the destruction of the rebel force, whether it remained in the interior of Mississippi, confronting him, or was hurried to Vicksburg to reënforce the garrison there.

There were, however, other, although secondary considerations, which confirmed his judgment in this matter, if they did not assist in determining it. Taking the river route earlier, would have left all the state of Mississippi free to the rebels, who could at any time have attacked his communications on that line, cutting him off more effectually and permanently than they did at Holly Springs; while Memphis itself would have been within reach of Bragg, by a rapidly executed movement. By moving towards Grenada, however, Grant covered Memphis and the country already acquired, besides threatening the region on both sides of his line of march. These advantages recommended this route to accomplished soldiers, even after the disaster at Holly Springs; and I have heard men of high military reputation maintain, since the capture of Vicksburg, that Grant should have persevered in his original plan of campaign. He, however, had no idea of remaining in the interior, or of returning to it, after this date, although strongly urged to such a course, by some of his most capable and trusted officers. He considered

that, by the destruction of the Mississippi Central road and its bridges, and the devastation of the resources of the country, he had sufficiently protected himself against attacks of any importance upon his new line; and the event proved that the rebels were too busy defending themselves, to take any initiative again, during the long campaign and siege that followed.

McClermand's assumption of the command of the river expedition was delayed by the break in communication. Grant could not transmit the orders he had received, although he wrote at once to McClermand; but, before the line was reopened, Sherman had embarked at Memphis, with thirty thousand men, and at Helena, was reënforced by twelve thousand more. He arrived at Milliken's bend, on the Arkansas side, and twenty miles above Vicksburg, on the 24th of December; here he spent two or three days, in attempts to cut the Vicksburg and Shreveport railroad (by which reënforcements could have been sent to Vicksburg), and waiting to hear from Banks, who had been ordered to move up the river from New Orleans and coöperate in the attack on Vicksburg. The rebels probably made use of these two or three days to prepare for the attack which they knew must follow. On the 26th, under convoy of Admiral Porter and his fleet of gunboats, Sherman advanced on transports up the Yazoo river, which empties into the Mississippi, about nine miles above the town. He debarked his troops on the 27th, on the south side of the river, near the mouth of the Chickasaw bayou.*

The long line of hills on which Vicksburg stands, turns off from the Mississippi, just above the town,

* The map of operations in Yazoo pass and Steele's bayou and map of Campaign against Vicksburg illustrate the operations here described.

and runs parallel to the Yazoo for several miles. Between the latter river and the bluffs, lies a strip of country peculiarly susceptible of defence; covered with a dense and tangled overgrowth, cut up with swamps and intersected with streams, and at this time almost entirely under water; in fact, impracticable for infantry, except along one or two narrow causeways; this strip of territory, some three miles wide, was commanded by the guns on the bluffs, which were strongly posted, and was besides completely within range from the numerous trenches and rifle-pits along the hills. Notwithstanding these difficulties, which rendered it impossible for Sherman to avail himself at any one time of half his force, he attacked the works on the 29th, got his men across this difficult country, and into the rebel lines; he even effected a lodgment on the hard land at the foot of the bluffs, but was finally driven back with severe loss. It was then determined to attempt a landing higher up the Yazoo, in the night, so as to attack the enemy's extreme right in coöperation with the naval force, and thus secure a base from which communication with Grant might be opened. The preliminary movements were made, but a dense fog set in, so thick that the vessels could not move, nor could the men see each other at the distance of ten paces. This lasted till day-break, when it was too late to start. A heavy rain then set in, rendering the ground if possible still more impracticable, and the attempt was abandoned. Sherman moved his troops out of the Yazoo, and at the mouth of the Mississippi, he was met by McClelland, on the 2d of January. He at once relinquished his command to that officer, assuming himself the command of a single corps.

He had lost one hundred and seventy-five men killed, nine hundred and thirty wounded, and seven hundred and forty-three missing.* In his report to Grant, he attributed his failure "to the strength of the enemy's position, both natural and artificial." Grant, however, had no fault to find with him; the assault was made at the only point where there was a chance of success, and was conducted with skill and judgment; the men behaved with a gallantry not surpassed during the war, but the extraordinary nature of the defences rendered the attempt unavailing. The rebels had doubtless been reënforced from Pemberton's command, but this contributed nothing to the result, as Sherman had twice as many men as he could use on the difficult ground where he fought.†

* The rebels reported a loss of sixty-three killed, one hundred and thirty-four wounded, and ten missing.

† It has been supposed and stated by some, that Sherman's reverse was the consequence of a failure on Grant's part to move south from Grenada, and appear in the rear of Vicksburg at the time of the assault. I have already explained what was the nature and extent of the coöperation planned by Grant. He meant, if he could, to hold Pemberton at Grenada, and thus allow Sherman to enter Vicksburg without any material opposition: but the strength of the works was not fully appreciated when this arrangement was made; they were so strong that had Grant been able to keep Pemberton's entire force in his own front, there would have been no different result to Sherman's endeavor. Sherman himself declared that his failure was owing to "the strength of the enemy's position, both natural and artificial;" and he never could have anticipated a tactical coöperation from Grant, for Grant had neither promised nor suggested it. The letters from Grant to Halleck, and Grant's orders to Sherman, both given in full above (in the text or in notes), are proof of this assertion. Sherman himself declared in his report of the operations: "I supposed their" (the rebel) "organized forces to amount to about fifteen thousand, which could be reënforced at the rate of about five thousand a day, *provided General Grant did not occupy all the attention of Pemberton's forces at Grenada.*" Again, in the same report: "Not one word could I hear from General Grant, who was supposed to be *pushing*

The rebels were jubilant over the double issue of this campaign, and they certainly succeeded in deferring the result at which the national commander aimed. The success of Grant's plans was indeed

south." "I proposed . . . to attack the enemy's right, which, if successful, would give us the substantial possession of the Yazoo river, and *place us in communication with General Grant.*" "Of course I was sadly disappointed, as it was the only remaining chance of our securing a lodgment on the ridge between the Yazoo and the Black rivers, from which to operate against Vicksburg and the railroad east, as also to secure the navigation of the Yazoo river." "The rumor of General Grant having fallen back behind the Tallahatchie, became confirmed by my receiving no intelligence from him." "The effort was necessary to a successful accomplishment of my orders, and the combinations were the best possible under the circumstances. I assume all the responsibility, and attach blame to no one."

In his orders to division commanders *before the attack*, dated December 23d, Sherman said: "Parts of this general plan are to coöperate with the naval squadron in the reduction of Vicksburg, to secure possession of the land lying between the Yazoo and the Black, and to act in concert with General Grant against Pemberton's forces, supposed to have *Jackson, Mississippi, as a point of concentration.*" In the same paper: "It may be necessary (looking to Grant's approach), before attacking Vicksburg, to reduce the battery at Haine's bluff first, so as to enable some of the lighter gunboats and transports to ascend the Yazoo, and *communicate with General Grant.*" Again: "*Grant's left and centre were at the last accounts approaching the Yallabusha, near Grenada,* and the railroad to his rear, by which he drew his supplies, was reported to be seriously damaged. This may disconcert him somewhat, but only makes more important our line of operations. *At the Yallabusha, General Grant may encounter the army of General Pemberton,* the same which refused him battle on the line of the Tallahatchie, which was strongly fortified; but as he" (Pemberton) "will not have time to fortify the Yallabusha, he will hardly fortify there, and in that event General Grant will immediately advance down the high ridge lying between the Big Black and Yazoo, and will expect to meet us *on the Yazoo,* and receive from us the supplies which he needs, and which he knows we carry along." Finally: "I purpose to land our whole force on the Mississippi side, and then to reach the point where the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad crosses the Big Black, after which to attack Vicksburg by land, whilst the gunboats assail it by water."

Of course those who think or have said that General Grant was to meet

more than once delayed ; sometimes by the skilful movements of his antagonists, and quite as often by the unskilful or unwilling operations of those whom he commanded : for in war, the loyalty of his subordinates is as important to the chief as the practicability of his plans or the steadiness of his soldiers. In this instance, Grant could not complain of his generals ; nor indeed is it easy to say that the fault was in his plans. The line he himself marched on, was that dictated by the rules of the military art, and, had he taken a larger force, his predicament would only have been so much the worse ; he would have had so many more men to feed. Sherman, too, had more troops than he could use, so that a different disposition of the forces could hardly have resulted more favorably. Indeed, when Grant threw both his

Sherman at Vicksburg, or to coöperate with him in the assault, never can have seen these papers. It is evident that Sherman understood exactly what his chief meant to do, and explained those intentions to his own subordinates. It is plain that he felt the greatest anxiety to open up the Yazoo river, so that Grant might descend, and in order to open the Yazoo, he made the assault ; it is plain, not only, that he did not expect Grant to be at Vicksburg, but that he had heard and believed strong rumors of the disaster which had occurred to Grant's line of communication ; that, knowing the probability of this disaster having occurred, he was, like a good soldier and loyal subordinate, still more anxious to assault, in order to relieve his commander from what might be imminent stress ; that he knew Grant's objective to be Pemberton, and declared that Pemberton's point of concentration was Jackson, fifty miles from Vicksburg ; that after the unsuccessful assault he still made no ungenerous attempt to lay the blame on any shoulders but his own, but assumed it all, if any blame there was in making a skilful and courageous though unsuccessful effort to take a place of unusual strength by storm. Sherman deserves all praise for his determination to attempt the assault, when he knew, not only, that Grant never intended to support him in its tactical execution, but that he was probably unable to render even the strategical support to the movement which had originally been planned.

armies on the Mississippi, success still fled before his advances, as coyly as in the interior.

As has been shown, he had early foreseen the especial difficulty which beset his army in this campaign; but marched on, trusting that in the manifold chances of war, he might be able to overcome or evade it. The rebels, however, saw plainly what their game was, and played it well; they withdrew before Grant's advance without risking a fight, and, then, suddenly cutting his communications, so as to hold him from any further progress, hastened by their interior lines to Vicksburg, to withstand Sherman; who, however, would have been equally unable to carry his point of assault, if Pemberton had remained in front of Grant. Had this been the end, it would have been a defeat for Grant; but nothing can be styled defeat which eventuates in success; and the idea of abandoning his aim was not even presented to this general's mind. He was baffled at Oxford, but before the rebel rear-guard was out of Holly Springs, he had planned another campaign with all his forces, by way of the Mississippi river. Delays and difficulties with him had only the effect of increasing his determination and provoking his obstinacy. Some men need the excitement of slight success to sustain their patience and inspire their hope; Grant's only enthusiasm was that confidence which becomes serene when emergencies threaten and crowd.

Upon leaving the Yazoo river, Sherman at once proposed to McClelland that, while waiting for further orders from Grant, the expeditionary force should be employed in the capture of Arkansas Post, a strong work on the Arkansas, fifty miles from its mouth. The object was to occupy the troops, and

raise their spirits, depressed by the recent failure, and also to secure the line of communication by the Mississippi against attacks from the Arkansas side. McClelland immediately acquiesced in Sherman's proposition, and moved his force up the Arkansas, the fleet under Porter accompanying. A naval bombardment, lasting several days, occurred; and on the 11th, the troops assaulted the works, when the post surrendered, after a fight of three hours, in which the squadron bore a conspicuous part. Five thousand prisoners and seventeen pieces of cannon fell into the hands of the victors; McClelland lost about a thousand men, in killed, wounded, and missing. The guns of the fort were silenced by the fleet, and Admiral Porter received the sword of its commander, but the troops were surrendered to the army.

This operation was planned and executed without Grant's knowledge or consent, and he was at first displeased with the movement, whose effect on the contemplated campaign was not perceptible. Lacking any confidence in McClelland's military judgment, and supposing that the plan emanated solely from that officer, he did not give it the same consideration it would have received, had he known that Sherman first suggested the idea. It seemed to him a mere side move, contributing in no degree to the great result at which he was aiming; and, throughout the war, he preferred to engage in no enterprise that did not tend directly to the accomplishment of his main object. He expressed his dissatisfaction in this instance both to McClelland and to Halleck, but, subsequently, became convinced that the reasons offered in favor of the movement were sufficient to warrant McClelland in making it.

Grant, meanwhile, had been extremely anxious on account of Sherman. Cut off, for more than a week, from all news from the North, and aware that the impossibility of holding any troops in his own front, might greatly increase Sherman's difficulties, he was yet unable to do any thing to relieve his subordinate. Even after communication with Memphis was reopened, it was long before he heard directly from the river expedition. On the 4th of January, he had news of the assault, but neither official nor definite, and could not learn, for a week afterwards, whether Sherman had fought his way into Vicksburg or not. On the 4th, McPherson was ordered north from the Tallahatchie; but the backward movement was a slow one; the roads were in miserable condition by reason of the winter rains, and, as it had been determined to abandon northern Mississippi, the accumulated quartermasters' and ordnance stores had to be removed with the army. It was not until the 10th of January, that the headquarters were established at Memphis.

From there, Grant wrote at once to McClernand that he had heard nothing official from the expedition since Sherman left: "This expedition must not fail. If there is force enough within the limits of my control to secure a certain victory at Vicksburg, they will be sent there." Being urged by Halleck to send every thing possible down the river, he stated his readiness to reinforce McClernand with twenty thousand troops. He also, at this time, sent an officer to Admiral Porter, to survey the ground, and determine the practicability of reopening the canal across the tongue of land opposite Vicksburg. McClernand was ordered to rendezvous at Milliken's bend, or

some other point convenient for coöperation with Banks, who was daily expected below Vicksburg.

It is necessary to a correct understanding of all these operations, and due to General Halleck, to keep constantly in mind that Major-General Banks had been sent to New Orleans, by sea, with an army of forty thousand men, and ordered to coöperate in the opening of the Mississippi river, and especially in the capture of Vicksburg.* He was to be supported by Admiral Farragut's fleet, already so renowned, and for months his arrival was constantly expected by Grant. Circumstances, which it is not my province to investigate or describe, delayed the movements of General Banks, who arrived at New Orleans in December, but did not start from there until March, and returned the same month. His movements afforded no coöperation to Grant.

All this while, Grant was greatly annoyed by McClernand's insubordinate behavior. That officer claimed to have been placed in command directly by the President, and therefore to be independent of his superior. He constantly appealed from Grant in matters of military etiquette and law; his language was as intolerable as his actions were injudicious; his official papers teemed with self-laudation and grandiloquent fustian, assuming credit to which he was not entitled, raising objections to the orders of his commanding officer, making suggestions contrary to all the principles of military science, and fostering jealousies among different portions of the army and with

* On the 2d of February, Halleck wrote to Banks: "General Grant's forces have been for some time operating in the vicinity of Vicksburg, and the President expects that you will permit no obstacle to prevent you from coöperating with him by some movement up the Mississippi river."

the naval officers.* All these peculiarities indicated to Sherman, to McPherson, and to Admiral Porter the same traits, and those three officers urged upon Grant, in writing and in conversation, that the only chance for the success of the enterprise was in his assuming command of it in person. He finally received authority from Washington to relieve McClelland, and either appoint the next officer in rank in his place, or to assume himself the immediate command.†

He, at first, desired to put Sherman in command; as that officer had started from Memphis with the expedition, and afterwards been obliged to yield precedence to McClelland, it seemed but fair to restore him. But Grant was especially anxious to place Sherman at the head of the expedition, because he thought Sherman especially capable of directing its movements. It was, however, represented by those in his confidence, that as McClelland was the senior of Sherman, to give the junior the higher command,

* On the 20th of January, Grant wrote to Halleck: "I regard it as my duty to state that I found there was not sufficient confidence felt in General McClelland as a commander, either by the army or navy, to insure him success. Of course, all would coöperate to the best of their abilities, but still with a distrust. This is a matter I made no inquiries about, but it was forced upon me. . . . I want you to know that others besides myself agree in the necessity of the course I had already determined upon pursuing. Admiral Porter told me he had written freely to the Secretary of the Navy, with the request that what he said might be shown to the Secretary of War."

On the 30th of January, McClelland wrote to Grant: "If different views are entertained by you, then the question should be immediately referred to Washington, and one or other, or both of us, relieved. One thing is certain: two generals cannot command this army, issuing independent and direct orders to subordinate officers."

† See Appendix for original and important papers relating to this expedition, and to McClelland's command of it; also for further extracts from McClelland's correspondence, confirmatory of assertions in the text.

even by authority of the government, would undoubtedly provoke feelings and conduct prejudicial to the public interest, especially in an officer of McClelland's peculiarities. Sherman, it is true, had submitted promptly to be relieved by McClelland, but he was a man with soldierly instincts, the first of which is subordination, and this was a trait that McClelland had seldom displayed, even towards Grant, his legitimate superior. Grant was, besides, the commander of the department, and entitled to direct the campaign in person; no one could complain of this, for he ranked everybody in the West, and his assumption of immediate command would, in fact, relieve the question of all difficulty.

This reasoning was unanswerable, and Grant allowed himself to be governed by it. He was loath, however, to deprive Sherman of the opportunity to throw off the odium caused by his unsuccessful assault; and, besides, disliked to use his own position as commander of the department, to claim the direction of a campaign originally intrusted to another. But, Sherman was informed of the reasons which led to the decision, and manifested a complete appreciation of Grant's motives. During the tedious and often discouraging campaign that ensued, he never failed to display a zeal and loyalty towards his commander equal to that commander's anxiety to support and bring forward his subordinate, even at the risk of his own chances for fame.

On the 17th, Grant paid his first visit to the transport fleet, then lying off Napoleon, at the mouth of the Arkansas, with all the troops on board; from there, he wrote to Halleck, what the experience of many months eventually confirmed: "Our troops

must get below the city to be used effectually." On the 18th, he wrote: "Should Banks pass Port Hudson, this force will be ready to coöperate on Vicksburg, at any time." On the 20th, he returned to Memphis, and sent word to one of his subordinates: "The Mississippi river enterprise must take precedence of all others, and any side move must simply be to protect our flanks and rear." On the 22d, he said to McClernand: "I hope the work of changing the channel of the Mississippi is begun;" and on the same day: "On the present rise, it is barely possible that the Yazoo pass might be turned to good account in aiding our enterprise." These two ideas were already prominent in his mind; they were destined to become fully developed ere long, and to be prosecuted with energy and persistency, but both to prove unsuccessful. Although so persistently and zealously followed up by Grant, he was not at any time persuaded of their adequacy; but he thought it his duty to give them a fair trial, and, at any rate, to occupy the troops vigorously until he should be able to get them below the city. On the 20th, after his visit to Napoleon, he wrote: "The work of reducing Vicksburg will take time and men, but can be accomplished."

He determined, now, to abandon the railroad from Jackson to Columbus, and to move all his troops south, except those absolutely necessary to hold the line from Memphis to Corinth. All heavy guns on the east bank, between Memphis and Columbus, and from Island Number Ten, as well as the floating batteries below there, were at once removed; as their remaining only offered inducements to the enemy to attack from the Tennessee side; and the expedition

was ordered to Young's point, opposite the mouth of the Yazoo. Grant wrote to Halleck, that he should require a large force in the final struggle, but could dispense with any further reënforcements for the present. He suggested, however, that it would be well to have the men in readiness when they should be needed. He also inquired if it would not be good policy to combine the four departments at the West—Rosecrans's, Steele's, Banks's, and his own—under one commander, and remarked: "As I am the ranking department commander in the West, I will state that I have no desire whatever for such combined command, but would prefer the command I now have, to any other that can be given." This suggestion was eventually acted upon, but not for many months, and until after the fall of Vicksburg, and the battle of Chickamauga, had demonstrated the sagacity of the thought, and made the selection of the man inevitable. As much of the Department of Arkansas, however, as he might desire, was placed under his command at once, so that he had control of both banks of the Mississippi. Forts Henry and Donelson were at the same time transferred to the Department of the Cumberland, leaving Grant the exclusive task of opening and controlling the Mississippi river.

On the 29th of January, General Grant arrived in person at Young's point, and, on the 30th, assumed immediate command of the expedition against Vicksburg. McClernand at once protested formally, but in vain.

CHAPTER VI.

Character of Mississippi valley—Position and strength of Vicksburg—Grant's force on taking command of expedition—Problem of the campaign—The Vicksburg canal—Continuous labor for months—Rise in river—Failure of canal—Lake Providence scheme—Difficulties of this route—Abandonment of the plan—Alarm and subsequent derision of rebels—The Yazoo pass—Circuitous route—Obstructions by rebels—Pass finally cleared—Troops enter the pass—Rebel fort at Greenwood—Naval attack unsuccessful—Reënforcements ordered into the pass—Route found impracticable—Steele's bayou expedition—Remarkable natural difficulties—Sherman and Admiral Porter proceed to Deer creek—Porter gets into danger—Sherman rescues the fleet—Further and irremovable obstructions—Return of both expeditions to Milliken's bend—Concentration of Grant's forces—Impatience of the country and government—Efforts to remove Grant—Grant's new plan—Opposition of Sherman and other of Grant's subordinates—Grant inflexible—Movement of Thirteenth Corps to New Carthage—Difficulties of route—Trouble with McClernand—Grierson's raid—Running of Vicksburg batteries—Coöperation of Admiral Porter—Attack on Grand Gulf—Failure to silence batteries—Further marches of troops—Running of batteries at Grand Gulf—Crossing of Mississippi river by Grant's advance—Demonstration by Sherman against Haine's bluff—Grant's confidence of success.

ALL the way from Cairo to New Orleans the Mississippi meanders through a vast alluvial region, the whole of which is annually overflowed, except where the system of artificial embankments, called levees,* has, of late years, afforded a partial barrier. This great basin is nearly fifty miles in width, and extends on the east to the upland plains of Tennessee and

* The word *levee* is in universal use at the Southwest. Breaks in the embankments are called *crerasses*.

Mississippi, while on the west it is bounded by the lesser elevations of drift alone. The bluffs that form the escarpment of the eastern plains are usually quite steep, and thickly overgrown with timber, underbrush, and vines. At various points in its course the river touches one extremity or the other of the bottom-land, washing the base of the bluffs, and often cutting deeply into the soft strata of which they are composed. Columbus, Fort Pillow, Memphis, Helena, Vicksburg, Grand Gulf, and Port Hudson are points of this kind, and rise from eighty to two hundred feet above the freshets.

The Mississippi is, perhaps, the most tortuous stream in the world. Its course is frequently north, east, south, and west, within a circuit of twenty miles. Every few years it deviates from its channel here and there, leaving the former bed for some new route, and creating islands and peninsulas innumerable; the flat nature of the country and the soft quality of the soil allowing these excursions, which occur whenever any unusual obstacle is presented to the vast momentum of the stream. The alluvial region, throughout its entire extent, is higher near the banks of the river, and falls off gradually till it reaches the line of the bluffs; the drainage is, therefore, necessarily towards the hills, and is the source of the intricate network of bayous* for which the basin is remarkable. The Coldwater, the Tallahatchie, the Yazoo, the Washita, the Red, and Atchafalaya rivers, besides numerous other and smaller streams, are accordingly nothing more than huge side drains. During freshets,

* The streams that everywhere intersect these alluvial regions are called *bayous*—a corruption of the French word *boyau*—a gut or channel.

the water that breaks over the Mississippi banks, or through the crevasses, flows through cypress-swamps, and a labyrinth of bayous, till it reaches the bluffs, and is again forced back into the parent stream.

Besides the bayous, crescent-shaped lakes, the sole remains of the ancient meanderings of the river, abound on both sides, often at considerable distances from the present channel. The forests of the alluvial region are extremely luxuriant and dense; cotton-wood, tulip-trees, sweet gum, magnolia, sycamore, and ash are found, with an almost impenetrable jungle of cane and vine. The cypress-swamps that occupy the lower portions of the bottom are nearly always under water; and this, with the slimy character of the soil, and the treacherous beds, and slippery, steep banks of the bayous, renders the country almost impassable in summer, and entirely so, except by boats, in winter.*

Winding through this abnormal region, the Mississippi makes a sudden bend below Young's point, opposite the mouth of the Yazoo, and turning towards the northeast, flows in that direction some four or five miles, till it strikes the Vicksburg hills, when it turns again, still more abruptly, and runs for almost the same distance towards the southwest. By this curve a narrow peninsula is formed of the Louisiana shore, which stretches out in the shape of a tongue, not more than a mile or two across. Opposite the lower side of the peninsula, the city of Vicksburg rises, terraced on its rugged site, and commanding the ap-

* Valuable material for this description of the Mississippi valley, as well as for this entire chapter, has been obtained from a manuscript memoir of the campaign and siege of Vicksburg, placed at my disposal by Brevet Major-General J. H. Wilson, lieutenant of engineers, and lieutenant-colonel on Grant's staff at the period of these operations.

proaches from above and below, for a distance of long cannon-range. The bluffs extend along the eastern bank for nearly twenty miles. From Walnut hills to Warrenton the Mississippi washes the foot of the range. At few places is the interval between the river and the bluff more than six hundred yards; and at the point where Vicksburg stands, the cliffs rise abruptly from the water's edge two hundred feet.

Above the town the hills turn to the northeast; the point where the range strikes the Yazoo nearly twenty miles from its mouth is known as Haine's bluff, and was the extreme right of the rebel line. It is very precipitous, and completely commands the navigation of the Yazoo, as well as the opposite shore. So long as this position was held by the rebels, Vicksburg could not be approached from the north. From Haine's bluff, which is twelve miles above the town, to the Mississippi, the highlands were completely and thoroughly fortified, and thence along down, till they recede from the river, at Warrenton, seven miles below. Twenty-eight guns of heavy calibre were mounted on the river front, all of which had a plunging fire; they effectually barred all progress by the stream, for no gun in the squadron could be sufficiently elevated to be formidable to batteries crowning cliffs two and three hundred feet high.

At the foot of the ridge, and along the slopes, rifle-pits were dug, that commanded the strip of swamp land which sometimes intervenes between the river and the bluffs. The Louisiana shore is swampy, and impracticable for the transportation or occupation of troops. Rafts were moored, chains were stretched across the Yazoo, to detain vessels under

fire, and thus render any attempt at surprise impracticable, so that troops could not possibly be landed near enough for an assault, except where Sherman's bold attack, in January, had been so unsuccessful.

In the rear of Vicksburg the range is rugged, broken by precipitous ravines, and presenting almost equally admirable facilities for defence on the land side. Creeks and bayous also abound, even in this higher country, whose nearer slopes encircle the city with a parapet of hills. The region outside, between the Big Black river and the Pearl, was an abounding granary, from which the besieged could draw at will, without danger of exhausting the supply.

This post was now the key to the Mississippi river, and to the magnificent valley which it fertilizes. At Grand Gulf, where the bluffs again approach the shore, some fifty miles below, another fortification was soon erected; and still another, of even greater strength, at Port Hudson, a hundred and fifty miles from the sea. Port Hudson and Grand Gulf were, in reality, the outworks of Vicksburg, and between them the mighty river was closed for a distance of four hundred miles, within which the rebels were as completely masters as though the national flag had never been supreme above its waters. But Banks, with an army of forty thousand men, and Farragut, with the fleet that had subdued New Orleans, were directed to put forth every effort against Port Hudson; while to Grant and his subordinates was assigned the task of unlocking the greatest barrier that vexed the waters of the Mississippi on their way to the sea.

On the 29th of January, the entire force in the Department of the Tennessee amounted to one hundred and thirty thousand men. It was divided into

four army corps, the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth, commanded by Major-Generals McClelland, Sherman, Hurlbut, and McPherson, respectively. The Arkansas troops had been assigned to the Thirteenth corps, which, in conjunction with the Sixteenth, now at Memphis and in West Tennessee, was required to protect Grant's rear, and keep open the river to Cairo. St. Louis and Memphis were made the depots for supplies. Porter's coöperating fleet numbered sixty vessels of all classes, carrying two hundred and eighty guns and eight hundred men.

The troops composing the expedition were at Young's point and Milliken's bend, and fifty thousand in number; they consisted of the Fifteenth and Seventeenth, and part of the Thirteenth corps; these had already been disembarked, and put in camps along the west bank of the river, on the low swamp-land, overflowed this year to an unusual extent. This protracted freshet, together with the extraordinary fall of rain, greatly increased Grant's difficulties, as well as the hardships of his army.

The camps were frequently submerged, and the diseases consequent to this exposure prevailed among the troops; dysenteries and fevers made sad havoc, and the small-pox even was introduced, but speedily controlled. The levees furnished the only dry land deep enough for graves, and for miles along the river bank this narrow strip was all that appeared above the water, furrowed in its whole length with graves. The troops were thus hemmed in by the burial-places of their comrades.

Every possible precaution, however, was taken to secure the health and comfort of the command; tents

were supplied, medical stores provided, and during the long and tedious campaign that followed, the sanitary condition of the army remained as tolerable as inevitable emergencies and hardships would allow. But exaggerated rumors of disease and even pestilence were circulated by the enemy, and at the North; these added to the anxieties of the country, as well as to the difficulties of the commander.

Grant's problem now was, to obtain a footing on the highlands of the eastern bank, and a base from which to operate against the city and its communications. A direct attack had already been tried by Sherman, at the only point where a landing was practicable, and failed, because of the character of the country, and the strength of the fortifications, at a time when those fortifications were much less elaborate than now. It remained, then, either to discover some means of reaching the Yazoo, at a point still farther from its mouth than Haine's bluff, and so secure a foothold in the rear of Vicksburg; or, to get below the works, at Warrenton, and thence operate, on the eastern side, against the town. The rains had filled the swamps and bayous, so that there was no probability of their drying again during the winter, or a landing might have been effected opposite Milliken's bend, and roads constructed to the Yazoo, above Haine's bluff, when the enemy's works would have been turned. With Grant once back of the intrenchments on the crest of the hills, the rebels would have been compelled either to come out and give him battle in the open field, or submit to have all their communications cut, and so be left to starve. The rains, however, rendered this operation impracticable.

But if an attempt should be made to get below the town, Vicksburg itself threatened the only line by which supplies could be obtained. Three means of obviating this difficulty suggested themselves: First, to turn the Mississippi river from its course, and, by cutting a canal across the peninsula in front of Vicksburg, create a new channel, through which the fleet might glide securely by the rebellious city, and in full view from its disappointed batteries, to the coveted position below. Second, by breaking levees, opening canals, and connecting and widening streams, a circuitous route, through bayous, and rivers, and swamps, could be opened, from Lake Providence on the Louisiana side, seventy miles above Vicksburg, and a passage found, through the Red river, into the Mississippi again, four hundred miles below. This route, however, would, at best, be long and difficult, and, if opened, would only afford an opportunity of reënforcing Banks, as the mouth of the Red river is just above Port Hudson. The third, and apparently only other possible plan, was to march the whole army along the western shore, to some point below the town, and then cross the river, and combine with Banks to operate against Port Hudson; and, after that place should fall, begin a new campaign against Vicksburg, from Grand Gulf or Warrenton, depending on supplies from below. The roads in Louisiana were, however, entirely under water, so that this plan was not now feasible; and until Port Hudson was taken and the river opened to New Orleans, the difficulty of supplying the army, when thrown below the town, appeared absolutely insuperable.

As early as the 20th of January, Grant had instructed McClernand to begin the enlargement of the

canal. He had himself been ordered by Halleck to direct his attention particularly to this undertaking, "as the President attaches much importance to this." It was a scheme of magnificent proportions, but more likely to attract an imagination like Mr. Lincoln's than to strike favorably a purely military mind. The country, North and South, watched its progress anxiously; and, even in Europe, the plan of turning a mighty river from its course attracted attention and comment. The rebels loudly predicted failure, and the gibes of those who opposed the war at the North, were incessant. Still Grant toiled on; four thousand soldiers were constantly employed on the work, besides negroes, who were comparatively of little use. On the 4th of February, however, he reported to Halleck that he had lost all faith in the practicability of the scheme. "The canal," he said, "is at right angles with the thread of the current at both ends, and both ends are in an eddy, the lower coming out under bluffs completely commanding it. Warrenton, a few miles below, is capable of as strong defences as Vicksburg; and the enemy, seeing us at work here, have turned their attention to that point."

The peninsula is about three and a half miles long, and where the canal was located, only a mile and a fifth in width. As constructed by General Williams, the canal was ten feet wide and six deep, but his excavation did not extend through the stratum of black alluvial soil to the sandy substratum, and in 1862, when the water rose so as to run through, there was no enlargement. Grant's engineers attempted to remedy this, by cutting a wing, from a point two or three hundred yards further up the river, where the current impinges more strongly against the

shore. It was hoped by the additional flow of water thus secured, and by the use of dredging-machines,* to widen and deepen the main canal. The design was, to allow a passage for vessels with a breadth of beam of sixty feet, and a draught of eight or nine.

The troops who were engaged for two months on the canal, were encamped immediately on its west bank, and protected from possible inundation by a levee; but the continued rise in the river made a large expenditure of labor necessary to keep the water out of the camps and canal. The work was tedious and difficult, and seemed interminable; and towards the last it became also dangerous, for the enemy, well aware how important it was to thwart this operation, threw shells all over the peninsula, and, as Grant had predicted, erected batteries which commanded the lower end of the canal. But, at last, there seemed some prospect of success; the dredge-boats worked to a charm; the laborers reached a sufficient depth in the soil; the wing was ready to connect with the main artery, and the undertaking was apparently all but completed; when, on the 8th of March, an additional and rapid rise in the river, and the consequent increase of pressure, caused the dam near the upper end of the canal to give way, and every attempt to keep

* The following correspondence contains the only suggestion made by General Halleck to Grant during this portion of the Vicksburg campaign :

" February 18.

" Cannot dredge-boats be used with advantage in the canal? There are four lying idle at Louisville, belonging to Barton, Robinson & Co., contractors.

" H. W. HALLECK, *General-in-chief.*"

" February 17.

" We have one dredging-machine here, and another ordered. More than two could not be advantageously used.

" U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*"

the rush of water out proved abortive. The torrent, thus admitted, struggled for a while with the obstacles that sought to stay its course; but finally, instead of coming out below, broke the levee of the canal itself, and spread rapidly across the peninsula, overwhelming every barrier, and separating the northern and southern shores as effectually as if the Mississippi itself flowed between them. It swept far and wide over the interior, submerging the camps, and spreading into the bayous, even to the Tensas and lower Red. The troops were obliged to flee for their lives, horses were drowned, implements were broken and borne away by the current, and all the labor of many weeks was lost.

Attempts were made to repair the damages, but on the 27th of March, Grant reported that all work except repairing the crevasses in the canal levee had been suspended for several days, the enemy having driven the dredges entirely out. "The canal may be useful in passing boats through, at night, but nothing further." As he had foretold, the batteries erected on the hills below Vicksburg completely enfiladed the canal. The rebels declared that the Yankees had been as impious as the Titans, in their audacity, and as impotent, and hoped that in future they would not attempt to disturb the natural features of the globe.

On the 30th of January, the day after he assumed command of the Vicksburg expedition,* Grant gave orders for cutting a way from the Mississippi to Lake Providence and went himself to that place on the 4th of February, remaining there several days.

* At this time Grant wrote to Halleck :

"January 31.

"I am pushing every thing to gain a passage, avoiding Vicksburg."

This sheet of water is a portion of the old bed of the river, and lies about a mile west of the present channel. It is six miles long, and connected by Bayou Baxter with Bayou Maçon, a navigable stream communicating in its turn with the Tensas, Washita, and Red rivers. Through these various channels it was thought possible to open a route by which transports of light draught might reach the Mississippi again, below, and thus enable Grant to reënforce Banks (then on either the Red river or the Atchafalaya), and to coöperate with him against Port Hudson.

The levee was cut, and a canal opened between the river and the lake, through which the water passed rapidly; but peculiar difficulties were encountered in clearing Bayou Baxter of the overhanging forests and fallen timber with which it was obstructed. The land, from Lake Providence, and also from Bayou Maçon, recedes until the lowest interval between the two widens out into a cypress-swamp, where Bayou Baxter is lost. This flat was filled with water to the depth of several feet; and the work of removing the timber, that choked the bayou thickly for a distance of twelve or fifteen miles, was, in consequence, exceedingly difficult and slow; but if this could have been accomplished, the channel, in high water, would have been continuous, although intricate and circuitous in a remarkable degree. So McPherson's corps was engaged in the undertaking for many weeks. The impossibility of obtaining the requisite number of light-draught steamers, however, would have rendered this route useless, even had it been thoroughly opened. But no steamer ever passed through the tortuous channel, which served only to employ the superfluous troops, and to demonstrate

the fertility and variety of devices developed during this anomalous campaign. The Lake Providence route was finally rejected, in March, at about the same time that all hope of effecting any thing by the canal was abandoned.

This project excited attention and speculation, especially in the rebellious states, where many imagined that the whole torrent of the Mississippi might be diverted, even into the Atchafalaya, and the old bed of the former stream forever denuded, which would have left New Orleans an inland town, far away from the river that was the sole source and cause of its prosperity. But no expectation of any such stupendous results was entertained by Grant. He believed that Vicksburg was only to be won by hard fighting, and by destroying armies; and although he resorted to these various schemes for placing his troops where a foothold for active operations could be maintained, and a route secured by which the new base might be supplied, he nevertheless looked on them as in reality offering little promise, and simply affording occupation for his men, till the subsidence of the waters should allow him to move in the ordinary way.

At the same time that he began these other undertakings, Grant sent Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of his staff, to Helena, to organize an expedition for opening and examining the Yazoo pass. This was with a view to destroying the rebel steamboats and embryo gunboats on the Yazoo river, above Haine's bluff. The pass is a narrow and tortuous bayou, sixty or eighty feet wide, and from twenty to thirty feet deep, running nearly east from a point on the Mississippi, six miles below Helena, into Moon lake, the former

bed of the river. Issuing thence, it still flows eastward, and, fifteen miles beyond, connects with the Coldwater. The latter stream, after fifty miles of windings, enters the Tallahatchie, which joins the Yallabusha to form the Yazoo, a hundred and fifteen miles below. This route was used in former times, as a roundabout way of reaching the Yazoo river with small steamers and light trading craft; but, as the entire course lies in the alluvial region, the country between the two rivers was frequently overflowed; and, accordingly, the state of Mississippi constructed a large and strong levee at the entrance to the pass, so as to cut off all communication between its waters and those of the parent stream.

This levee was cut on the 2d of February, and the water let in by the explosion of a mine planted at the mouth of the cut; and, in two days, the torrent carried away the levee so completely as to allow the largest steamers to pass through the crevasse into Moon lake, about a mile beyond. But in the mean time, the rebels had begun to make obstructions lower down, by felling huge trees into the pass. The forest was extremely luxuriant, and the rafts and entanglements thus formed were obstacles of the most formidable character, extending, with intervals, a distance of nearly four miles. A single one of these barricades was a mile and a quarter in length, and composed of no fewer than eighty trees, reaching completely across the stream. Cottonwood, sycamore, oak, elm, and pecan-wood was used, and none of this timber, except the cottonwood, will float. The removal, in consequence, was a tedious task. Many of the trees, weighing at the least twenty tons, had to be hauled out entire upon the shore by strong

cables, while a few of the most buoyant were cut in pieces and fastened along the banks. To add to the difficulties, the rapid rise of the water, from the crevasse at the entrance, submerged the entire country, except along a very narrow strip of land near the shore. The men, in parties of about five hundred, were thus obliged to work in the water, as well as during almost incessant rains. The barriers, however, being removed, and a heavy growth of overhanging timber cut away, the distance from Moon lake to the Coldwater was finally cleared. But, while Grant's forces were thus diligently engaged in opening one end of the pass, the enemy had gained time to securely fortify below.

On the 15th of February, however, a way was open to the Tallahatchie, and Brigadier-General Ross, with forty-five hundred men, was ordered into the pass. He embarked on twenty-two light transports, preceded by two iron-clad gunboats, and a mosquito fleet, as the light-armored craft suitable for this navigation was called. Lieutenant-Commander Watson Smith commanded the naval force. The difficulty of procuring light transports delayed Ross over a week, but the combined fleet entered the pass on the 24th of February, and reached the Coldwater, twenty-five miles from the Mississippi, on the 2d of March. The Coldwater is over a hundred feet wide, and runs through a dense wilderness, for nearly all its course. The Tallahatchie is a stream of similar nature, and, from its width and depth, no longer susceptible of obstruction by the enemy. Thirty miles below the mouth of the Coldwater, the Tallahatchie affords free navigation for boats two hundred and fifty feet long. When once the expedition reached these rivers, a great

part of its difficulties would, it was hoped, be past. The naval commander moved cautiously, running but little faster than the current by daylight, and tying his boats to the shore after nightfall, so that the expedition did not reach the lower Tallahatchie till the 10th of March. This long passage of two hundred and fifty miles, through an almost unbroken forest, was made without the loss of a man. The country being overflowed, the river-banks could not be approached in any force by guerillas or sharpshooters.

Wilson now reported the practicability of the route as a line of important military operations, and Grant determined to prosecute his entire campaign, if possible, in this direction. The idea was to reach the Yazoo river, above Haine's bluff, with the whole army; the distance from Milliken's bend would have been nearly nine hundred miles. At first, only a single division of troops, under Brigadier-General Quimby, was sent to the support of Ross; but, shortly afterwards, McPherson, with his whole corps, and an additional division from Hurlbut's command (at Memphis), was ordered into the pass, whenever suitable transportation could be procured. Great difficulty, however, was found in obtaining light-draught steamers fit for the navigation of these narrow and devious streams; and the reënforcements were, in consequence, delayed at Helena.

Near where the waters of the Tallahatchie meet those of the Yallabusha, the small town of Greenwood is built; a little way above this point, the former stream sweeps to the east for eight or ten miles, and then doubles at the confluence; while the Yazoo, which is formed by the junction, flows back again to within five hundred yards of the Tallahatchie. At

the narrowest part of the neck of land thus created, the rebels had hastily constructed, of earth and cotton-bales, a line of parapet, running irregularly across from the Tallahatchie to the north bank of the Yazoo. This work they called Fort Pemberton; it was defended by two heavy guns and a light battery, and so located as to command both the land and the water approaches, from the northwest; it also guarded the Yallabusha, and the road in the rear to Grenada, as well as the Yazoo. It was built on ground so low that the water spread along its entire front, across the neck of land, and indefinitely towards the interior. All approach being thus rendered impracticable for infantry, the idea of a land attack was excluded, and the expedition was compelled to rely entirely upon the naval force for success.

Two attacks were accordingly made by the iron-clads, on the 11th, and one on the 13th of March, at a range of eight or nine hundred yards, and aided by a battery erected on the shore. In these fights one vessel was disabled, six men were killed, and twenty-five wounded.* Neither of the attacks was successful, and as every thing depended on the ability of the gunboats to silence the rebel batteries, and enable the transports to run down and land troops immediately at or on the fort itself, operations were apparently at an end; unless, indeed, the flood should drive out the occupants of the fort. As the site of the work was so little above water, a rise of two feet would accomplish this last object; and the levee on the Mississippi, three hundred miles away, was accordingly cut, at Austin, eighteen miles above Helena, with the hope that so large a volume of water

* The enemy lost one man killed and twenty wounded.

might be induced to take the line of the Coldwater and Tallahatchie, as to flood the country around the fort, The cut, however, did not prove large enough to produce this effect.*

The rebels meanwhile had made haste to avail themselves of the delay occasioned by the lack of transportation for McPherson's corps, and Grant was informed that they were hurrying troops from Vicksburg, over their shorter lines, to Greenwood. In order to relieve Ross, who was now in imminent danger of being surrounded, isolated as he was, away off in this tangled network of forest and bayou, Grant devised still another scheme.

This was to hem in the enemy on the Yazoo, by sending a force along another of these labyrinthine routes, that leaves the Yazoo river below Haine's bluff, and, after innumerable windings, reënters the same stream sixty miles above that point, and in the rear of Greenwood. The route was by way of the Yazoo river to Steele's bayou, up the latter to Black bayou, through that to Deer creek, and along Deer creek to the Rolling Fork; thence, across to the Big Sunflower, and down the Sunflower to the Yazoo; in all, about a hundred and fifty miles. On the 14th of March, Admiral Porter made a reconnoissance of these streams, as far as Deer creek, and informed Grant that, up to the limit of exploration, they were navigable for the

* There is a discrepancy between some of the statements made by subordinate army and navy officers about the Yazoo pass expedition. Each arm of the service blamed the other for delays and mishaps, for which, perhaps, neither was fairly blamable. The difficulties were prodigious, and sufficiently account for the failure of the expedition, without attributing it to a lack of energy, much less of earnestness or courage in any concerned. When accounts differ, I have adopted the statements which seemed to me best authenticated.

smaller iron-clads. Grant, the next day, accompanied the admiral on a second reconnoissance, and satisfied himself that, so far as he had penetrated, the principal obstruction was in the overhanging trees. He at once returned to Milliken's bend, with the purpose of hurrying up men and means for clearing the channel. "If we can get boats in the rear of them in time," he wrote, "it will so confuse the enemy as to save Ross's force. If not, I shall feel restless for his fate until I know that Quimby has reached him." Had this plan succeeded, it would have left Greenwood between the two national forces, and made imperative the immediate abandonment of that stronghold; about thirty steamers of the enemy would thus have been destroyed, or have fallen into Grant's hands.

On the 16th of March, he sent Sherman with a division of troops (Stuart's) up Steele's bayou; five iron-clads and four mortar-boats accompanied, under Porter. The object was, not only to liberate Ross, but to find a practicable passage to the Yazoo, without passing the enemy's batteries at Haine's bluff; and to get possession of some point on the east bank, from which Vicksburg could be reached by dry land. Grant informed Quimby of Sherman's coöperation, and urged him to the support of Ross from the north, saying: "Sherman will come in below the enemy you are now contending against, and, between the two forces, you will find no further difficulties before reaching the ground I so much desire." In all these various operations, Grant never lost sight of his principal aim—to obtain a footing and a secure base from which to prosecute his campaign on dry land.

Sherman's troops went up the Mississippi on large transports, about thirty miles, to Eagle bend, where Steele's bayou runs within one mile of the river; they thus saved the distance from the mouth of the Yazoo, and also the most difficult part of the navigation in the bayou. They marched across the strip of land between the river and the bayou, building floating bridges over part of the way, which led through a swamp called Muddy bayou. Small-class steamers then ferried them up the stream, Porter having the advance. The drift-timber soon began to obstruct the channel, and the gunboats got entangled, but nevertheless forced a way through. The turns were so short, that the admiral was obliged to heave his vessels around the bends, having not a foot to spare. It took him thus twenty-four hours to advance four miles.

By this time, it had become evident that transportation for McPherson, through the Yazoo pass, could not be procured; his previous orders to go to the assistance of Ross were therefore countermanded, Grant now intending to bring him to the lower end of the expedition. Quimby's orders, however, were not yet revoked.

Porter pushed along with his unwieldy iron-clads, through the labyrinth, his way obstructed now far more than in the earlier stages of the expedition. The gunboats moved like snails, but with great power, pushing all saplings, and bushes, and drift aside. The bayous were narrow and crooked, the turns sudden, the channel was half filled with cypress and willows growing in the bed of the stream; a thicket of trees overhead had to be thrust aside, but he broke the branches of the forest with his heavy iron-clad boats,

and made a tortuous path in advance of the lighter transports, which had still more difficulty than he in forcing a passage.* Trees had to be pulled up by the roots, and stumps sawn off below the surface of the water; chimneys, and guards, and pilot-houses were swept away by the wilderness of boughs that reached down from above, and stretched out on either side.

There was no dry land along the route as far as Deer creek, and all the troops had finally to be removed from the transports and conveyed on tugs and coal-barges, the way having become impassable to the steamers. The movement of the land forces was therefore extremely slow, and the naval vessels got some thirty miles in advance, near the Rolling Fork. Here, on the 20th of March, Porter was attacked by sharpshooters, to whom his heavy ordnance could render only ineffectual replies. The rebels had not only impeded his progress, by hewing heavy trees in his front, but begun doing the same in his rear. The labor of removing these artificial obstructions was prodigious; it was prosecuted by night as well as by day, and under artillery and musketry fire; and Porter finally sent back for Sherman to hurry up to his assistance.

Sherman was then at the junction of the Big Black bayou and Deer creek. He at once sent forward all the troops which had arrived at that point; and, when, in a few hours, reinforcements came up, although it was night, he marched at their head, along the narrow and only track of hard land that

* "I never yet saw vessels so well adapted to knocking down trees, hauling them up by the roots, or demolishing bridges."—*Admiral Porter's Report.*

had been found, leading his troops by lighted candles through the canebrake. They got up opportunely for Porter, whose iron-clads were three feet below the banks of the river, and thus unable to reply to the sharpshooters. He had in fact begun to withdraw; but the rebels had a force of about four thousand men in the swamps, and were compelling negroes, at the muzzle of the musket, to fell trees all around the fleet, in rear as well as in advance. A battery of artillery was also established in front. Sherman, however, speedily drove away the annoying skirmishers, and saved the admiral with his fleet.*

But the impracticability of the campaign had been demonstrated. So much time had been consumed, that the enemy was now fully aware of the movement. The creek was blockaded just where the boats would leave it for the Rolling Fork, and the rebels occupied the ground in force, from which they could prevent the removal of the obstructions. The admiral, therefore, was forced to desist from any further effort to proceed, when within a few hundred yards of clear sailing to the Yazoo; for, once in the Rolling Fork, there would have been no more difficulties. The character of the country precluded the possibility of taking any land route, and it was accordingly necessary to return, without having accomplished any of the objects of the expedition.

The troops had, however, been carried into the heart of the granary from which the Vicksburg forces were being fed, and great alarm had been caused to the enemy. Rebel guns were removed from batteries along the Mississippi, citizens in the interior fled from their plantations, several thousand bales of cotton

* The losses on both sides in this entire expedition did not amount to half a score.

were burnt, lest they should fall into the hands of the national forces, and much of the bacon, beef, and poultry of the region was consumed. But these results were insignificant, when compared with those which it had been hoped to attain.

The iron-clads had to back out of the stream into navigable water, as there was not room to turn, and, with unshipped rudders, rebounded from tree to tree. Sherman, on shore, protected them during this difficult and dangerous operation, and, on the 27th, he was back in his original camps opposite Vicksburg.

Meanwhile, Ross had withdrawn from before Fort Pemberton, and on his way back met Quimby, on the 22d of March, near the head of the Yazoo pass. Quimby being senior, decided to return, and ascertain for himself the situation, but soon discovered that nothing could be done to remedy it; and, as soon as Grant learned the failure of the Steele's bayou expedition, he directed the concentration of all his forces at Milliken's bend.

These various attempts and expeditions on both sides of the Mississippi, although unsuccessful in their main objects, were yet productive of beneficial results. The national forces, so constantly employed, became hardened by exposure, and of course improved in spirits and health; they obtained also a thorough knowledge of the peculiar difficulties of the country in which they were operating, and were thus better able to encounter those difficulties. The enemy, besides, was kept continually on the alert, and, obliged to move his troops hurriedly and frequently from place to place; not knowing in what quarter nor from what direction the blow might fall, he was forced to maintain large detachments at posts remote

from Grant's real objective point. The men were thus wearied and distracted, in advance of the great trial of their spirit and strength which was sure to come in the end.

While all these operations had been going on, Admiral Farragut, with a part of his fleet, had run by the batteries at Port Hudson, and communicated with Grant. For a while, he lay just below Warren-ton, having even passed the fortifications at Grand Gulf. Through Farragut, Grant was enabled to communicate with Banks. All hope of receiving any aid from that officer had long since been abandoned; he had found the capture of Port Hudson as difficult a task as that of Vicksburg had proven to Grant; and, the latter, when it became apparent that neither the canal, nor the Lake Providence, nor the Yazoo pass, nor the Steele's bayou scheme was likely to be of any avail, now proposed to send an army corps to coöperate with Banks.* With this increased force, Port Hudson could certainly be taken, and then Banks's entire army might be combined with Grant's, and, moving up from below, a coöperative attack be made on Vicksburg. The great distance that separated the two armies, however, between whom also lay the two strongholds which were the objective

* On the 2d of April, Halleck wrote to Grant, using these words: . . . "What is most desired (and your attention is again called to this object) is, that your forces and those of General Banks should be brought into coöperation as early as possible. If he cannot get up to coöperate with you on Vicksburg, cannot you get troops down to help him at Port Hudson, or at least can you not destroy Grand Gulf before it becomes too strong?" This and the dispatch of February 13th, already quoted, are the only orders or suggestions relating to military operations that were made to Grant by the general-in-chief, from January 29th to May 11th. That of May 11th will be given in its place.

points of the campaign of each, prevented the realization of this plan.

The country, meanwhile, and the government, had become very impatient. Clamors were raised everywhere against Grant's slowness; the old rumors about his personal character were revived; his soldiers were said to be dying of swamp fevers and dysenteries, in the morasses around Vicksburg; he was pronounced utterly destitute of genius or energy; his repeatedly baffled schemes declared to emanate from a brain unfitted for such trials; his persistency was dogged obstinacy, his patience was sluggish dulness. McClelland, and Hunter, and Fremont, and McClellan were spoken of as his successors; senators and governors went to Vicksburg, and from Vicksburg to Washington, to work for his removal. McClelland's machinations at this time came very near succeeding. His advocates were never so earnest nor so hopeful, while some of Grant's best friends failed him at the critical moment. But the President said: "I rather like the man; I think we'll try him a little longer."* But for this persistency, Grant would undoubtedly have been relieved, and McClelland put in command of the expedition against Vicksburg. Grant was aware of all these efforts to supplant him, and of the probability of their success. His anxieties as a commander were of course enhanced by the near prospect of his removal.

On the 2d of April, Halleck informed him that

* A congressman, who had been one of Grant's warmest friends, was found wanting at this juncture. He went to the President without being sent for, and declared that the emergencies of the country seemed to demand another commander before Vicksburg. To him Mr. Lincoln replied: "I rather like the man. I think we'll try him a little longer."

the President "seems to be rather impatient about matters on the Mississippi," and inquired if Grant could not coöperate with Banks against Port Hudson. On the 9th, also, he wrote: "You are too well advised of the anxiety of the government for your success, and its disappointment at the delay, to render it necessary to urge upon you the importance of early action;" but, added in his own behalf: "I am confident that you will do every thing possible to open the Mississippi river." And, indeed, it is not surprising that the government should have urged him on. No substantial victory had cheered the flagging spirits of the North, since Grant's own successes at Corinth and Iuka, of the preceding autumn. Banks had achieved no military results, with his mammoth expedition; Burnside, in December, had suffered the repulse at Fredericksburg; Rosecrans had not got further than Murfreesboro; and, the great force of sixty or seventy thousand men, at Grant's disposal, had accomplished absolutely nothing, during six long, weary months of effort and delay.

The rebels were confident of the security of their stronghold, and taunted Grant with his failures; every new plan awoke new demonstrations of contempt, and Vicksburg was pronounced by Mr. Jefferson Davis to be the Gibraltar of America. A reconnoissance was made to Haime's bluff, but it only demonstrated the impracticability of attacking that place during the high stage of water. Whichever way the national forces turned, nature seemed to combine with art to render the rebel fortifications impregnable. The elements were the strongest defences of Vicksburg, stubborn and gallant as was the courage of her soldiers.

Still, Grant wrote, on the 4th of April, after all these failures: "The discipline and health of this army is now good, and I am satisfied the greatest confidence of success prevails." In the following words he described to Halleck the plan which he next essayed. It was the last:

"There is a system of bayous running from Milliken's bend, also from near the river at this point" (Young's point), "that are navigable for large and small steamers, passing around by Richmond to New Carthage. There is also a good wagon-road from Milliken's bend to New Carthage. The dredges are now engaged cutting a canal from here into these bayous. I am having all the empty coal-boats and other barges prepared for carrying troops and artillery, and have written to Colonel Allen for some more, and also for six tugs to tow them. With them it would be easy to carry supplies to New Carthage, and any point south of that.*

"My expectation is for some of the naval fleet to run the batteries of Vicksburg, whilst the army moves through by this new route. Once there, I will move to Warrenton or Grand Gulf, probably the latter. From either of these points, there are good roads to Jackson and the Black river bridge, without crossing Black river. I will keep my army together, and see to it that I am not cut off from my supplies, or beat in any other way than a fair fight."

Grant himself had long believed that he should

* As early as February 4th, Grant had written to Halleck about this route: "There is no question but that this route is much more practicable than the present undertaking, and would have been accomplished with much less labor, if commenced before the water had got all over the country."

eventually be compelled to adopt this plan; but the submerged condition of the roads on the Louisiana shore had hitherto rendered it impracticable. When the idea became known to those in his intimacy, to his staff, and to his corps commanders, it seemed to them full of danger. To move his army below Vicksburg was to separate it from the North, and from all its supplies; to throw what seemed an insurmountable obstacle between himself and his own base; to cut his own communications, and place his army exactly where it is the whole object and aim of war to get the enemy. In a word, it was to hazard every thing, for if failure came, it was sure to be overwhelming; only the most complete and speedy victory could insure him against absolute annihilation. These considerations were urged upon Grant by the most accomplished soldiers of his command; those who have since acquired reputations of the most brilliant character, strove to divert their chief from what they considered this fatal error. Sherman, McPherson, Logan, Wilson, all opposed—all of course within the proper limits of soldierly subordination, but all with energy.

Even after the orders for the movement had been issued, Sherman rode up to Grant's headquarters, and proposed his plan. He asserted, emphatically, that the only way to take Vicksburg was from the north, selecting some high ground on the Mississippi for a base. Grant replied that such a plan would require him to go back to Memphis. "Exactly so," said Sherman, "that is what I mean;" and he developed the reasons, which seemed to him unanswerable, in favor of such a course. Grant, however, believed that a retrograde movement, even if temporary, would

be disastrous to the country, which was in no temper to endure another reverse; he was determined to take no step backward, and so declared. Sherman thereupon returned to his own headquarters, and, on the 8th of April, addressed a formal communication to Lieutenant-Colonel Rawlins, Grant's chief of staff, in which he again set forth the advantages of the route he had recommended, and suggested that Grant should call on all his corps commanders for their views.

"Let the line of the Yallabusha be the base," he said, "from which to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central crosses Big Black, above Canton, and lastly where the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad crosses the same river. The capture of Vicksburg would result."* The letter was able, and in strict accordance with the established principles of military science; it was respectful and subordinate in tone, and concluded in these words: "I make these suggestions with the request that General Grant simply read them, and give them, as I know he will, a share of his thoughts. I would prefer he should not answer them, but merely give them as much or as little weight as they deserve; whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from me the same zealous coöperation and energetic support as though conceived by myself."

Colonel Rawlins handed the paper to Grant without saying a word; Grant read it carefully but in silence, and after the perusal was finished made no comment. The orders were not revoked, the council of war was not called, and the letter has never since been mentioned between the two commanders. Its

* See Appendix for Sherman's letter in full.

existence was not disclosed by Grant, until Sherman himself publicly related the incident, after the investment of Vicksburg, when several prominent men were attributing to him the conception of the campaign which resulted in opening the Mississippi river.

Sherman, doubtless, was induced to take this step by his anxiety for the success of the campaign, as well as for the reputation of his chief, between whom and himself relations of such peculiar intimacy had long existed; but Grant was firmly determined to make the movement, and the disapproval of his ablest generals had no effect to deter him. Sherman, thinking the plan almost certain of defeat, for that reason felt the greater need of making the greater effort to insure its success. He did not fail, nor did any of those officers whose faith in the enterprise was least, to do their utmost to falsify their own opinions. Indeed, had Grant's subordinates been less thoroughly subordinate, had they done less than their best to attain a result which they believed almost, if not quite unattainable, no determination, nor daring, nor energy in their commander could have availed. But, not a word of dissatisfaction or criticism escaped from these true soldiers, after it once became evident that Grant was immovable.

At this time, however, he had not himself determined to do all that he afterwards attempted. His plans, indeed, were always ripened into their full fruition by the emergencies and opportunities of a battle or campaign; his judgment was always sharpened by events, his faculties were always brighter at a crisis; his decisions were most unerring when compelled to be most sudden and irrevocable. Then, words, if few, were not laggard, and always to the point; and

action followed as fast on thought as a strong man's movements on his will.

His design, now, was to move his army to some point below Vicksburg, where he might be able to supply himself by the roads and bayous in Louisiana, and thence send a corps to coöperate with Banks in the reduction of Port Hudson. After that place should have fallen, Banks, with his whole army and the corps from Grant, was to march up and unite in the campaign against Vicksburg. As the Mississippi would then be open from New Orleans, supplies could reach the army from below. In order to accomplish this movement, it was necessary for Grant to throw his whole force simultaneously south of Vicksburg, as a single corps would be exposed to the risk of attack from the garrison, as well as from the rebel army in the interior. Banks was the senior of Grant, and upon a junction of their forces must have assumed command.

Accordingly, in the last week in March, orders were issued for the concentration of all the forces of the expedition at Milliken's bend; McPherson was brought from Lake Providence and the Yazoo pass, and Sherman from Steele's bayou; Hurlbut was stripped of every man that could be spared from the rear; yawls and flat-boats were collected from St. Louis and Chicago, and, on the 29th of March, McClermand was sent by the circuitous roads that lead from Milliken's bend, by way of Richmond and west of Roundaway bayou, to New Carthage, twenty-seven miles below. McPherson and Sherman were to follow McClermand, as rapidly as ammunition and rations could be forwarded. The movement was necessarily slow; the roads though level, were intolerably bad,

the effects of the long overflow having not yet disappeared. A new canal was being constructed at Duckport, to connect the Mississippi with Roundaway bayou, and there was danger of McClelland's route becoming overflowed from this canal. The wagon-road, even where built up, was only twenty inches above water in the swamp; and the river was four and a half inches higher than the land, at the point where the water was to be let into the canal. Grant, at this time, wrote to Halleck: "The embarrassment I have had to contend against, on account of extreme high water, cannot be appreciated by any one not present to witness it."

New Carthage, however, was occupied on the 6th of April, but the levee of Bayou Vidal, which empties into the Mississippi at that point, was broken in several places, and the country deluged for a distance of two miles; boats were accordingly collected from all the bayous in the vicinity, and others were constructed of such material as was at hand. One division, with its artillery, was thus conveyed across Vidal bayou, and through the overflowed forest to the levee at New Carthage; but, the ferriage of an entire army in this way would have been exceedingly tedious, and a new route was found from Smith's plantation, where the crevasse had occurred, to Perkins's, twelve miles below. This made the march from Milliken's bend to the new point from which it was now proposed to operate, about thirty-five or forty miles. Four bridges, two of them six hundred feet long, had to be laid across the swollen bayous which interrupted this route. These were built of the barges and flats previously used at Smith's plantation, and of forest timber found near the crossing.

The transport route, through Duckport canal and the bayous, had just become practicable, when a fall in the waters of the Mississippi occurred, and one steamer only got through this passage. Afterwards, the depth of water was insufficient to allow transports of the smallest draught to make their way, and all supplies of ordnance stores and provisions had to be hauled by land over the miserable, muddy roads.

As early as the 13th of February, Grant had written to Hurlbut: "It seems to me that Grierson, with about five hundred picked men, might succeed in cutting his way south, and cut the railroad east of Jackson, Mississippi. The undertaking would be a hazardous one, but it would pay well if carried out." This road was the principal avenue of communication for the rebels with Vicksburg. Circumstances prevented the execution of the plan until the 9th of March, when full instructions were issued to Hurlbut to send Grierson on such an errand; but obstacles again intervened, and it was not till the middle of April that a cavalry force, seventeen hundred strong, was organized at La Grange, and the command given to Colonel B. H. Grierson, of the Sixth Illinois cavalry. This force was ordered to make its way south, from La Grange, through the state of Mississippi, to some point on the river below Vicksburg, destroying railroads and cutting off supplies in every way possible from the besieged city. The movement was also intended to act as a diversion in favor of Grant's new campaign, as well as to test the idea he entertained, that the fortunes of the rebellion were waning, its armies becoming exhausted, and its supplies rapidly decreasing; that, in fact, men and stores were alike drawn to the outside, and the so-

called Confederacy itself was only a "hollow shell." This "shell" Grierson was to penetrate. He started on the 17th of April, and made one of the most memorable cavalry expeditions of the war, traversing the entire state of Mississippi, without meeting any large force to oppose him; destroying stores, burning bridges, tearing up railroads, and having a moral effect upon the population of the interior altogether unprecedented. Larger cavalry forces often moved, far greater cavalry campaigns were made, but this was the most remarkable which had then occurred, and therefore produced a greater effect upon the imaginations of the rebels than any that came after. Grierson emerged out of the unknown and hostile territory, at Baton Rouge, on the 2d of May. He had captured five hundred prisoners, killed and wounded one hundred rebels, destroyed fifty miles of railroad and telegraph wire and three thousand stands of arms, and marched six hundred miles, in less than sixteen days. His loss was three killed and seven wounded. Five men were left on the road, sick, and nine straggled.*

While Grant had been prosecuting his different campaigns, by land and river and swamp, above the city, several of the vessels in Porter's command had run by the Vicksburg batteries, with various fortune. One was captured, two were sunk, and one, the *Queen of the West*, passed by without serious injury. For several reasons it had now become indispensable to have a supply of boats below Vicksburg. Barges were needed to ferry the troops across the river, to the point from which the new campaign was to commence; and the transportation of supplies by land was so tedious, that Grant determined to risk send-

* For Grierson's raid, see Map of Theatre of War.

ing three steamers and ten barges past the batteries, loaded with rations and forage. The coöperation of Admiral Porter was necessary in this part of the undertaking; and, whenever, in all this long and varied campaign, such coöperation was needed, Grant never applied in vain. On the 26th of April, he wrote: "I am happy to say the admiral and myself have never yet disagreed upon any policy."

Only two of the steamboat masters were willing to encounter the danger; the crew of one transport also remained aboard, but all the others shrank. When, however, it became known in the army that volunteers were wanted for the dangerous task, men enough to man a hundred steamers pressed themselves upon the commanders; pilots, masters, engineers, and men, all were found in the ranks and among the officers on shore, and from these, crews were speedily improvised for the transport fleet. While seven of Porter's iron-clads engaged the batteries, the river steamers, protected by bales of cotton and wet hay, and towing the barges, were to run the gantlet of twenty-eight heavy guns that commanded the river for over fifteen miles.

The night of the 16th of April was selected for the undertaking. There was no moon, and by ten o'clock all was ready. One after another, and as silently as possible, the venturous fleet steamed down the river to the bend. From this point they proceeded more leisurely, drifting with the current, the gunboats in advance. Porter led the way, on the Benton, and reached the first batteries without being discovered; but, at sixteen minutes past eleven, the artillery opened from the bluffs; the admiral at once responding with a rapid fire. The vessels of the

squadron, all in line, followed his example, while the transports hugged the Louisiana shore, and sought to hurry by under cover of the smoke. Grant remained on a transport just above the bend, where he could watch the operations, within range. Shot and shell fell thick around him.

The night was dark, but houses were speedily set on fire by the rebels along the shore on either side, and the bright glare thrown across the water made it light as day. When the fleet got opposite the city, the men at the batteries and in the streets of Vicksburg, could be plainly seen. The first transports arrived opposite the court-house at twenty minutes past twelve. It was here they received the heaviest fire; each vessel became a target to the rebel shot, and a storm of projectiles of every variety and size came crashing over them, cutting the ropes and chimney-guys, bursting in the pilot-houses, and shivering the machinery. Men were stationed in the holds, to put cotton-bags into such openings as were made by the rebel shot; and, soon after getting under fire, the barges were cut loose, some of them sweeping down in the current, even below New Carthage.

Every transport was struck, and two were drawn into the eddy, and ran over a part of the distance in front of Vicksburg no less than three times. The *Forest Queen* was disabled by a round shot, and drifted down opposite the lower picket stations, where the gunboat *Tuscumbia* took her in tow, and landed her just above the crevasse at New Carthage. The *Henry Clay* also became disabled, and was in a sinking condition soon after coming within range of the upper batteries; she had in tow a barge with soldiers aboard, which was cast loose, and floated

down the stream. Not long afterwards the boat itself took fire, from the explosion of a shell, and burned to the water's edge, drifting along with the current, a flaming mass. General Sherman was in a small boat, watching the bombardment, and picked up the pilot as he floated from the wreck. The crew pushed off in yawls to the Louisiana side, where they landed, and hid themselves behind an old levee, during the cannonade. After it had ceased, they made their way back through the submerged swamps, to camp.

The light streamed up from the blazing hull of the *Henry Clay*, and threw into strong relief against the shadows of night the other transports, and the gunboats at their fiery work. The currents were strong, and dangerous eddies delayed the vessels; the lights glaring in every direction, and the smoke enveloping the squadron, confused the pilots; the bulwarks, even of the iron-clads, were crushed; and the uproar of artillery, reëchoing from the hills, was incessant. One of the heaviest guns of the enemy was seen to burst in the streets of Vicksburg, and the whole population was awake and out of doors, watching the scene on which its destinies depended. For two hours and forty minutes, the fleets were under fire. But, at last, the transports and the gunboats had all got out of range, the blazing beacons on the hills and on the stream burned low, the array of batteries belching flame and noise from the embattled bluffs had ceased their utterance, and silence and darkness resumed their sway over the beleaguered city, and the swamps and rivers that encircle Vicksburg.

On the gunboats, no one was killed, and only eight wounded; all of Porter's vessels were ready for

service within half an hour after passing the batteries. No casualties were reported on the transports, but both the steamers and barges were materially damaged.

Meanwhile, McClelland's advance had arrived at New Carthage, and was watching anxiously the issue of the operation. At first, only the burning fragments of the *Henry Clay*, and the barge that had been cut loose, came floating down; and an old rebel, on whose estate McClelland's headquarters were established, was jubilant at what he supposed the defeat of the Yankees. "Where are your gunboats now?" he exclaimed; "Vicksburg has put an end to them all;" and the national officers feared lest his elation might prove well-founded. By daylight, however, the wrecks had all passed by; and, after a while, a gunboat appeared below the bend; and then, a transport; then, one after another, the whole fleet of iron-clads and army steamers hove in sight, from their perilous passage. The "Yankees" now had their turn of rejoicing, and thanked the rebel for teaching them the word. "Where are your gunboats now?" they said. "Did Vicksburg put an end to them all?" But the old man was too much exasperated at the national success, to endure the taunts he had himself provoked, and rushed away in a rage. The next day he set fire to his own house, rather than allow it to shelter his enemies.

His plantation was one of the loveliest in Louisiana; high enough to be secure from inundation, it overlooked the meanderings of the Mississippi for nearly fifty miles; wide savannas teemed with the wealth of the corn and the cotton-plant, while the spacious lawns were clad in all the charms of preco-

cious summer in this balmy clime. Japan plums and fig-trees grew in the open air, and groves of magnolia and oleander bloomed. The softness of the atmosphere, redolent with unfamiliar fragrance, and the aspect of the landscape, brilliant with blossoms and verdure, enchanted the soldiers. "Here, at last," they cried, "we have found the sunny South." But desolation and destruction fell like a storm-cloud over the scene. In a few hours a blackened pile was all that remained of the stately mansion; the broad plantation became a camping-ground; the venerable trees in which it was embosomed were hewn down for firewood, and the secluded fields were speedily transformed into a confused and bustling bivouac.*

Grant's orders to McClernand had been explicit and urgent, to seize and occupy Grand Gulf. In order to appease the unappeasable ambition and conceit of his subordinate, he had given him command of the advance, and charged him with an operation, which, if successful, would have rendered McClernand famous at once. On the 12th of April, he wrote to that officer: "It is my desire that you should get possession of Grand Gulf at the earliest practicable moment. . . . I wanted particularly to see you about the facilities for getting troops from Smith's

* "The movement of troops from Milliken's bend to New Carthage will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance required by previous orders. Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the beef cattle, corn, and other necessary supplies for the army, on the line of march, but wanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses without proper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited. All such irregularities must be summarily punished."—*Extract from Grant's General Order for this movement. (See Appendix for order, entire.)*

plantation to New Carthage, and the chances for embarking there." On the 13th: "It is not desirable that you should move in any direction from Grand Gulf, but remain under the protection of the gunboats. The present plan, if not changed by the movements of the enemy, will be to hold Grand Gulf." On the 18th: "I would still repeat former instructions, that possession be got of Grand Gulf at the earliest possible moment." Again: "I will be over here in a few days again, and hope it will be my good fortune to find you in safe possession of Grand Gulf."

But McClelland's inefficiency in conducting the movements of his corps was such, that Grant was obliged to instruct him in the most minute details.* Instead of appreciating this, McClelland resented it as interference. Admiral Porter, after the running of the batteries, also endeavored to make suggestions to the intractable and incompetent commander of the advance. He informed McClelland of opportunities for attacking Grand Gulf, and urged him to make a combined assault with the navy, on that place. But all in vain.

Finally, Porter wrote to Sherman, with whom he was intimate, and begged him to induce General Grant at once to come down in person to the front, and examine the situation for himself, as the favorable opportunity was fast slipping by. Grant was suffering from boils at the time, and almost unable to mount a horse; but, the day after receiving this request, he rode forty miles, from Milliken's bend to Perkins's landing, and there gave McClelland further

* See Appendix for Grant's letter to McClelland of April 18th.

instructions. The time that had been wasted, however, was irrecoverable; the rebels had used it to advantage, and Grant became convinced that nothing would be accomplished until he took command in person, and remained with the advance. He returned, therefore, to Milliken's bend, to hasten the transportation of McPherson's corps.

In fact, during this entire campaign, Grant constantly directed the quartermasters and commissaries, the movements of troops and the transportation of stores and ordnance, the plans of reconnoissances and the positions of important batteries. Not only was there no movement of a division, from the time he took command, in January, that was not expressly ordered by himself, but his instructions, even to regimental commanders, when these commanded detached posts, were numerous, and constant, and detailed. This course was indispensable, because of the complicated character of the campaign, the vast distances over which he was operating, and the extreme difficulties in transportation, against which he was obliged to contend. In no other way could he harmonize these various movements, and evoke unity out of the confused and apparently conflicting combinations. A commander who had not supervised every thing, at this emergency, would have failed.*

On the 26th of April, six other transports attempted to run by the Vicksburg batteries; five of them succeeded, although in a damaged condition; one was sunk, being struck in the hull by a solid shot. The crews of all these transports, like those of their

* See Appendix for Grant's orders to Sherman, of April 24th. Grant's letter-book to subordinates at this time is probably one of the most curious in the history of war.

predecessors, were composed of volunteers for the purpose, from the army. Twelve barges, laden with forage and rations, were sent in tow of the last six steamers, and half of them got safely by. On this occasion, but one man was killed, and six or eight were wounded; about five hundred shots were fired.

Immediately after the running of the batteries, the various vessels and barges were repaired, by order of Admiral Porter, who furnished the material. Mechanics were found in the army to do the work; for it was a striking feature of the volunteer service, throughout the war, that no mechanical or professional need arose, when accomplished adepts could not be found in almost any regiment to perform the duty required. The army craft was soon in a condition to be of use in moving troops; but, the destruction of two transports and six barges, reduced the number so that it was found necessary to march the men from Perkins's plantation to Hard Times, twenty-two miles further, and a distance of seventy miles from Milliken's bend. The new road lay along the west bank of Lake St. Joseph, and across three large bayous, over which bridges were built by the troops, the materials being taken from plantation-houses near by.

The whole route was in miserable condition, and after the march was once begun, the roads became intolerable. But, on the 29th of April, the entire Thirteenth corps had arrived at Hard Times, ten thousand men having moved from Perkins's plantation on transports. Grant's headquarters, on the 24th, were with the advance.

Reconnoissances of the eastern shore had meanwhile been ordered by Grant, and resulted in the dis-

covery that there was but one point between Warrenton and Grand Gulf, where a good road existed from the river to the bluffs, the whole country being still overflowed on the left bank of the river. This dry point was at a place called Congo Island, and was so strongly protected by natural defences, that it was not judged advisable to attempt a landing there. The road led to Cox's farm on the Big Black river, and to use this landing would have necessitated crossing the Big Black in the face of the enemy.

The Seventeenth corps, under McPherson, had followed McClelland closely, and Grant, after consulting with Admiral Porter, now determined to attack the works at Grand Gulf. The Mississippi, at this place, has cut away the alluvium to the foot of the highland, and forms a large semi-circular bay or "gulf." The bluff rises into a bold promontory, and commands a full view of the river for five or six miles above. The fortifications consisted of a series of rifle-trenches, and of two batteries, mounting thirteen heavy guns. The plan was, for the naval force to bombard and silence the batteries, and, immediately afterwards, the troops were to land at the foot of the bluff, and carry the works by storm. Accordingly, ten thousand troops of the Thirteenth corps were crowded aboard the transports and barges, and moved down the stream, to the front of Grand Gulf, at a point just out of range.

Grant, however, had foreseen that a necessity for running by the batteries might again arise. In his order to McClelland for the attack, dated the 27th of April, he remarked: "It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run

past Grand Gulf and land at Rodney, . . . or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. In this case, then, the transports would have to be brought back to where the men could land, and move by forced marches to below Grand Gulf, reëmbark rapidly, and proceed to the latter place."* With the exception of the march to Grand Gulf, this is what actually occurred, two days afterwards. On the same day, Grant instructed McClernand: "The amount of transportation being limited for the number of men it is desirable to take to Grand Gulf, I especially intended that no horses, except what was necessary for drawing the artillery, should be taken."

At eight o'clock on the morning of the 29th, Porter began the bombardment with all his iron-clads, seven in number, and one ordinary gunboat. For five hours and twenty minutes, he kept up a vigorous fire, without intermission, running his vessels at times almost within pistol-shot of the batteries. The current of the Mississippi at this place is quite swift, and the stream too deep for anchorage, so that the gunboats were compelled to keep continually in motion; they were turned round and round in the eddies, exposed of course at every turn. The vessels were handled with skill and boldness, but the rebel batteries were too elevated for Porter to accomplish any thing; he was not able to dismount a solitary piece, and it would have been madness to attempt a landing, under unsilenced guns like these. No serious injury was sustained by any of the fleet, but, at twenty minutes past one o'clock, the admiral with-

* See Appendix for Grant's orders to McClernand for the attack in full, April 27th. Also Grant's orders of April 24th.

drew, the utter futility of his effort having been amply demonstrated; the enemy also suspended fire. Porter's loss was eighteen killed and fifty-six wounded. One of his vessels was struck as many as forty-seven times.

Grant had witnessed the bombardment from a tug in the stream, and, immediately upon its close, he signalled the admiral, who took him aboard the flagship. There, he at once requested Porter to run by the batteries at Grand Gulf that night, with his entire fleet, as a cover to the transports, while the troops should be disembarked at Hard Times, and marched to De Shroon's, a point on the western shore, three miles below Grand Gulf. Porter promptly acquiesced, and that night the gunboats again engaged the batteries, while all the transports ran by, receiving no damage in the passage, only one or two being struck. They were thus ready, on the morning of the 30th, to take the troops aboard at De Shroon's. During the night, the Thirteenth corps marched around to that place, on the levee. The gunboats also passed below the batteries.

Grant had previously ordered the eastern shore below Grand Gulf explored, to find a landing-place, and hardly hoped to get a footing anywhere north of Rodney; but, that night, information was procured from a negro, that a good road led from Bruinsburg, six miles below Grand Gulf, to Port Gibson, twelve miles in the interior, and on high ground. When the embarkation began in the morning, it was with a view to steam down the river, until hard land should be found, but, this information being relied on, the first transports went direct to Bruinsburg, and found the negro's story correct; a good dry road leading to

the bluffs, which were at least two miles from the river.

At the same time that the attack on Grand Gulf was ordered, Grant wrote to Sherman, who had not yet started from Milliken's bend, to make a demonstration against Haine's bluff, which should serve as a diversion merely, in favor of the assault below. "The effect of a heavy demonstration in that direction," said Grant, "would be good, so far as the enemy are concerned; but I am loath to order it, because it would be so hard to make our own troops understand that only a demonstration was intended, and our people at home would characterize it as a repulse." Sherman had been so unfortunate, and the comments of the newspaper press on his career had been so unjustly harsh, that Grant felt an especial unwillingness to place him and his command in a position that would subject them to unpleasant criticism. Still, he preferred Sherman to any other commander, for this separate and important part of the enterprise. But Sherman replied: "I believe a diversion at Haine's bluff is proper and right, and will make it, let whatever reports of repulses be made." On the 29th of April, accordingly, he moved ten regiments up the Yazoo on transports, while the gunboats which had been left by Porter north of Vicksburg (eight in number), also appeared in sight of the bluff, and engaged the batteries. The troops were landed, and mock dispositions made for attack; reconnoissances were sent out, and the enemy opened heavy fire both upon the naval and the land forces. This lasted for two days, and Grant afterwards learned that the movement caused great anxiety and many changes of troops, in the command at Vicksburg. Not a man of

Sherman's force was hurt, nor were there any losses in the squadron. On the 1st of May, Sherman got orders from Grant to withdraw from before the bluff, and follow as rapidly as possible, on the heels of McPherson's corps. "Move up to Perkins's plantation, with two divisions of your corps, as rapidly as possible."

On the 29th, after passing Grand Gulf, Grant wrote to Halleck: "I feel now that the battle is more than half over." During this tedious month, his confidence had never failed. On the 2d of April, he said to Halleck: "In two weeks I expect to be able to collect all my forces and turn the enemy's left." When Sherman returned, unsuccessful, from Steele's bayou, Grant consoled himself by saying that "the expedition has at least pushed our troops into the heart of the granary from which the Vicksburg forces are now being fed." On the 11th, he announced: "My force in a few days will be all concentrated; I expect to take Grand Gulf." On the 17th: "I go to New Carthage to-night; if it is possible, I will occupy Grand Gulf in four days." On the 18th: "I hope very soon to be able to report my possession of Grand Gulf." On the 21st: "My force is abundant, with a foothold once attained, to do the work." On the 24th, to Sherman: "I foresee great difficulties in our present position, but it will not do to let these retard any movements." Again: "Once at Grand Gulf, I do not feel a doubt of success in the entire clearing out of the enemy from the banks of the river." "Every effort will be exerted to get speedy possession of Grand Gulf, and from that point to open the Mississippi."

CHAPTER VII.

Preliminary orders for the campaign—Passage of the Mississippi river—Movement to the high land—Battle-field of Port Gibson—McClermand meets the enemy—Battle of Port Gibson—Grant comes on the field in person—Arrival of McPherson's command—Success on the right—McPherson's charge—Defeat of the rebels—Pursuit until dark—Rebels retreat beyond Port Gibson—Pursuit to Big Black river—Bridges burnt by rebels and rebuilt by Grant—Evacuation of Grand Gulf—New plan of campaign—Reasons for the change—Dispatches from Banks—New plan not divulged to Halleck—Efforts to bring up troops and supplies—Demonstrations towards Vicksburg—Instructions to Hurlbut—McPherson advances—Sherman arrives—Correspondence with Sherman—Army moves—Position of troops—Grant's habit in planning campaigns—Grant's force at outset of campaign—Headquarters at Cayuga—More dispatches from Banks—Final dispatches to Halleck—McPherson ordered to Raymond—Battle of Raymond—Capture of Raymond—Enemy retreat to Jackson—Pemberton deceived by Grant's manœuvres—Advance of Sherman and McPherson—Pursuit of the rebels towards Jackson—Johnston's arrival at Jackson—Pemberton ordered to attack Grant's rear—McPherson arrives at Clinton—Battle of Jackson—Position of McPherson and Sherman—Charge of Crocker's division—Capture of Jackson—Retreat of Johnston towards Canton—Destruction of railroad and stores—Frustration of Johnston's plans—Pemberton again ordered to join Johnston—Grant intercepts Johnston's dispatches—Moves at once towards Bolton—Grant converges while rebels diverge—Pemberton moves to cut Grant's communications—Receives Johnston's orders and reverses his column—Battle-field of Champion's Hill—McClermand's advance—Grant's arrival—Hovey's attack—Battle of Champion's Hill—Hovey's success—Enemy masses on Hovey—Grant reinforces Hovey—McClermand repeatedly ordered up, but does not arrive—McPherson outflanks the enemy—Rebels finally driven from the field—McClermand arrives when the battle is over—Reasons for McClermand's delay insufficient—Pursuit of the rebels—Rout of the enemy complete—Loring cut off—Losses on both sides—Hill of Death—Grant gets in advance of column—Johnston loses a day—Sherman ordered to Bridgeport with pontoon train—McClermand comes up with enemy at Black river bridge—Battle-field of Black river bridge—Gallant charge of Lawler—Demoralization of rebels—Firing of bridge—Capture of prisoners and cannon—Rapid

reconstruction of bridges—Passage of Black river by entire army—Pursuit of the rebels to Vicksburg—Sherman strikes Walnut hills—Investment of Vicksburg—Evacuation of Haine's bluff—Results of campaign—Rebel movements during campaign—Reflections—Comparison with Italian campaign in 1796.

THE gunboats being now all below Grand Gulf, it was possible that the rebels might send armed steamers down the Big Black river, and up the Mississippi as far as Perkins's plantation, where Grant had established a depot of supplies. In order to prevent any damage to this depot by the enemy, Grant, on the night of April 29th, ordered McPherson, who had arrived at Hard Times, to improvise a gunboat by putting a section of light artillery aboard one of the transports, and to send it up to guard the plantation. He also directed four thirty-pound Parrott guns, which he was taking with him on this campaign, to be hauled by oxen to the bank of the river at Perkins's, and put in battery there. These arrangements effectually protected the position.

On the 30th, orders were issued to the chief commissary and quartermaster of the command, to prepare two more tugs to run the blockade, each with two barges in tow, and to load them to nearly their full capacity with rations. "Do this," said Grant, "with all expedition, in forty-eight hours from receipt of orders, if possible. Time is of immense importance. Should their crews decline running through, call on the commanding officer for volunteers, and discharge the crews." The same day, the chief commissary of the Thirteenth corps received the following directions: "You will issue to the troops of this command, without provision returns,* for their

* *Provision returns* are the vouchers invariably required of officers drawing rations for troops. They are minute in character, and to de-

subsistence during the next *five* days *three* rations ;” and corps commanders were instructed to direct their “chief quartermasters to seize, for the use of the army in the field during the ensuing campaign, such land transportation as may be necessary, belonging to the inhabitants of the country through which they may pass.”

These orders and dispatches were all written in Grant’s own hand, and nearly all signed with his own name. Like most of the important papers emanating from his headquarters during the war, they were his own composition, struck out at the moment they were needed by the emergency of the moment, and sent off without emendation or change. Dates and names, and matter of that description in the larger reports were, of course, often supplied by others, but the gist and the text were Grant’s own. None of his staff-officers ever attempted to imitate his style.*

On the 30th of April, as soon as the troops could be supplied with three days’ rations in their haversacks, the advance of McClelland’s corps was marched from Bruinsburg, at the mouth of the Bayou Pierre, towards the high ground, two and a half miles inland. The road runs close to the south side of the bayou, entering the hills through a defile which might easily have been defended. The remainder of the Thirteenth, and two divisions of the Seventeenth corps were ferried across the river as rapidly as possible, from De Shroon’s. Not a tent nor a wagon accompanied them, nor was any personal baggage trans-

lay at this time for their preparation would have retarded the movement of the army.

* The quotations in this history are invariably given in Grant’s original language, and from papers not touched up by any subordinate.

ported until all the troops were over. Grant and his staff crossed in the early morning, and in advance of their horses, which did not reach them again for several days. Not only was every barge and tug crowded to its utmost capacity, but the gunboats were offered for the ferriage of artillery and troops, by Porter, who fully appreciated the value of every moment. The Mississippi here is over a mile wide; the distance from De Shroon's to Bruinsburg is six miles.

What was necessary now was to gain the high land and establish a base, before the enemy should become aware of the movement. This Grant deemed a matter of vast importance. But as soon as the march of troops should be discovered, his purpose of reaching the interior would of course become apparent. The means of ferriage were limited, and the weather was intensely hot; but within twenty-four hours from the first landing, the infantry and artillery of the Thirteenth corps, and one division of McPherson's command were firmly established on the main land of Mississippi. The bluffs were reached an hour before sunset, and McClernand pushed on at once, in the direction of Port Gibson, hoping to surprise the rebels if they attempted to defend that place, as well as to prevent their destroying the bridges across the Bayou Pierre. Port Gibson is twelve miles from Bruinsburg, and at the junction of the road from the latter place with that from Grand Gulf; it is besides on the direct route from the Mississippi to Jackson, the capital of the state, as well as to Vicksburg. Its possession would turn Grand Gulf, and compel the evacuation of that stronghold.

At two A. M., on the 1st of May, McClernand's

advanced division came in contact with the enemy, about eight miles out from Bruinsburg. Some little skirmishing took place, and as fast as the troops got up they became engaged. No heavy fighting, however, occurred before daybreak, when the enemy was discovered in position, and evidently determined to accept battle. His force was composed of the garrison of Grand Gulf, which had marched out promptly under General Bowen, with the idea of holding Grant in check near the Bayou Pierre, until reënforcements could arrive from Vicksburg.* Including these last, Grant estimated the number of the enemy at eleven thousand.† His own force engaged was composed of the Thirteenth corps and two brigades of the Seventeenth, amounting in all to nearly nineteen thousand men.‡

The country at this place is admirably adapted for defence; a series of irregular ridges is divided by

* All the unqualified statements of rebel movements or forces made in this chapter are taken from the rebel official reports. I have examined Johnston's, Pemberton's, Bowen's, Loring's, and all the sub-reports, having had access to the original documents, now in the possession of the government.

† Bowen himself reported that he had fifty-five hundred men engaged, but Loring reports that, after the battle, Bowen told him he had still about seven thousand. This was exclusive of the reënforcements brought by Loring. After careful examination of all data, rebel and national, I am inclined to estimate Bowen's force at between seven and eight thousand.

‡ Throughout this work I am indebted to Brevet Major-General Rawlins, chief of staff to the General of the Army, for estimates of both national and rebel forces and losses. General Rawlins was with Grant from the outset of his career, and always in his confidence. He knew, as well as anybody could, the exact number of troops brought into the field on each occasion; and every officer of experience is aware how frequently such numbers differ from those borne on the rolls. General Rawlins has entered into minute calculations of regiments and batteries, so that my statements may be taken without qualification. I

deep and difficult ravines, and the ground, where not opened for cultivation, is grown up with heavy timber and an underbrush of cane; the roads are few, and run along the ridges, making it impossible to deploy any considerable portion of the troops at once. The road to Port Gibson divides upon the battlefield, branching in exactly opposite directions, but the branches soon converge again, a little west of the town. The enemy was in position across both these roads (never more than two miles apart), and the attacking party was thus obliged to follow, separated by steep ravines, that were choked up with magnolia-trees and tangled with bamboo and vine. A very small force could in this way retard the progress of a much larger one for hours.

McClelland, however, bringing up his rear divisions, developed his whole force as rapidly as the country allowed. On the right, were the divisions of Hovey, Carr, and A. J. Smith, and on the left, the division of Osterhaus, all in the Thirteenth corps. The national troops faced east, and as soon as the glimmering of the rising sun and the smoke of the previous skirmishing had ceased to blind their eyes, the battle began. In less than an hour, nearly the whole command was engaged. The artillery fire was heard at the landing, eight miles off, and Grant started at once for the front, arriving on the field at ten A. M., on a borrowed horse, and with no escort but his staff. He immediately assumed direct command.

have especially striven to avoid under-estimates of national strength and losses, and exaggeration of those of the rebels.

I shall owe much of whatever accuracy and authenticity this volume may possess, in other departments besides that of statistics, to the remarkable memory of General Rawlins—a memory almost never at fault, and which my researches have corroborated hundreds of times.

At this time, McClelland was pressing the rebels vigorously on the right with the bulk of his force, and slowly but steadily gaining ground; but Osterhaus's division on the left had not been so successful. The enemy's troops in his front were posted on a ridge admirably chosen; their left in a sunken road, and the right protected by an almost impassable ravine. Osterhaus made repeated efforts to dislodge them, but was foiled, until two brigades of Logan's division in McPherson's corps appeared.

The battle had now been going on for several hours, and McPherson pushed his men as rapidly as possible, coming on the ground in person, with his advance, as soon as the last of the Thirteenth corps was out of the road. This was about noon. Grant at once directed him to throw John E. Smith's brigade to the support of Osterhaus, with instructions to advance on the left, and, if possible, outflank the enemy. Grant and McPherson accompanied this brigade, and the movement was perfectly successful. As soon as the position of the enemy could be definitely ascertained, and the ground sufficiently reconnoitred, a charge was made across the ravine and on the rebel flank, simultaneously with a direct attack by Osterhaus in front. This combined effort soon drove the rebels from their position on Grant's left, and sent them in precipitate retreat towards Port Gibson. Before sunset, their right was completely turned, and the entire line broken and swept away.

McClelland, meanwhile, notwithstanding the determined gallantry and steady progress of Hovey, Carr, and A. J. Smith, was sending repeated messages to Grant for reënforcements on the right; but his wishes were only partly gratified. Grant had

been on that part of the field in person, and did not see how additional troops could be used to advantage. The three divisions there had been steadily driving the enemy from position to position, all day. Early in the action, Hovey pushed boldly forward, and captured a four-gun battery. But, later, the enemy held his ground with more tenacity, encouraged doubtless by reënforcements which arrived from Vicksburg during the fight, having marched more than twenty miles. Although in the face of greatly superior numbers, the rebels now obstinately disputed every inch of the field; they had, however, every possible advantage of position, the ridges commanding the approaches on every side.

McClernand had asked for two more divisions, and Grant finally sent him one brigade of Logan's troops, under Stevenson, at the same time that he ordered McPherson to the left, with Smith's brigade of Logan's division, and Logan in person. But, before Stevenson's brigade appeared on the right, the rebels had begun to withdraw, and the sight of fresh national troops probably added to their demoralization, although not to their discomfiture, as Stevenson did not really become engaged. Finding himself outnumbered, and, in spite of his strenuous exertions, beaten on every part of the line, Bowen finally gave way, and fell back rapidly towards Port Gibson, leaving his dead and wounded on the field.

The pursuit was continued from point to point, till night closed in, and as long as possible after dark. It reached to within two miles of Port Gibson, but the nature of the country was such that further advance in the dark was not deemed prudent or desirable. The enemy making the appearance of

another stand, the troops slept on their arms till daylight. Grant thought it evident that the rebels would attempt a retreat under cover of the night, and his last order to McClernand was: "Push the enemy with skirmishers well thrown out, until it gets too dark to see him; then place your command on eligible ground wherever night finds you. Park your artillery so as to command the surrounding country, and renew the attack at early dawn. If possible, push the enemy from the field or capture him. No camp-fires should be allowed, unless in deep ravines and to the rear of troops."

In the battle of Port Gibson, Grant's loss was one hundred and thirty killed, and seven hundred and eighteen wounded. He took six hundred and fifty prisoners, and estimated the enemy's loss in killed and wounded as about equal to his own.* Six field-guns were captured. Bowen's advance to Port Gibson was bold, and his defence a good one, but the national forces were too heavy for the rebels, and the movement by Bruinsburg was undoubtedly a surprise.

Prisoners stated that Bowen had taken up his position on the battle-ground of Port Gibson, late in the night of the 30th, having made a forced march from Grand Gulf, as soon as Grant's movement was discovered. He had expected reinforcements of five thousand men from Vicksburg, and others from Jackson, under Loring; but the national troops were too quick for him, and only two brigades arrived from Vicksburg to participate in the fight. General Tracy, of the rebel army, was killed, and many evidences of demoralization appeared. Pemberton, who was in command of the rebel department of Mississippi, that

* Bowen reported four hundred and forty-eight killed and wounded, and three hundred and eighty-four missing!

night telegraphed to General Joseph E. Johnston, his immediate superior: "A furious battle has been going on since daylight just below Port Gibson. Enemy can cross all his army from Hard Times to Bruinsburg. I should have large reënforcements. Enemy's movements threaten Jackson, and, if successful, cut off Vicksburg and Port Hudson."

During the night, as Grant had foreseen, the rebels evacuated Port Gibson, and withdrew across the two forks of the Bayou Pierre, destroying the bridges in their rear. They left a battery and several regiments of infantry to prevent the reconstruction of the bridge over the North fork. Early on the morning of the 2d, McClellan's troops, flushed with the success of the day before, and elated at the idea of being at last on dry land, with plenty of open country for operations, pushed into the town, finding no enemy but the wounded. Grant immediately detached one brigade of Logan's division to the left, to engage the attention of the rebels there, while a heavy detail of McClellan's troops was set to work, rebuilding the bridge across the South fork. The break was more than a hundred and twenty feet long, but was repaired with extraordinary rapidity, officers and men working up to their waists in the water, and the houses in the neighborhood being torn down for timber. While this was doing, two brigades of Logan's division forded the bayou and marched on.

Meanwhile, another division (Crocker's), of McPherson's corps, had been ferried across the Mississippi, and, stopping only to fill their haversacks with three days' rations, which they were ordered to make last five, had come up with the command. McArthur's

division of this corps had been left to guard the lines of communication from Milliken's bend to Perkins's plantation, until relieved by Sherman. Grant now ordered McPherson to "push across the bayou and attack the enemy in flank, and in full retreat through Willow Springs, demoralized and out of ammunition."

McPherson started at once, and before night his two divisions had crossed the South fork and marched to the North fork, eight miles farther on. They found the bridge at Grindstone ford still burning, but the fire was extinguished and the bridge repaired in the night, the troops passing over as soon as the last plank was laid. This was at five A. M. on the 3d. Before one brigade had finished crossing, the enemy opened on the head of the column with artillery; but the command was at once deployed, and the rebels soon fell back, their movement being intended only to cover the retreating force. McPherson followed rapidly, driving them through Willow Springs, and gaining the cross-roads. Here Logan was directed to take the Grand Gulf road, while Crocker continued the direct pursuit. Skirmishing was kept up all day; the broken country, the narrow, tortuous roads, and impassable ravines offering great facilities for this species of warfare: the enemy availed himself fully of every advantage, contesting the ground with great tenacity. This continued all the way to Hankinson's ferry, on the Big Black river, fifteen miles from Port Gibson. Several hundred prisoners were taken in the pursuit.

At four o'clock in the afternoon, McPherson came up with the rebels, in force, and Logan at the same time appearing on their right flank, caused them to

move precipitately towards the river. McPherson followed hard, and arrived just as the last of the rebels were crossing, and in time to prevent the destruction of the bridge. It being now dark, and the enemy driven across the Big Black, the command was rested for the night. McPherson was ordered to hold the position with one division, from the Big Black river to Willow Springs, and McClernand, on his arrival, to join in this duty.

McClernand was also directed to guard the roads to the rear, especially towards Grand Gulf, and to "watch the enemy's movements far down the Bayou Pierre." "Make a reconnoissance in that direction with one division; the enemy may be practising a sharp game to get in our rear with a force to destroy all we have hanging behind."

At this time, Grant learned the success of Grierson's raid, and the timely effect it was producing on the Southern people. The rebel newspapers were filled with accounts of the damage done; and this really daring exploit, unexampled at that period of the war, was magnified into proportions and importance greatly superior even to what Grant had hoped.* Nothing could have been more opportune. On the 2d, also, telegrams between Bowen and Pemberton were intercepted, in which the former announced that he had been compelled to fall back, after a determined effort to hold his own, his ammunition having become exhausted. Pemberton, in reply, promised that "ammunition should be sent in due time."

* "So great was the consternation created by this raid, that it was impossible to obtain any reliable information of the enemy's movements, rumor placing him in various places at the same time."—*Pemberton's Report*.

Grant's army was now in fine condition, although, since leaving Milliken's bend, it had marched by night as well as by day, through mud and rain, without tents, and on irregular rations. There was no murmuring, and almost no straggling. Grant had, in McClernand and McPherson's command, five divisions, amounting in all to nearly thirty thousand men. "My force," he said, "is composed of hardy and disciplined men, who know no defeat, and are not willing to learn what it is."

By this time, it was evident that the rebels were evacuating Grand Gulf, which, indeed, there was nothing more to gain by holding;* and their movements, since the battle, had all been made to cover the escape of the garrison. Accordingly, on the morning of the 3d, Grant started from Willow Springs in person, with one brigade of Logan's division, and a cavalry escort of twenty men, for the town. On the way, he learned that the rebels had already abandoned all the country between the Big Black river and the Bayou Pierre. He determined, therefore, not to detach any troops from his main column; and the brigade which accompanied him was turned off, where the road to Grand Gulf forks, about seven miles out, the last of the retreating force having already passed on, towards Hankinson's ferry. Grant then rode into the town, with his staff and cavalry escort, to make the necessary arrangements for removing his base of supplies from Bruinsburg to Grand Gulf.

He found the naval force in possession, Porter

* "Grand Gulf was not selected as a position for land defence, but for the protection of the mouth of the Big Black, and also as a precautionary measure against the passage of transports."—*Pemberton's Report*.

having landed early in the day; but the magazines had been blown up in the night, the cannon buried or spiked, while the garrison had begun its retreat at eight o'clock the evening before. Grant's movements were so rapid that it was impossible to withdraw the heavy guns, and thirteen pieces fell into the hands of the victors.* On the water front, works were found elaborate and extensive even beyond expectation, while on the land side the place was susceptible of as complete defence as Vicksburg; but, cut off from all reinforcements or relief, it was sure to fall, and a delay in the evacuation would only have sacrificed the garrison.

Grant had not been abed, nor had off his clothes, since leaving Bruinsburg, three days before, and went aboard one of the gunboats, where he borrowed a change of linen, and wrote dispatches till midnight. He sent long letters to Halleck, announcing the success of his operations, and detailing the movement against Grand Gulf, the march to the interior, and the battle of Port Gibson. Sherman, now on the march from Milliken's bend, was informed: "My base is now at this place, and in executing your orders for joining me you will govern yourself accordingly. . . . Logan is now on the main road from here to Jackson, and McPherson, closely followed by McClelland, on the branch of the same road from Willow Springs. . . . The road to Vicksburg is open. . . ."

It had already become apparent that "the country would supply all the forage required for an active campaign, as well as the necessary beef; all other

* "So great were his" (Grant's) "facilities for transportation, and so rapid his movements, that it was impracticable to withdraw the heavy guns."—*Pemberton's Report*.

supplies would have to be drawn from Milliken's bend, a long and precarious route;" but Grant declared: "I have every confidence of succeeding in doing it." Accordingly, he wrote that night to Sullivan, who commanded the district between Milliken's bend and Smith's plantation: "You will give special attention to the matter of shortening the line of land transportation from above Vicksburg to the steamers below. As soon as the river has fallen sufficiently, you will have a road constructed from Young's point to a landing just below Warrenton, and dispose of your troops accordingly. Every thing depends upon the promptitude with which our supplies are forwarded." To Sherman he said: "I wish you to collect a train of one hundred and twenty wagons at Milliken's bend and Perkins's plantation, send them to Grand Gulf, and there load them with rations, as follows: one hundred thousand pounds of bacon, the balance, coffee, sugar, salt, and hard bread. For your own use on the march from Grand Gulf, you will draw five days' rations, and see that they last five days. It is unnecessary for me to remind you of the overwhelming importance of celerity. . . . All we want now are men, ammunition, and hard bread; we can subsist our horses on the country, and obtain considerable supplies for our troops."

It has been seen that, up to the time of crossing the Mississippi, Grant's intention was to collect all his "forces at Grand Gulf, and get on hand a good supply of provisions and ordnance stores, and, in the mean time, to detach a corps to coöperate with Banks against Port Hudson, and so effect a junction of their forces." But, having beaten the enemy at Port Gibson, and followed him to the Big Black river, Grant

was now fifteen miles on the road from Grand Gulf either to Jackson, Black river bridge, or Vicksburg. He could not afford to delay, much less to retrace his steps. Many days could not elapse before the battle must be fought on which the fate of Vicksburg would depend, and it was impossible to predict how long the contest might last. Grant had also certain information that the rebel General Joseph E. Johnston was on his way to Jackson, and that reënforcements were constantly arriving at that place from Port Hudson and other Southern cities. Instead of reënforcing Banks, there was need of Banks to come to the support of Grant.

But, at this crisis, he received a letter from Banks, who was now west of the Mississippi, near Alexandria, and who declared that he could not reach Port Hudson before the 10th of May, and that, even after the reduction of that place, he could reënforce Grant with only twelve thousand men. Grant at once determined to turn all his forces against Vicksburg. To delay until the 10th of May, and after that for the reduction of Port Hudson, would be fatal; it would not leave him relatively as strong as if he moved promptly with what force he already had at his command. The losses he would undoubtedly suffer during the Port Hudson campaign, from sickness and straggling, and in battle and during the siege, would reduce his numbers so, that with the added strength the enemy was daily receiving, no actual reënforcement would be gained. These were the negative considerations which influenced him.

But the positive ones were of greater force, as they always were with this commander. He had won a victory, had gained a foothold on the high

land and on the east bank, that he had been five months striving to obtain; he had captured Grand Gulf, one of the rebel strongholds, and an outwork of Vicksburg; his troops were encouraged, and the enemy demoralized. He, doubtless, himself felt the inspiration of success, and it was his nature, in war, always to prefer the immediate aggressive. He determined, that night, to detach no force to Banks, but to begin operations at once against Vicksburg.

But there was still a point of vital importance to decide, upon which, indeed, hinged all that gave this campaign its distinctive character. Having obtained that for which he had been all winter struggling, having at last reached high dry ground upon which to operate, apparently Grant's most natural course was to march direct upon Vicksburg, and at once begin the siege, or, at least, attack its garrison, should that come out to meet him. He was not more than twelve miles from Warrenton, and had only one formidable natural obstacle to encounter, the Big Black river, the line of which would probably be taken by any enemy opposing him. Pemberton was in Vicksburg and along the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad, with, as afterwards proved, fifty-two thousand men,* but as Grant then supposed, with thirty thousand. Another force, about equally distant, was collecting towards the east and north, and supposed to be commanded by Gregg, of whose strength Grant was not well informed. This force would, of course, endeavor to unite with the garrison of Vicksburg, and the two would be able to outnumber, and, perhaps, overpower the national commander. Grant determined to prevent this; to push between the two armies be-

* Pemberton's field return for his entire command on the 31st of March showed a force, present, of 59,411 men.

fore they could combine; to drive eastward the weaker one; attack and beat Gregg before Pemberton could come to the rescue; and to seize Jackson, the capital of the state, situated fifty miles in the rear of Vicksburg, and at the junction of the railroads by which Vicksburg is supplied. When once the roads that centre there were destroyed, troops as well as stores would be cut off, and Vicksburg with its garrison isolated from the would-be Confederacy.

This movement presented the most absolute and splendid advantages, but it also presented difficulties and dangers sufficient to deter any but the most confident of commanders. To undertake it, Grant must not only advance between two armies, either of which was a formidable opponent, and run the daily risk of their combining to crush him; but, more daring still, by moving towards Gregg, he would expose his only line of communication with the Mississippi to attacks from Pemberton. If he attempted to guard that line, he must weaken his moving column, so that it would be unsafe to cope with Gregg, now daily expecting reinforcements from the south and east. He at once decided to abandon his base altogether, to plunge into the enemy's country with three days' rations, trusting to the region itself for forage and supplies, and to the chances of victory to enable him to regain some point on the Mississippi, in spite of all the opposition of two hostile armies. In doing this, he risked greatly to gain greatly. If the rebel forces were able to combine, they were almost certain to crush him; if he could be kept from his base he was ruined. The utmost celerity of movement, as well as a series of victories over both armies, was

indispensable, not only to his success, but to his salvation.

Believing that he would not be allowed to make the campaign if he announced his plan beforehand, Grant did not now inform the general-in-chief of what he contemplated. It was fortunate that he took this precaution. Not one syllable of encouragement had reached him since starting from Milliken's bend, and the President wrote, after all was over: "When you got below, and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks; and when you turned northward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake." * This disapprobation was not confined to the President. When Grant's plan of campaign was indicated, a few days later, Halleck at once sent him orders to return and coöperate with Banks: "If possible, the forces of yourself and Banks should be united *between Vicksburg and Port Hudson*, so as to attack these places separately with the combined forces." This dispatch was dated the 11th of May, ten days after the battle of Port Gibson. Hooker had just been defeated at Chancellorsville, and the government must have been aghast at the news that Grant had plunged into the hostile region of Mississippi, confronting two armies, and cutting loose from all communication. But there was no telegraphic line in operation from Washington, further than Cairo, and nearly a week elapsed before the countermanding dispatch was received. Had the general-in-chief, however, been able to reach his subordinate, the Vicksburg campaign would never have been fought.

* This letter is given in full on page 399.

So Grant was alone; his most trusted subordinates besought him to change his plans, while his superiors were astounded at his temerity and strove to interfere. Soldiers of reputation and civilians in high place condemned, in advance, a campaign that seemed to them as hopeless as it was unprecedented. If he failed, the country would concur with the government and the generals. Grant knew all this, and appreciated his danger, but was as invulnerable to the apprehensions of ambition as to the entreaties of friendship, or the anxieties, even of patriotism. That quiet confidence in himself which never forsook him, and which amounted indeed almost to a feeling of fate, was uninterrupted. Having once determined in a matter that required irreversible decision, he never reversed, nor even misgave, but was steadily loyal to himself and his plans. This absolute and implicit faith was, however, as far as possible from conceit or enthusiasm; it was simply a consciousness, or conviction, rather, which brought the very strength it believed in; which was itself strength, and which inspired others with a trust in him, because he was able thus to trust himself.

At midnight of the 3d, he turned his back on the Mississippi river, and started for Hankinson's ferry.

Directions were given at once, for the supply of the entire force with three days' rations, and several days were spent in bringing Sherman's corps across the river to Grand Gulf, and preparing for the march. Supplies had to be hauled sixty miles, from Milliken's bend to Hard Times, and then ferried across the river and hauled eighteen miles further, to Hankinson's ferry, or wherever else the army lay. Every hour

now was invaluable. Grant's dispatches teem with indications of the efforts that were made to save time.

To Sherman, who had left Blair's division at Milliken's bend, to guard that place, he wrote: "Order forward immediately your remaining division, leaving only two regiments (to guard Richmond), as required in previous orders. Have all the men leave the west bank of the river, with three days' rations in haversacks, and make all possible dispatch to Grand Gulf." In order that Blair might be brought forward, Hurlbut, who was still at Memphis, was directed to order four regiments of his command to Milliken's bend, "with the utmost dispatch." "Take them from the troops most convenient to transportation." On the 5th, Grant also ordered Hurlbut to "send Lauman's division to Milliken's bend, to be forwarded to this army with as little delay as practicable. . . . Let them move by brigades, as fast as transportation can be got. . . . This order for Lauman's division is in addition to the four regiments ordered a few days since."

The commissary of subsistence at Grand Gulf was instructed: "You will load all teams presenting themselves for rations with promptness and dispatch, regardless of requisitions or provision returns. There must be no delay on account of either lack of energy or formality." To an officer of his staff, who had been left at Grand Gulf to hurry up supplies and superintend transportation, Grant wrote: "See that the commissary at Grand Gulf loads all the wagons presenting themselves for stores, with great promptness. Issue any order in my name that may be necessary to secure the greatest promptness in this respect. . . .

Every day's delay is worth two thousand men to the enemy."

To the same officer he said, on the 6th: "Send me a report of about the number of rations on hand and sent forward to Grand Gulf. Send also to McFeely and Bingham,* and remind them of the importance of rushing forward rations with all dispatch. The road to below Warrenton ought now to be completed. If so, rations can be got over by that route very rapidly. . . . How many teams have been loaded with rations and sent forward? I want to know as near as possible how we stand in every particular for supplies. How many wagons have you ferried over the river? How many are still to bring over? What teams have gone back for rations?"

On the morning of the 3d, Admiral Porter had started with a part of his fleet for the Red river, to coöperate with Banks, and left orders with Captain Owens, the naval officer next in command, to obey the directions of Grant. Accordingly, on the 5th, Grant instructed Owens to "place his flag-ship in the mouth of Black river, to watch any movement of the enemy in that direction. Leave Captain Murphy's vessel in front of Grand Gulf, to guard the stores and to convoy any steamer that may require it. . . . Send the remaining iron-clads to the vicinity of Warrenton, to watch the movements of the enemy there, and prevent them from sending troops across the river to interrupt our lines from Milliken's bend and Young's point."

On the 4th, while the troops were resting on the Big Black, waiting for Sherman and supplies, Grant

* The chief commissary of subsistence and chief quartermaster of the command.

said to McClernand: "There will be no general movement of the troops before the cool of the evening, if at all to-day. You can therefore collect for your command such supplies as the country affords. Reconnoitre the Jackson road, and ascertain if the enemy has retreated in that direction, and if so, whether any considerable portion of them." And to McPherson, on the same day: "I wish you would have a reconnoissance made of the roads near the river, up and down." These demonstrations were made, partly, to induce the enemy to suppose that the short route to Vicksburg was the one Grant now contemplated taking. They reached to within six miles of Vicksburg, on the west side of the Big Black river, and it was believed that their object of concealing Grant's real intention was accomplished. Pemberton, at any rate, made no show of approaching on the right, nor any attempt to get between Grant and Jackson, much less to combine with the force covering that place. On the contrary, these movements demonstrated that Bowen had retreated across the Big Black at Hankinson's ferry, and was now concentrating with the main portion of the enemy, at Bovina station, on the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad.

Hurlbut was to remain at Memphis, and, on the 5th, Grant sent detailed instructions to govern him during the campaign.* "You will have a large force

* "I am ordering to you all the cavalry at Helena except two regiments. You can further strengthen your southern line by bringing troops from the District of Columbus. The completion of the road from Grand Junction to Corinth will enable you to draw off all the troops north of that road. Make such disposition of the troops within your command as you may deem advisable for the best protection of your lines of communication. When the road to Corinth is completed,

of cavalry; use it as much as possible in attracting attention from this direction. Impress upon the cavalry the necessity of keeping out of people's houses, or taking what is of no use to them in a military point of view;" and, in conformity with the views entertained by him, since Shiloh, he said: "They must live as far as possible off the country through which they pass, and destroy corn, wheat-crops, and every thing that can be made use of by the enemy in prolonging the war. Mules and horses are to be taken to supply all our own wants, and, when it does not cause too much delay, agricultural implements may be destroyed. In other words, cripple in every way, without insulting women and children, or taking their clothes, jewelry, etc."

While he was lying at Hankinson's ferry, the horses and personal luggage of Grant and his staff arrived at headquarters. Up to this time, he and his officers had messed with any general near whose camp they happened to halt, riding borrowed horses, and sleeping in the porches of houses on the road. When he left Hard Times, Grant took no baggage with him but a tooth-brush.

On the 6th, he informed Halleck: "Ferrying land transportation and rations to Grand Gulf is detaining me on the Black river. I will move as soon as three days' rations are secured, and send the wagons back to the Gulf for more to follow. Information from the other side leads me to believe the

put in there, as speedily as possible, sixty days' supply of provisions and forage. . . . Telegraph to General Halleck direct, the forces I have drawn from you, and should reënforcements be found necessary to hold your district, let him know it. Whilst headquarters are so distant, communicate direct with Washington in all important matters, but keep me advised at the same time of what is going on."

enemy are bringing forces from Tullahoma" (in Tennessee). "Should not Rosecrans at least make a demonstration of advancing?" The only answer to this was the dispatch recalling Grant.

On the 6th, Grant ordered McPherson: "Move one of your divisions to Rocky Springs to-morrow, leaving the other to occupy from your present headquarters to the ferry. On the approach of Sherman's advance, order up the second." Accordingly, at ten A. M. on the 7th, McPherson's troops were again in motion, Logan's division in the advance, followed closely by Crocker. They marched to Rocky Springs, about ten miles distant, where they remained in camp till the 9th. On the 8th, Grant's headquarters were removed to Rocky Springs.

After making his demonstration against Haine's bluff, Sherman had left Blair's command at Milliken's bend, and, on the morning of the 2d of May, started with Steele and Tuttle's divisions for Hard Times. He reached there by noon of the 6th, crossed the Mississippi during that night and the following day, and, on the 8th, after filling his haversacks with three days' rations, pushed on to the front, marching from Grand Gulf to Hankinson's ferry, eighteen miles; at the latter place, he relieved Crocker's division, of McPherson's corps.

This day, Grant announced to Halleck: "Our advance is fifteen miles from Edward's station, on Southern railroad.* All looks well. . . ."

One staff officer, Captain Bowers, had been left at Milliken's bend, and to him Grant wrote on the 9th: "What I have wished to impress upon the gen-

* This estimate was incorrect. Rocky Springs is full twenty-five miles from Edward's station.

erals remaining upon the Louisiana side of the Mississippi is, that the wagon road from Milliken's bend to Perkins's plantation should be shortened by every practicable means, and that, when circumstances will admit of it, it shall run from Young's point to a point below Warrenton. Meanwhile, all possible exertions should be made to keep the army supplied by the present route. Hard bread, coffee, and salt should be kept up anyhow, and then the other articles of the ration as they can be supplied." On this point his anxiety was unabated, for it was of paramount importance; and, on the same day, he informed Captain Owens of the navy: "A road is now about complete across the point from Young's point to below the Warrenton batteries. This will shorten the route over which supplies have to be drawn, to about eight miles, and enable me to abandon the route across to Richmond. I would request that you keep the Tuscumbia at the depot below Warrenton; keep one of the other gunboats at Grand Gulf, and with the other two, keep the river clear between the two points."

Sherman was still uneasy about the success of the campaign. He did not, as yet, understand that Grant contemplated marching without any base at all, and wrote to his superior from Hankinson's ferry, describing the confusion among troops and trains, and urging him to "stop all troops till your army is partially supplied with wagons, and then act as quick as possible. For this road will be jammed, as sure as life, if you attempt to supply fifty thousand men by one single road." To this, Grant replied: "I do not calculate upon the possibility of supplying the army with full rations from Grand Gulf. I know it

will be impossible without constructing additional roads. What I do expect, however, is to get up what rations of hard bread, coffee, and salt we can, and make the country furnish the balance. We started from Bruinsburg with an average of about two days' rations, and received no more from our own supplies for some days; abundance was found in the mean time. Some corn-meal, bacon, and vegetables were found, and an abundance of beef and mutton. A delay would give the enemy time to reënforce and fortify. If Blair was up now, I believe we could be in Vicksburg in *seven days*. *The command here has an average of about three days' rations, which could be made to last that time.** You are in a country where the troops have already lived off the people for some days, and may find provisions more scarce; but, as we get upon new soil, they are more abundant, particularly in corn and cattle. Bring Blair's two brigades up as soon as possible. . . ."

When the march from Hankinson's ferry began, McPherson's corps had the left, on the Rocky Springs road, nearest Black river; McClelland kept to the right, and moved direct by the road from Willow Springs, while Sherman followed with his corps divided on the two roads, and closely guarding the ferries across the Big Black, against Pemberton. But, at Rocky Springs, Grant heard that the rebels were fortifying and concentrating at Edward's station, about twenty-five miles off, on the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad, and he at once determined to change the relative positions of the corps. It was his intention now to hug the Black river as closely as possible, with McClelland and Sherman's corps,

* These italics are not Grant's.

and strike the railroad with them beyond Edward's station, somewhere between that place and Bolton, forty or fifty miles from Hankinson's ferry. Meanwhile, McPherson was to move by way of Utica to Raymond, thirty-five miles from the ferry, and thence into Jackson, twenty miles further, destroying the railroad, telegraph, and public stores there; he was then to push west and rejoin the main force. By these dispositions, Grant would avoid a battle with the main rebel army on the ground selected by Pemberton; he could also protect McPherson in his easterly movement, and keep all his own troops within supporting distance of each other, no matter on which side they might be attacked; while, at the same time, he divided the enemy, interposing between Pemberton and the rebel forces at Jackson.

Sherman and McPherson understood this arrangement; the latter especially was aware that, if possible, he was to push on towards Jackson, though, of course, not without express orders. These Grant never gave in advance; it was his custom always to await the contingencies of a campaign. None of his plans were so precise that he could not vary them; all allowed for the uncertain and unexpected movements of the enemy. After the great features of a campaign, or the principal object of a battle was indicated, and the position of troops at the outset determined, he contented himself beforehand with giving orders for the earliest movements; always expecting to be governed afterwards by the emergencies that were sure to arise. Many of his most notable successes were inspired at the moment, like the advance of Smith, at Donelson, or the move to the interior, in the Vicksburg campaign. Yet these

sudden and unforeseen determinations tended essentially to the consummation of objects long before and patiently sought. So, now, McPherson only knew that it was probable he should go to Jackson, and McClermand was not informed of this intention at all; Grant feared to intrust McClermand with an independent expedition, which the movement against Jackson seemed likely to prove; and therefore put him on the left. McClermand was sure always to claim the most important position or command, but as he was now really nearer the great bulk of the rebel army, he had no reason to complain, supposing himself to be in the advance.

McPherson marched, accordingly, on the 9th of May, to a point seven miles west of Utica, and McClermand to the Big Sandy river. That evening, McPherson was directed: "March your command to-morrow to water beyond Utica, provided you find it within six or seven miles of the place, on the direct Raymond road." The only regiment of cavalry in the command was now given to McPherson, and, by Grant's orders, it reconnoitred vigorously on the right flank and front of the Seventeenth corps. The same day (May 9th), McClermand was ordered: "Move your command to-morrow, on the telegraph road, to Five-mile creek. Instructions have been given to Generals Sherman and McPherson to move so as to continue on the same general front with you. Have all the lateral roads leading from your line of march carefully examined, to facilitate communication with the other corps in case of necessity." All the movements, thus far, were preliminary merely, or of the nature of developments, the necessary supplies and ammunition for the march not having yet arrived.

On the 10th, however, the headquarters were removed to Cayuga, eight miles beyond Rocky Springs, and, in accordance with the plan already described, McPherson moved to the north and east of the rest of the army; Sherman had the centre, while McClelland, further west, kept one division as far to the left as the Big Black river, and, in his turn, was ordered to watch the ferries, and thus secure the rear against Pemberton. Grant's position now was with the centre, Sherman's corps. He had at this time about forty-three thousand men in motion, besides an artillery force of one hundred and twenty guns; but these numbers include Blair's division, as well as McArthur's, of the Seventeenth corps, neither of which had yet crossed the river. The column absolutely in march on the east side of the Mississippi, on the 10th of May, did not number more than thirty-five thousand men, and twenty light batteries.*

"When I crossed the Mississippi river," said Grant, "the means of ferriage were so limited, and time so important, that I started without teams, and an average of two days' rations in the haversacks. . . . We picked up all the teams in the country, and free Africans to drive them. Forage and meat were found

* There were not more than sixteen thousand men in any one of the three corps at any time during the campaign, even if the whole force had come up; but Blair's division of Sherman's command did not reach the army until after the capture of Jackson, on the 14th of May; while, of McArthur's division in the Seventeenth corps, one brigade only had arrived, at the battle of Champion's Hill, on the 16th; another joined the command about the time of the battle at Black River bridge, on the 17th; and the third brigade did not get up at all, until the siege of Vicksburg. Besides these subtractions, McClelland's command was reduced, after the battle of Port Gibson, by casualties, sickness, and other contingencies, to fifteen thousand men, so that the estimate in the text is not too small.

in great abundance through the country." What his expectations were at this time, may be gathered from a dispatch to Sullivan: "Keep all prisoners sent to Milliken's bend until further orders. If they are sent north, they will be sent east for exchange. I prefer keeping them where they are, until *the fate of Vicksburg is decided, and then paroling them.*"

On the 10th of May, Grant heard again from Banks, who was now earnestly demanding reinforcements on the Red river. But Grant wrote at once to that commander, explaining the situation in rear of Vicksburg. "My advance will occupy to-day Utica, Auburn, and a point equally advanced towards the Southern Mississippi railroad, between the latter place and the Big Black.* It was my intention, on gaining a foothold at Grand Gulf, to have sent a sufficient force to Port Hudson to have insured the fall of that place with your coöperation, or rather to have coöperated with you to secure that end." He then set forth the reasons for the change in his plans,† and

* On the 10th, Grant said to McClernand, from Cayuga: "My headquarters will remain here to-night, and be removed to Auburn in the morning. You need not move to-morrow, except to better your position on Five-mile creek." To McPherson, he wrote: "General McClernand is now on Five-mile creek, on the Telegraph road to Edward's station. He is directed to move no farther to-morrow, but to reconnoitre the road to Fourteen-mile creek. Sherman will not get much past this place to-night. In the morning, he will move forward to Auburn, and if he meets with no resistance, will throw his advance forward to Fourteen-mile creek, on the Raymond road. Move your command forward also, so as to occupy something near the same east and west line with the other army corps. Let me know what point you move to. Send your cavalry out to watch the enemy as far to the southeast as you can." These orders were obeyed.

† "Meeting the enemy as I did below Port Gibson, however, I followed him to the Big Black, and could not afford to retrace my steps. I also learned, and believe the information to be reliable, that Port

concluded: "I would urgently request, therefore, that you join me, or send all the force you can spare, to coöperate in the great struggle for opening the Mississippi river."

On the 11th of May, Grant finally wrote to Halleck, from Cayuga: "My forces will be this evening as far advanced towards Jackson as Fourteen-mile creek, the left near Black river, and extending in a line as nearly east and west as they can get without bringing on a battle. As I shall communicate with Grand Gulf no more, except it becomes necessary to send a train with heavy escort, you may not hear from me again for several days." Singularly enough, this was the date of Halleck's dispatch to Grant, to return and coöperate with Banks. While the general-in-chief, at Washington, was issuing his orders forbidding the campaign, Grant, of course in ignorance of these commands, sent word to his superior: "I shall communicate with Grand Gulf no more."

On the same day, he ordered McPherson, who was now beyond Utica: "Move your command to-night to the next cross-roads, if there is water, and to-morrow, with all activity, into Raymond. . . . We must fight the enemy before our rations fail, and we are equally bound to make our rations last as long as possible. Upon one occasion you made two days' rations last seven. We may have to do the same thing again. . . . Sherman is now moving out on the Auburn and Raymond road, and will reach Fourteen-mile creek to-night. When you arrive at Raymond,

Hudson is almost entirely evacuated. This may not be true, but it is the concurrent testimony of deserters and contrabands. Many days cannot elapse before the battle will begin, which is to decide the fate of Vicksburg, but it is impossible to predict how long it may last. I would urgently request, therefore," etc.

he will be in close supporting distance. I shall move McClernand to Fourteen-mile creek, early to-morrow, so that he will occupy a place on Sherman's left." * . . .

Accordingly, on the 12th, at three and a half A. M., Logan's division moved towards Raymond, followed by Crocker, at four. The rebel videttes showed themselves frequently soon after the march began, and three miles out, McPherson ordered two regiments to be deployed on each side of the road, with skirmishers in advance; these were followed by the remainder of the column, the cavalry being called in and placed on the flanks. At eleven o'clock, McPherson came upon the enemy, about five thousand strong, within two miles of Raymond. This body was a part of the reënforcements from Port Hudson, and under the

* The following instructions were also sent on the 11th, to Sherman: "It will be necessary to guard Hall's ferry with a regiment of infantry and a company of cavalry, until our positions are fully taken, after which cavalry alone can watch the rear. McClernand is directed to guard Baldwin's ferry. I will direct Tuttle to send a regiment for this duty, so that you need not make any further detail until you want his relieved by some other troops." And at fifteen minutes past eight P. M.: "McClernand is ordered to move up by the Telegraph road, also a road to the left of that, to Fourteen-mile creek, starting at daylight. McPherson is ordered to move on to Raymond. I will go forward to-morrow, probably as far as Raymond, and return in the evening to near Fourteen-mile creek for headquarters."

At the same hour, Grant wrote to McClernand: "In accordance with my verbal instructions this afternoon, you will move your command at daylight to-morrow, on the Auburn and Edward's station road, and if practicable, a part of one division by the road to the westward of the one just mentioned. Move cautiously, but rapidly as convenient, and so that your entire corps will arrive on the Fourteen-mile creek simultaneously and in a compact line. It is also important that your corps reach the creek at or about the time that Sherman does, he having to move only about seven miles. I shall pass to the front early to-morrow, and go to Raymond if I can, from that place. I shall return on the road to a convenient point for headquarters in the vicinity of Fourteen-mile creek."

command of Gregg. It was judiciously posted, with two batteries of artillery so placed as to sweep the road, as well as a bridge which McPherson had to cross. The greater portion of the rebel infantry was posted on a hill to the left of the road, and in the timber and ravines in front of the hill. The fight for Raymond, it was evident, must take place here.

Orders were immediately sent back to move all trains out of the road, and for the remainder of Logan's division to advance as rapidly as possible, followed by Crocker, who was to form the reserve. Both sides of the road were occupied, and at two P. M. the whole line was ordered forward. Scarcely had the advance begun, when the battle opened vigorously on the centre and left centre, where, under cover of woods and ravines, the rebels had massed a large portion of their force. McPherson, however, outnumbered Gregg by two to one, and before Crocker's division had reached the field, the enemy was beaten, and in full retreat towards Raymond. A battery of artillery was moved to an open space on the right, and played vigorously on the rebel flanks during their retreat. They made one attempt to charge and capture this battery, but were met with a fire of grape and canister, under which they speedily broke and fled from the field.

Pursuit was made at once, and Raymond was entered by the national troops at five P. M., the rebels having passed through, without stopping, on the Mississippi Springs road, towards Jackson. The rough and impracticable nature of the country, filled with ravines and a dense undergrowth, prevented very rapid pursuit, and McPherson followed no further than Raymond. In this short but spirited en-

gagement he lost sixty-nine men killed, three hundred and forty-one wounded, and thirty missing. The enemy's loss was one hundred killed, and three hundred and five wounded, besides four hundred and fifteen prisoners; two pieces of cannon were disabled, and a quantity of small-arms fell into McPherson's hands. Many rebels threw down their arms and deserted.

Pemberton had been completely deceived by Grant's manœuvres; supposing the object of the latter to be Edward's station, he remained at that place with the bulk of his force, awaiting an attack, and sent word to Gregg to strike the national forces in flank and rear, as soon as they became engaged.* Reënforcements under Walker were also ordered up from Jackson to the support of Gregg. But Grant, instead of assaulting the main rebel force concentrating to meet him on his left, pushed out with his right under McPherson, and destroyed the opposition at Raymond, where he met only a detachment of the enemy. He thus completely opened the road to Jackson, avoided a battle where he did not care to fight, in order to fight where the enemy was unprepared, and, for the second time since the campaign

* "On the 12th, the following was addressed to Major-General Stevenson: 'From information received it is evident that the enemy is advancing in force on Edward's depot and Big Black bridge. . . . You must move up your whole division to the support of Loring and Bowen at the bridge.' . . . In consequence of this information Brigadier-General Gregg was ordered not to attack the enemy until he was engaged at Edward's or the bridge, but to be ready to fall on his rear or flank at any moment."—*Pemberton's Report*.

Pemberton also sent telegrams, on the 12th, to Johnston and Mr. Jefferson Davis, announcing: "The enemy is apparently moving his heavy force towards Edward's depot on Southern railroad. With my limited force I will do all I can to meet him. *That will be the battle-place.*"

had begun, divided the rebels and beat them in detail.

During this engagement Grant in person was with Sherman, who had gained the crossing at Fourteen-mile creek, after slight skirmishing, the enemy first destroying the bridges. McClelland was west of Sherman, on the Telegraph road, with three divisions, one being thrown around by Baldwin's ferry. At forty-five minutes past ten A. M., Grant sent word to McPherson, from Fourteen-mile creek, announcing the situation there, and said: "If you have gained Raymond, throw back forces in this direction, until communication is opened with Sherman. Also feel to the north towards the railroad, and, if possible, destroy it and the telegraph. If the road is opened, I will ride over to see you this evening, but I cannot do so until I know McClelland is secure in his position." To McClelland, he said: "Sherman will probably succeed in following out original intentions of going in advance of this place (Fourteen-mile creek) to the cross-roads. Gain the creek with your command, if possible, and hold it, with at least one division thrown across. Reconnoitre the roads in advance, and also in this direction, so as to open communication with General Sherman and myself. If bridges are destroyed, make fords."

The marching over this rugged country was hard, and the troops were obliged to forage on the road.* They seized all the flour-mills, grinding whatever

* "During these thirteen days" (up to May 12th), "my corps subsisted on six days' rations, and what scanty supplies the country in the immediate vicinity of the route afforded; were wholly without tents and regular trains, and almost without cooking utensils, yet they were cheerful and prompt in the discharge of duty."—*McClelland's Report.*

corn was found in store-houses. The ambulances were used as ammunition wagons.

Later on the 12th, Grant said to McClelland, from Dillon's plantation: "Edward's station is evidently the point on the railroad the enemy have most prepared for receiving us; I therefore want to keep up appearances of moving upon that place, but want to get possession of less guarded points first. You will then move to-morrow, to keep up this appearance, a short distance only from where you now are, with the three advanced divisions, leaving the fourth, or Smith's, in about its present position." McClelland had some skirmishing before he was able to cross Fourteen-mile creek. But, on the evening of the 12th of May, the Army of the Tennessee occupied a line almost parallel with the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad, and about seven miles south of it. McPherson was on the right, at Raymond; Sherman seven miles to the west, at Dillon's plantation; and McClelland, four miles to the left, at Montgomery bridge, on Fourteen-mile creek, with a detachment guarding Baldwin's ferry. Grant's headquarters were at Dillon's.

The rebels retreated direct through Raymond to Jackson, where Johnston next day took command, having just arrived in the state from Tullahoma, Tennessee. He was still expecting reinforcements from the south and east, of which Grant was fully aware. It was necessary, indeed, for the enemy to collect his forces at once, or the control of the Mississippi river was forever gone.

The battle of Raymond, and the flight of the rebels to Jackson, confirmed Grant in the idea that a strong hostile force was on his right flank, and he at

once determined to move his entire army in that direction, deflecting McClernand and Sherman from the course he had previously ordered them to pursue. McPherson alone might not have been able to dislodge Johnston from Jackson, which was strongly fortified; and the destruction of that place as a railroad centre was absolutely necessary, in order to deprive the rebels of its use in concentrating a force to interfere with Grant's future operations. He therefore determined to make sure of Jackson, and leave no enemy in his rear.

At a quarter past nine, on the evening of the 12th, he directed McPherson to "move on to Clinton and Jackson, at daylight in the morning." Sherman's orders were changed at the same hour: "After the severe fight of to-day at Raymond, and repulse of the enemy towards Clinton and Jackson, I have determined to move on the latter place, by way of Clinton, and take the capital of the state, and work from there westward. McPherson is ordered to march at daylight to Clinton. You will march at four A. M. in the morning, and follow McPherson. McClernand will follow you with three divisions, and send his fourth back to Old Auburn, to await the arrival of trains now on the road, and Blair's division to conduct them to the army." Instructions conformable to this dispatch were sent at once to McClernand: "Start with three of your divisions as soon as possible, by the road north of Fourteen-mile creek, to this place" (Dillon's), "and on to Raymond." It was fortunate that Grant acted with such promptness, for, on the night of the 13th, Johnston arrived at Jackson, and took supreme command of all the rebel forces in the state; and he was a man of far more

genius and energy than his subordinate. When Johnston reached Jackson, he found a force there, reported at six thousand men, part of which had been driven from Raymond the day before; Maxey, with a brigade from the south, was expected on the 14th, as well as other reënforcements under Gist, so that Johnston estimated his whole available force would amount to eleven thousand men. In addition to these, twelve thousand or thirteen thousand more were on the road to join him from the east; for he had urged the rebel government to make every effort, if they hoped to retain Vicksburg and the command of the Mississippi.

Ascertaining, on the 13th, the approach of the national army, Johnston that night ordered Pemberton, who was now at Edward's station,* with all his force except the garrison of Vicksburg, to come up in the rear of Grant, and attack him at once at Clinton.† Johnston's hope, undoubtedly, was to detain his antagonist in front of Jackson until the reënforcements from the south and east could arrive, and then to unite with Pemberton and his whole force in an attack both in front and rear of Grant. But the movements of the national commander were not coöperative with those of the enemy.

On the 13th, in obedience to orders, McPherson moved cautiously but rapidly towards Clinton, for it

* Pemberton did not arrive in person at Edward's till the 14th, but his troops were there the day before.

† "I have lately arrived, and learn that Major-General Sherman is between us with four divisions at Clinton. It is important to reëstablish communications, that you may be reënforced. If practicable, come up in his rear at once. To beat such a detachment would be of immense value. All the troops you can quickly assemble should be brought. Time is all-important."—*Johnston to Pemberton, May 13th.*

was important to deprive the rebels as speedily as possible of the use of the railroad. He reached the town by two o'clock in the afternoon, without opposition, and at once set about tearing up railroad track and ties, bending the iron, burning bridges, and destroying culverts and telegraph poles and wires. Important dispatches from Pemberton to Gregg were also captured at this time, from which it was evident that Pemberton still expected an attack at Edward's station, and was remaining on the defensive there.

Sherman had arrived at Raymond before McPherson left the town, and Grant immediately ordered him to take the direct or southern road to Jackson. By night, he had reached a position near Mississippi Springs, and parallel with McPherson's corps. During this day, McClermand withdrew from his position near Edward's station, where his pickets had been within two miles of Pemberton's army. One division of the Thirteenth corps was drawn up in line of battle; and, behind this cover the remainder of the command retired without embarrassment, the enemy discovering the movement too late to interfere; McClermand's troops then marched to a point near Raymond, where they were in a position to coöperate with either of the two corps in the advance; one division lay at the point of divergence between Sherman and McPherson's commands, and the remainder of the corps was left in Raymond, or still further to the rear. Clinton is only ten or twelve miles from Raymond, so that the entire command was now well in hand. Grant remained that night in Raymond, equally near to either corps. It was at this time that Johnston sent his order to Pemberton to attack the national forces,

supposing Sherman to be alone at Clinton, unsupported by any other portion of Grant's command.

During the evening, McPherson was ordered to "move at early dawn upon Jackson," ten miles from Clinton, and Sherman also to "move directly towards Jackson, starting at early dawn in the morning." At thirty minutes past seven, Grant directed McClelland: "Move one division of your corps through this place" (Raymond) "to Clinton, charging it with destroying the railroad as far as possible to a point on the direct Raymond and Jackson road. Move another division three or four miles beyond Mississippi Springs, and eight or nine miles from this place, and a third to Raymond, ready to support either of the others. Also, direct your thirty-pound siege-guns to follow close behind the advance guard of the division which takes post beyond Mississippi Springs, on the main Jackson road. You will begin your movements at four A. M. to-morrow."

Early on the morning of the 14th, Grant sent word to Halleck: "I will attack the state capital to-day." A courier carried the message to Grand Gulf, through a country unprotected by national troops. This was the first report Grant had made since severing communication with the government.*

Sherman and McPherson communicated before morning, so as to arrive at Jackson at the same hour;

* "RAYMOND, *May 14th*.—McPherson took this place on the 12th, after a brisk fight of more than two hours. Our loss fifty-one killed, and one hundred and eighty wounded; enemy's loss seventy-five killed, and buried by us. One hundred and eighty-six prisoners, besides wounded. McPherson is now at Clinton, Sherman on the direct Jackson road, and McClelland bringing up the rear. I will attack the state capital to-day." The losses were larger on both sides than Grant was aware of when this dispatch was written.

and their combined forces moved at daylight. The rain had fallen in torrents during the night, making the roads at first slippery, and then miry; but the troops marched in excellent order, without straggling, and in the best of spirits. At nine o'clock, the pickets of Crocker's division, which had the advance of McPherson's corps, engaged the enemy, about five miles out from Jackson. The rebel outposts were speedily driven in, and Crocker pushed on till within two and a half miles of the city, where the enemy was found in position, outside of the defences, and under the command of Johnston. This force was composed of the troops that had been driven from Raymond two days before, as well as the garrison of Jackson. Besides these, reënforcements from South Carolina and Georgia regiments arriving in the night, had been immediately marched out and put into position at the rebel front.* Reconnoissances were made at once, and artillery brought up to reply to the rebel guns, which had already opened on the national advance.

McPherson now had the left, on the Clinton road, and Sherman was deployed to the right, on the south and southwest of Jackson, where he met a small force of infantry and artillery at about the same distance from the city as the troops in McPherson's front. There was a gap of nearly two miles between the Fifteenth and Seventeenth corps, but Grant had estimated the rebel strength, and calculated that either part of his command was more than a match for Johnston's entire force, in case the enemy assumed the offensive; he made no effort, therefore, to connect the wings, thinking it more important to hold the

* I state this on the authority of McPherson.

southern road, and prevent the escape of the garrison in that direction.

In conformity with his orders, McClelland now occupied Clinton with one division, Mississippi Springs with another, and Raymond with a third; his fourth division was at Auburn. Blair's division, of Sherman's corps, had come up with a wagon-train from Grand Gulf, and was also at New Auburn;* while McArthur, with one brigade of his division of McPherson's corps, had also arrived from the river, and was moving towards Raymond, on the Utica road. These forces were all held in reserve: it was not Grant's intention to move them any nearer to Jackson, but simply to have them within supporting distance, if the resistance at that place should prove more obstinate than there seemed reason to anticipate.

While dispositions for the attack were making at the front, a very heavy shower set in, which deferred the battle for an hour and a half; the rain coming down in such torrents that there was great danger of the ammunition being spoiled, if the men opened their cartridge-boxes. The time, however, was well employed, putting the troops in position; and McPherson brought up Logan's division as a reserve. The enemy in McPherson's front occupied a semicircular ridge stretching across the main Clinton road, his right holding a piece of woods, and his centre and left commanding a rolling ground in front, over which it was necessary for McPherson to pass, in order to make an assault. Two rebel batteries were

* Blair started from Grand Gulf on the 12th of May, and guarded a train of two hundred wagons, the only supplies that Grant received, after cutting loose from his base, during this campaign.

also in position, one covering the road, and the other having a good range across the open field. The national troops were deployed on both sides of the road, in the timber, and in the open field; and Stevenson's brigade of Logan's division was thrown across a ravine, to the extreme left, with orders to advance and gain a road which enters the city from the northwest.

At eleven o'clock, the rain having partially ceased, McPherson ordered an advance, preceded by a heavy line of skirmishers, which soon became warmly engaged. These drove the pickets of the enemy back towards his main line, and into a ravine filled with willows. Here the national skirmishers halted for a few moments, when the rebel fire becoming heavy, they were recalled to their regiments, and a charge was ordered. Crocker's whole line at once swept forward with cheers, and in perfect order, drove the enemy out of the ravine, and charged gallantly up the hill.* The rebels did not wait to receive the full force of the assault, but broke and fled precipitately, behind their works.

McPherson followed for a mile and a half, till he came within range of the artillery of the defences of Jackson. Here he wheeled two batteries into the first advantageous position, and opened a well-directed and effective fire on the retreating enemy. When the troops reached this point, they were halted, and the line was re-formed, having become somewhat broken in marching over the uneven ground. Skirmishers were immediately thrown out, and officers

* I have often heard General Grant say, that except Sherman and Sheridan, he never knew a better division commander than Crocker.

sent forward to reconnoitre the enemy's position and defences.

In these operations, McPherson had occupied nearly three hours; and Sherman, meanwhile, advancing on the Mississippi Springs road, had forced a rebel battery from its position, where it commanded the road, as well as a bridge and stream over which he was obliged to pass. A determined advance of his skirmishers soon drove the small infantry force in his front into a skirt of woods, in front of the intrenchments at Jackson. Tuttle's division followed, and the enemy took refuge behind his rifle-pits, not attempting to destroy the bridge. The Fifteenth corps at once emerged from the woods, and occupied the ground beyond the stream, and on both sides of the road. In front, and as far to the left as could be seen, appeared a line of intrenchments; and the enemy kept up a brisk fire of artillery from the points enfilading Sherman's road.

Grant had been with Sherman all the morning, and finding the obstacles important, he now ordered that commander to send a force to the extreme right, as far as the Pearl river, and reconnoitre the flanks of this line of intrenchments. The party not returning promptly, and Sherman being still detained, Grant rode to the right himself, escorted only by his staff, and found a clear road into Jackson. The enemy had evacuated the town, and Grant, with his party of about a dozen officers, was the first to enter the works. His son, a lad of thirteen years, accompanied him on this campaign, and as they rode up to the limits of the town, the boy spurred on his horse, and galloped, ahead of the army, into the capital of Mississippi.

The detachment sent to the right by Sherman soon discovered the weakness of the enemy; and their appearance caused the rebels to retire from that part of the line. Tuttle's troops at once advanced to the rear of the guns which had been playing on them in front, capturing ten pieces of artillery, together with all the gunners, a hundred and fifty in number; and the Fifteenth corps advanced into Jackson. At about the same time, McPherson also learned that the rebels had abandoned the place, and his troops moved forward inside the defences simultaneously with those of Sherman. Crocker captured seven guns, which the enemy in his haste had neither injured nor attempted to withdraw. By three o'clock, the two corps were in possession of Jackson. Crocker's troops raised the national flag over the capitol.

It was now apparent that McPherson had engaged the bulk of Johnston's command, without further aid than the moral support afforded by the enemy's knowledge of Sherman's presence on the south side of the works. Only a small infantry and artillery force had been stationed to impede Sherman's progress; but, as has been seen, it was impossible to ascertain the strength of the enemy, at this part of the line, in time to justify an immediate assault. When the troops in McPherson's front were driven in, those opposing Sherman of course retired; a few of the artillerists, however, remained in position till the last moment, evidently instructed to delay the advance as long as possible, and expecting, no doubt, to be captured in the end. It was these that Tuttle had taken prisoners. While this show of opposition was being made in Sherman's front, McPherson was

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held long enough for the main body of the enemy to escape by the Canton road, on the northern side of the town, by which alone Johnston could effect a junction with Pemberton. McPherson immediately dispatched Stevenson's brigade to cut off the retreat, but the troops arrived too late, and the rebels received no further injury. McPherson considered Stevenson's delay unnecessary, and blamed his subordinate.

The rapidity of the march from Raymond, however, had frustrated Johnston's plans; he was unable to hold Grant until the rebel reënforcements could come up from the east; and the same celerity also took Grant out of the reach of Pemberton, who had been ordered to attack his rear. The vigor of McPherson's assault had been such that Johnston was unable to save his artillery. Seventeen cannon fell into the hands of the victor. In this battle, McPherson lost thirty-seven men killed, and two hundred and twenty-eight wounded. He reported the enemy's loss at eight hundred and forty-five, in killed, wounded, and prisoners.* Sherman was but lightly engaged; his loss was four killed and twenty-one wounded.

That night Grant slept in the house occupied by Johnston the night before. There was proof that the rebel party had been a gay one; probably anticipating the destruction of their enemy on the morrow.

Between three and four o'clock in the afternoon, Grant sent for his corps commanders, and gave them their orders at the state-house. McPherson was to

* Johnston's official report contains no statement of his losses at Jackson.

encamp one division inside the intrenchments, and the other between the battle-field and the city. Sherman was directed to occupy the line of rifle-pits at once, and, on the following day, to destroy effectually the railroad tracks in and about Jackson, and all the property belonging to the enemy.* He set about his work in the morning, and utterly destroyed the railroads in every direction, north, east, south, and west, for a distance in all, of twenty miles. All the bridges, factories, and arsenals were burned, and whatever could be of use to the rebels, destroyed.† The importance of Jackson, as a railroad centre and a depot of stores and military factories, was annihilated, and the principal object of its capture attained. A hotel and a church in Jackson were burned without orders, and there was some pillaging by the soldiers, which their officers sought in every way to restrain.‡

* "Designate a brigade from your command to guard the city. Collect stores and forage, and collect all public property of the enemy. The division from which such brigade may be selected will be the last to leave the city. You will direct them, therefore, to commence immediately the effectual destruction of the river railroad bridge, and the road as far east as practicable, as well as north and south. The Fourth Iowa cavalry and a brigade of infantry should be sent east of the river, with instructions for the cavalry to go on east as far as possible. Troops going east of the river should burn all C. S. A. cotton and stores they find."

† The owners of a valuable cotton factory protested against its destruction, on the ground that many females and poor families were employed in the workshops; but Sherman decided that the machinery could so easily be converted to hostile purposes, that the buildings must be burned. He offered, however, to take the poor back to the Mississippi, and feed them there, till they could find employment or seek refuge elsewhere.

‡ The hotel was called the Confederate Hotel, and the men who burned it had been led prisoners through the streets of Jackson some months before. The cattle-cars on which prisoners were transported

On the 14th, Johnston marched six miles on the Canton road, and then went into camp. He sent Gist forty or fifty miles to the east, and ordered Maxey to "return to his wagons and provide for the security of his brigade, for instance, by joining Gist." It was hoped thus to prevent Grant from drawing supplies from the north and east.* From his new camp, Johnston also sent dispatches to Pemberton, announcing the loss of Jackson, and said: "As soon as the reënforcements are all up, they must be united to the rest of the army. I am anxious to see a force assembled that may be able to inflict a heavy blow upon the enemy." In the same dispatch, he inquired if Grant could "supply himself from the Mississippi. Can you not cut him off from it, and above all, should he be compelled to fall back for want of supplies, beat him?" It had not occurred to either Johnston or Pemberton that Grant had cut his own communications a week before, and was at this time drawing all his supplies from the country where he moved.

It was apparent now that a concentration of the rebels was imminent, and, before dark, Grant got pos-

were halted in front of this building, and the captives asked for a cup of cold water only. This was refused them, with scurrilous taunts, by the inmates of the hotel. The prisoners were soon afterwards exchanged; and returning to Jackson as conquerors, they remembered the house where this indignity had been offered them, and burned it to the ground.

* "Telegrams were dispatched when the enemy was near, directing General Gist to assemble the approaching troops at a *point forty or fifty miles from Jackson*, and General Maxey to return to his wagons, and provide for the security of his brigade—for instance, by joining General Gist. That body of troops will be able, I hope, to prevent the enemy in Jackson from drawing provisions from the east, and this one may be able to keep him from the country towards Panola."—*Johnston's Report*.

itive information of Johnston's orders to Pemberton, of the night before, to attack his rear.* Accordingly, that afternoon, McPherson was directed to retrace his steps, marching early in the morning, on the Clinton road, towards Bolton, about twenty miles west of Jackson, and the nearest point where Johnston could strike the railroad. Grant also informed McClelland of the capture of Jackson, and of Johnston's line of retreat, and ordered him to face all his troops towards Bolton. "It is evidently the design of the enemy to get north of us and cross the Black river, and beat us into Vicksburg. We must not allow them to do this. Turn all your forces towards Bolton station, and make all dispatch in getting there. Move troops by the most direct road from wherever they may be on the receipt of this order." General Frank Blair had, by this time, got up near Auburn, with his division of the Fifteenth corps, and he also was instructed to move in the direction of the enemy. "Their design is evidently to cross the Big Black, and pass down the peninsula between the

* Johnston sent the order to Pemberton in triplicate, and one of the originals reached Grant. Some months before these events, a loyal man in Memphis, anxious to serve the national cause, had been drummed out of that place by Hurlbut with a great show of disgrace, for uttering seditious language and communicating with the enemy. He was furnished with papers indicating the cause of his expulsion, and went south beyond the national lines. With such evidence of his fealty to the rebellion, he had been able to obtain accurate information, and on several occasions furnished it opportunely to Hurlbut. This man was in Jackson when Grant came up from Raymond; he offered to carry the dispatch from Johnston to Pemberton; a dangerous task, as the national army lay between the two rebel commanders. One so noisy in his professions was of course regarded as safe; the dispatch was intrusted to the national spy, who brought it direct to McPherson, and McPherson forwarded both dispatch and messenger to Grant.

Black and Yazoo rivers. We must beat them. Turn your troops immediately to Bolton; take all the trains with you. Smith's division, and any other troops now with you, will go to the same place. If practicable, take parallel roads, so as to divide your troops and train."

By these dispositions, Grant's whole command would converge at Bolton, marching by different roads. The troops were admirably located for such a move. The heavy rains, however, had impeded the march, and pioneers had sometimes to drain the roads before artillery or wagons could pass. These rapid movements taxed the strength of the troops, but no one murmured. Officers and men seemed inspired to extraordinary efforts, and finding that every time they met the enemy they outnumbered and beat him, began to understand that life was saved and success secured by the rapidity which cost them only temporary fatigue. "Better weary our legs in marching, than lose them altogether in battle," said the soldiers, and moved on cheerfully.

When Grant's orders reached McClernand, that commander had Hovey's division on the Clinton road, four miles in rear of McPherson, and facing Jackson; another division (Carr's) was within six miles of Sherman, near Mississippi Springs, and a third, under Osterhaus, was at Raymond. Smith's division was back near Auburn, with Blair, guarding the only train of supplies that Grant received from Grand Gulf during this campaign. McClernand faced about his troops promptly, and moved, on the 15th, at an early hour. By nine and a half o'clock, a detachment of cavalry in Osterhaus's command had seized Bolton, driving out the enemy's pickets, and

capturing several prisoners. Hovey came up soon after from Clinton, and occupied the town. By dark, Carr and Osterhaus were posted nearly parallel with Hovey, but three miles to the left, on the middle road from Raymond to Edward's station; and Smith, arriving from Auburn in the night, bivouacked north of Raymond. Blair, too, was at Raymond, in Smith's rear.

At five o'clock on the morning of this day, Logan's division of McPherson's corps, had started for Bolton from Jackson, followed by Crocker, at seven. They were instructed to march as far as possible by four P. M., and then go into camp. Passing through Clinton, the advance came up with Hovey, shortly before four o'clock, about a mile and a half from Bolton; and Logan went into camp on Baker's creek, within supporting distance of Hovey. Crocker bivouacked on the Clinton road, in rear of Logan.* At forty-five minutes past four, Grant reached Clinton in person, and immediately ordered McClernand: "Move your command early to-morrow morning towards Edward's depot, marching so as to feel the enemy's force if you encounter him, and without bringing on a general engagement, unless you feel

* On the 15th, Grant reported to Halleck, sending the dispatch as before, by courier, to Grand Gulf. "JACKSON, *May 15th.*—This place fell into our hands yesterday, after a fight of about three hours. Jo. Johnston was in command. The enemy retreated north, evidently with the design of joining the Vicksburg force. I am concentrating my forces at Bolton, to cut them off if possible. A dispatch from Banks showed him to be off in Louisiana, not to return to Baton Rouge until the 10th of May. I could not lose the time. I have taken many prisoners from Port Hudson, who state that it will be evacuated on the appearance of a force in the rear. I sent a special message to Banks, giving him the substance of the information I had, and asking him to join me as soon as possible. The message was sent on the 10th."

entirely able to contend with him. Communicate this order to Major-General Blair, who will move with you."

On the 14th, Pemberton, still at Edward's station, had received Johnston's orders of the day before, to attack Grant at Clinton, but disobeyed them.* He held a council of war while Grant was attacking Jackson, and declared that the movement indicated by Johnston was extremely hazardous. A majority of his officers, notwithstanding, advised obedience; but he decided, instead, to march against Dillon's, and cut Grant's communications with the Mississippi.† He had been informed that Grant had an army corps at Dillon's. As Johnston had fled towards Canton, after the fall of Jackson, and scattered his forces fifty miles away, the rebels were now actually moving in three different directions—Pemberton south, Johnston north, and Gist to the east—while Grant was converging between them; Pemberton seeking to cut Grant's communications with the Mississippi, while Grant, with his whole command, flushed with another

* Johnston renewed these orders on the 15th, but in a qualified form: "Would it not be better to place the forces to support Vicksburg between General Loring and that place, and merely observe the ferries, so that you might unite, if opportunity to fight presented itself? . . . General Gregg will move towards Canton to-morrow. If prisoners tell the truth, the forces at Jackson must be half of Grant's army. It would decide the campaign to beat it, which can be done only by concentrating, especially when the remainder of the eastern troops arrive. They are to be twelve thousand or thirteen thousand." —*Johnston's Report*.

† At forty minutes past five P. M. on May 14th, Pemberton sent word to Johnston from Edward's depot: "I shall move as early to-morrow as practicable a column of seventeen thousand on Dillon's. The object is to cut the enemy's communications, and force him to attack me, as I do not consider my force sufficient to justify an attack on the enemy in position, or to attempt to cut my way to Jackson."

victory, was returning to Vicksburg, and bearing down from three several directions on Pemberton.

At one o'clock on the 15th, in open disobedience of his orders, Pemberton moved his entire force from Edward's station towards Dillon's; but the heavy rains had made Baker's creek impassable by the ordinary ford on the main Raymond road, and the bridge had been washed away by previous freshets: the column was, therefore, marched by the northern or Clinton road, on which there was a good bridge; and after crossing the creek, it filed to the right on a neighborhood road, so as to strike the Raymond road, about three and a half miles from Edward's depot; a short distance beyond this junction Pemberton went into camp. He was anxious to reconnoitre in front, and his troops were in motion till midnight; he, therefore, did not issue orders to continue the movement on the 16th.*

At about six and a half o'clock of the next day (the 16th), however, he received positive orders from Johnston to join him at Clinton. "May 15th, 1863, 8.30 A. M. Our being compelled to leave Jackson makes your plan impracticable. The only mode by which we can unite is by your moving directly to Clinton, and informing me that we may move to that point with about six thousand men." Pemberton, no longer daring to disregard his superior, immediately directed a retrograde movement, reversing his column as it stood. His purpose was to return

* "The divisions of Generals Stevenson and Bowen having been on the march until past midnight, and the men considerably fatigued, desiring also to receive reports of reconnoissances made in my front before proceeding farther, I did not issue orders to continue the movement at an early hour the following morning" (May 16th).—*Pemberton's Report*.

towards Edward's depot, and take the Brownsville road, and then proceed north of the railroad towards Clinton. He notified Johnston in haste that his communication had been received, and informed him of the route of march.

At about five o'clock on this morning, two men employed on the Jackson and Vicksburg railroad, and who had passed through Pemberton's army the night before, were brought into Grant's headquarters at Clinton. He was wakened at once to receive the news. The men stated that Pemberton was at Edward's station, fifteen or eighteen miles off, with eighty regiments of infantry and ten batteries of artillery. They estimated his whole force at twenty-five thousand troops, still advancing. From them, also, Grant heard again of the enemy's design to attack his rear. Until this time, it had been his intention to leave one division of Sherman's corps still another day in Jackson, to complete the destruction of roads and stores; but this information determined him to bring up his entire command at once; and, at five and a half o'clock, he dispatched to Sherman, to move promptly to the support of the main army, at Bolton or beyond: "Start one of your divisions on the road at once with their ammunition wagons, and direct the general commanding the division to move with all possible speed, until he comes up with our rear, beyond Bolton. It is important that the greatest celerity should be shown in carrying out this movement, as I have evidence that the entire force of the enemy was at Edward's depot at seven p. m. last night, and was still advancing. The fight may therefore be brought on at any moment; we should have every man in the field." The other division of the

Fifteenth corps was to follow as speedily as possible. This dispatch reached Sherman at ten minutes past seven, and his advance division (Steele's) was in motion, in one hour from that time. At half-past five Grant also ordered Blair, who was near Auburn, to push forward his division in the direction of Edward's station, with all dispatch: "The enemy have moved out to Edward's station, and are still pushing on to attack us with all their force. Push your troops on in that direction as rapidly as possible. If you are already on the Bolton road, continue so; but if you still have a choice of roads, take the one leading to Edward's depot. *Pass your troops to the front of your train, except a rear-guard, and keep the ammunition wagons in front of all others.*" This last injunction was very necessary, as Blair was obliged to reverse his command, which would bring the wagon-trains in front.

McClermand was now directed to assume command of Blair, and establish communication between him and Osterhaus at once, and to keep it up, moving forward cautiously: "Direct Major-General Blair to move with his division to the support of General Osterhaus, as soon as possible, moving on the same line, by the first lateral road leading into the one on which Osterhaus is now marching." At forty-five minutes past five, McPherson was also ordered forward to the support of Hovey: "The enemy has crossed Big Black, with the entire Vicksburg force. He was at Edward's depot last night, and still advancing. You will, therefore, pass all trains and move forward to join McClermand" (Hovey's division). "I have ordered your rear brigade to move at once, and given such directions to other commanders

as will secure a prompt concentration of your forces." Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of Grant's staff, was at this time sent forward to communicate to McClelland the information received, and with verbal instructions for the disposition of his forces.

Three roads lead to Edward's station from the Raymond and Bolton road, one diverging a mile and a half north of Raymond, a second three miles and a half farther north, and on the third, which is seven and a half miles from Raymond, Hovey and McPherson were moving. These were known as the southern, middle, and northern roads to Edward's station. McClelland was ordered to move Blair and A. J. Smith by the southern road, to put Carr and Osterhaus on the middle road, converging to the same point, and to advance Hovey on the direct road from Bolton to Edward's station; and, finally, to establish communications between all parts of his line. When these dispositions were made, he was to feel the enemy with a heavy line of skirmishers, but not to bring on a general engagement unless certain of success.

He advanced slowly; and, at seven o'clock, just as Pemberton's reverse movement began, the rebel skirmishers were met by Smith's division, on the southern road, about five and a half miles from Edward's station. The enemy's pickets at once retired, and Smith, advancing about half a mile, delivered a brisk artillery-fire, which was immediately returned. Hearing the report of guns on his left, Osterhaus now pushed forward on the middle road, as far as a thick wood covering a chaos of hills and abrupt ravines. He drove a line of rebel skirmishers from the skirt of this wood, and uncovered a large body of the enemy.

Not knowing yet whether these movements indicated an attack in force, or simply an armed reconnaissance, and, indeed, utterly ignorant that Grant's entire army was in this neighborhood,* Pemberton at first continued his backward movement; but, the demonstrations soon becoming serious, he directed his division commanders to form a line of battle on the cross-road from the Clinton to the Raymond road, with Loring on the right, Bowen in the centre, and Stevenson on the left. This was the line with which Grant had to contend in the battle of Champion's hill. Pemberton declared in his official report that it included only seventeen thousand five hundred men.† Grant estimated it at least as high as twenty-five thousand.

McClermand had notified McPherson of the movements of his command; and McPherson, anticipating Grant's directions, at once ordered Logan to follow Hovey, and Crocker, who was in column further back, to come up as rapidly as possible with his division. After proceeding about five miles, Hovey sent

* "When General Johnston, on the 13th of May, informed me that Sherman was at Clinton, and ordered me to attack him in the rear, neither he nor I knew that Sherman was in the act of advancing on Jackson, which place he entered at twelve o'clock on the next day; that a corps of the enemy was at Raymond, following Sherman's march upon Jackson; and that another corps was near Dillon's, probably moving in the same direction; and, consequently, that the orders to attack Sherman could not be executed. Nor was I myself aware until several hours after I had received and promised to obey the order, that it could not be obeyed without the destruction of my army; but on my arrival at Edward's depot, two hours after I received the order, I found a large force of the enemy at Dillon's, on my right flank, and ready to attack me in the flank or rear if I moved on Clinton."—*Pemberton's additional Report.*

† I shall take occasion, further on, to dispute this assertion of Pemberton. See page 399.

word to McPherson that he had met the enemy in force, strongly posted on the northern or Bolton road.

At six and a half o'clock, McPherson dispatched to Grant: "I think it advisable for you to come forward to the front as soon as you can." * Grant started at once, at forty minutes past seven, for the advance. On the way, he found Hovey's division at a halt, and the road blocked up with wagon-trains at the crossing, and himself ordered all quartermasters and wagon-masters to draw their teams to one side, and make room for the passage of troops. McPherson was brought up by the road thus cleared. Passing to the front, Grant found Hovey's skirmishers near the enemy's pickets. The troops were rapidly getting into line, and Hovey could have brought on an engagement at any moment.

The enemy was strongly posted, with his left on a high wooded ridge, called Champion's hill, over which the road to Edward's station runs, making a sharp turn to the south, as it strikes the hills. This ridge rises sixty or seventy feet above the surrounding country, and is the highest land for many miles around; the topmost point is bald, and gave the rebels a commanding position for their artillery; but the remainder of the crest, as well as a precipitous hillside to the east of the road, is covered by a dense forest and undergrowth, and scarred with deep ravines, through whose entanglements troops could pass only with extreme difficulty. To the north, the

* McPherson saw that a battle was imminent, and McClernand was the ranking officer at the front. McPherson was unwilling to risk his troops under that general, unless it became unavoidable, and therefore sent the dispatch given above. After the battle, he explained this to Grant.

timber extends a short distance down the hill, and then opens into cultivated fields on a gentle slope towards Baker's creek, almost a mile away. The rebel line ran southward along the crest, its centre covering the middle road from Raymond, while the extreme right was on the direct or southern road. The whole line was about four miles long. Midway,* or Champion's hill, on the rebel left, was evidently the key to the whole position.

Hovey's division was disposed for attack on the Bolton road, and reached to the hill-side and into the wooded ravine; two brigades of Logan's division were thrown to the right of the road, and almost to the rear of the enemy; while Crocker was still coming up in column on the road. But Grant would not permit the attack to begin until he could hear from McClelland, now advancing with four divisions from Raymond. McClelland, in person, was with Osterhaus and Carr, on the middle road. Staff officers were sent to him at once, and successive messages dispatched, for him to push forward with all rapidity; but, by the nearest practicable route of communication, he was at least two and a half miles off. At fifteen minutes past ten, Grant sent him written orders: "From all information gathered from citizens and prisoners, the mass of the enemy are south of Hovey's division. McPherson is now up with Hovey, and can support him at any point. Close up all your forces as expeditiously as possible, but cautiously. The enemy must not be allowed to get to our rear. If you can communicate with Blair

* Midway hill was so called from being midway between Jackson and Vicksburg. Champion was the name of the principal proprietor of the neighborhood.

and Ransom, do so, and direct them to come up to your support by the most expeditious route."

Ransom's brigade, of McArthur's division, in McPherson's corps, was marching up on the road from Grand Gulf, and supposed to be now within supporting distance of the left of the army. Grant, therefore, directed Ransom to move his command so as to join the forces north of him, by the first road leading northward. "Enemy are reported as having sent a column to our left and rear; avoid being cut off."

Continuous firing had been kept up all the morning between Hovey's skirmishers and the rebel advance; and, by eleven o'clock, this grew into a battle. At this time, Hovey's division was deployed to move westward, against the hill, the two brigades of Logan supporting him. Logan was formed in the open field, facing the northern side of the ridge, and only about four hundred yards from the enemy; Logan's front and the main front of Hovey's division being nearly at right angles with each other. As Hovey advanced, his line conformed to the shape of the hill and became crescent-like, the concave towards the hill. McPherson now posted two batteries on his extreme right, and well in advance; these poured a destructive enfilading fire upon the enemy, under cover of which the national line began to mount the hill. The enemy at once replied with a murderous discharge of musketry; and the battle soon raged hotly all along the line, from Hovey's extreme left to the right of Logan; but Hovey pushed steadily on, and drove the rebels back six hundred yards, till eleven guns and three hundred prisoners were captured, and the brow of the height was gained. The road

here formed a natural fortification, which the rebels made haste to use. It was cut through the crest of the ridge at the steepest part, the bank on the upper side commanding all below; so that even when the national troops had apparently gained the road, the rebels stood behind this novel breastwork, covered from every fire, and masters still of the whole declivity. These were the only fortifications at Champion's hill, but they answered the rebels well.

Finding himself, however, in spite of this advantage, losing ground on a point so vitally important, the enemy now pushed reënforcements rapidly; and, when these arrived, rallied, under cover of the woods, and poured down the road in great numbers on the position occupied by Hovey. For a while, Hovey bore the whole brunt of the battle, and, after a desperate resistance, was compelled to fall back, though slowly and stubbornly, losing several of the guns he had taken an hour before. But Grant was watching the fight on the first spur of the hill,* under fire, and seeing that the enemy was getting too strong for Hovey, he sent in a brigade of Crocker's division, which had just arrived. These fresh troops gave Hovey confidence, and the height, that had been gained with fearful loss, was still retained. The preponderance, however, was even yet in favor of the enemy, for McClelland's advance divisions had not arrived.

Meanwhile, the rebels had made a desperate attempt, on their left, to capture the battery in McPherson's corps which was doing them so much damage; they were, however, promptly repelled by Smith's brigade of Logan's division, which drove them back with great slaughter, capturing many

* His son, thirteen years old, was close by his side all day.

prisoners. Discovering, now, that his own left was nearly turned, the enemy made a determined effort to turn the left of Hovey, precipitating on that commander all his available force; and, while Logan was carrying every thing before him, the closely-pressed and nearly exhausted troops of Hovey were again compelled to retire. They had been fighting nearly three hours, and were fatigued and out of ammunition; but fell back doggedly, and not far. The tide of battle, at this point, seemed turning against the national forces, and Hovey sent back repeatedly for support. Grant, however, was momentarily expecting the advance of McClelland's four divisions, and never doubted the result. At thirty minutes past twelve, he had again dispatched to McClelland: "As soon as your command is all in hand, throw forward skirmishers and feel the enemy, and attack him in force, if an opportunity occurs. I am with Hovey and McPherson, and will see that they coöperate."

That commander, however, did not arrive; and Grant, seeing the critical condition of affairs, now directed McPherson to move what troops he could, by a left flank, around to the enemy's right front, on the crest of the ridge. The prolongation of Logan to the right had left a gap between him and Hovey, and into this the two remaining brigades of Crocker were thrown. The movement was promptly executed; Boomer's brigade went at once into the fight, and checked the rebel advance, till Holmes's brigade came up, when a dashing charge was made, and Hovey and Crocker were hotly engaged for forty minutes, Hovey recapturing five of the guns he had already taken and lost. But the enemy had massed his forces on this point, and the irregularity of the ground pre-

vented the use of artillery in enfilading him. Though baffled and enraged, he still fought with courage and obstinacy, and it was apparent that the national line was in dire need of assistance. In fact, the position was in danger.

At this crisis, Stevenson's brigade of Logan's division was moved forward at a double quick into a piece of wood on the extreme right of the command; the brigade moved parallel with Logan's general line of battle, charged across the ravines, up the hill, and through an open field, driving the enemy from an important position, where he was about to establish his batteries, capturing seven guns and several hundred prisoners. The main Vicksburg road, after following the ridge in a southerly direction for about a mile, to the point of intersection with the middle Raymond road, turns almost to the west again, running down the hill and across the valley where Logan was now operating, in the rear of the enemy. Unconscious of this immense advantage, Logan swept directly across the road, and absolutely cut off the rebel line of retreat to Edward's station without being aware of it. At this very juncture, Grant, finding that there was no prospect of McClelland's reaching the field, and that the scales were still balanced at the critical point, thought himself obliged, in order to still further reënforce Hovey and Crocker in front, to recall Logan from the right, where he was overlapping and outflanking the rebel left. Had the national commander been acquainted with the country, he would, of course, have ordered Logan to push on in the rear of the enemy, and thus secured the capture or annihilation of the whole rebel army. But the entire region was new to the national troops, and this great oppor-

tunity unknown. As it was, however, the moment Logan left the road, the enemy, alarmed for his line of retreat, finding it, indeed, not only threatened, but almost gone, at once abandoned his position in front; at this crisis a national battery opened from the right, pouring a well-directed fire, and the victorious troops of Hovey and Crocker pressing on, the enemy once more gave way; the rebel line was rolled back for the third time, and the battle decided.

Before the result of the final charge was known, Logan rode eagerly up to Grant, declaring that if one more dash could be made in front, he would advance in the rear, and complete the capture of the rebel army. Grant at once rode forward in person, and found the troops that had been so gallantly engaged for hours withdrawn from their most advanced position, and refilling their cartridge-boxes. Explaining the position of Logan's force, he directed them to use all dispatch and push forward as rapidly as possible. He proceeded himself in haste to what had been Pemberton's line, expecting every moment to come up with the enemy, but found the rebels had already broken and fled from the field. Logan's attack had precipitated the rout, and the battle of Champion's hill was won. This was between three and four o'clock in the afternoon.

Arriving now at the Raymond road, Grant saw on his left, and along the next ridge, a column of troops approaching, which proved to be Carr's division: McClelland was with it in person. To the left of Carr, Osterhaus soon afterwards appeared, with his skirmishers well in advance. Grant at once sent word to Osterhaus that the rebels were in full retreat, directing him to press forward with all speed. The situa-

tion was soon explained, and Carr also was ordered to pursue as rapidly as possible to Black river, and cross it if he could. Osterhaus was to follow Carr. Some of McPherson's troops had already got into the road in advance, but, having marched and engaged the enemy all day, they were fatigued, and gave way to Carr, who continued the pursuit until after dark.

While the day had been so obstinately contested on the right, Grant, as has been seen, repeatedly sent orders to McClelland to push the divisions of Carr and Osterhaus into the fight, and to communicate similar orders to Blair and A. J. Smith. These four divisions were admirably situated for attack, and, by ten o'clock, were so close as to have their skirmishers engaged. Ransom's brigade of McArthur's division had also arrived, and moved to their support; but, notwithstanding all this, and Grant's urgent and repeated orders, they were not so directed as to take any important part in the action; indeed, their influence was altogether inadequate to their strength or opportunities. Had McClelland caused them to act with any degree of vigor, to do only half so much as Hovey and McPherson performed, it is difficult to perceive how any portion of the rebel army could have been withdrawn as an organized force. At half-past three or four o'clock, the enemy was broken and flying from the field, but a vigorous effort on the part of McClelland would have accomplished the defeat by noon. The rebel right might have been destroyed, and the massing on their left prevented; or, later in the fight, Logan could have been kept in their rear, if McClelland had come up in time; and, with all retreat cut off, the enemy might have been forced to surrender on the field, in mass.

But the battle was fought with McPherson's command and Hovey's division of the Thirteenth corps, Grant directing all of Hovey's movements himself, in the absence of McClernand.* Immediately after the retreat began, Ransom arrived on the field, where the main battle had been fought; and Blair also was up, in time to engage in the pursuit. McClernand's delay was occasioned by an excess of caution; the country he marched through was broken and densely wooded, as well as unknown to him, and a comparatively small force of the enemy had detained him. While he was developing and manœuvring, instead of attacking, the battle was fought elsewhere. Fifteen thousand men thus lingered under his command, in the vicinity of the field, though moving on roads converging to the front. The force opposed to him was probably not greater than six or seven thousand. The rebels were not intrenched, and a good soldier would at once have tested their opposition, especially after the peremptory orders of his chief, and within sound of a critical battle, not three miles off. Even during the pursuit, when the beaten enemy came headlong across his front, McClernand, supposing this an assault, developed his troops, and prepared to receive a flank attack from the pell-mell fugitives.†

Grant had, in Hovey and McPherson's command, about fifteen thousand men engaged: every man in the three divisions was under fire. This hardest-fought battle of the campaign cost him four hundred and twenty-six men killed, eighteen hundred and

* During the battle McClernand sent positive directions to Hovey to connect with the right of Carr; in order to obey, Hovey would have had to fall back two miles. But Grant was with Hovey at the time, and of course forbade the movement.

† See Osterhaus's Report.

forty-two wounded, and one hundred and eighty-nine missing. Hovey, alone, lost in killed, wounded, and missing, twelve hundred men, one-third of his command. McPherson lost about one thousand men; and McClelland fifteen killed, and one hundred wounded. The losses were thus heavy from the nature of the ground; Grant was compelled to mass his men in order to charge; and, in the ascent of the hill, the fire from the rebel infantry into the serried ranks of the assailants was murderous.

The enemy's loss was estimated at between three and four thousand men, in killed and wounded; and nearly three thousand prisoners were captured on the field, or during the pursuit.* Hovey alone captured three hundred under fire, and four hundred after the battle ceased, besides paroling five hundred and sixty-nine sick and wounded, and burying two hundred and twenty-one rebel dead. Logan captured eleven guns and thirteen hundred prisoners. Besides these, Loring's entire division, which had held the right of the rebel line, on the direct Raymond road, had become separated from the main army by the rapidity of Grant's advance after the battle, and found no chance in the flight to unite with the rest of the command. Abandoning all his artillery, Loring, therefore, determined to make an effort to join Johnston, and set out in the darkness of the

* The official reports of Pemberton and Johnston, contain no statement of the losses in this battle, or in any battle of the campaign. I have, however, found a rebel pamphlet published in 1863, and purporting to have been written by one engaged in the siege of Vicksburg; this gives the rebel loss at Champion's hill as six thousand men and thirty cannon. Two of the brigade commanders reported their losses; in one case these were six hundred, and in the other nine hundred and ninety-five men.

night, towards Utica. In order to avoid capture or destruction, he was forced to make a wide detour to the south and east, losing hundreds if not thousands of his men by desertion and straggling; but, after several days, he succeeded in making a junction with Johnston near Jackson, having suffered greatly on the road. One whole division was thus cut off from the garrison of Vicksburg; for this force never was able to rejoin Pemberton.* Grant estimated Loring's strength, after the battle, and exclusive of desertions, at four thousand men.† Having been in McClernand's front, it had not been seriously engaged.

The rout of the rebels was complete. Large numbers of men on Pemberton's left had abandoned the field without orders, even before the battle was over, and made their way to the rear in haste and confusion.‡ General Tilghman was killed, Loring cut off, and the separation from Johnston final. Many of the men threw away their small-arms and gave themselves up as prisoners, unasked. Two batteries, of six guns each, were left in the swamps, and every step of the pursuit was strewn with the wrecks of the dissolving army. Pemberton himself fled that night to Smith's ferry, where the railroad bridge

* Pemberton had the same trouble with Loring that Grant had found with McClernand. He repeatedly ordered Loring to come to the assistance of the left, where the battle raged, but was unable to move him. The consequence was, that when the fighting ceased, and Pemberton was driven towards Vicksburg, Loring, unable to join his chief, was cut off by the advancing columns of Grant.

† May 24th, Loring reported 5,778 men at Jackson.

‡ "A part of Stevenson's division broke badly, and fell back in great disorder."

"Large numbers of men were abandoning the field on Stevenson's left, deserting their comrades."

"Although a large number of men had shamefully abandoned their commands, and were making their way to the rear, the main body of the troops retired in good order."—*Pemberton's Report.*

crosses the Big Black, about fifteen miles distant; and a part of his command bivouacked at Bovina, marching till after midnight. One division remained at the bridge to hold it for Loring's crossing. But Loring never came.*

As soon as McPherson's cartridge-boxes could be refilled, the Seventeenth corps continued the pursuit, and kept it up until dark, the troops bivouacking from two to five miles in advance of the battle-field; one brigade, however, remained to guard the wounded, and assist in burying the dead, and securing the spoils of the enemy. These amounted to no less than thirty cannon, besides numerous stands of colors, and large quantities of small-arms and ammunition. Carr reached Edward's station at eight o'clock P. M., where his command, with that of Osterhaus, remained during the night. Blair captured three hundred prisoners, and rested three miles southeast of Edward's station; Logan reached a point within three miles of Black river bridge; while Hovey was left at Midway, to care for the wounded and bury the dead. The heroes slept on the field they had won so dearly. Men, horses, cannon, and all the wrecks of the battle, were scattered around in wild confusion; rebels and Union men heaped upon each other; dead and dying; their struggles ended, their hot rage all chilled. The soldiers called the spot the "Hill of Death."

Grant and his staff pushed on at the head of the column of pursuit until long after dark; and, in the

* "I awaited in vain intelligence of General Loring. It was necessary to hold the position to enable him to cross the river, should the enemy, which was probable, follow him closely up. For this purpose alone I continued the troops in position."—*Pemberton*.

ardor of victory, got so far ahead of the main body that it was thought advisable to halt for the night. The house where they stopped was lonely, and, before long, they discovered that their position was unsafe, in fact, a mile or more in advance of the troops, and they returned to the vicinity of the column, which was just going into bivouac on the road. The headquarters' tents and wagons had not come up, and they stretched themselves under the porch of a house used as a rebel field hospital. The bleeding and the dying from the battle were crowded close inside, and the slumbers of the men who had conquered were disturbed by the groans of their wounded foes.

That night, Grant received Halleck's dispatch of the 11th of May, ordering him to return and coöperate with Banks; but the campaign that seemed so daring had been won. The subordinate was indeed retracing his steps, but with victorious banners; no danger now of rebuke; no more countermands, no more recalls.

Only the celerity of the movements which have been described prevented the junction of the rebel armies; for, as has been seen, Pemberton was actually moving to join Johnston when Grant came up and attacked him. Pemberton had even sent word to Johnston of the route he was taking, saying: "I am thus particular, that you may be able to make a junction with this army;" but, in a postscript, he added: "Heavy skirmishing now going on in my front." This was the preliminary firing of the battle which forever prevented any junction between the two rebel armies. The next dispatch from Pemberton announced to his commander that he had been "compelled to fall back with heavy loss."

On the 16th, while this furious battle was being fought, Johnston, who had marched ten miles and a half the day before, rested his troops, and lost a day.*

Sherman had evacuated Jackson by noon of the 16th, paroling his prisoners, and leaving his wounded on account of the haste of the movement.† He marched twenty miles, reaching Bolton with his entire command the same day, and was that night informed of the victory of Champion's hill, and ordered to turn his corps northward to Bridgeport, pressing forward without delay. His rear-guard arrived at Bolton at two A. M. on the morning of the 17th, and the same troops started for Bridgeport at four and a half.

Blair was informed: "Sherman is ordered to Bridgeport with his corps. He will probably arrive there this morning" (May 17th). "Move to the same point with your division, and take the pontoon train with you." Blair was to move by way of Edward's station. This arrangement brought Sherman's whole corps together at the most favorable position for crossing the Big Black river, and turning the enemy's left flank, or, if it became more desirable, for striking the important position of Haine's bluff. It had

* "The brigadier-generals reporting that their troops required rest, after the fatigue they had undergone in the skirmishes and marches preceding the retreat from Jackson, and having yet no certain intelligence of General Pemberton's route or General Gist's position, I did not move on Saturday."—*Johnston's Report*.

† "It is a matter of great anxiety to me to add this little force to your army, but the enemy being exactly between us, and consultation by correspondence so slow, it is difficult to arrange a meeting."—*Johnston to Pemberton, May 16th, from Calhoun*.

† On the 17th, Grant sent back an officer under flag of truce, with provisions for these wounded, necessarily left to the tender mercies of the rebels. He sent supplies for his wounded enemies as well.

now become a matter of the highest consequence to secure a base of supplies. None of importance had been received since leaving Grand Gulf, and, although in this rich and fertile country where he was operating, Grant had found forage and beef in abundance, all other supplies were getting short. Two hundred wagons had come up from Grand Gulf, with Blair, but no other regular rations were received after leaving Hankinson's ferry. The only pontoon train with the army was therefore sent with Sherman, to Bridgeport, and the other two corps pushed on to the Black river, lower down, to force a passage. The main column, moving on the direct road to Vicksburg, could thus operate favorably on the flank of any force attempting either to confront Sherman, or to defend Haine's bluff; while, if the rebels still remained in force before Grant, Sherman was in a position to threaten their line of retreat, interposing between them and Vicksburg. To Sherman, Grant said: "I will endeavor to hold the enemy where he is, to give you time to cross the river, if it can be effected. The moment the enemy begins to give way, I will endeavor to follow him so closely that he will not be able to destroy the bridge. Let me hear from you the hour you expect to arrive at Bridgeport."

At three and a half o'clock, on the morning of the 17th, McClelland's corps resumed the pursuit, Carr's division in the advance, followed closely by Osterhaus. Six miles to the west, the enemy was discovered in force, strongly posted at Big Black river bridge. The river at this crossing makes a bend somewhat in the shape of a horse-shoe, open towards the east. High bluffs extend on the western shore to the water's edge; on the eastern side, is an open

bottom nearly a mile in width, and surrounded by a stagnant bayou, two or three feet deep and nearly twenty feet across. At the narrowest part of this bend, and immediately inside of the bayou, the rebels had constructed a strong line of infantry parapet, and, at intervals, dispositions were made for artillery. The line was about a mile in length, abutting north on the river, and south on a cypress-brake that extends to the bank of the river below. The bayou was parallel to the works, making a natural wet ditch of a formidable character; the trees and brush growing in its bed had been felled, and left to obstruct the national advance; while the intrenchments behind were commanded by the bluffs on the right bank of the river; the open space between, however, afforded no cover for the rebels, if once driven from the trenches. This *tête-de-pont* was defended by twenty pieces of artillery, and a garrison of four thousand men—as many as could be advantageously used on the line. The main rebel army had already crossed on boats and bridges, but Pemberton said: “I determined not to abandon so strong a front while there was a hope of Loring’s arrival.” *

The exterior of the bridge-head was situated in the bottom land, with open fields in front, except on the extreme left of the enemy, where a thick copse reached from the road to the river. Carr’s division occupied the right in investing the place, and Lawler’s brigade had the right of the division. Osterhaus was on Carr’s left, extending to the river below. McPherson remained in rear and in column, on the road,

* “So strong was the position, that my greatest, almost only apprehension, was a flank movement by Bridgeport or Baldwin’s ferry, which would have endangered my communications with Vicksburg.”—*Pemberton*.

ready either to support McClelland, if necessary, or to effect a crossing higher up, and, in conjunction with Sherman, drive the enemy from the position at the bridge, by marching on his left flank.

Artillery-fire and skirmishing continued for several hours. The day was hot, and Lawler, who was rushing around without a coat, discovered that by moving one portion of his brigade through the copse, under cover of the river-bank, and the remainder directly against the left flank of the enemy, he could reach a position from which he might be able to carry the work by storm. Accordingly, he marched eleven hundred men, the rest of the command supporting, across the open ground, exposed to a destructive fire of musketry, up to the very edge of the ditch. The supports charged as soon as they saw Lawler start, for the troops were inspired by their continued success, and emulous of each other's glory. The head of the assaulting column arrived opposite the end of the rebel parapet, and discovered that the trees and brushwood had not been felled in the stream at this point, so that there was a narrow and unobstructed defile, through which four men could pass abreast. Through this the entire party rushed, crossed the ditch in a moment of time, and before the enemy could make any disposition to resist the attack, the whole rebel line in front of Lawler was driven from the parapet. The remainder of Carr's division and Osterhaus's command, hearing the cheers of Lawler's men, moved forward on a run, but met no opposition. The enemy had fled before Carr and Osterhaus could reach the ditch.* The unexpected success of the

* "Our troops on their front did not wait to receive them, but broke and fled precipitately. One portion of the line being broken, it very soon became a matter of *saute qui peut*."—*Pemberton*.

charge completely demoralized the rebels, already disheartened by the great defeat of the day before. They fled at once to the crossing, abandoning their guns without a struggle. The panic spread to the troops on the western bank, who set fire to the bridge before half of those on the eastern side had crossed. Then began a wild struggle to reach the river; some few rebels succeeded in swimming across, among them General Green, but many were drowned. No regard for rank was observed; officers and men made up one mass of fugitives. Some were too timid to expose themselves to the fire of the pursuing enemy, and remained in the trenches to surrender. One entire brigade was thus surrounded and captured. Grant's loss in this engagement was twenty-nine killed and two hundred and forty-two wounded. Seventeen hundred and fifty-one prisoners fell into his hands, and eighteen cannon and five stands of colors were also trophies of this brilliant movement. The number of killed and wounded among the rebels is not known; it was, however, small.

Without any delay, or any further attempt to resist the crossing of the national troops, Pemberton now started at once for Vicksburg, with his depressed and discomfited followers. Stragglers in large numbers had already abandoned his army, whose spirit seemed absolutely destroyed; he was ignorant of the fate of Loring's division, and was alarmed lest Grant, by a flank movement on Bridgeport or Baldwin, might even reach Vicksburg before him. The rapidity and strangeness of the latter's manœuvres had evidently affected the imagination of his antagonist, for he said: "The enemy, by a flank movement on my left at Bridgeport, and on my right by Baldwin's or other

ferries, might reach Vicksburg almost simultaneously with myself, or perhaps interpose a heavy force between me and that city. I myself proceeded at once to Vicksburg to prepare for its defence." Grant, indeed, could have gone into Vicksburg, that night, if the bridges had not been destroyed. The battle of Black river bridge was over by ten o'clock in the morning. Lawler had received no orders to make his gallant charge; he and his men deserve all the credit of its success.* Of course, it greatly facilitated the advance of the national army, entirely uncovering every road to Vicksburg.

Grant at once directed the construction of bridges, for at this place the Big Black is wide and deep, and the rebels had secured at least twelve hours' advance, by the destruction of the crossing. He also ordered all the cavalry at his disposal to move out as far as Brownsville, and ascertain if possible the position and intentions of Johnston. During the day, he sent word to Sherman: "Secure a commanding position on the west bank of Black river, as soon as you can. If the information you gain after crossing warrants you in believing you can go immediately into the city, do so. If there is any doubt in this matter, throw out troops to the left, after advancing on a line with the railroad bridge, to open your communications with the troops here. We will then move in three columns, if roads can be found to move on, and either have Vicksburg or Haine's bluff to-morrow night. The enemy have been so terribly beaten yesterday and to-day, that I cannot believe that a stand

* Colonel Kinsman, of the Twenty-Third Iowa, who was killed at the head of his regiment, is said to have suggested the charge.

will be made, unless the troops are relying on Johnston's arriving with large reënforcements; nor that Johnston would attempt to reënforce with any thing at his command, if he was at all aware of the present condition of things."

McPherson and McClermand constructed floating bridges out of the dry timber taken from the trestle-work of the railroad, and from cotton-gins and farm-houses in the neighborhood. One was built of cotton bales, fastened together by boards, and covered with a roadway of plank obtained from adjacent houses. Ransom built a bridge by simply felling large trees on either bank, and bending them so as to meet in the middle of the stream. Planks were then laid across, and the troops marched over. These labors continued all night, and by eight o'clock on the morning of the 18th of May, the Thirteenth and Seventeenth corps were again in motion for Vicksburg.

Sherman reached Bridgeport by noon of the 17th, and found Blair already there, with his pontoon-train. The enemy's bridge of boats had been destroyed, and a body of rebels was intrenched to defend the crossing; but, on the appearance of national troops, they at once displayed a white flag, and the pontoon bridge was laid. Blair and Steele passed over that night, Tuttle following in the morning.

On the 17th, Johnston marched fifteen miles, towards the point indicated in Pemberton's dispatch of the 16th, for their junction; but, Pemberton had already been beaten at Champion's hill, and was then being beaten again at the Big Black bridge. That night, he retired within the lines at Vicksburg, and

Johnston marched, on the 18th, to Vernon, where he hoped to form a junction with his unlucky subordinate, if the latter should ever succeed in cutting his way out of the town.

Starting at break of day, on the 18th, Sherman pushed rapidly on, and, by nine and a half o'clock, the head of his column had struck the Benton road, three miles and a half from Vicksburg; he thus commanded the Yazoo river, interposing a superior force between the rebels in the town and their forts on the Yazoo. His advance now rested till the whole command should close up.

Grant was with Sherman when his column struck the Walnut hills. As they rode together up the farthest height, where it looks down on the Yazoo river, and stood upon the very bluff from which Sherman had been repulsed six months before, the two soldiers gazed for a moment on the long-wished-for goal of the campaign,—the high dry ground on the north of Vicksburg, and the base for their supplies. Sherman at last turned abruptly round, and exclaimed to Grant: "Until this moment, I never thought your expedition a success. I never could see the end clearly, until now. But this is a campaign; this is a success, if we never take the town." The other, as usual, smoked his cigar and made no reply. The enthusiastic subordinate had seen the dangers of this venturesome campaign so vividly, that his vision was dimmed for beholding success, until it lay revealed on the banks of the Yazoo; but then, with the magnanimity of a noble nature, he rejoiced in the victories whose laurels he could not claim. His chief had believed all along that he should accomplish what was now performed, and the realiza-

tion of this belief neither surprised nor elated the most equable of commanders.*

Grant now directed Sherman to operate on the right, and gave McPherson the centre, while McClernand had the left of the command. Sherman pushed the head of his column till the skirmishers were within musket-range of the defences of Vicksburg; and, by dark, he had reached the bluffs on the Mississippi river. Early next morning, possession was obtained of the enemy's outer works; his camps, and many prisoners, left behind in the hasty evacuation, were also captured; and Steele's pickets were within easy range of the new rebel line. At eight A. M. on the 19th of May, the enemy was compassed on the north side of Vicksburg; Grant's right resting on the Mississippi river, within full view of the national fleet at the mouth of the Yazoo. Vicksburg itself was in plain sight, and nothing separated Sherman from the enemy but a space of about four hundred yards, cut up by almost impassable ravines, and the rebel line of intrenchments.

McClernand and McPherson also moved, at the earliest practicable moment on the 18th, Grant having ordered: "No teams allowed to cross the river until all the troops are over, except ambulances and ammunition-wagons."† McPherson crossed the

* Sherman had not been present at any of the victories in this campaign, except Jackson. It so chanced that his corps had done more than its share of the marching, and none at all of the heavy fighting, during the twenty days; he therefore had not felt that splendid confidence which only those who engage in successful battle know.

† "Move your corps as early as possible, taking the direct road as far as Mount Albans. From that point reconnoitre well as you advance. If a parallel road can be found within three miles of the direct road, take it. No trains will be allowed to cross the river until all the troops

Big Black, above the Jackson road, early in the day, and came into the same road with Sherman, but in the rear. His advance arrived after nightfall, at the place where Sherman had turned to the right, and took a position on Sherman's left. The remainder of the Seventeenth corps bivouacked, that night, further back on the road, where there was water, and came into line in the morning. McClelland marched, by the Vicksburg and Jackson road, to Mount Albans, and then turned to the left, to the Baldwin's ferry road. At sunset, he had reached a point about four miles from Vicksburg. By these dispositions, the three army corps covered all the ground their strength would allow, and on the morning of May 19th, the siege of Vicksburg began.

Communication was at once opened with the fleet, and a force was sent to take possession of Haine's bluff; for the enemy had already abandoned that stronghold, which had so long opposed the national commanders, and its garrison was withdrawn into Vicksburg. It was, of course, impossible for Pemberton to hold the place after Grant had got between Haine's bluff and Vicksburg. Fourteen heavy guns had been abandoned, for there was not time to remove them; these were taken possession of by the navy, before the troops arrived. Chickasaw landing, at the foot of Walnut hills, was at once made the base for supplies during the siege; bridges and roads were built, to bring up ammunition and provisions; and the very post that had so long obstructed Grant was thus compelled to minister him

are over, except ambulances and ammunition-wagons. One brigade will be left to guard the bridge and trains, and to bring the latter over after the troops have all passed."—*Grant to McClelland.*

strength, while he prosecuted his efforts against the city of which it had been so formidable an outwork. But, the rebels had now given up all outworks, and, discomfited in the open field, the relieving army driven away, all communication destroyed, all supplies cut off, the garrison had retired within the defences of Vicksburg.

It was just twenty days since the campaign began. In that time, Grant had marched more than two hundred miles, beaten two armies in five several battles, captured twenty-seven heavy cannon and sixty-one pieces of field-artillery, taken six thousand five hundred prisoners, and killed and wounded at least six thousand rebels more. He had forced the evacuation of Grand Gulf, seized the capital of the state, destroyed the railroads at Jackson for a distance of more than thirty miles, and invested the principal rebel stronghold on the Mississippi river. Separating forces twice as numerous as his own, he had beaten first, at Port Gibson, a portion of Pemberton's army; then, at Raymond and Jackson, the troops under Johnston's immediate command; and again, at Champion's hill and the Big Black river, the whole force that Pemberton dared take outside of the works of Vicksburg. Starting without teams, and with an average of two days' rations in haversacks, he had picked up wagons in the country, and subsisted principally on forage and rations that he found on the road. Only five days' rations had been issued in the twenty days, yet neither suffering nor complaint was witnessed in the command. His losses were six hundred and ninety-eight killed, three thousand four hundred and seven wounded, and two hundred and thirty miss-

ing; in all, four thousand three hundred and thirty-five.*

The rebel movements in this campaign could hardly have been better contrived to facilitate the movements and objects of the national commander. When Grant moved south of Vicksburg, Pemberton was at once apprised of the fact by Bowen, and made what he supposed ample dispositions to meet the national forces.† The demonstration at Haine's bluff, however, distracted the rebel general, who repeatedly alludes to it in his official reports. But he sent orders for Loring, who was at Jackson, to hurry with two regiments to the support of Bowen, and also directed Stevenson, in command at Vicksburg, to have five thousand men ready to reënforce the garrison at Grand Gulf.‡ When it was discovered that Grant

* The following extracts from Napoleon's proclamation to his soldiers after his first great Italian campaign, illustrate how curiously History repeats itself: "Soldiers! in a fortnight you have gained six victories, taken twenty-one pairs of colors, fifty-five pieces of cannon, several fortresses, and conquered the richest part of Piedmont; you have made fifteen thousand prisoners, and killed or wounded more than ten thousand men. . . . Destitute of every thing, you have supplied all your wants. You have gained battles without cannon, crossed rivers without bridges, made forced marches without shoes, bivouacked without brandy, and often without bread. The republican phalanxes, the soldiers of liberty alone, could have endured what you have endured. . . . The two armies which so lately attacked you boldly are fleeing affrighted before you; the perverse men who laughed at your distress, and rejoiced in thought at the triumphs of your enemies, are confounded and trembling."

† Pemberton had anticipated an attack on Grand Gulf as early as April 23d, immediately after the passage of the batteries by Grant.

‡ On the 28th of April, Pemberton ordered Stevenson, "All troops not absolutely necessary to hold the works at Vicksburg, should be held as a movable force for either Warrenton or Grand Gulf;" and on the 29th he informed Johnston: "The enemy is at Hard Times, in large force, with barges and transports, indicating a purpose to attack Grand Gulf, with a view to Vicksburg."

had absolutely landed, these forces were all ordered forward; but the rebels did not move with the celerity of their antagonists; before Loring arrived, and when about half of the troops from Vicksburg were on the field, the battle of Port Gibson was lost and won. Had the reënforcements all got up, however, the result would probably have been unchanged. The fragments of his army, that Pemberton sent forward, were mere mouthfuls to Grant, who was advancing with all his disposable force. Port Gibson was lost as a matter of course, and Grand Gulf fell, before the rebels had time to carry off their heavy guns.

Johnston, although so far away, saw this emergency more clearly than his subordinate. He telegraphed from Tullahoma, May 1st, after the battle of Port Gibson: "If Grant's army lands on this side of the river, the safety of Mississippi depends on beating it. For that object you should unite your whole force." And again on the 2d: "If Grant crosses, unite your whole force to beat him; success will give back what was abandoned to win it." Very good advice, but easier to give than to execute; and, at any rate, written after the events had occurred which rendered obedience impossible; for Grant was, at this moment, in possession of Grand Gulf and in pursuit of Bowen.*

In his report he declares: "It was the hope of being able to hold the position on Bayou Pierre, upon which the safety of Jackson depends, that made me most anxious to reënforce General Bowen."

* Pemberton thus explains his failure to move against Grant at this time: "The only means of subsisting an army south of Big Black are from Vicksburg or Jackson, the former requiring a transportation by dirt road of forty, and the latter of forty-five miles, in addition to that by rail. Without cavalry, I could not have protected my own com-

He did not give Pemberton time to develop any plan of his own, but pushed on to the Big Black river, threatening Vicksburg, and, by his demonstrations towards the west, probably prevented the rebels from detecting his real design of attacking Jackson. Pemberton at any rate made no effort to interfere, but remained carefully in Vicksburg, or near it, while Grant was bringing up reënforcements and supplies. When the eastern movement at length began, Pemberton still seemed not to comprehend it; apparently not dreaming that Grant would dare move so far from a base, he saw him start to the interior without alarm, thinking himself sure of cutting the communications of the national army. But, even yet, he did not attempt to accomplish his own designs, until Grant reached Raymond. Then, indeed, he fell into the snare designed; supposing Edward's station to be the objective of Grant, he waited there securely to receive an attack; and, in his foolish confidence, even ordered troops from Jackson and Raymond to fall on the flank and rear of his antagonist. These unfortunates accordingly came up to Raymond and met their own destruction; for Grant, instead of assaulting the mass of the rebels at Edward's station, where they were prepared, reached out after this detachment at Raymond, falling upon it once more with a superior force, which left no doubt of the result.

Johnston now appears upon the scene in person.

munications, much less have cut those of the enemy. To have marched an army across Big Black with sufficient strength to warrant a reasonable hope of successfully encountering his very superior forces, would have stripped Vicksburg and its essential flank defences of their garri-sons, and the city itself might have fallen an easy prey into the eager hands of the enemy."

He arrived at Jackson the day after the defeat at Raymond, and, finding a corps of Grant's army advanced as far as Clinton, supposed it to be entirely detached from the rest of the national command, that command being only ten miles off. Johnston ordered Pemberton to fall at once on the rear of this detached corps, while the troops at Jackson should come out in its front, and the corps would be annihilated. Again, a very pretty plan to conceive, but again a difficult one to execute. In the first place, Grant's entire army was within supporting distance, and had Johnston's orders been literally obeyed, the result would hardly have been more fortunate. But Johnston's orders were set at naught. Pemberton did not like risking his communications with Vicksburg, and remained quiet for a day, after receiving this order; while Grant moved with two corps against Johnston, a third time beating the enemy in detail; but, this time, meeting other troops and a new and greater general.

Jackson fell, the railroads were destroyed, and Pemberton's real communications cut, if he had had but the wit to know it; for he could not live in Vicksburg, with a hostile army between himself and Jackson. Pemberton was besieged when Jackson fell. But Johnston now, in his turn, began scattering his troops; he went himself with one division towards Canton, and ordered another body coming up, to remain forty or fifty miles to the east, out of the reach of this army of Grant, that was falling upon every scattered detachment in the state. If he could not unite his forces, at least he would disperse and save them. So Johnston went north and Gist went east, while Grant converged.

At this time, Pemberton, not dreaming that Grant had reached and captured Jackson, proposed to fall on the communications of his antagonist, supposing these could be cut at Dillon's. But what communications Grant now had were with Jackson, and his face was turned towards Vicksburg, when Pemberton set out to attack his rear at Dillon's. Slowly moving, Pemberton hears of Johnston's defeat, and gets renewed orders to unite with his commander. At last he obeys; reverses his column, to form a junction with Johnston, and is struck in the act by the whole army of Grant, already back from Jackson, and moving up in three columns to the assault. Pemberton falls into position in which to receive the national attack; a position strong by nature, and defended by twenty-five thousand troops, who as yet had not been defeated by Grant. Here he fights well, and, at last, is in numbers a match for his foe; but neither numbers nor position avails; he is driven in utter confusion from his lofty height, and the garrison of Vicksburg is fugitive.

Demoralization now begins. The rebel troops are disheartened at their series of reverses; whichever way they turn, this omnipresent enemy falls upon them. They flee to the Big Black river, but he is already on their left, and they fear he will soon be in their rear; when he attacks in front, they lose their wonted courage, which had stood them so well in many a gallant fight, and ignominiously succumb. Large numbers are captured without resistance; and the army that set out from the stronghold of Mississippi so proud and so terrible, returns a cowering, discomfited mob; many of its numbers left dead and wounded on a well-contested field, thousands cut off

none knew how nor where, thousands prisoners in the hands of the enemy—thousands straggling, deserting—all flying before a flushed and victorious foe; their banners captured, their guns left in the hands of the enemy. Three cannon only are said to have been carried back into Vicksburg by Pemberton.

Grant followed up rapidly, and shut the rebels in on every side; the day of their arrival, the hostile lines were formed, and Vicksburg was besieged.

The campaign in the rear of Vicksburg was remarkable, not only for the rapidity with which it was executed and the success which attended its movements, but for the originality of its conceptions, both in their general plan and in detail. The war of the rebellion was not like wars on European battle-fields, where the opposing generals can overlook the contending armies as two chess-players do their board. The extensive forests which cover the Southern country gave the rebels the advantage of a great natural defence, and afforded a cloak to all their movements to surprise or outflank an invading army. In this wilderness, good common roads were almost unknown, and military roads, like those in Europe, unheard of; heavy rains often converted the rivulets into rivers, and the highways into impassable canals. Railroads, therefore, became the vital lines of support to all defensive armies, and the object of attack to every invading column. All the strategy of the war was based on the importance and applicability of this principle. The rapid concentration of troops and the transportation of supplies, the relief of beleaguered garrisons, the separation of supporting armies, often depended solely on the security or destruction of railroad lines.

It was this which induced commanders to risk raids and marching columns far into the wilderness, leaping from one base of supplies to another, hundreds of miles away. Grant's march through the forest till he passed below Vicksburg, his crossing the almost impassable Mississippi, an enterprise deemed so difficult that the rebels hardly considered it in their arrangements for defence, his throwing his columns into the wilderness in the rear of the city, and suddenly appearing before Johnston and beating him in detail, then driving Pemberton into Vicksburg, and striking for a new base on the Yazoo—were all due to the conclusion he arrived at, that the rules of strategy laid down in the books and applicable in a champaign country, should be violated in the wilderness. The condition of things was unprecedented in the wars we read of; his mode of overcoming such unknown obstacles had to be, and was, original. His mind, indeed, was never much inclined to follow precedents, or to set store by rules. He was not apt to study the means by which other men had succeeded; he seldom discussed the campaigns of great commanders in European wars, and was utterly indifferent to precept or example, whenever these seemed to him inapplicable. He thus disappointed his greatest subordinates, and, indeed, even the general-in-chief and the government, as well as the enemy, none of whom anticipated the success of his plans, or foresaw the means by which that success was to be accomplished.

But Grant remembered and applied the lesson taught him at Holly Springs. He had learned there that an army could live without a base; and now with a larger army, and for a longer period, and amid

tenfold greater dangers, he put the principle to the test. No army in modern times had ever made a similar attempt. Napoleon, indeed, as he tersely said, made war support war, but it was on a different plan from Grant's. The great Corsican forced the cities and towns that he conquered to furnish him supplies; but he did it deliberately, and in advance; he made his arrangements according to a system of forced requisitions, and through the authorities; he never plunged into a hostile region with no more supplies than his army carried in their haversacks. This may, indeed, have been done for a day or two, on a forced march, or for a special object, but never at the outset of a campaign which was expected to endure for weeks, and in which a force greater than his own was sure to be encountered. Yet such operations were infinitely more feasible in the rich and cultivated plains of Europe, than among the sparsely settled wilds of Mississippi.

The people of the country, of course, suffered greatly in this campaign. The system of foraging was very simple. There was no time for elaborate requisitions. Parties of men were dispatched each night, as well as often during the march by day, who scoured the country for miles on each side of the main column of march; these visited every plantation and farmhouse, ransacked every barn, worked every mill, seized every animal; they were always supposed to be under command of officers, but it often happened that squads of men were without this restraint. There was, however, not much time for pillage; the movements were too rapid, and the danger of capture to stragglers too imminent, for any great amount of plundering: indeed, the constant

motion of the troops gave less time for even the collection of supplies, than might otherwise have been thought indispensable. What was endured was doubtless hard enough, but instances of outrage and insult were rare. The rebels, too, were as merciless in their demands upon the country as the national troops, and lived off the people quite as closely,* so that the inhabitants had small choice between friend or foe. They were stripped bare of supplies.

The Vicksburg campaign has frequently been compared with that of Napoleon at Ulm;† but, however much it may resemble that wonderful series of operations in some of its results, it will be seen, upon closer study, to bear still more resemblance to the first fifteen days of the same great warrior in Italy in 1796, than to any other campaign in modern times. In each, the invader was opposed by two armies, separated by a distance of thirty or forty miles; in each, the natural obstacles were prodigious; Napoleon crossed the Appenines, Grant the Mississippi; in each, the invader penetrated between the two armies that should have combined to crush him. In both campaigns the successful soldier massed his forces each time upon a smaller body of the enemy, and, although with fewer troops in all, contrived to be the superior

* "Instructions had been given from Bovina that all cattle, sheep, and hogs belonging to private parties, and likely to fall into the hands of the enemy, should be driven within our lines. A large amount of fresh meat was secured in this way. The same instructions were given in regard to corn, and all disposable wagons applied to this end."—*Pemberton's Report*.

† "In boldness of plan, rapidity of execution, and brilliancy of routes, these operations will compare most favorably with those of Napoleon about Ulm."—*Halleck to Grant, July 31, 1863*.

wherever he met the foe; in both, this was accomplished by a celerity which left the enemy no time to recover from the effect of one blow before another fell; in both, the rapidity of the marching, and the unexpected novelty of the combinations, made the strategy more important than the fighting; in both, the results were still more remarkable than the manner of the achievements. Napoleon secured Genoa, and divided the kingdom of Sardinia from the Austrian alliance; while he created a new base for the splendid operations which speedily followed in Parma and Lombardy. Grant, besides the immediate successes of the campaign itself, won Vicksburg, opened the Mississippi river, and dealt the rebellion a blow from which it was destined never to recover.

Grant's disadvantages were enhanced by his unfamiliarity with the country, and by the broken, rugged nature of the hills, which gave the rebels innumerable and splendid opportunities for defence, of which they never failed to avail themselves. Every hillside was a fortification, every creek a ditch, every forest an abatis. Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, Champion's hill, and the Big Black—each battle illustrates this, and added to the losses and difficulties of the national commander. But Napoleon had more mobile and better-trained troops to contend with, and found the fastnesses of the Appenines as difficult as the ravines of Mississippi were to the American; so that their difficulties were probably equalized. Finally, although Napoleon had conquered a kingdom when he ended the campaign, he had still other states to master, which it took him a whole year to subdue; while Grant, too, was only ready to begin a

siege when the field-fighting and the marching were concluded ; success to each was but the stepping-stone to other struggles, the vestibule to other and greater victories.*

* See Appendix for Grant's correspondence with the government, in regard to the Vicksburg campaign, entire.

CHAPTER VIII.

Land defences of Vicksburg—Johnston orders Pemberton to evacuate—Pemberton determines to hold out—Position of Grant's army on 19th of May—Partial and unsuccessful assault—Rebels recover their spirit—National troops rested and supplies brought up—Orders for a general assault on the 22d—Reasons for this assault—Mortar bombardment—Heavy cannonade on land front—Sherman assaults with Blair and Steele's divisions—Troops reach the parapet, but are repelled—Ransom's assault—Difficult nature of the ground—Failure of McPherson's attempt—McClelland's assault determined and gallant, but completely repelled—Distinguished bravery of individuals—Failure of assault all along the line—McClelland's dispatches—Grant's replies—Renewal of the assault—Second failure—Grant's position during the assault—Renewed dispatches from McClelland—Reinforcements sent to McClelland—Death of Boomer—Results of the assault—Comparison with assaults in European wars.

THE ground on which the city of Vicksburg stands is supposed by some to have been originally a plateau, four or five miles long and about two miles wide, and two or three hundred feet above the Mississippi river.* This plateau has been gradually washed away by rains and streams, until it is transformed into a labyrinth of sharp ridges and deep irregular ravines. The soil is fine, and when cut verti-

* The official report of engineer operations at the siege of Vicksburg, by Captains Prime and Comstock, U. S. Engineers, and the manuscript memoir, already referred to, of Lieutenant (now Brevet Major-General) Wilson, have furnished most of the details of engineer operations for this and the following chapter.

cally by the action of the water, remains in a perpendicular position for years; and the smaller and newer ravines are often so deep that their ascent is difficult to a footman, unless he aids himself with his hands. The sides of the declivities are thickly wooded, and the bottoms of the ravines never level, except when the streams that formed them have been unusually large.

At Vicksburg, the Mississippi runs a little west of south, and all the streams that enter it from the east run southwest. One of these empties into the river five miles below the city, and the dividing ridge that separates two of its branches was that on which the rebel line, east of Vicksburg, was built. On the northern side of the town, the line also ran along a dividing ridge, between two small streams that enter the Mississippi just above Vicksburg: these ridges are generally higher than any ground in their vicinity. Leaving the Mississippi on the northern side of Vicksburg, where the bluffs strike the river, the line stretched back two miles into the interior, crossed the valleys of two small streams, and reached the river again below, at a point where the bluff falls back from the Mississippi nearly a mile. Here, the works followed the bluff up the river for a mile or more, so as to give fire towards the south on any troops that might attempt an attack from that direction, by moving along the bottom-land between the bluff and the Mississippi.

The whole line was between seven and eight miles long, exclusive of the four miles of rifle-trench and heavy batteries on the water-front. It consisted of a series of detached works, on prominent and commanding points, connected by a continuous line of

trench or rifle-pit. The works were necessarily irregular, from the shape of the ridges on which they were situated, and, in only one instance, closed at the gorge. They were placed at distances of from seventy-five to five hundred yards from each other. The connecting rifle-pit was simple, and generally about breast-high. The ravines were the only ditches, except in front of the detached works, but no others were needed, trees being felled in front of the whole line, and forming, in many places, entanglements which, under fire, were absolutely impassable. In military parlance, Vicksburg was rather an intrenched camp than a fortified place, owing much of its extraordinary strength to the difficult nature of the ground, which rendered rapidity of movement and unity of effort in an assault, impossible.

North of the Jackson road, the hills are higher, and covered with a denser growth of timber, and here, in consequence, the enemy had been able to make his line exceedingly strong, and difficult of approach. But, from the Jackson road to the river, on the south, the country was cleared and cultivated; the ridges also were lower, and the slopes more gentle, though the ground was still rough and entirely unfitted for any united tactical movement. What the enemy lacked on this side, in natural defences, he had supplied by giving increased strength to his works. The whole aspect of the rugged fastness, bristling with bayonets, and crowned with artillery that swept the narrow defiles in every direction, was calculated to inspire new courage in those who came thronging into its recesses and behind its bulwarks, from their succession of disasters in the open field.

Here, too, were at least eight thousand fresh troops, who as yet had suffered none of the demoralization of defeat; and, with his thirty thousand men, and nearly two hundred cannon, the rebel leader thought himself well able to stand a siege. If he had supplies enough to feed his army, he could surely hold out till another force, under Johnston, could be collected for his relief.

But, as soon as Johnston learned that Pemberton had been driven into Vicksburg, he dispatched to that commander: "If Haine's bluff be untenable, Vicksburg is of no value, and cannot be held. If, therefore, you are invested at Vicksburg, you must ultimately surrender. Under such circumstances, instead of losing both troops and place, you must, if possible, save the troops. If it is not too late, evacuate Vicksburg and its dependencies, and march to the northeast." This order reached Pemberton on the 18th of May, while Grant was still advancing on the Jackson road. Pemberton, as usual, called a council of war, to deliberate on the propriety of obedience. The council was composed of all his general officers, and their opinion was unanimous, that "to withdraw from Vicksburg, with such *morale* and *matériel*, as to be of further service to the Confederacy, would be impossible." Before the council broke up, the guns of the advancing army were heard, as they opened on the works of Vicksburg, and reports came in, that Grant's troops were crossing the Yazoo river, above Haine's bluff. Pemberton at once replied to his commander: "I have decided to hold Vicksburg as long as possible, with the firm hope that the government may yet be able to assist me in keeping this obstruction to the enemy's

free navigation of the Mississippi." He was determined to be besieged.

Pemberton was now, according to his own statement, able to bring into the trenches eighteen thousand five hundred muskets; from these, however, his reserves were to be deducted, which, he said, would reduce the force in the trenches to fifteen thousand five hundred men.* Stevenson was put on the right, his troops reaching from the Warrenton road to the railroad, a distance of nearly five miles; Forney had the line between the railroad and the Graveyard road; and Smith, with his own troops, and some remnants of Loring's fugitive command that had straggled back into Vicksburg, had the extreme left, from the Graveyard road to the river on the north. Bowen was held in reserve, ready to strengthen any portion of the line most threatened. In addition to the guns on the water-front, one hundred and two pieces of artillery of different calibre, principally field, were placed in position on the land side, and details of men were set to work strengthening the fortifications. All cattle, sheep, and hogs belonging to private parties, as far as Bovina, had been driven into the works several days before, and all corn on the road also collected. "With proper economy of subsistence and ordnance stores," said Pemberton, "I knew I could stand a siege."

The steep hills and deep gullies in the rear of Vicksburg extended beyond the rebel fortifications and into the region occupied by Grant. The stiff

* Although Pemberton said that he had only eighteen thousand five hundred men at this time, he surrendered thirty-one thousand nearly seven weeks later, and received no reinforcements in the mean while.

hard clay of which the soil is composed was much cut up by the wash of streams, and covered with as dense a forest, here, as inside the works; the valleys were filled with cane and willow, and accessible only by two or three tolerable roads. In the dry season, which was now approaching, water is very scarce, and found only in pools or ponds made by damming up the little gullies. It was through this broken country, and across these wooded cliffs and rugged chasms, that the national line was formed. Sherman's corps was on the right, McPherson had the centre, and McClernand the left of the command. On the northern and eastern sides of the city, the investment was complete, but the line did not reach to the river again on the south, there being more ground along McClernand's front than he had troops to cover it with. The investment was made close on the northern rather than the southern side, in order to prevent any junction between Johnston's army and the garrison, before Grant could make an assault, as well as to cover the new base of supplies at Chickasaw bayou. Grant had, at this time, about thirty thousand men in line.

The troops were buoyant with success and eager for an assault, and their commander believed himself justified in an attempt to carry the works by storm. The conduct of the rebel army at the Big Black bridge, and the precipitate flight into Vicksburg afterwards, had sufficiently proved the demoralization of his antagonists; he also underestimated Pemberton's numbers, supposing them to be about twelve thousand or fifteen thousand effective men. Accordingly, on the first day of the investment, the 19th of May, Grant ordered his corps commanders to

"push forward carefully, and gain positions as close as possible to the enemy's works, until two o'clock p. m.; at that hour, they will fire three volleys of artillery from all the pieces in position. This will be the signal for a general charge along the whole line."

There was slight skirmishing on various parts of the line from early morning, and everywhere the troops were deployed and put into position; on the right, important ground was gained, and Sherman moved forward Blair's division on the right and left of the road leading to the enemy's intrenchments, disposing his artillery so as to cover the point where the fortifications were to be entered. At the appointed hour, Blair advanced in line, but the ground on both sides of the road was so impracticable, cut up in deep chasms, and filled with standing and fallen timber, that it was impossible for the assaulting parties to reach the trenches in any thing like an organized condition. The Thirteenth United States infantry was the first to strike the works, and planted its colors on the exterior slope; its commander, Captain Washington, was mortally wounded, and seventy-seven men out of two hundred and fifty, were either killed or wounded. Two volunteer regiments reached the same position nearly as soon, and held their ground, firing upon every head that presented itself above the parapet, but failed to effect a lodgment or even penetrate the line. Other troops also gained positions on the right and left, close to the parapet, but got no further than the counterescarp. The rebel fire was hot, and the national loss severe. Steele's division, on Sherman's extreme right, was not close enough to attack the main line, but carried a number of outworks and captured a few prisoners.

McPherson had arrived in front of Vicksburg after nightfall of the 18th, bivouacking on the road; but, early on the 19th, he moved forward into position, in the ravines and along the ridges; his line was well protected by the nature of the ground, but the roughness of the country prevented any decided advance, except by Ransom's brigade, which made a brief and unsuccessful attempt to carry the works in its front. McClernand, having more ground to march over than either of the other corps, was still, at early dawn, four miles from Vicksburg; but his troops were deployed at once, batteries were put in position, and opened on the rebel line, and, by two o'clock, the whole corps was advanced as close to the enemy's works as the irregular ground allowed. The extreme steepness of the acclivities, the strength of the works, and the vigorous resistance everywhere made, all rendered it necessary to move with circumspection; so that without any fault or hesitation on the part of either troops or commanders, night had overtaken the national forces before they were really in a condition to obey the order of Grant, except at the point where Sherman had reached the works, but failed to make any serious impression. Blair, however, held his advanced position with tenacity until dark; and, as soon as night closed in, Sherman ordered him back a short distance, to a point where the shape of the ground gave partial shelter and the troops could bivouac. The result of the assault was, therefore, unsuccessful. The Fifteenth corps was the only one able to act vigorously; the other two having succeeded no further than to gain advanced positions, covered from the fire of the enemy.*

* No report was made to Grant of the losses in this assault. They

The rebels had evidently begun to recover their spirits. Driven to their last stronghold, like wild beasts at bay, they still held off the pursuers who had chased them so far and hard among the hills. It often happens that a panic-stricken army, after long flight and apparently irremediable disaster, suddenly recovers its tone and makes the new mettle more conspicuous by comparison with former recreancy. Something like this occurred at Vicksburg. The rebels had reached the works in a condition which their own records prove to have been as miserable as any in which an army ever fled towards its citadel. Late on a Sunday night, the main body of the vanquished forces began pouring into the town. Neither order nor discipline had been maintained on the march; the men were scattered for miles along the road, declaring their readiness to desert rather than serve again under Pemberton. The planters and population of the country, fleeing from the presence of the victorious enemy, added to the crowd and the confusion; and the inhabitants of the city awoke in terror, to find their streets thronged with fugitives—one vast, uproarious mass, in which, with shrinking citizens and timid women and children, were mingled the remnants of Pemberton's dismayed and disorganized army. And these were the troops that were now the reliance of Vicksburg.* But, comforted by the sight of the formidable hills, Nature's own fortress, and looking up at the works which had already withstood so many sieges and as-

were estimated by him at fewer than five hundred; of these about one hundred were killed or severely wounded.

* See a rebel narrative of the siege of Vicksburg, by H. S. Abrams, published in 1863, at Atlanta, Georgia.

saults, the rebels, who were good enough soldiers, as full of courage and endurance as any men that ever fought, grew ashamed of their strange unmanliness; and, when Sherman's troops rushed up, thinking to march easily into Vicksburg, they found not only the ramparts were difficult, but the defenders had got new spirit, and were once more the men who had fought at Donelson, and Shiloh, and at Champion's hill.

But, although unsuccessful, the operations of this day were important to Grant. The nature of the enemy's works and their approaches, the character of the ground, and the unusual obstacles by which it was encumbered, together with the policy of the defence, all became known; while the national lines were advanced, positions for artillery selected, and the relations of the various parts of the army were fully established and understood. It was clearly seen, from the knowledge thus obtained, that to carry the works of Vicksburg by storm was a more serious undertaking than had been at first supposed.

The troops having been constantly on the march from the middle of April, and for the most of the time with short supplies, were now greatly fatigued; the weather was warm and dusty; a change of clothing, as well as a supply of rations, was required. Plenty of meat had at all times been obtained during the march, but bread had been more scarce, and the men began seriously to feel its need. The camp and garrison equipage had been left behind, as well as all extra clothing; and it was imperative to look, in some degree, after the comfort of the army, before any thing further was attempted.

The 20th and 21st of May were devoted to the

accomplishment of these objects; communications were opened, from the right and rear of the lines, with the steamboat landing near Chickasaw bayou; new roads were made, so that the trains going and coming might not interfere with each other; bridges of flat-boats were laid across the bayou; steamboats were brought to the landing, loaded with supplies of subsistence, forage, and ordnance stores, and served as store-houses until their cargoes should be needed. In case of disaster, they were thus ready to move off without the sacrifice of their vast quantity of stores. McClelland was directed to open communication with Warrenton, and for a while drew his supplies from that point; trains on the west bank moving from Milliken's bend to a point opposite Warrenton, whence stores were ferried to the eastern shore. The hospitals and supplies at Grand Gulf were also ordered up to Warrenton. Hard bread, coffee, and sugar were hauled out to the front; and the troops rested for two days, clearing the ground on which they were to encamp, and acquiring a more distinct idea of that over which they were to advance. Lauman's division was now arriving at Chickasaw bayou, and the rest of McArthur's command at Warrenton.

Pickets were pushed forward, in the mean time, and positions selected for the artillery. On the 20th, also, Grant sent Admiral Porter word: "A gunboat playing on the second water-battery would materially help us;" and, at noon of that day, the mortar-fleet took position on the west side of the peninsula, and commenced the bombardment of the city. This fire continued without intermission on the 21st, accompanied by occasional musketry and artillery attacks from the land side, to which but slight response was

made. Several rebel guns were dismounted, the works were ploughed up in one or two instances, and a number of officers and men killed and wounded.* Pemberton, however, had determined to be economical in the use of ammunition, and forbade both picket skirmishing and artillery combats. In consequence of this, Grant was able to push forward his own sharpshooters, and obtain better positions for his guns. The mortar bombardment was so heavy that the citizens began digging caves in the sides of the hills, to which they retreated for shelter. Pemberton had desired them to leave the town, but in vain; they declared themselves willing to risk the horrors of a siege rather than quit their homes. At this time, also, it was found impossible to feed the large numbers of horses and mules in Vicksburg, and they were driven beyond the lines for pasturage. This relieved Pemberton of a serious encumbrance, which would otherwise have made heavy demands upon his limited supplies of forage.

On the 21st, the arrangements for drawing supplies of every description being complete, Grant decided to make another attempt to carry Vicksburg by storm. There were many reasons which determined him to adopt this course. First of all, and most important, he felt that a resolute assault from the advanced positions obtained on the 19th, would succeed, if made with the proper vigor and coöperation. He believed that if he formed his columns of attack on the main roads, he could reach the rebel works in sufficient order and with weight enough to break through, before any serious loss could be inflicted by the enemy. The distance to be passed over in no

* See rebel reports.

case exceeded four hundred yards, and in almost every instance partial cover could be obtained, up to within one hundred yards of the rebel line.

In addition to these tactical considerations, it was known that Johnston was at Canton, with the troops that had escaped from Jackson, reënforced by others from the east and south; that accessions were daily reaching him, and that every soldier the rebel government could gather up, in all its territory, would doubtless soon be sent to Johnston's support. In a short time he might be strong enough to attack Grant in the rear, and, possibly, in conjunction with the garrison, be able to raise the siege. Possession of Vicksburg, on the contrary, would enable Grant to turn upon Johnston and drive him from the state; to seize all the railroads and practical military highways, and effectually secure all the territory west of the Tombigbee river, before the season for active campaigning in this latitude should be past; the government would thus be saved all necessity of sending him reënforcements, now so much needed elsewhere.

Finally, the troops themselves were impatient to possess Vicksburg, the prize of all their battles, and bivouacs, and marches. The weather was growing extremely hot, the water among the hills was getting scarce, and likely to fail entirely during the summer. The temper of the army, after its triumphant march, was such that neither officers nor men would have worked in the trenches with any zeal, until they became certain that all other means had failed. The capture of the works on the Big Black river was too recent in their memories for them yet to tolerate the tedious processes of a siege. "They felt," said one

who was with them, "as if they could march straight through Vicksburg, and up to their waists in the Mississippi, without resistance." So, although Grant certainly expected to succeed, he felt now, as he did at Belmont, that there was a moral as well as a military necessity for the assault. The spirit of the men demanded it, and to this spirit every real commander will defer; or rather, with this spirit his own is sure to be in unison. Either he feels the same causes, and recognizes the same effects as they; or he infuses into his men the passion, or temper, or idea with which he himself is animated. It takes both troops and commander to make an army; consciously or not, they sympathize, like the soul and body of a living man.

On the 21st of May, accordingly, Grant issued his orders for a general assault along the whole line, to commence at ten A. M. on the morrow. Corps commanders were directed to examine thoroughly all the ground over which troops could possibly pass, to put in position all the artillery that could be used, and to advance their skirmishers as close as possible to the enemy's works. The artillery was to make a vigorous attack at an early hour; while the infantry, with the exception of reserves and skirmishers, was to form in columns of platoons, or by a flank, if the ground would not admit of a wider front. The columns of attack were to move at quick time, with fixed bayonets, carrying only canteens, ammunition, and one day's rations, and not to fire a gun till the outer works were stormed; the skirmishers to advance as soon as possible after the heads of columns, and scale the walls of any works that might confront them. "If prosecuted with vigor, it was confidently

believed that this course would carry Vicksburg in a short space of time, and with very much less loss of life than would result from a protracted siege." "Every day's delay," said Grant, "enables the enemy to strengthen his defences and increase his chances for receiving aid from outsiders." Grant also wrote to Admiral Porter, on the 21st: "I expect to assault the city at ten A. M. to-morrow. I would request and urgently request that you send up the gunboats below the city, and shell the rebel intrenchments until that hour, and for thirty minutes after. If the mortars could all be sent down to near the point on the Louisiana shore, and throw in shells during the night, it would materially aid me." McArthur's division, not having yet arrived in line, was to act independently, moving up from Warrenton by the direct road, and striking Vicksburg on the left of McClernand, beyond the line of investment. "Move cautiously," said Grant, "and be prepared to receive an attack at any moment. Penetrate as far into the city as you can. Should you find the city still in possession of the enemy, hold as advanced a position as you can secure yourself upon."

The mortars were mounted on large rafts and lashed to the further side of the peninsula. Porter kept six of them playing rapidly all night on the town and works, and sent three gunboats to shell the water-batteries and any places where rebel troops could be rested during the night; and, at three o'clock on the morning of the 22d, the cannonade began from the land side. Every available gun was brought to bear on the works; sharpshooters at the same time began their part of the action; and nothing could be heard but the continued shrieking of shells,

the heavy booming of cannon, and the sharp whiz of the Minié balls as they sped with fatal accuracy towards the devoted town. Vicksburg was encircled by a girdle of fire; on river and shore, a line of mighty cannon poured destruction from their fiery throats, while the mortars played incessantly, and made the heavens themselves seem to drop down malignant meteors on the rebellious stronghold. The bombardment was the most terrible during the siege, and continued without intermission until nearly eleven o'clock, while the sharpshooters kept up such a rapid and galling fire that the rebel cannoneers could seldom rise to load their pieces; the enemy was thus able to make only ineffectual replies, and the formation of the columns of attack was undisturbed.

All the corps commanders had set their time by Grant's, so that there might be no difference between them in the movement of the assault. Grant himself took a commanding position near McPherson's front, from which he could see all the advancing columns of the Seventeenth, and a part of those of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth corps. Promptly at the appointed hour the three corps moved to the assault. No men could be seen on the enemy's works, except that occasionally a sharpshooter would show his head and quickly discharge his piece. A line of select skirmishers was placed to keep these down.

As on the 19th, Sherman's main attack was along the Graveyard road. Blair was placed at the head of this road, with Tuttle in support, while Steele was left to make his attack at a point in his own front, about half a mile further to the right. The troops were grouped so that, as far as the ground would allow, the movement might be connected and rapid.

The Graveyard road runs along the crown of an inferior ridge, over comparatively smooth ground. Its general direction was perpendicular to the rebel line; but, as it approached the works, it bent to the left, passing along the edge of the ditch of the enemy's bastion, and entering at the shoulder of the bastion. The timber, on the sides of the ridge and in the ravine, had been felled, so that an assault at any other point in front of the Fifteenth corps was almost impossible. The rebel line, rifle-trench as well as small works for artillery, was higher than the ground occupied by the national troops, and nowhere, between the Jackson road and the Mississippi on the north, could it be reached without crossing a ravine a hundred and twenty feet below the general level of the hills, and then scaling an acclivity, whose natural slope was everywhere made more difficult by fallen trees and entanglements of stakes and vines.

A forlorn hope was formed of a hundred and fifty men, who carried poles and boards to cross the ditch. This party was followed closely by Ewing's brigade; Giles Smith and Kilby Smith's brigades bringing up the rear of Blair's division. All marched by the flank, following a road selected the night before, on which the men were partially sheltered, until it became necessary to take the crown of the ridge, and expose themselves to the full view of the enemy, known to be lying concealed behind his well-planned parapet.

At the very moment named in Grant's orders, the storming party dashed up the road, at the double quick, followed by Ewing's brigade, the Thirtieth Ohio leading. Five batteries, of six pieces each, stationed on the ridge, kept up a concentric fire on the

bastion, which was doubtless constructed to command the very approach on which Sherman was moving. The storming party reached the salient of the bastion, and passed towards the sally-port, when rose from every part along the line commanding it, a double rank of the enemy, and poured on the head of the column a terrific fire. The men halted—wavered—sought cover. But the column behind pressed on; it crossed the ditch on the left face of the bastion, clambered up the exterior slope, and planted its colors on the outside of the parapet; the fire, however, was too hot to bear them further. The brigade broke, and the men burrowed in the earth to shield themselves from a flanking fire.

Ewing being thus unable to carry this point, the next brigade, Giles Smith's, was turned down a ravine, and, making a circuit to the left, found cover, formed line, and threatened the parapet at a point three hundred yards to the left of the bastion; while the brigade of Kilby Smith was deployed on the off-slope of one of the spurs, where, with Ewing's brigade, it kept up a constant fire against any object that presented itself above the parapet. At about two o'clock, Blair reported that none of his brigades could pass the point of the road swept by the terrific fire which Ewing had encountered, but that Giles Smith had got a position more to the left, where, in connection with Ransom, of McPherson's corps, he was ready to assault. Sherman thereupon ordered a constant fire of artillery and infantry to be maintained, in order to occupy the attention of the enemy in front, while Ransom and Giles Smith charged up against the parapet.

The ground over which they passed is the most

difficult about Vicksburg. Three ravines cover the entire distance between the Graveyard and the Jackson roads, and, opening into one still larger, rendered this portion of the line almost unapproachable, except for individuals. Nowhere between these points could a company march by the flank in any thing like order, so broken is the ground, and so much was it obstructed by the slashing which had been made by felling forest-timber and the luxurious vines along the sides of the ravines. But, although these obstructions were thus almost insurmountable, they yet afforded effectual cover to the assailants till they got within eighty yards of the enemy; and, even then, they rendered the rebel fire much less destructive than it would have been on the open ground. The troops pushed on, and struggled in the blazing sun to reach the enemy's stronghold; but, like the column of Ewing, they became hopelessly broken up into small parties, and only a few, more daring than the rest, succeeded in getting close enough to give the rebels any serious cause for alarm. But these were met by a staggering fire, and recoiled under cover of the hillside. Many a brave man fell after he had passed through the difficulties of the approach and reached the rebel line. The foremost were soon compelled to crawl behind the logs and under the brow of the hills, where they waited for single opportunities to bring down the enemy, as he showed himself along the parapet or in the rifle-trench.

Steele's artillery had been placed in position on the abandoned outworks of the enemy, along a ridge on the north side of a creek which separated the belligerents at this point. His infantry was on the road, under the bluffs and behind the hills. The val-

ley between had been cleared and cultivated; it was wider near Ewing's right, and exposed, for three-quarters of a mile, to a plunging fire from every point of the adjacent rebel line. The distance to pass under fire was not less than four hundred yards; and, though the obstacles to overcome were less, the exposure to fire being greater, made the result here the same as in the assault on Sherman's left. The main effort of Steele's right was directed against a water-battery, at the mouth of a creek which empties into the Mississippi, above Vicksburg. But, by two o'clock, it was evident that the national forces could not reach the rebel fortifications at any point in Sherman's front in numbers or order sufficient to carry the line, and all further operations were suspended.*

In the mean time, the troops of McPherson and McClernand's corps had advanced promptly at ten o'clock. McPherson's line extended from Sherman's left to within half a mile of the railroad, Ransom on the right and in the ravines, Logan on the main Jackson road, and Quimby in the valleys towards the south. The rebel works here followed the line of the ridge, running nearly north and south; they were about two miles from the river, and three hundred and twenty-nine feet above low-water mark. They were strongly constructed, and well arranged to sweep the approaches in every direction. The road follows the tortuous and uneven ridge separating two deep ra-

* General Sherman's report of this assault is very full and vivid. I have not hesitated to avail myself of his language whenever it suited my purpose. General Sherman, indeed, has offered me unrestricted access to all his papers, and in conversation often thrown light on points that could not otherwise have been made clear.

vines, and was completely swept at many points by direct and cross fires from the enemy's line. In Logan's division, John E. Smith's brigade, supporting Leggett's, was on the road, and Stevenson in the ravines and on the slopes to the south; all moved forward under cover of a heavy artillery fire.

Their order of battle, however, was weak, from the nature of the ground—columns of regiments not greater than platoon front, battalions by the flank, in columns of fours, or regiments in single line of battle, supported by troops in position, and covered by skirmishers. Notwithstanding the bravery of the troops, they became broken and disorganized by the difficult ground and the fire of the enemy from trench and parapet; and they, too, were compelled to seek cover under the brows of the hills along which they had advanced. John E. Smith was thus checked by the cross-fire of artillery commanding the road, and it soon became apparent that nothing favorable could be expected from efforts in this quarter. Stevenson, however, was somewhat protected by the uneven ground, and, although compelled to advance into a reëntrant of the enemy's line, he had a better opportunity to assault. His advance was bold, and nearly reached the top of the slope in his front, but being only in line, and therefore without any great weight, unsupported by columns or heavy bodies of troops to give it confidence or momentum, it also failed. Quimby's troops moved out, but the enemy's line in their front being a strong reëntrant, no great effort was made by them. At this time, they were simply useful from the menacing attitude they held.

McClelland's corps occupied the extreme left of the line; A. J. Smith on the right of the railroad,

in and across the ravines, on Quimby's left. The gully nearest the railroad afforded excellent cover, and led to within twenty yards of the enemy's line. Carr's division joined Smith's left, on the railroad, and extended south, along and behind a narrow ridge. Osterhaus was still further to the south, with an interval of about two hundred yards between his right and Carr's left, in a ravine, the general direction of which was towards the point where the railroad enters the rebel line. This ravine was well swept by musketry, as well as by the guns of the rebel batteries. The side ravines were extremely difficult and intricate, though not encumbered, as in Sherman's and part of McPherson's front, by fallen timber. Hovey's division was still further to the left, and somewhat more distant from the enemy's line; the ground in his front was more difficult, being still more uneven, and covered with a heavier growth of timber.

The only heavy artillery with the army, consisting of six thirty-pound Parrott rifles, had been placed in battery, just to the left of the railroad, on a prominent point close in rear of Carr's right. The field-batteries of the Thirteenth corps, numbering thirty-three guns, were also posted advantageously along the ridges and prominences in the rear. These opened early, and McClelland succeeded in breaching several points of the enemy's works, temporarily silencing one or two guns, and exploding four rebel caissons.* At the precise time appointed, the bugles sounded the charge, and, with all the alacrity of Port Gibson and the Big Black bridge, McClelland's columns moved to the assault; but, as in the case of McPherson and Sherman, by brigade, regiment, or

* See rebel reports.

battalion front, in weak order, and without coöperation or unity. The right, under Smith, succeeded in pushing close to the enemy's works, but was met by the destructive fire of musketry, and unable to get further. Lawler's brigade, in Carr's division, which had carried the *tête-de-pont* on the Big Black river, dashed forward with its old impetuosity, supported by Landrum's brigade of Smith's division; and, in less than fifteen minutes, a part of one regiment, the Twenty-second Iowa, succeeded in crossing the ditch and parapet of a rebel outwork; but, not receiving the support of the rest of the column, could not push further, nor drive the enemy from the main work immediately in rear. A hand-to-hand fight here ensued, lasting several minutes; hand-grenades also were thrown by the rebels in rear, while the national troops still commanded the outer parapet. Every man in the party, but one was shot down. Sergeant Joseph Griffith, of the Twenty-second Iowa, fell at the same time with his comrades, stunned, but not seriously hurt. On his recovery, he found a rebel lieutenant and sixteen men lying in the outwork, still unwounded, though exposed to the fire of both friend and foe. He rose, and bade them follow him out of the place, too hot for any man to stay and live. The rebels obeyed, and, calling to the troops outside to cease their firing, Griffith brought his prisoners over the parapet, under a storm of rebel shot that killed four of those so willing to surrender.*

* For this act of gallantry, Griffith was next day promoted by Grant to a first lieutenancy, thus literally, like a knight of the middle ages, winning his spurs on the field. He was not twenty years old, and shortly afterwards received an appointment to the Military Academy at West Point, where he was known as "Grant's cadet," and graduated in 1867, fifth in his class.

The colors of the One Hundred and Thirtieth Illinois were now planted on the counterscarp, and those of two other regiments were also raised on the exterior slope of the parapet. The work, however, was completely commanded by others in rear, and no real possession of it was obtained by the national soldiers. But the troops remained in the ditch for hours, although hand-grenades and loaded shells were rolled over on them, from the parapet. The colors were not removed; as often as a rebel attempted to grasp the staff, he was shot down by soldiers in the ditch; and the national flags waved all day on the rebel work, neither party able to secure them, but each preventing their seizure by the other. After dark, a national soldier climbed up stealthily and snatched one of the flags away; the other was captured by a rebel, in the same manner, leaning over suddenly from above.

Fired by the example of Lawler and Landrum's commands, Benton and Burbridge's brigades, the former in Carr's, the latter in Smith's division, now rushed forward, and reached the ditch and slope of another little earthwork, planting their colors also on the outer slope. Captain White, of the Chicago Mercantile battery, rivalling Griffith's gallantry, dragged forward one of his pieces, by hand, quite to the ditch, and, double-shotting it, fired into an embrasure, disabling a gun just ready to be discharged, and scattering death among the rebel cannoneers.*

* General A. J. Smith had been ordered by McClelland to get two guns up to this position, and called upon five or six batteries successively; but the captains all protested that it was impossible to drag guns, by hand, down one slope and up another, under fire. Smith, however, exclaimed: "I know a battery that will go to — if you order it there." So he sent for Captain White, of the Chicago Mercantile battery, and

A detachment here got into the work, but the rebels rallied and captured every man. These were the only troops that actually carried or gained possession, even for a moment, of any portion of the enemy's line.

Hovey and Osterhaus had also pushed forward on the left, under a withering fire, till they could hear the rebel words of command. They reached the top of the hill, and advanced along the naked brow, through a storm of grape, canister, and musketry, under which they also broke, seeking cover behind the irregularities of the ground, but not retreating. Indeed, they had gone on so far, that retreating was as dangerous as to advance. But, from eleven till two, a desultory and aimless skirmish was maintained.

In the mean time, McArthur's division, of the Seventeenth corps, had crossed the Mississippi, at Warrenton. It went into position, on the extreme left, on the 21st, extending from the Hall's ferry road to the crest of the hill immediately on the river. The naval forces had moved at seven o'clock, and four gunboats engaged the water-batteries; they advanced in some instances within four hundred and fifty yards of the enemy, inflicting severe damage, dismounting several guns, and bursting one; but received in return the hottest fire they ever yet had

told him what he wanted. White replied: "Yes, sir, I will take my guns there." And his men actually dragged the pieces over the rough ground, by hand, carrying the ammunition in their haversacks. One gun was stuck on the way, but the other they hauled up so near the rebel works, that it was difficult to elevate it sufficiently to be of use; finally, however, White succeeded in firing into the embrasure. The gun was then dragged off down the ravine, and, after nightfall, hauled away; but the ammunition being heavy, was left on the field.

known; one vessel was severely damaged, but not a man was killed. Doubtless, the share in the bombardment, taken by the fleet, served materially to distract and annoy the garrison, but the distance of the lower works from the river, and their elevation, were too great for any permanent effect to be accomplished by the gunboat fire. McArthur, however, was preparing to take advantage of the temporary silence of the rebel works in this quarter, when he received other orders.

Thus, all along the line, the assault, though made by heroes, had completely failed. Each corps had advanced, had met the shock, and then recoiled. The rebel position was too strong, both naturally and artificially, to be taken by storm. At every point assaulted, and at all of them at the same time, the enemy was able to show all the force his works could cover; while, the difficulties of the ground rendered an attack in column, or indeed almost any tactical movement by the national troops, utterly impossible. Each corps had many more men than could possibly be used, on such ground as intervened between it and the enemy. Grant's loss had been great, both in killed and wounded. The hillsides were covered with the slain, and with unfortunates who lay panting in the hot sun, crying for water which none could bring them, and writhing in pain that might not be relieved; while the rebels, ensconced behind their lofty parapets, had suffered but little in comparison. The national troops had everywhere shown the greatest individual bravery. Regiments, in all three corps, had planted their flags on the enemy's works, where they still waved, the rebels unable or afraid to remove them; national detachments, after ineffectual

efforts to penetrate further, had sheltered themselves on the outer slopes of the parapets, and behind the brows of the ridges, watching for opportunities to injure the enemy; while the main body of the troops, at a greater distance and along the hills in rear, kept the rebels down by an incessant fire of musketry, whenever an object exposed itself for a moment on the works.* The brunt of the battle incident to the first assault was over in less than an hour, and no substantial result had been obtained. It was plain that Grant could not hope to succeed by assault.

At about twelve o'clock, while near McPherson's headquarters, Grant had received a dispatch from McClelland, that he was hard pressed at several points: "I am hotly engaged with the enemy. He is massing on me from the right and left. A vigorous blow by McPherson would make a diversion in my favor." Grant replied: "If your advance is weak, strengthen it by drawing from your reserves or other parts of the line." He then rode around to Sherman's front, and had just reached that point, when he received a second dispatch from McClelland: "We are hotly engaged with the enemy. We have part possession of two forts, and the stars and stripes are floating over them. A vigorous push ought to be made all along the line." This note reached Grant, after the repulse of both Sherman and McPherson. He showed it to Sherman and to his own staff. He and his staff had witnessed, from a high and commanding point, the assault of McClelland's corps; had seen a few

* In many instances, the riflemen who had got too near to withdraw with safety, stood up, exposed from head to foot, facing the rebel parapet, and held their pieces at a ready, to fire on any head that showed itself. The fire of the works was invariably kept down where the national soldiers had nerve enough for this desperate defence.

men enter the works, and the colors planted on the exterior slopes; but had also seen the whole column repelled. Grant was disinclined to renew the assault which had been so unsuccessful; yet he could not disregard these positive assertions. Sherman was, therefore, immediately ordered to repeat the attack in his front, and McClelland was directed to order up McArthur to his assistance. "McArthur is on your left; concentrate with him and use his forces to the best advantage."

Grant himself started at once for McPherson's front, to convey to him the information contained in this last dispatch, so that he, too, might make the diversion required. But, before he reached McPherson, he met a messenger with a third dispatch from McClelland: "We have gained the enemy's intrenchments at several points, but are brought to a stand. I have sent word to McArthur to reënforce me if he can. Would it not be best to concentrate the whole or a part of his command on this point? P. S.—I have received your dispatch; my troops are all engaged, and I cannot withdraw any to reënforce others."

The position occupied by Grant, during most of the assault, gave him a better opportunity of seeing what was going on, in front of the Thirteenth corps, than it was possible for its commander to enjoy. He had not perceived any possession of forts, nor any necessity for reënforcements, up to the time when he left this place, between twelve and one o'clock. He again expressed doubts of the accuracy of the reports; but these reiterated statements could not be unheeded, for they might possibly be correct: and that no opportunity of carrying the enemy's stronghold should be allowed to escape, through fault of his,

Grant now sent his chief of staff, with McClelland's note, to McPherson, indorsing on it an order for Quimby's division (all of McPherson's corps then available, except one brigade), to report to McClelland. The dispatch was sent to McPherson, to satisfy him of the necessity of an active diversion on his part, so that as great a force as possible might be held in his and Sherman's fronts. McPherson sent the dispatch and order to Quimby, who forwarded it at once to Colonel Boomer, commanding his left brigade, with orders to move promptly to McClelland's support. Grant notified McClelland of these arrangements; that Quimby was to join him, and that McPherson and Sherman would renew their assaults by way of a diversion in his favor.

Sherman and McPherson, accordingly, made their advance, which was prompt and vigorous. Sherman now put into battle Mower's brigade, of Tuttle's division, which had as yet been in reserve, while Steele was hotly engaged on the right, and heavy firing was going on, all down the line on Sherman's left. Mower's charge was covered by Blair's division, deployed on the hillside, and the artillery posted behind parapets, within point-blank range. Mower carried his brigade up, bravely and well, but again arose a fire, if possible, more severe than that of the first assault, with an exactly similar result. The colors of the leading regiment were planted by the side of those of Blair's storming party, and remained, but the column was shattered and repelled. Steele, too, passed through a scathing fire—clouds of musket-balls descending on the uncovered ground over which he had to cross, and beating down his men as a rain-storm does the grass; still, he reached the para-

pet, but could not carry it; he held possession of the hillside, however, till nightfall, when, by Sherman's order, he was withdrawn.

McPherson's advance, likewise, had no result except to double the number of killed and wounded. His position was not advanced, nor any other advantage gained. His efforts continued until dark, though in a desultory manner, but clearly revealing his presence and power to the enemy.

At half-past three o'clock, Grant received a fourth dispatch from McClernand: "I have received your dispatch in regard to General Quimby's division and General McArthur's division. As soon as they arrive, I will press the enemy with all possible speed, and doubt not I will force my way through. I have lost no ground: my men are in two of the enemy's forts, but they are commanded by rifle-pits in the rear. Several prisoners have been taken, who intimate that the rear is strong. At this moment, I am hard pressed."

McArthur did not arrive till the next morning, and it was nearly sundown, before Quimby's division reached McClernand; it had been on the field all day, marching or fighting, but was immediately moved to the front, where it was required to relieve a part of A. J. Smith's division from an exposed position in line of battle. The enemy now made a show of advancing, and the lines being so close, the action, which had for some time been lulled, was renewed with the greatest fury. For a few minutes, the fire of musketry was murderous. The third brigade, of Quimby's division, lost many men and some of its most valuable officers, including its commander, the gallant Boomer. He bore on his person the dispatch

from McClernand, which had occasioned all this added loss, and which proved as fatal to Boomer as the wound of which he died. No other attack was made by McClernand.

The battle was thus prolonged, many lives were sacrificed, and no advantage was gained, all owing to the incorrect accounts forwarded by McClernand. No part of any fort had been carried or held by him; his men had displayed extraordinary gallantry, his corps had accomplished quite as much as either Sherman or McPherson's, but, like all the troops along the line, it was repelled disastrously. The fact that a dozen men, at one place, got inside the rebel lines and were killed, and that elsewhere, others reached the ditch and were captured, was magnified by him into the capture of a fort. His repeated calls for assistance cost the army hundreds of lives.*

Three thousand national soldiers were killed or wounded in this disastrous fight; and the army was now made sadly sure that over ground so rough, and so much obstructed, with formations necessarily so weak, it could not hope to carry Vicksburg by storm. But the quality of the troops was proven. There was no murmuring, no falling back, no symptom of demoralization. Detachments remained, till night-fall, close up to the advanced positions reached during the day, and then dug their way back out of the ditches. Save in one or two instances, they bore off the national flags that had waved over the works of Vicksburg, prematurely but prophetically. One, that could not be carried away, was buried in the earth of the ditch, with the soldier who bore it thither;

* See Appendix, for official letters of Generals Sherman and McPherson, concerning this assault.

their most glorious resting-place was the spot where they fell together.

This assault was, in some respects, unparalleled in the wars of modern times. No attack on fortifications of such strength had ever been undertaken by the great European captains, unless the assaulting party outnumbered the defenders by at least three to one. In the great sieges of the Peninsular war, the disproportion was even greater still. At Badajos, Wellington had fifty-one thousand men, eighteen thousand of whom were in the final assault, while the entire French garrison numbered only five thousand; the British loss, in the assault alone, was thirty-five hundred. At Ciudad Rodrigo, Wellington had thirty-five thousand men, and the French, less than two thousand, not seventeen hundred being able to bear arms; the British loss was twelve hundred and ninety, seven hundred and ten of these at the breaches; while only three hundred Frenchmen fell. But Badajos and Rodrigo were carried.

In the second assault on Vicksburg, Grant had, in his various columns, about thirty thousand men engaged; of these, he lost probably three thousand, in killed and wounded. He, however, was met by an army, instead of a garrison. Pemberton, according to his own statement, put eighteen thousand five hundred men in the trenches.* It was, therefore, no reproach to the gallantry or soldiership of the Army of the Tennessee that it was unable to carry works of the strength of those which repelled it, manned by

* The rebel pamphlet, to which I have before alluded, gives the rebel loss as eight hundred. Pemberton said, on the 29th of May: "Since investment we have lost about one thousand men, many officers." I can find no other official statement of his losses on this occasion.

troops of the same race as themselves, and in numbers so nearly equal to their own. Neither can the generalship which directed this assault be fairly censured. The only possible chance of breaking through such defences and defenders was in massing the troops, so that the weight of the columns should be absolutely irresistible. But, the broken, tangled ground, where often a company could not advance by flank, made massing impossible; and this could not be known in advance. The rebels, too, had not shown, in the week preceding the assault, any of the determination which they displayed behind their earthen walls at Vicksburg; the works at the Big Black river also were impregnable, if they had been well defended; and Grant could not know, beforehand, that Pemberton's men had recovered their former mettle, any more than he could ascertain, without a trial, how inaccessible were the acclivities, and how prodigious the difficulties which protected these re-invigorated soldiers. But, Badajos was thrice besieged, and oftener assaulted, ere it fell; and the stories of Saguntum and Saragossa prove, that Vicksburg was not the only citadel which long resisted gallant and determined armies.

On the night of the 22d, the troops were withdrawn from the most advanced positions reached during the assault, still retaining, however, ground that was of importance during the siege. They took back many of their wounded with them, but the dead remained unburied. There was not time enough to remove the bodies before daybreak, when the rebel fire commanded all the ground where they lay. For two days, the unburied corpses were left festering between the two armies, when the stench became so in-

tolerable to the garrison, that Pemberton was afraid it might breed a pestilence. He, therefore, proposed an armistice for two and a half hours, to enable Grant to remove his dead and the few wounded who had not yet been cared for.* The offer was promptly accepted, and the rebels also availed themselves of the opportunity to carry off the dead horses and mules that lay in their front, and were becoming very offensive to the besieged. These were the animals that Pemberton had turned loose from the city and driven over the lines, from want of forage. They were shot wherever they were seen, by the sharpshooters of the besieging army, that the stench arising from their putrefaction might annoy the enemy.

The suspension of hostilities lasted several hours, during which time, many exchanges of civilities took place between the officers and men of the two armies. There was an utter absence of insulting language, as well as of any manifestations of malice or animosity. The belligerents had too much reason to respect each other's prowess to indulge in petty exhibitions of spite or spleen. Soldiers, indeed, are apt to get rid of their bad blood in battle, and leave wrangling and revenge to those who stay a good way off in time of danger.†

* Pemberton accused Grant of inhumanity, in not sooner burying his dead and caring for his wounded. But, as stated in the text, most of the wounded had already been removed, and the impossibility of relieving the others was occasioned by Pemberton's own troops, of which, however, Grant had no right to complain. The wounded suffer frightfully after every battle, and the party which is repelled is always unable to bestow attention on those whom it leaves on the field.

† During the war of the rebellion, the women and clergymen, at the South, were everywhere more offensive in their behavior and language to national soldiers, than those who bore arms, relying on their

On the 22d, Grant reported to Halleck his arrival at the Mississippi, and the investment of Vicksburg. In narrating the events of the assault, he said: "General McClelland's dispatches misled me as to the facts, and caused much of this loss. He is entirely unfit for the position of corps commander, both on the march and on the battle-field. Looking after his corps gives me more labor and infinitely more uneasiness than all the remainder of my department." On the 24th, also, Grant made his first report of the battle of Champion's hill, which had been fought eight days before. After leaving Jackson, he had no opportunity of communicating with the government until he arrived before Vicksburg; and, since then, he had been too busy to write reports.

sex or their cloth to shelter them from punishment. Next to them, the politicians, who brought on the war which the people did not desire, were universally inclined to fight with tongue or pen, rather than with more warlike weapons.

CHAPTER IX.

Preparations for the siege—Grant orders troops from Memphis—Halleck sends reinforcements from the East and West—Lack of siege material—Scarcity of engineer officers—First ground broken 23d of May—Engineer operations—Ingenuity of officers and men—Enemy's defence—Sorties—Wood's approach—Loss of the Cincinnati—Tuttle's approach—Blair's approach—Ransom's approach—Logan's approach—A. J. Smith's approach—Carr's approach—Hovey's approach—Lauman's approach—Herron's approach—Menacing attitude of Johnston—Correspondence with Banks—Osterhaus sent to the Big Black—Blair sent to the Yazoo—Mower and Kimball sent to Mechanicsburg—Attack on Milliken's bend—Arrival of Herron and Parke—Completion of investment—Fortification of Haine's bluff—Corps of observation—Line of countervallation—Pemberton prepares for escape—McClelland relieved—Condition of garrison—Sufferings of inhabitants—Mine of June 25th—Hardships of national troops—Persistency of Grant—Final assault fixed for July 6th—Pemberton proposes surrender—Terms of capitulation—Interview between commanders—Surrender of Vicksburg—Treatment of prisoners—Pemberton's headquarters—Garrison paroled and marched out of Vicksburg—Fall of Port Hudson—Opening of Mississippi river—Sherman sent against Johnston—Johnston retreats to Jackson—Sherman besieges Jackson—Johnston evacuates—Destruction of railroads—Return of Sherman—Results of entire campaign—Congratulations of the President and general-in-chief—Grant made major-general in regular army—Joy of the country—Dismay of the rebels.

THE assaults on Vicksburg having failed, Grant at once set about his preparations for a siege. The three corps retained the same relative positions they already occupied, Sherman having the right, McPherson the centre, and McClelland the left of the line; but Lauman's division, arriving on the 24th of May, was put on the left of McClelland, where it guarded

the Hall's ferry and Warrenton roads; while McArthur's entire command had, by this time, joined the Seventeenth corps. Grant now ordered Prentiss and Hurlbut to send forward "every available man that could possibly be spared." "The siege of Vicksburg is going to occupy time, contrary to my expectations when I arrived near it. To watch the enemy, and to prevent him from collecting a force outside, near enough to attack my rear, I require a large cavalry force. Contract every thing on the line of the route from Memphis to Corinth, and keep your cavalry well out south of there; by this means, you ought to be able to send here quite a large force."

But even these reënforcements would be insufficient. It was certain that the rebel government would still make strenuous efforts to rescue Vicksburg, and, if possible, drive the besieging force from the advantageous footing it had obtained, at the expense of so much blood and labor and time; and, should this prove impossible, Johnston would undoubtedly endeavor to raise the siege, at least long enough to extricate the garrison. The remnants of the rebel army outside of Vicksburg, with reënforcements already received from the East, were collected at Canton—sure earnest of a determination to strike one more blow; while the inactivity of Rosecrans, in Tennessee, gave ground for fears that, rather than lose all on the Mississippi, the rebels, in order to reënforce Johnston heavily, might withdraw a heavy force from Bragg, who was in front of Rosecrans. Grant was thus obliged, not only to assemble a force sufficient to conduct the operations of the siege, but at the same time to hold the line of the Big Black river, keep Johnston in check, and to cover the Y

zoo, from the mouth of that stream to Haine's bluff. The resources of his own department, although considerable, were insufficient for these emergencies. But the general-in-chief appreciated the importance and character of the crisis, and made every exertion to supply Grant's necessities. He did not even wait to be asked, but, as soon as he learned the situation, telegraphed: "I will do all I can to assist you. I have sent dispatch after dispatch to Banks to join you." In such matters Halleck was never lacking; his patriotism was pure, and his anxiety for success never flagged. If he neither planned victories, nor achieved them, he was always ready to further the plans of others, as soon as it became evident that only through those plans could victory be achieved.

Grant had now about forty thousand men for duty, and on the 23d, orders were given for the axe and the shovel to support the bayonet. The hot season was at hand, the troops had already endured many hardships, they were almost altogether unprovided with siege material, so that the difficulties before the national army were not only formidable, but peculiar. The engineer organization was especially defective; there were no engineer troops in the entire command, and only four engineer officers, while twenty would have found ample opportunity for all their skill.* Several pioneer companies of volunteers were, however, used for engineering purposes, and, although raw at first, became effective before the close of the siege. There were no permanent depots of siege

* Captain Prime, of the corps of engineers, was at first in charge of the engineer operations, but he fell sick, and was obliged to leave the field; and, late in the siege, his place was supplied by Captain (now Brevet Brigadier-General) C. B. Comstock, of the same corps.

material; spades and picks were kept at the steam boat landing, on the Yazoo, and in the camps near the trenches; gabions* and fascines were made as they were needed, by the pioneer companies, or by details of troops from the line. Grant's artillery was simply that used during the campaign, with the addition of a battery of naval guns of larger calibre, loaned him by Admiral Porter. There was nothing like a siege train in all the West, no light mortars, and very few siege-howitzers nearer than Washington; and there was not time to send to northern arsenals for supplies. With such material and means the siege of Vicksburg was begun.

Each commander was at once set to work putting his men into as comfortable camps as could be established in the woods and ravines, and as close to the enemy's works as shelter could be found. Most of the camps were within six hundred yards of the rebel parapet. Camp equipage and working utensils were brought up, and large quantities of quartermaster's and subsistence stores accumulated at the landing, to be hauled to the front whenever required. The number of wagons on hand was limited, and it was not thought desirable to establish large depots of supplies near the lines, to be abandoned in case of an attempt to raise the siege; only three or four days' rations, therefore, were kept at the front for issue.

As soon as the troops were well settled in camp, and their wants supplied, the ground meanwhile having been accurately examined, details were made to open roads and covered ways from one camp to another; while other details were slowly cutting out the fallen timber, and constructing the regular ap-

* See Appendix, page 675 for glossary of siege terms.

proaches of the siege. The first ground was broken on the 23d of May, and batteries placed in the most advantageous positions to keep down the rebel fire. Lines of parapet, rifle-trench, and covered way were then constructed to connect these batteries. The enemy seldom showed his guns, hardly attempting, indeed, to prevent the besiegers from getting their artillery into position; for, the slightest exposure or demonstration on the part of the rebels excited the liveliest fire from the national batteries, and the advantage was always in favor of the latter, as they could bring to bear a much larger number of guns than the enemy. This, and the remarkable activity and vigilance of Grant's sharpshooters, in a great measure kept down the fire of the besieged. The enemy, however, was undoubtedly scant of ammunition, and anxious to husband what he had, for more effective use at closer quarters.

The connecting parapets, as well as all other available positions within rifle range, were kept occupied by a line of sharpshooters during daylight, and by trench-guards and advanced pickets, after dark. Wherever an approach gave opportunity, loopholes were formed, by piling sand-bags and pieces of square timber on the parapet, or logs and stumps, when these were more convenient; the men were thus enabled to shelter themselves completely. This timber was rarely displaced by the enemy's fire; but, had the rebel artillery opened heavily, splinters must have become dangerous to the besiegers. The positions of the national sharpshooters were generally quite as elevated as those occupied by the rebels; and the approaches, running along the hillsides and up the slopes in front of the enemy's works, were

lower than the besieged, so that the sappers and working-parties could not be molested by the rebels, without very great exposure on their own part to sharpshooters of the attacking force. So effective was this system, that, by the end of the first fortnight, nearly all the artillery of the enemy was either dismounted or withdrawn, and the rebels scarcely ever fired.

The style of work in the batteries was varied, depending entirely on the material that could be obtained at the time. In some cases, the lines were neatly revetted with gabions and fascines, and furnished with substantial plank platforms; while, in others, a revetting of rough boards or cotton bales was used, and the platforms were made of timber from the nearest barn or cotton-gin house. The embrasures were sometimes revetted with cane, and sometimes lined with hides taken from the beef-cattle. The parapets were not often more than six or eight feet thick, as the enemy's artillery-fire was feeble; but, in all close batteries, the gunners soon found the necessity of keeping the embrasures closed against rifle-balls, by plank shutters, sometimes swung from a timber across the top of the embrasure, sometimes merely placed in the embrasure, and removed in firing. In close approaches, the sap was generally revetted with gabions, empty barrels, or cotton bales, but sometimes left entirely unrevetted; for, when the enemy's fire was heavy, it became difficult to prevent the working-parties from sinking the sap as deep as five or even six feet, when, of course, revetting became unnecessary.

Material for gabions was abundant, grape-vine being chiefly used, though this made the gabions in-

conveniently heavy, the vines being too large. Cane was also used for wattling, the joints being crushed with wooden mallets, and the rest of the cane split, and interwoven between the stakes of the gabion. The cane made excellent fascines, and was frequently used in this way. At first, some difficulty was found in making sap-rollers, which should be impervious to Minié balls, and yet not too heavy for use on the rough ground over which the sap must run. Two barrels, however, were placed head to head, and the sap-roller was then built of cane fascines, wound around this hollow core. At one point, the enemy's salient was too high for the besiegers to be able to return the hand-grenades which were thrown into the trenches so freely. There were no Cohorn-mortars with the army, and wooden mortars were therefore made, by shrinking iron bands on cylinders of tough wood, and boring them out for six or twelve pound shells. These mortars stood firing well, and gave good results at a distance of one hundred or one hundred and fifty yards.

The labor in the trenches was performed either by men of the pioneer companies, by details from the line, or by negroes. Several of the pioneer companies had negroes attached to them, who had come within the national lines, and were paid according to law. These proved very efficient, when under good supervision. The labor performed by details from the line was light, in comparison with that done by the same number of pioneers or negroes; without the stimulus of danger, or pecuniary reward, troops of the line would not work so efficiently, especially at night, and after the novelty of the labor had worn off.

The lack of engineer officers gave the siege one

of its peculiar characteristics; at many times, and at different places, the work to be done depended on officers and men without either theoretical or practical knowledge of siege operations, and who had, therefore, to rely, almost exclusively, on their native good sense and ingenuity. Whether a battery was to be constructed by men who had never built one before, or sap-rollers made by those who had never heard the name, or a ship's gun-carriage put together by infantry soldiers, it was always done, and, after a few trials, well done. This fertility of resource and power of adaptation to circumstances, possessed in so high a degree by the volunteers, was, however, displayed while a relieving force was gathering in Grant's rear. Officers and men had to learn to be engineers while the siege was going on. Much valuable time was in this way lost, and many a shovelful of earth was thrown that brought the siege no nearer to an end.

One result of this scarcity of engineers was, that Grant gave more personal attention to the supervision of the siege than he would otherwise have done. His military education fitted him for the duty, and he rode daily around the lines, directing the scientific operations, infusing his spirit into all his subordinates, pressing them on with energy to the completion of their task, and, with unflagging persistency devising and employing every means to bring about the great end to which all labor, and skill, and acquirement was made to tend.*

There were eight principal points of approach, all on the main roads leading into Vicksburg. These roads had originally been built on the most suitable

* At one time every graduate of the Military Academy, in Grant's army, below the rank of general, was on engineer duty.

and even ground for ingress to the city; in almost every case, they followed the back of a narrow transverse ridge, between ravines on either side, more or less rugged and tortuous in character. The nature of the ground gained in the assaults allowed the national forces to dispense with the first and second parallels, generally necessary in a siege; the natural surface, undefended by either artillery or skirmishers, affording ample protection in all cases, up to within six hundred yards, and often within four hundred yards of the works. Thus, the reverse side of the hills corresponded to the first and second parallels in an ordinary siege. The approaches to these were through the transverse ravines, by roads cut into the hillsides, the fallen timber being first cleared away. Whenever it became necessary to cross a ravine commanded by the enemy's sharpshooters or artillery, advantage was taken of the night, to build a parapet of logs entirely across the unprotected space, and of sufficient height to cover the advance. The enemy dared not open on such a work as this, as for each shot fired he would have received twenty in return.*

The aggregate length of the trenches was twelve miles. Eighty-nine batteries were constructed during the siege, the guns from those in rear being moved forward as the siege advanced. The troops were moved on at the same time, and encamped in the rear of batteries, at the heads of ravines. On the 30th of June there were in position two hundred and twenty guns, mostly light field-pieces; one battery

* "A novel reconnoissance of the rebel ditch was made, one morning, by means of a mirror attached to a pole; this was raised above the sap-roller, a little to the rear, and then inclined forward. A perfect view of the ditch was thus obtained."—*Engineer's Report*.

of heavy guns, on the right, was manned and officered by the navy.

After the assault of May 22d, the enemy's defence was feeble. As the national batteries were built and opened, the rebel artillery-fire slackened, until, towards the close of the siege, it was hardly employed at all; the enemy contenting himself with occasionally running a gun into position, firing two or three rounds, and withdrawing the piece again as soon as the national fire was concentrated in reply. At almost any point, if the rebels had put ten or fifteen guns into position, instead of one or two, which merely invited concentration of the besiegers' fire, they might have seriously delayed the approaches. This silence of the artillery was attributed to a lack of ammunition; but a judicious use of the ordnance which the rebels really possessed would have interfered greatly with Grant's operations. As it was, he had little but musketry-fire to contend with in the more distant approaches and parallels, and even this was sparingly used, in comparison with that of the besiegers: a deficiency in percussion caps probably accounts in some measure for this fact.

The enemy sometimes resorted to mines, to delay the approaches of Grant; but they were feeble, their charges always light, and they rarely did other damage than to make the ground where they had been exploded, impracticable for mining by the besiegers. Occasional sorties were also made, sometimes delaying operations for a day or two. At one point, the enemy opened ninety yards of trench, as a counter-work, running down the ridge from a rebel salient, and quite up to the parallel of the besiegers. But the position was recovered the next night by a

bayonet charge, the enemy routed from his own trench, twelve muskets captured, a portion of the rebel trench then filled up, and the rest easily guarded. Once or twice, the rebels succeeded in throwing fire-balls, until one lodged under the edge of a sap-roller. Hand-grenades were next thrown into the fire made by the spreading of the inflammable fluid contained in the ball; the grenades bursting, threw fragments all around, tearing the sap-roller, and the enemy then kept up an incessant musketry-fire, until the roller was destroyed and the trench exposed. None of these efforts, however, made any remarkable change in the operations of Grant.

The aim of the rebels seemed to be to await another assault, losing in the mean time as few men as possible. This indifference to Grant's approach became, at some points, almost ludicrous. The besiegers were accustomed to cover the front of their night-working parties by a line of pickets, or by a covering party; and, while these were not closer than a hundred yards, the enemy would throw out his pickets in front. At one point, the rebel pickets entered into a regular agreement with those of the besiegers, not to fire on each other at night; and, as most of the work in a siege is done at night, this arrangement was eminently satisfactory to the working-parties. On one occasion, the picket-officer was directed to crowd his pickets on the enemy's, so as to allow the working party to push on another parallel. In doing this, the two lines of pickets became intermixed, and, after some discussion, the opposing officers arranged their lines by mutual compromise, the pickets, in places, not being ten yards apart, and in full view of each other. A working party was then

stretched out in rear of the national line, and the work was begun. The enemy's out-guard could see all that was going on, but made no effort to interfere, and a trench was opened within sixty yards of the rebel salient. The ground was such that it would have been difficult to carry on the work in any other way; by merely remaining in his fortifications, and firing an occasional volley, the enemy could have easily stopped the approach. The advantage of this arrangement, novel in war, was entirely on one side. The rebels, however, allowed it at no other point on the line.

The armament of the rebels, on the land front, was field-artillery, and one ten-inch mortar; the batteries on their extreme left, being also used against the vessels in the river, mounted heavy guns, and were able to sweep a small section of the land approaches. One gun in the water-battery, in front of Wood (who had the right brigade of Steele's division, of Sherman's corps), was particularly troublesome, though it did but little actual damage. Against this gun, and the battery in which it was situated, Wood's first operations were directed. A line of empty rifle-trench, on the hill opposite the enemy's left, was occupied, and in a few days converted into good cover for infantry and batteries for artillery. One field-battery of howitzers and rifles was stationed on the extreme point, and, near it, arrangements were made for the battery of ship's guns sent ashore by Porter, and manned and officered by the navy. A line of simple trench running down the hillside, from the point of the ridge to the mouth of a creek that empties into the Mississippi here, was the first and only approach made on this road. The workmen were often an-

noyed during the day, being within easy rifle-range, while the rebels were but little exposed to the fire of the assailants.

This trench was pushed on rapidly, under the personal supervision of Wood, till it reached the plateau and terrace of a farm-house in its front. The plateau, although overlooked by the rebels, and in close range, was occupied by a line of trench running around the outer part of the crest, for the purpose of keeping the enemy out of the part of the valley immediately below. From the terrace, the approach was continued down the slope, towards the mouth of the creek, and then directed upon a small mound on the north side of the stream, from the top of which it was thought the guns of the water-battery might be seen and silenced by sharpshooters. The work was completed, and the result all that had been hoped for. The enemy spiked his guns and abandoned the work. But, although unable to occupy the position during the day, he still continued to make it a picket-station at night. This could not well be prevented, as the banks of the stream, between the approach and the rebel work, were both steep and high; and the water here had cut the bed of the stream into an almost impassable chasm. There being no available means of getting across the creek, or driving the sap closer, there was an end to all approaches on this road. But the troops were not allowed to remain idle. The batteries were completed, and the naval guns put into position. The fleet-battery consisted of two eight-inch ship-howitzers; it opened, on the 7th of June, and did excellent service, completely silencing all the guns within its range.

On the 27th of May, in compliance with a request

of Grant, Porter sent the iron-clad Cincinnati from above, Lieutenant-Commander Bache commanding, to attack the water-battery, and enfilade the left of the rebel line. The vessel was packed with logs and hay, for protection; and, at half-past eight o'clock, with a full head of steam, she stood for the position assigned her. No sooner had she got within range, than the rebels opened rapidly with heavy guns from different batteries. Their shots at first went wild, but, as the iron-clad was rounding, broadside to, abreast of a battery, she received a shot in her magazine, flooding it almost immediately. Shortly after this, the starboard tiller was carried away, the enemy now firing with greater accuracy, and hitting almost every time; his shots passed entirely through the triple protection of hay, wood, and iron. The national batteries, and all of Sherman's musketry within range, opened in support of the gunboat; but, the current being very swift, the Cincinnati was compelled to lay head to the stream, exposing her stern, which was unprotected by plating. She was especially annoyed by plunging shots from a ten-inch columbiad and a heavy rifle on the hills, two hundred feet above the decks. Her stern was repeatedly struck, and the flag-staff shot away, but the colors were nailed to the stump. Officers and men behaved admirably. The enemy's metal, however, was too heavy; and the leak in the magazine, with the shot-holes in the stern, compelled the commander to withdraw. He ran the vessel up stream, as near the right-hand bank as his damaged steering apparatus would allow, got out a plank, and put the wounded ashore. Next, he attempted to make his vessel fast to a tree, but before the hawser could be tied, the boat began drifting

out, and, while near the shore, and under rebel fire, the Cincinnati filled and sank, her flag still flying from the shattered mast. Fifteen of her crew were drowned, and twenty-five killed or wounded; several others floated down the stream, opposite the city, where they were taken prisoners. For some weeks, the vessel lay near the shore, about a mile from Steele's position; but, during the siege, the river subsided, leaving her nearly out of water. The guns were then taken out, and two of them placed in battery, by Wood, in the latter part of June.

The point selected for this battery was near the bank of the Mississippi, and a few yards above the mouth of the creek. A trench leading to it was constructed down the hillside, giving concealment to the working-parties. It was hoped that, by using the heavy guns of the Cincinnati, the town might be reached from this point, and much damage done, while the enemy's heavy batteries could at the same time be effectually annoyed. The rebel fire was several times drawn upon the battery, but no injury received. The completion of the work was, however, delayed by the want of sling-carts, and means of transporting the guns through the bottom to the point where they were to be used, and the siege terminated before the battery was ready to open. The other operations of Steele's division were of no great importance. The approach along the ridge road was not pushed with vigor, and was exposed to a long line of plunging fire.

Tuttle's advance, on the left of Steele, was begun behind a spur, through which a deep cut was made. It led down the slope, in plain view of the rebels, and was directed perpendicularly on their line. The

approach was a full sap, covered on both sides by gabions, and, on the top, by a roof of cane gabions. This protection was necessary till it reached the foot of the hills, on the crest of which the enemy's line was situated; the hills, however, were so steep as to afford perfect shelter from the hostile fire, up to within thirty yards of the parapet. At this part of the line, the timber had been cleared some time before, but the ground, in front of the rebel trench, was obstructed by an entanglement of posts and vines.

The principal position, however, for Sherman's batteries was on the ridge, about four hundred yards from the enemy's line, and at a point near the head of the stream, on the north side of the rebel defences. Four batteries, of six guns each, were disposed on Blair's front. His approach started from the left of the principal battery, near the Graveyard road, and was directed against the salient of the work commanding this road, the same which he had assaulted on the 22d of May. It was carried steadily forward, till it reached a large oak-tree, standing alone, about one hundred and twenty yards from the rebel works. This tree was subsequently known as the "Lone Tree," and gave name to a battery erected here, or rather to a parapet and place of arms. The place of arms was furnished with communications with both flanks, by boyaux leading down into the ravines, and was well revetted, and prepared with a banquettes for sharpshooters. From its right, a new double sap was started, following around the hillside; this was, at first, directed just outside the enemy's line, but then, turning, it ran up-hill in the direction of the rebel salient. At the turn, it was defiled, by excavating it till the part of the hillside towards the enemy became a com-

plete protection. When the sap reached the axis of the ridge upon which the road was located, a sap-roller was used, and the sap carried steadily on, without important interruption, to within fifteen feet of the rebel ditch. The enemy's pickets, at night, seemed to watch its progress with great interest, but attempted no serious disturbance. The work was generally suspended during the day, except for widening and finishing the approaches and communications. The situation of the sharpshooters, on the different ridges, was the best protection for the working-parties.

From the right of the place of arms, at the "Lone Tree," a half parallel was constructed to the foot of the hill in front. This was a very laborious piece of side-cutting, but allowed the construction of a parapet on the brow of the hill, and within eighty yards of the enemy's work, from which Grant's sharpshooters were able to give the rebels serious annoyance.

Ransom's brigade, in McArthur's division, was on the left of Blair. Being camped in a ravine, the brigade was compelled to employ its entire strength, for several days, in clearing out a road down the ravine, to the hill just in front of the enemy's line, and in the construction of batteries on the right and left of the ravine. Ransom's works were well built, the entrance to the main advance being by a broad, well-constructed, and completely defiladed road, through the ravines. The trenches themselves were well located in the hillside, which here was very steep and difficult of ascent. The obstructions of fallen timber were removed, and roads or heads of sap constructed up the slope. The road or parallel continued around the foot of the hill, so as to allow

the assembling of an entire brigade, and a debouche for each regiment, wide enough for columns of fours to rush up the hills and assault the enemy's line, in strong support of Sherman's columns, along the Graveyard road.

A high and precipitous ridge, pointing towards the enemy, separated the camp of Blair's division from Ransom's, and the water from different branches of the stream, here, flowed by each division. The communication by the ravine was tortuous, in some places exposed to a raking fire of the enemy, and everywhere obstructed by fallen timber or difficult ground. For these reasons, the two covered approaches, through the main branches of the ravines, were connected by a road leading over the point of the ridge, instead of around it. By this means, communication was shortened and rendered much less difficult.

As early as the 19th of May, a position for artillery had been selected on the Jackson road, by Logan's division, but the guns were not put in position till the 21st. On that day, another battery was posted near the same point. When the regular approaches began, these positions, being favorable, were retained for artillery. McPherson commenced systematic operations on the 24th, by completing these batteries, and preparing the road, so as to allow the yard of a house, near by, to be reached without exposure. This was done by excavating along the hillside, so that its crest would defile the advance of troops until they reached the ridge where the battery was posted. Although this ridge was within a few hundred yards of the rebel work, its reverse side and the ravine near it were used for camps, the men constructing huts by

digging into the hills, and thatching the huts with brush and cane. On the 26th, these roads were made passable, and the trenches were begun. The trench was constructed five feet deep and eight feet wide, with a parapet and banquette for infantry. The parapet was surmounted by square logs and sandbags, through which apertures were made for the marksmen. Three hundred men were kept at work both night and day, but the heads of saps advanced only under cover of darkness. During the day, the details were employed in widening the trenches and finishing them for defence.

The most important approaches to the enemy's line were, thus, the two by trench, along the Graveyard and Jackson roads, and the two covered approaches of Blair and Ransom, through the ravines. By these approaches and covered ways, and the secondary approaches of Tuttle's division, Grant was able to move two divisions, under cover, to within an average distance of two hundred yards from the works, and with means of debouching upon comparatively good ground with the heads of columns. Batteries on Logan's, Ransom's, Blair's, Tuttle's, and Steele's fronts were able to bring a converging, direct, enfilading, and reverse fire on all that part of the rebel line lying in their front. These batteries were continually being strengthened, or changed in position, in order to obtain greater advantages of aim. The one on the high ridge of the Graveyard road was raised six or eight feet, so as to give as great a view of the ground inside and behind the enemy's works as possible. Its height, above the level of low water in the Mississippi, was over two hundred feet.

Quimby's division retained its old position, after

the assault of the 22d; it lay on the lower ground and in the ravines, on the left of Logan, and was employed erecting batteries and constructing rifle-trenches, along the ridges parallel to the enemy's works. These were intended to strengthen the main approach along the Jackson road, and to prevent sorties.

The positions occupied by McClernand's infantry and artillery, at the beginning of the siege, were substantially those of the 22d of May. Two of the thirty-pound Parrott guns had been sent to McPherson, but the others remained in battery, as before. This battery was strengthened by increasing the height and thickness of the parapet, and a large magazine was constructed, just in rear. A. J. Smith's approach followed the line of the Baldwin's ferry road. He pushed forward during the night, and constructed a rifle-trench in his front, so as to annoy the rebels and keep them on the alert. From the broken nature of the ground, his trench could not be connected either with those on his left, in front of Carr, or with Quimby's, on the right. The rear communications, however, with both these divisions were good. They were by roads running along the reverse sides of the ridges, or across the back of the inferior ravines, so that a sortie upon any portion of the line could have been promptly met by troops from other points. When Smith's approach reached the immediate vicinity of the salient against which it was directed, its progress was much impeded by the rebel artillery fire, and the sappers were greatly annoyed by hand-grenades. The rebels threw fire-balls constantly, and attempted to blow up the sap-roller with mines.

Carr's approach followed the railroad cut for a

hundred yards, and was directed upon one of the largest rebel works; it was pushed to within ten yards of the enemy's ditch; one parallel was made at the distance of sixty yards, from which the salient was to have been stormed. A burnt house near the railroad was selected as a position for field artillery; it was seized in the night, and a rifle-pit hastily constructed, parallel to the enemy's works. To the right, the trench extended down the hill, into the ravine, and, to the left, along the line of ridges as far as Carr's left. It was, however, extremely difficult to induce McClelland to give the necessary orders to widen and strengthen this parallel sufficiently to allow free communication. The engineers, supervising operations in his front, repeatedly requested him to extend the trench from Carr's front, across the ridge, to Hovey's right, a distance of two hundred yards; but McClelland objected to this, that he could go around by one of the valleys in the rear, a distance of not far from a mile. At last, however, he reluctantly yielded, and gave the necessary orders, but the work still made slow progress.* The trench was pushed forward on the main road, till within a few feet of the enemy's works, where, as in the cases on the right and left, the sappers were greatly annoyed by hand-grenades thrown from the rebel works.

Hovey's approach, directed on a redoubt, was not begun until late in the siege, although the ground gave cover here to within a short distance of the rebel line. This was one of the many instances where the need of engineer officers was apparent. With a proper number of officers, the ground, in all its de-

* This statement is taken from the manuscript memoir of General Wilson.

tails, would have been thoroughly examined, and the best positions chosen for approach, instead of wasting work, as in this case, where the best approaches were only selected when the siege was nearly half over. The quality of the work on this front was not so good as that done by Sherman or McPherson; but this arose from no lack of capacity or zeal on the part of the men, but from the peculiarities of their commander. The engineer officer in charge, here, was extremely fortunate in accomplishing as much as he did, in the face of such negative support as he received.

Lauman's division arrived on the 24th of May, and was put in position on the south side of the city, effectually guarding the Hall's ferry and Warrenton roads. At first, Lauman was not required to push forward a system of approaches, so much as to maintain a strong position on this part of the line, for the purpose of preventing egress, and to hold the rebels in check until assistance could be sent, should an attempt to escape be made. Herron's division, from the Army of the Frontier, Department of Missouri, arrived on the 11th of June, and was assigned a position on the extreme left of the besieging force, extending from the Hall's ferry to the Warrenton road. Lauman was then moved further to the right, extending to the left of Hovey; and, for the first time, the investment became complete, all possibility of Pemberton's escape, without assistance from outside, being effectually cut off.

Lauman now began an approach, near the entrance of the Hall's ferry road, where a battery of naval guns was placed in position. The approach, at first, was on a ridge which ran out from the enemy's

line, east of the Hall's ferry road; but this was afterwards abandoned for the road itself, the ravines there giving cover, up to within three hundred yards of the rebel line. This approach was directed against a work very salient, and therefore very weak. The rebels, conscious of this weakness, made repeated sorties, driving off the working-parties, and taking a few prisoners. In one case, they filled up fifty yards of trench, from which they were driven the following night with loss. In spite of serious opposition, the head of this sap was pushed to within a few feet of the rebel line.

In Herron's front a strong line of trench was begun on the 11th of June, running along the Warrenton road. Little was done here until late in the siege, except driving in the enemy's pickets and erecting three batteries. The approach was directed against the extreme southern limit of the defences of Vicksburg. It afforded safe and convenient shelter to the troops guarding the left, and allowed an advance, by a defiladed trench, upon the rebel work guarding the entrance of the Warrenton road. Saps were driven towards this work, and, notwithstanding the ground over which they were conducted was swept by the fire of a ten-inch columbiad and smaller guns, they were pushed with vigor. Guns were placed in position on the brow of the hills, at the extreme left, troops were sent into the bottom, and around the head of the swamp as far as the river-bank, and all communication by courier, in this direction, was completely intercepted. The Hall's ferry road was tortuous, and afforded good means of approach towards the city. An approach, here, reached to within two hundred yards of the rebel line, and, at other

points, the lines ran so near that the enemy was greatly annoyed by Herron's sharpshooters.

While the investment of Vicksburg was thus proceeding, the menacing attitude of Johnston had early attracted Grant's attention, and made it necessary to establish a strong corps of observation in the rear. Immediately after the assault of the 22d of May, the small cavalry force attached to the command was sent out, to interrupt the enemy's communications, and to obtain accurate information as to the movements of the relieving force. It was soon learned that Johnston had been joined by at least ten thousand fresh troops; and Grant was thus made reasonably certain that the rebels would endeavor to raise the siege, attacking from the northeast, with all the men they could command. He, therefore, wrote to Banks, on the 25th: "I feel that my force is abundantly strong to hold the enemy where he is, or to whip him if he should come out. The place is so strongly fortified, however, that it cannot be taken without either a great sacrifice of life, or by a regular siege. I have determined to adopt the latter course, and save my men. . . . The great danger now to be apprehended is that the enemy may collect a force outside, and attempt to rescue the garrison. . . . I deem it advisable that as large a force be collected here as possible. Having all my available force that can be spared from West Tennessee and Helena here, to get any more I must look outside of my own department. You being engaged in the same enterprise, I am compelled to ask you to give me such assistance as may be in your power. . . . I would be pleased, general, to have you come, with such force as you may be able to spare."

Osterhaus's command was, at this time, sent out as far as the Big Black river, to obstruct the approaches to Vicksburg from the east, and to destroy all the railroad bridges and forage that could be reached. "All trains and cattle should be brought in, and every thing done to prevent an army supplying itself coming this way. Wherever there is a bridge or trestle-work, as far east as you send troops, have them destroyed." On the 26th, Grant also sent a force of twelve thousand men, under Blair, to drive off a body of the enemy supposed to be collecting between the Big Black river and the Yazoo. This command was not expected to fight Johnston, but simply to act as a corps of observation, and to destroy all stock, forage, roads, and bridges as it returned. Blair moved along the Yazoo about forty-five miles, and effectually accomplished the purpose of his expedition, preventing Johnston from moving upon Vicksburg in that direction, and also from drawing supplies in the fertile region between the two rivers. He was absent nearly a week, and reconnoitred the whole region thoroughly.

On the 31st, Grant wrote: "It is now certain that Johnston has already collected a force from twenty thousand to twenty-five thousand strong, at Jackson and Canton,* and is using every effort to increase it to forty thousand. With this he will undoubtedly attack Haine's bluff, and compel me to abandon the investment of the city, if not reënforced before he can get here." Admiral Porter was accordingly requested to direct a brigade of amphibious and useful troops at his disposal, known as the Marine brigade, to debark at Haine's bluff and hold the place until re-

* On the 4th of June, Johnston had twenty-four thousand infantry and two thousand eight hundred cavalry. (See his official report.)

lieved by other forces. Hurlbut was directed to hurry up the reinforcements already ordered from his command. "No boat will be permitted to leave Memphis, going north, until the transportation is fully provided for all troops coming this way. I want your district stripped to the very lowest possible standard The entire rebel forces heretofore against me are completely at my mercy. I do not want to see them escape by being reinforced from elsewhere."

On the same day, Grant received a letter from Banks, setting forth the necessity of concentration, and calling for ten thousand men. To this he replied: "Concentration is essential to the success of the general campaign in the West, but Vicksburg is the vital point. Our situation is, for the first time during the entire Western campaign, what it should be. We have, after great labor and extraordinary risk, secured a position which should not be jeopardized by any detachments whatever. On the contrary, I am now, and shall continue to exert myself to the utmost to concentrate. I have ample means to defend my present position, and effect the reduction of Vicksburg within twenty days, if the relation of affairs which now obtains remains unchanged. But, detach ten thousand men from my command, and I cannot answer for the result. I need not describe the severity of the labor to which my command must necessarily be subjected, in an operation of such magnitude as that in which I am now engaged. Weakened by the detachment of ten thousand men, or even half that number, with the circumstances entirely changed, I should be crippled beyond redemption. My arrangements for supplies are ample, and can be

expanded to meet any exigency. All I want now is men."

On Blair's return, Grant sent a brigade of troops under Brigadier-General Mower, and nearly twelve hundred cavalry, up the Yazoo to Mechanicsburg, to watch the crossings of the Big Black, from Bridgeport, and obstruct the roads. On the 3d of June, one division from Hurlbut arrived, under Brigadier-General Kimball, and was sent at once after Mower to Mechanicsburg, with the same instructions that Mower had already received. Grant himself went up to Satartia, on the 8th of June, to inspect the condition of affairs there, and became still further convinced that the enemy was collecting a large force at Canton, of course with a view to raise the siege. To Kimball, he said: "It is important that the country be left so that it cannot subsist an army passing over it. Wagons, horses, and mules should be taken from the citizens, to keep them from being used with the Southern army."

On the 7th, the enemy, nearly three thousand strong, attacked Milliken's bend, which, however, was successfully defended by black and white troops under Brigadier-General Dennis, ably assisted by the gunboats Choctaw and Lexington. Grant at once ordered Mower's brigade to reënforce Dennis, with instructions to drive the rebels beyond the Tensas river. "Every vestige of an enemy's camp ought to be shoved back of that point" (Richmond).

On the 8th of June, another division of troops, under Brigadier-General Sooy Smith, arrived from Memphis, and was ordered to Haine's bluff, where Washburne was now placed in command. This place had again become of vital importance; for, if the national forces should be compelled to raise the siege, and yet

remain in possession of Haine's bluff, with undisputed control of the Mississippi river, they could still concentrate resources for a new effort, either against the city itself or its means of supply. The orders were to fortify it, so that it could be held against a sudden movement by ten thousand men, and be capable of giving protection to at least forty thousand. The position, naturally strong, was defended, on the south and east, by a line of continuous rifle-trench, with five small batteries on commanding points, situated so as to sweep the ground exterior to the rest of the line, while a parapet of weak profile was constructed, from the foot of the bluff, across the bottom-land to the river. The entire position was enclosed, after three days' labor, and rendered practically defensible against any force likely to attack it. The strange anomaly was thus presented of a work against which the national efforts had so long been spent in vain, now fortified by national efforts against the very power for whose protection it had originally been built. Even while Grant was prosecuting the siege of Vicksburg with all his might, he was preparing to defend the strongest outwork of Vicksburg against a rebel army.

Reënforcements, meanwhile, continued to arrive. Since the beginning of the siege, Grant had received twenty-one thousand additional troops from his own department; Herron's division, the strongest in the combined army, arrived from Schofield's command, on the 11th of June; and, by the wise prevision of the general-in-chief, two divisions of the Ninth corps, under Major-General Parke, were diverted from their march to East Tennessee, and arrived before Vicksburg, on the 14th of the same month. Herron was

put on the left of the line of circumvallation, and Parke was sent to Haine's bluff. By this time, Grant's force amounted to seventy-five thousand men, about half of whom remained in the trenches till the end of the siege. The others formed an army of observation, and closely watched all the movements of the relieving force.

On the 11th, Grant informed Sherman that reënforcements were expected, and told him, if Haine's bluff should be besieged, "You will be detached temporarily from the command of your corps here, to take command of Haine's bluff." On the same day, Grant said: "It is evident the enemy have brought large reënforcements from Bragg's army, and I cannot think it is with any other design than to raise the siege of Vicksburg." He had now ten thousand or twelve thousand men at Haine's bluff, but ordered both McPherson and Sherman to hold part of their forces in readiness, in case that place should be besieged. Detailed instructions were at the same time given to McClernand, to govern him if the garrison should attempt to take advantage of the expected arrival of a relieving army, and the consequent weakening of the besiegers. The most constant watchfulness was required on the front towards the city, while, at the same time, Grant's dispatches were incessant and anxious to all the commanders in the corps of observation, especially to Washburne, who was yet in command at Haine's bluff.

On the 21st of June, Grant received curious information through the rebel pickets; the national works had now approached so close to those of the besiegers, that the two picket-lines were within hail of each other; and, one of the rebels made an agreement

with a national sentinel, that they should lay down their arms and have a talk. The rebel declared that Grant's cannonading had killed and wounded a great many in the rifle-pits; that the besieged had fully expected another assault, and been prepared to meet it; but, as no assault was made, the troops had been canvassed by their officers, to see if they could not be got outside to attack the "Yankees." Not only was this declined, but many were ready to mutiny, because their officers would not surrender. The men, however, were reassured, and told that provisions enough remained to last them seven days more; in that time, two thousand boats would be built, and the besieged could escape by crossing the Mississippi river. The rebel finished by announcing that houses in Vicksburg were now being torn down to get material for the boats.*

This singular story excited attention, and preparations were made to render abortive any such attempt at escape as had been described. Admiral Porter was warned, the pickets were redoubled at night, and material was collected to light up the river, should a large number of boats attempt to cross. Batteries also were got ready behind the levee on the western bank, but the attempt was never made.

On the 22d, positive information was received that Johnston was crossing the Big Black river, and intended marching immediately against Grant. Sherman was at once directed to assume command of the force in the rear. Troops were taken from his corps

* On the 22d of June, Johnston wrote to Pemberton: "If I can do nothing to relieve you, rather than surrender the garrison, endeavor to cross the river at the last moment;" and, when Vicksburg fell, a large number of badly-constructed boats was found in the town, evidently intended for some such purpose as that spoken of in the text.

and that of McPherson, in the line of intrenchments, and added to the force which was to meet Johnston ; the four divisions of Washburne and Parke were also included in this new command, which amounted to nearly half of Grant's army. Besides these, Herron and A. J. Smith were notified to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice. "Should Johnston come, we want to whip him, if the siege has to be raised to do it." To Sherman, Grant said : "Use all the forces indicated, as you deem most advantageous, and, should more be required, call on me, and they will be furnished to the last man here and at Young's Point." To McPherson, he said : "Sherman goes out to meet Johnston. If he comes, the greatest vigilance will be required on the line, as the Vicksburg garrison may take the same occasion for an attack also. Batteries should have a good supply of grape and canister." To Parke : "We want to whip Johnston at least fifteen miles off, if possible."

A line of works was now constructed from the Yazoo to the Big Black river, quite as strong as those which defended Vicksburg, so that the city was not only circumvallated, but counter-vallated, as well. In case of an attack, Johnston would have been obliged to assault Grant's rear, under the same disadvantages that Grant himself had encountered in attacking Vicksburg. Grant's position, however, was at this time peculiar, if not precarious. He was again between two large rebel armies : besieging one, he was himself threatened with a siege by the other ; while, if both combined to assault him from different sides, it seemed quite possible that the garrison of Vicksburg, that splendid prize for which he had been so long struggling, might even yet elude his grasp. He might be

compelled to throw so much strength on his eastern front, that the besieged could succeed in effecting their escape by some opposite and comparatively unguarded avenue. To prevent this contingency was the object of unceasing vigilance. It would not do to go out after Johnston, lest the prey inside should evade the toils that had been spread so carefully; and yet, while Grant remained in his trenches enveloping the city, his own communications and base were threatened from outside. Haine's bluff was once more an object of immense solicitude, and the Big Black had again become the line of defence; but, this time, it was a defence to national troops against the rebels; for Grant now, in part, faced east, and the men of the South were striving to fight their way to the Mississippi.

On the 17th of June, Grant received formal and official communications from both Sherman and McPherson, couched in the strongest and most indignant language, and complaining of a congratulatory order issued by McClelland to his corps, on the 30th of May. The order had never been seen by Grant, although army regulations and the orders of the department both required subordinates to forward copies of all such papers to their superiors. It was unmilitary and offensive in tone, magnifying McClelland's services and importance, and full of insinuations and criminations against the officers and soldiers of the rest of the army. It had been published in a Northern newspaper, copies of which were sent to Sherman and McPherson, who at once resented the assertions it contained, branding them in so many words as "false," and calling on their commander to interfere. Grant immediately wrote

to McClernand as follows: "Enclosed I send you what purports to be your congratulatory address to the Thirteenth army corps. I would respectfully ask if it is a true copy. If it is not a correct copy, furnish me one by bearer, as required both by regulations and existing orders of the department." A copy of the address was sent at once to his headquarters, and, the next day, McClernand was relieved of the command of his corps, and ordered home. Major-General Ord was appointed in his stead, subject to the approval of the President.*

This was the termination of the troublesome connection with McClernand. It had begun at Cairo, in 1861. McClernand had served under Grant, at Belmont, and Donelson, and Shiloh, but early developed the qualities which afterwards insured his downfall. At first, he had been willing to learn from men versed in their profession and experienced in war; but he soon set about accomplishing his advancement by political means. His efforts, partially successful, to obtain a high command; his protracted machinations to supersede Grant, which were only defeated by the wise counsels of the general-in-chief, and the practical good sense of the administration; his insubordination, incompetency, and restless ambition, displayed on so many occasions during the Vicksburg campaign, gave Grant the only real embarrassment proceeding from the conduct of subordinates that he experienced for more than a year.

The commander was long-suffering indeed. Though repeatedly urged to relieve McClernand, when that officer wrote letters such as no soldier

* See Appendix for McClernand's order, and the letters of Generals Sherman and McPherson.

should receive from a subordinate; or, when he suggested in writing the plans which Grant had already dictated in conversation; or when, with intolerable assumption, he claimed the credit of operations which his own inefficiency had nearly marred, Grant's only answer was: "*I cannot afford to quarrel with a man whom I am obliged to command.*" He constantly gave McClelland as important positions as it was possible to intrust him with, having any reference to the safety or success of the enterprise; he regarded his rank, and disregarded his military character, although constantly informing the government of his own views of that character. Finally, about the 14th of May, he received "authority to relieve any person who, from ignorance in action, or for any cause, interfered with or delayed his operations." He was even informed that the government expected him to enforce his authority, and would hold him responsible for any failure to exert his powers. When, after this, the congratulatory order was brought to his notice, the interests of the service forbade any longer delay, and action was summary.*

As early as the 29th of May, Johnston had sent word to Pemberton: "I am too weak to save Vicksburg. Can do no more than attempt to save you and your garrison. It will be impossible to extricate

* "A disposition and earnest desire on my part to do the most I could with the means at my command, without interfering with the assignment to command which the President alone was authorized to make, made me tolerate General McClelland long after I thought the good of the service demanded his removal. It was only when almost the entire army under my command seemed to demand it, that he was relieved. . . . The removal of General McClelland from the command of the Thirteenth army corps has given general satisfaction; the Thirteenth army corps sharing, perhaps, equally in the feeling with other corps of the army."—*Grant to Halleck, June 26, 1863.*

you unless you coöperate." On the 14th of June, he said to his subordinate: "By fighting the enemy simultaneously, at the same points of his line, you may be extricated; our joint forces cannot raise the siege of Vicksburg." On the 18th, Johnston informed the rebel Secretary of War: "Grant's position, naturally very strong, is intrenched and protected by powerful artillery, and the roads obstructed. . . . The Big Black covers him from attack, and would cut off our retreat if defeated."

The garrison, meanwhile, was suffering for supplies. Pemberton was particularly short of percussion caps, and his scouts contrived, occasionally, to elude the pickets of Grant, and transmit this information to Johnston. Supplies, in consequence, were sent as far as Grant's lines, but were generally captured; in several instances, however, caps were successfully conveyed to the besieged, sometimes two hundred thousand at a time; canteens full of caps being carried by rebel scouts in the national uniform, and suddenly thrown across the picket line. After the assaults in May, the ammunition scattered in the trenches was collected by the rebels, and even the cartridge-boxes of the dead, in front of the works, were emptied.

The meat ration was reduced by Pemberton at first to one-half, but that of sugar, rice, and beans, at the same time, largely increased. Tobacco for chewing was impressed, and issued to the troops. After a while, all the cattle in Vicksburg was impressed, and the chief commissary was instructed to sell only one ration a day to any officer. At last, four ounces of rice and four of flour were issued for bread—not half a ration. Still, on the 10th of June, Pemberton sent word to Johnston: "I shall

endeavor to hold out as long as we have any thing to eat. Can you not send me a verbal message by carrier, crossing the river above or below Vicksburg, and swimming across again, opposite Vicksburg? I have heard nothing of you or from you since the 25th of May." In the same dispatch, he said: "Enemy bombard day and night from seven mortars. . . . He also keeps up constant fire on our lines with artillery and musketry." On the 15th: "We are living on greatly reduced rations, but I think sufficient for twenty days yet. . . . Our men, having no relief, are becoming much fatigued, but are still in pretty good spirits." On the 19th: "On the Graveyard road, the enemy's works are within twenty-five feet of our redan, also very close on Jackson and Baldwin's ferry roads. I hope you will advance with the least possible delay. My men have been thirty-four days and nights in the trenches without relief, and the enemy within conversation distance. . . . We are living on very reduced rations, and, as you know, are entirely isolated. What aid am I to expect from you?"

The prices of food in the town had, by this time, risen enormously. Flour was five dollars a pound, or a thousand dollars a barrel (rebel money); meal was one hundred and forty dollars a bushel; molasses, ten and twelve dollars a gallon; and beef (very often oxen killed by the national shells and picked up by the butchers) was sold at two dollars and two dollars and a half, by the pound. Mule-meat sold at a dollar a pound, and was in great demand. Many families of wealth had eaten the last mouthful of food they possessed, and the poorer class of non-combatants was on the verge of starvation. There was scarcely a building that had not been struck

by shells, and many were entirely demolished. A number of women and children had been killed or wounded by mortar-shells, or balls; and, all who did not remain in the damp caves of the hillsides, were in danger.* Even the hospitals where the wounded lay were sometimes struck, for it was found impossible to prevent occasional shells falling on the buildings, which of course would have been sacred from an intentional fire.

Fodder was exhausted, and the horses were compelled to subsist wholly on corn-tops, the corn being all ground into meal for the soldiers. In the conversations that nightly occurred between the pickets, the rebels were always threatened with starvation, even if another assault should fail. For, the pickets of both armies were good-natured enough, and often sat down on the ground together, bragging of their ability to whip each other. Sometimes, they discussed the merits of the war; the debates would be carried on with vehemence, till argument failed on one side or the other, when the parties separated, as one of them said, "to avoid a fight on the subject." Incidents like these relieved the tedium of the siege to those outside, and lessened some of its horrors for the rebels. A favorite place for the meetings was at a well, attached to a house between the lines; hither, after dark, the men from both sides repaired, slipping outside their pickets in search of the delicious draught; for water was scarce, and, at this point, there was none other within a mile. The house was unoccupied,

* The sufferings of the inhabitants are very fully described in the pamphlet of A. S. Adams, who was an eye-witness and participant. All my statements of what occurred in the town during the siege, are taken from this narrative, or from the rebel official reports.

having been riddled with shot from both besiegers and besieged, and, over the broken cistern, the rebel and national soldiers held their tacit truce, a truce which neither ever violated.

Meanwhile, the heads of sap had reached the enemy's lines, on the Graveyard and Jackson roads, and in Ransom's front, as well as on the Baldwin and Hall's ferry roads. Mining had been resorted to, by both besiegers and besieged, and, on the Jackson road, Grant fired a heavy mine on the 25th of June. It extended thirty-five feet from the point of starting: fifteen hundred pounds of powder were deposited in three different branch mines, and seven hundred in the centre one; fuses were arranged so as to explode them all at the same instant, and the mine was tamped with cross-timbers and sand-bags. Troops were disposed so as to take advantage of any result. At three and a half p. m. the explosion took place, and a heavy artillery-fire opened along the line at the same moment. Huge masses of earth were thrown up in the air, and the ground was shaken as if by a volcano. As soon as the earth was rent, a bright glare of fire issued from the burning powder, but quickly died away, as there was nothing combustible in the fort. A few rebel soldiers were hurled into the air, one or two of whom came down alive, inside the national lines. The enemy, however, had detected the building of the mine, and, in anticipation of the explosion, removed most of his troops behind a new line in the rear. Counter-mining had also been resorted to by the rebels, and several sappers, who were in the lower shaft, were buried: all the troops in the neighborhood were jarred by the shock.

The cavity made was large enough to hold two regiments, and, as soon as the partial destruction of the parapet was discovered, a column of Grant's infantry, which had been concealed in a hollow beneath the fort, rushed forward with loud cheers to gain possession of the breach. The ditch and slope were gained, and a desperate struggle ensued in the crater, but the rebels soon retired to their interior line, only a few feet back. Pioneers went to work at once, clearing an entrance to the crater, but both sides were reënforced promptly, and no further result was attained. The loss on the national side was thirty men killed and wounded, and to the besieged about the same.*

The crater was cone-shaped, and entirely exposed to field projectiles or loaded shells thrown by hand, but McPherson's men rushed into this gulf, lighting and throwing grenades in return. The enemy, however, from his higher position, could throw ten shells to their one, and, in nearly every case, could see to direct them with deadly effect; indeed, the rebels had only to lay the lighted missiles on the parapet and roll them down. But, on the night after the explosion, details from Leggett's brigade relieved each other in the attempt to hold the crater. No systematic attempt could be made to carry the enemy's work, or to take possession of his parapet and run boyaux along the exterior slope; yet, all night long, parties of men, fifty, sixty, or eighty at a time, stood in the crater, along its sides not shaped into banquettes, and fired at an enemy they could not see; for, after the first hour, the rebels ceased to appear on the parapet at all, contenting themselves with the use of the grenades.

* The statement of the rebel loss is merely an estimate.

After awhile, feathered grenades were given to the national troops, and thrown inside the rebel line, with some effect; but many of these failed to explode, and were hurled back by the rebels, with terrible results. Boxes of field-ammunition were also brought out by the enemy, who lighted them with port-fires and threw them by hand into the crater. Nearly every one took effect, killing and wounding sometimes half a dozen men. The crater was called by the soldiers "the death-hole;" but the ground that had been gained was held through all the horrors of the night, and rifle-pits next day were built across the aperture. A covered gallery was also at once commenced, from which further mines or counter-mines could lead.

As it was found impossible to continue the work, until the rebels were driven from the outer face of the opposing parapet, another mine was at once begun. This was sprung on the 1st of July. The result was the demolition of an entire redan, leaving only an immense chasm where the rebel work had stood. The greater portion of the earth was thrown towards the national forces, the line of least resistance being in that direction. The rebel interior line, however, was much injured, and many of those manning the works were killed or wounded.* But no serious attempt to charge was made, the result of the assaults, on the 25th, having been so inconsiderable.

From this time forward, the engineers were kept constantly and busily employed, mining and counter-mining on different portions of the line. Demonstrations were made by Johnston, and some of his dispatches were intercepted, from which it was dis-

* Pemberton's report.

covered that he intended immediately to attempt the forcible relief of the garrison. The works on the Big Black, extending from that river to the Yazoo, a distance of eight miles, were strengthened, in anticipation of such a movement. The troops on the west side of the Mississippi also were on the alert, as there was danger that the rebel general, Richard Taylor, might move up from Louisiana against them.* Grant was constantly warning and directing his officers on the western shore.

A continuous siege, and a mighty battle imminent. A citadel surrounded by land and water. The bombardment almost incessant. The beleaguered garrison reduced to quarter rations; living on mule-meat, and thinking it good fare. The population of the town hiding in caves to escape the storm of mortar-shells exploding in their streets. A squadron thundering at their gates, by night as well as day. Mines trembling beneath their feet. What rare news came from Johnston, far from cheering; all hope indeed of succor quite cut off. Ammunition almost expended. The lines of the besieger contracting daily; his approaches getting closer, his sharpshooters more accurate; his sap-rollers steadily rising over the hills that Vicksburg had proudly declared impassable. Every day some new battery opening from an unexpected quarter; every day the position detected from which to-morrow still another battery would surely begin its fire. To crown all, after a few more contractions of the coil, another mighty assault would

* "General Taylor is sent by General E. Kirby Smith to coöperate with you from the west bank of the river, to throw in supplies, and to cross with his force, if expedient and practicable."—*Johnston to Pemberton, June 22d.*

bring the enemy immediately beneath the walls, when, covered by their works, and more numerous than the besieged, the assailants, in every human probability, would storm the town, and all the unutterable horrors to which fallen cities are exposed, might come upon the devoted fortress.

Even if the garrison held out, it was only to prolong its miseries; starvation must come at last. The privations and exposures of the men were telling on their strength and spirits. The miasmatic exhalations of the swamps, rising through the hot atmosphere of June, enveloped and penetrated their weary frames, exhausted by the long series of disastrous battles, and protracted marches, and incessant bivouacs; debilitated, too, by the alternate fevers of anxiety and the still more terrible chills of despair. Their numbers were reduced by casualties, but far more by disease. Thousands were tossing and groaning in the hospitals, with none of the delicacies and little of the attention that the sick require; while those in the trenches were hardly better off. Forty-seven long days and nights they lay there without intermission, for Pemberton had not men enough to relieve his commands. Scorched by the sun, drenched by the rain, begrimed with dirt, unable to wash their bodies or their clothes, for water was far off, and time more precious still; pinched with hunger, anxious every moment for their lives, these weary but heroic rebels defended the citadel, whose fall, they believed, would be the fall of their confederacy. Those who fought them hardest could not and did not fail to recognize their splendid gallantry, and thorough devotion to an unrighteous cause.

Perhaps, to some among them, the suffering was

rendered bitterer by the recollection of its needlessness. Had they but remained true to their country, these trials had not come. The simple soldier might have been sharing the joys of home with tender wife and prattling child; or the eager youth, telling the oft-told tale to some bashful but lingering girl, in the very haunts where now his dreams were disturbed by the thunder of hostile cannon, or the horrid scream of the shell—had they only not rebelled.

But the suffering was not all on the side of the besieged. The long marches and exposures, and the bloody battles had been shared by the national troops, as well. They were unused to the dampness of the Southern night and the heats of the Southern day; they were, it is true, inspired by the recollection of their victories, and the confidence of eventual success, which was felt by soldiers as well as commanders, but their labors in the trenches were incessant, their watchings continuous, their hardships not few. Food was plenty, but water scarce; and the men dug wells among the hills. The picket duty was hard, and the sharpshooters were kept constantly on the alert.*

Nothing, however, wearied the patience or depressed the hope of the commander. On the 23d of May, the day after the unsuccessful assault, he said: "There is no doubt of the fall of this place, ultimately;" and, on the 24th, to Halleck: "The enemy are now undoubtedly in our grasp. The fall of Vicksburg, and the capture of most of the garrison, can only be a question of time." Without a particle

* The sharpshooters occupied positions behind the chimneys left standing where houses had been destroyed; or, sometimes, shrouded themselves in the abundant Spanish moss that hangs from the Southern trees; concealed in this, they remained in the branches all day, like leopards waiting to bring down their prey.

of what is ordinarily called enthusiasm, he yet was the most confident man in his army. On the 3d of June, he said: "The approaches are gradually nearing the enemy's fortifications. Five days more should plant our batteries on their parapets. The best of health and spirits prevail among the troops." On the 16th: "Every thing progresses well here. I am fortifying at Haine's bluff, to make my position certain, but I believe I could go out with force enough to drive the rebels from between the two rivers." On the 26th, he reported the explosion of the mine in Logan's front, and said: "The fight for it has been incessant, and thus far we have not been able to establish batteries in the breach. Expect to succeed. . . . I will use every effort to learn any move Johnston may make, and send troops from here to counteract any change he may make, if I can." On the 27th, he reported that Johnston expected ten thousand reinforcements from Bragg. "They are expected next week. I feel strong enough against this increase, and I do not despair of having Vicksburg before they arrive. This latter, however, I may be disappointed in." On the 30th of June, after the siege had lasted more than forty days, he wrote: "The troops of this command are in excellent health and spirits. There is not the slightest indication of despondency, either among officers or men." To Banks, on this date, he said, evidently contemplating speedy success: "Should it be my fortune, general, to get into Vicksburg while you are still investing Port Hudson, I will commence immediately shipping troops to you, and will send such number as you may indicate as being necessary."

This confidence, however, was built upon deter

mination. It was a knowledge of his own traits and his own acts that made him so secure. He was one day riding around his lines, and stopped for water at the house of a rebel woman, who had remained within her shattered walls, not changing her disloyal sentiments. She asked Grant, tauntingly, if he expected ever to get into Vicksburg. "Certainly," he replied. "But when?" "I cannot tell exactly when I shall take the town, but *I mean to stay here till I do, if it takes me thirty years.*" The woman's heart seemed to fail her at the reply. Apparently, she had hoped that her friends might be able to tire out the besiegers, even if they could not drive them off; but this waiting thirty years, if necessary, was a greater persistency than she had contemplated.

His orders to subordinates completely express this side of Grant's character, and reveal the means by which he accomplished his results. To Dennis, on the west bank of the Mississippi, he said, on the 13th of June: "Drive the enemy from Richmond. Reënforce Mower all you can, and send him to do it." This is the entire dispatch. To McClelland, June 15th: "Should the enemy attempt to get past your left, with the view of forming a junction with Johnston's force, he must be defeated. . . . We should hold and fight the enemy wherever he presents himself, from the extreme right to your extreme left. . . ." In the same dispatch, but on another subject, he said: "This is given only as a general plan, to be adopted under certain circumstances. *The movements of an enemy necessarily determine counter-movements*"—a principle that Grant never forgot, either in his instructions to others, or in his own plans of battle or campaign.

To Parke, on the 18th, he said: "I want the work of intrenching your position pushed with all dispatch; be ready to receive an attack, if one should be made, and to leave the troops free to move out, should the enemy remain where he is." To Ord, on the 19th: "Get batteries as well advanced as possible, during the day and night." To Parke, when that commander was ordered to join Sherman: "An attack is contemplated, evidently by way of Bear creek, and that within two days. Move out four brigades of your command to support your cavalry, and obstruct their advance as near Black river as possible, until all the forces to spare can be brought against them. Travel with as little baggage as possible, and use your teams as an ordnance and supply train, to get out all you may want from the river. . . . Move out early to-morrow morning, or sooner if you can." To Dennis: "An attack upon you is not at all impossible. You will therefore exercise unusual vigilance in your preparations to receive an attack. Keep your cavalry out as far as possible, to report any movement of the enemy, and confer with Admiral Porter, that there may be unanimity in your action." To Parke: "Certainly, use the negroes, and every thing within your command, to the best advantage." To Herron: "Be ready to move with your division at the shortest notice, with two days' cooked rations in their haversacks." To McPherson: "There is indication that the enemy will attack within forty-eight hours. Notify McArthur to be ready to move at a moment's notice, on Sherman's order. The greatest vigilance will be required on the line, as the Vicksburg garrison may take the same occasion for an attack also."

To McPherson, on the 23d: "Have your forces in readiness for any action." To Ord: "The utmost vigilance should be observed in watching the crossings of the Big Black." To Sherman, on the 25th: "Should you discover a change of plans on his (Johnston's) part, counteract it." To a junior officer, on a certain occasion: "Use every effort to effect the object of the expedition. Should they retreat, and your force prove sufficient to compete with them, follow them as long as there is a hope of capture." To Ord, on the 26th: "Keep Smith's division sleeping under arms to-night, ready for an engagement. There should be the greatest vigilance on the whole line." Again: "Hold your troops in readiness to threaten an assault, to keep the enemy from massing on McPherson." And again: "Notify General Lauman to be in readiness all night." To Washburne: "Make the detail with reference to the competency of the colonel who will command the expedition. He must be a live and active man." To Ord, on another occasion: "Prepare to march this evening." This is the whole dispatch.*

By the 1st of July, the approaches in many places had reached the enemy's ditch. At ten different points, Grant could put the heads of regiments under cover, within distances of from five to one hundred yards of the rebel works, and the men of the two armies conversed across the lines. The hand-to-hand character of the recent fighting showed that little

* It is unnecessary to call the attention of a military reader to the clearness of these dispatches. A distinguished officer, who had wide experience in studying and obeying confused dispatches, declared that there never was any difficulty about knowing what Grant meant; a child could understand his orders.

further progress could be made by digging alone, and Grant accordingly determined to make the final assault on the morning of the 6th of July. Orders were issued to prepare the heads of approaches for the easy debouche of troops, to widen the main approaches so that the men could move easily by fours, and to prepare planks and sand-bags filled with pressed cotton, for crossing ditches.

Johnston was moving up at the same time. On the night of the 1st, he encamped between Brownsville and the Big Black river, and, on the 3d, sent word to Pemberton, that about the 7th of the month, an attempt to create a diversion would be made, to enable the garrison to cut its way out.* This attack, however, was never made. The movement to Brownsville was the last operation undertaken for the relief or the defence of Vicksburg.

On the 22d of June, Pemberton had suggested to Johnston that the latter should make propositions to Grant to pass the garrison out, "with all its arms and equipages;" but Johnston replied: "Negotiations with Grant for the relief of the garrison, should they become necessary, must be made by you. It would be a confession of weakness on my part, which I ought not to make, to propose them. When it becomes necessary to make terms, they may be considered as made under my authority."

On the 1st of July, therefore, Pemberton having become satisfied that the time had arrived when he must either capitulate or evacuate the city, addressed the following communication to each of his four division commanders, Stevenson, Forney, Smith,

* This dispatch did not reach Pemberton till the 10th of July, when both he and the messenger were prisoners.

and Bowen: "Unless the siege of Vicksburg is raised, or supplies are thrown in, it will become necessary, very shortly, to evacuate the place. I see no prospect of the former, and there are many great if not insuperable obstacles in the way of the latter. You are, therefore, requested to inform me, with as little delay as possible, as to the condition of your troops, and their ability to make the marches and undergo the fatigues necessary to accomplish a successful evacuation."

Two of these officers recommended a surrender, and the others declared the chances were that an attempt at evacuation would not succeed; accordingly, on the morning of the 3d of July, Pemberton dispatched the following letter to Grant:

"I have the honor to propose to you an armistice of — hours, with a view to arranging terms for the capitulation of Vicksburg. To this end, if agreeable to you, I will appoint three commissioners, to meet a like number to be named by yourself, at such place and hour as you may find convenient. I make this proposition to save the further effusion of blood, which must otherwise be shed to a frightful extent, feeling myself fully able to maintain my position for a yet indefinite period. This communication will be handed you, under a flag of truce, by Major-General John S. Bowen."

The white flag was hoisted at about ten o'clock in the morning. Hostilities in that quarter ceased at once, and Bowen and Colonel Montgomery, an aide-de-camp of Pemberton, were soon seen wending their way from the works of Vicksburg towards the national lines. The rebel soldiers instantly became excited, conjecturing that a surrender was contemplated;

but, to counteract this, a story was circulated that Pemberton was sending to ask Grant's permission for the removal of the sick and wounded to some point outside the lines. Bowen was received by General A. J. Smith, and expressed a strong desire to converse with Grant; this, however, was not allowed; he then suggested that it would be well if Grant and Pemberton could meet. Grant, therefore, sent a verbal message that, if Pemberton wished to see him, an interview could be had between the lines, in McPherson's front, at three o'clock that afternoon. The written reply to Pemberton was as follows:

"Your note of this date is just received, proposing an armistice for several hours, for the purpose of arranging terms of capitulation through commissioners, to be appointed, etc. The useless effusion of blood you propose stopping by this course can be ended at any time you may choose, by the unconditional surrender of the city and garrison. Men who have shown so much endurance and courage as those now in Vicksburg will always challenge the respect of an adversary, and I can assure you will be treated with all the respect due to prisoners of war. I do not favor the proposition of appointing commissioners to arrange the terms of capitulation, because I have no terms other than those indicated above."

At three o'clock in the afternoon, Pemberton proceeded to the front, accompanied by Bowen and Colonel Montgomery. With Grant were Generals Ord, McPherson, Logan, and A. J. Smith, and several members of Grant's staff. The two commanders met under a tree on a hillside, within two hundred feet of the rebel line. The works on both sides were crowded with unarmed men, lying on their faces, or hanging

over the parapet, and looking eagerly on. The day was sultry ; there was no rain, but the clouds hung heavily down, as if to watch the interview. The loud-mouthed cannon held their peace, and the strange cessation of artillery and musketry fire made the silence oppressive. The two generals shook hands, and Pemberton inquired what terms of capitulation would be allowed him. Grant replied, "Those that had been expressed in his letter of the morning ;" whereupon Pemberton haughtily declared, "If this were all, the conference might terminate, and hostilities be resumed immediately." "Very well," said Grant, and turned away.

But General Bowen then proposed that two of the subordinates present should retire for consultation, and suggest such terms as they might think proper for the consideration of their chiefs. Grant had no objection to this, but would not consider himself bound by any agreement of his subordinates. He must himself decide what terms were to be allowed. Smith and Bowen accordingly went a little way apart, while Grant and Pemberton walked up and down, between the parapets, conversing. After a few minutes, all returned to the tree of rendezvous, and Bowen proposed that the rebels should march out of Vicksburg with the honors of war, carrying their muskets and field-guns with them, but leaving their heavy artillery. Grant smiled at this proposal, which was promptly rejected. After some discussion, it was then agreed that Grant should send his terms to Pemberton before ten o'clock that night, and the interview was at an end, having lasted a little more than an hour. Hostilities were not to be resumed until the correspondence had terminated.

Grant returned to his quarters, and, for the only

time in his life, held what might be called a council of war. He sent for all his corps and division generals on the city front, and received their opinions as to the terms which should be allowed to Pemberton. With one exception (General Steele), they suggested terms that Grant was unwilling to sanction, and their judgment was not accepted. The following letter was written instead, and forwarded to Pemberton:

“In conformity with agreement of this afternoon, I will submit the following proposition for the surrender of the city of Vicksburg, public stores, etc. On your accepting the terms proposed, I will march in one division as a guard, and take possession at eight A. M. to-morrow. As soon as rolls can be made out, and paroles signed by officers and men, you will be allowed to march out of our lines, the officers taking with them their side-arms and clothing, and the field, staff, and cavalry officers one horse each. The rank and file will be allowed all their clothing, but no other property. If these conditions are accepted, any amount of rations you may deem necessary can be taken from the stores you now have, and also the necessary cooking utensils for preparing them. Thirty wagons also, counting two horse or mule teams as one, will be allowed to transport such articles as cannot be carried along. The same conditions will be allowed to all sick and wounded officers and soldiers as fast as they become able to travel. The paroles for these latter must be signed, however, whilst officers are present authorized to sign the roll of prisoners.”

By the terms of a cartel, then existing between the national and rebel authorities, all officers and

men of either army, captured or surrendered at any point in the entire theatre of war, were to be delivered up to their respective authorities within ten days after capture; those taken east of the Alleghanies, at Richmond, and those west, at Vicksburg. At these places they were to be exchanged, or paroled until exchanged. Grant was therefore obliged to parole and discharge his prisoners.*

Pemberton submitted Grant's letter to a council of general officers, all of whom, except Baldwin, recommended acceptance of the propositions it contained: and, late at night, the following reply was made: "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your

* WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, }
WASHINGTON, September 25, 1862. }

General Orders, No. 142.

The following is the cartel under which prisoners are exchanged in the existing war with the Southern states: . . .

ARTICLE 1. It is hereby agreed and stipulated that all prisoners of war held by either party, including those taken on private armed vessels, known as privateers, shall be discharged upon the conditions and terms following: . . .

ARTICLE 4. All prisoners of war to be discharged on parole, in ten days after their capture, and the prisoners now held, and those hereafter to be taken, to be transported to the points mutually agreed upon, at the expense of the capturing party. . . .

ARTICLE 7. All prisoners of war now held on either side, and all prisoners hereafter taken, shall be sent with all reasonable dispatch to A. M. Aiken's, below Dutch Gap, on the James river, Virginia, or to Vicksburg, on the Mississippi river, in the state of Mississippi, and there exchanged, or paroled until such exchange can be effected. . . .

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE, }
WASHINGTON, July 3, 1863. }

General Orders, No. 207.

The attention of all persons in the military service of the United States is called to Article 7 of the cartel agreed upon on the 22d of July, 1862, and published in General Orders No. 142, September 25, 1862. According to the terms of this cartel, all captures must be reduced to actual possession, and all prisoners of war must be delivered at the places designated, there to be exchanged, or paroled until exchange can be effected.

communication of this date, proposing terms of capitulation for this garrison and post. In the main, your terms are accepted; but, in justice both to the honor and spirit of my troops, manifested in the defence of Vicksburg, I have to submit the following amendments, which, if acceded to by you, will perfect the agreement between us. At ten o'clock A. M. to-morrow, I propose to evacuate the works in and around Vicksburg, and to surrender the city and garrison under my command, by marching out with my colors and arms, stacking them in front of my present lines, after which you will take possession. Officers to retain their side-arms and personal property, and the rights and property of citizens to be respected."

This was received after midnight. The answer was immediate, and in these words: "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of 3d July. The amendment proposed by you cannot be acceded to in full. It will be necessary to furnish every officer and man with a parole signed by himself, which, with the completion of the roll of prisoners, will necessarily take some time. Again, I can make no stipulations with regard to the treatment of citizens and their private property. While I do not propose to cause them any undue annoyance or loss, I cannot consent to leave myself under any restraint by stipulations. The property which officers will be allowed to take with them will be as stated in my proposition of last evening: that is, officers will be allowed their private baggage and side-arms, and mounted officers one horse each. If you mean by your proposition for each brigade to march to the front of the lines now occupied by it, and stack arms at ten o'clock A. M., and then return to the

inside and there remain as prisoners until properly paroled, I will make no objection to it. Should no notification be received of your acceptance of my terms by nine o'clock A. M., I shall regard them as having been rejected, and shall act accordingly. Should these terms be accepted, white flags should be displayed along your lines to prevent such of my troops as may not have been notified, from firing upon your men."

The following from Pemberton concluded the correspondence: "I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of this day, and in reply, to say that the terms proposed by you are accepted."

Meanwhile, as soon as Grant had received Pemberton's first communication, he had given Sherman directions to march out against Johnston, the moment the surrender should be consummated. "There is but little doubt," he said, on the 3d, "but the enemy will surrender to night or in the morning. Make your calculations to attack Johnston and destroy the road north of Jackson." Again, on the same day: "I have directed Steele and Ord to be in readiness to move as you suggested, the moment Vicksburg is surrendered. I want Johnston broken up as effectually as possible. You can make your own arrangements, and have all the troops of my command except one corps."

During that night, Grant sent instructions to Ord and McPherson to put discreet men on picket, and allow them to communicate to the enemy's pickets the fact, that in case of surrender, both officers and men would be paroled, and allowed to return to their homes. A close watch was kept lest any should

attempt to escape on Herron's front, and no more deserters were received.

At ten o'clock of Saturday, the 4th of July,* the anniversary of American independence, the garrison of Vicksburg marched out of the lines it had defended so long, and stacked its arms in front of the conquerors. All along the rebel works they poured out, in gray, through the sally-ports and across the ditches, and laid down their colors, sometimes on the very spot where so many of the besiegers had laid down their lives; and then, in sight of the national troops, who were standing on their own parapets, the rebels returned inside the works, prisoners of war. Thirty-one thousand six hundred men were surrendered to Grant. Among these were two thousand one hundred and fifty-three officers, of whom fifteen were generals.† One hundred and seventy-two cannon also fell into his hands, ‡ *the largest capture of men and material ever made in war.* §

* "If it should be asked why the 4th of July was selected as the day for surrender? the answer is obvious. I believed that upon that day I should obtain better terms. Well aware of the vanity of our foes, I knew they would attach vast importance to the entrance, on the 4th of July, into the stronghold of the great river, and that, to gratify their national vanity, they would yield then what could not be extorted from them at any other time."—*Pemberton's report.*

† The number actually paroled was twenty-eight thousand eight hundred and ninety-two; in addition to these, seven hundred and nine refused to be paroled, and were sent north as prisoners; many hundreds died in the hospitals before the paroling could be completed, and over a thousand escaped, or concealed themselves, or, disguised as citizens, avoided being paroled.

‡ There were one hundred and five field-pieces captured at Vicksburg, and sixty-seven garrison-guns. During the previous campaign, seventy-four guns were taken, of which twenty-five were heavy pieces, captured at Grand Gulf and Haine's bluff, making a total of two hundred and forty-six cannon captured during the campaign and siege.

§ "A spectacle took place on the following day *unparalleled in mod-*

Logan's division was one of those which had approached nearest the rebel works, and now was the first to enter the town. It had been heavily engaged in both assaults, and was fairly entitled to this honor. The Forty-fifth Illinois infantry marched at the head of the column, and placed its battle-torn flag on the court-house of Vicksburg.

Grant rode into the town, with his staff, at the head of Logan's division. The rebel soldiers gazed curiously at their conqueror, as he came inside the lines that had resisted him so valiantly, but they paid him no sign of disrespect. He went direct to one of the rebel headquarters; there was no one to receive him, and he dismounted and entered the porch, where Pemberton sat with his generals; they saluted Grant, but not one offered him a chair, though all had seats themselves. Neither the rank nor the reputation of their captor, nor the swords he had allowed them to wear, prompted them to this simple act of courtesy. Pemberton was especially sullen, both in conversation and behavior. Finally, for very shame, one of the rebels offered a place to Grant. The day was hot and dusty; he was thirsty from his ride, and asked for a drink of water. They told him he could find it inside; and, no one showing him the way, he groped in a passage until he found a negro, who gave him the cup of cold water only, which his enemy had almost denied. When he returned, his seat had been taken, and he remained standing during the rest of the interview, which lasted about half an hour.

ern warfare, and sufficient to have turned the strongest head. On that memorable morning the garrison of Ulm, thirty thousand strong, with sixty pieces of cannon, marched out of the gates of the fortress to lay down its arms."—*Alison's History of Europe*, chap. xl.

Pemberton now requested Grant to supply the garrison with rations; to this he immediately consented, and inquired how many would be needed. "I have thirty-two thousand men," was the reply; and, for the first time, the victor was aware of the extent of his victory. He had not imagined the garrison to be greater than fifteen or twenty thousand men. But he expressed no surprise.

Grant afterwards rode to the wharf, and exchanged congratulations with Admiral Porter on the flagship, but returned to his old camp at dark. His quarters were not removed into Vicksburg until the 6th.

On the night of the 4th, he announced his capture to the government, in these words: "The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a great advantage to us at this moment. It saves, probably, several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service. Sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on Johnston, to drive him from the state. I will send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the Ninth army corps to Burnside." He also notified Banks of the capture of Vicksburg, and, a few days afterwards, offered to send him an army corps of "as good troops as ever trod American soil; *no better are found on any other.*"

The men of the two armies affiliated at once. The rebels were fed, and treated with great kindness, and appreciated the consideration of their victors. Rebel and national soldiers were often seen walking arm-in-arm; they felt that they were countrymen, for all the strife. Seven hundred of the garrison refused to be paroled, preferring to be sent north as

prisoners. Pemberton protested against this, and wanted Grant to compel these men to return to the Southern army, but Grant thought his soldiers could be better employed than in forcing men back into the ranks of the rebellion. Pemberton also wanted Grant to allow him arms for a few of his troops, so that they might guard the others on their march to the interior, as, otherwise, many might desert. This, however, was exactly what Grant desired, and he declined assisting Pemberton to guard the paroled prisoners on their way home.

In a week, the paroles were completed, and on Saturday morning, July 11th, about half an hour before noon, the rebel garrison took up its line of march. As they reached the fortifications, each man's name was called and checked off on the rolls. National troops were placed as guards on both sides of the road, for some distance beyond the intrenchments; and, in all the bitterness of defeat, the prisoners marched by. All that had passed was as nothing to this. Amid the thickest storm of battle, there had always been the expectation of succor or success; while they lay on the weary picket, or in the hot trenches, they had still hoped on, though hope was long deferred. But now all hope was gone; the rebel yell of defiance,* so often raised in battle, opposed to the national cheer, might not be heard;

* Those who ever heard either of these battle-cries never mistook them afterwards. The national troops always cheered, the rebels always yelled. The very terms, "cheer" and "yell," were adopted by both armies, and writers on either side discriminate thus between them. The rebel yell was usually given in advance of a charge, or at the moment of making or receiving it; the national cheer more often after victory. One was used to produce, the other to announce success.

their willing hands no longer grasped familiar weapons; the standards, under which they had fought so proudly, were in the keeping of their conquerors. Large tear-drops fell on many a weather-beaten face, and ever and anon they paused, and, turning back, took one last look at the city they had striven so hard to retain.* The national army gazed on in silence; proud as was the sight to them, exultant as were the emotions with which they contemplated a spectacle that repaid them a thousand-fold for all their toils, and wounds, and sufferings, they yet could not but pity the humiliation of their foes. No insulting taunt was heard, no cheer of triumph nor mocking cannon saluted the ears of the departing prisoners.† Silently and sadly they marched on, and, in a few hours, Vicksburg was again free from the taint of treason.

The parallel between Ulm and Vicksburg is principally in results. Napoleon had twice as many men as Mack in his great campaign, while the rebels had twice as many men as Grant, when the latter crossed the Mississippi; although, at the close of the siege, Grant's numbers were more than equal to those of Pemberton and Johnston combined. Napoleon's achievement was accomplished solely by his own splendid strategy and the amazing stupidity of his antagonist; there was not a battle fought in the Ulm campaign. Grant won his results by fighting

* See pamphlet of Abrams.

† Grant's orders were: "Paroled prisoners will be sent out of here to-morrow. They will be authorized to cross at the railroad-bridge, and move from there to Edward's ferry, and on by way of Raymond. Instruct the commands to be orderly and quiet as these prisoners pass, to make no offensive remarks, and not to harbor any who fall out of ranks after they have passed."

as well as by strategy, aided, doubtless, by Pemberton's repeated blunders; but he fought five battles, and made two assaults, and prosecuted a siege for over forty days, before he opened the gates of Vicksburg. Besides this, Napoleon's army was composed of veterans, the pride of France, inspirited with long success, selected and controlled by himself alone. Grant's men, on the contrary, were volunteers, many of them entirely raw, all sent to him by others; and, instead of moving fresh from a camp like that of Boulogne, the Army of the Tennessee had spent months amid the swamps and fevers of the Mississippi; while its enterprise was derided as hopeless, and its leader declared incompetent by half the North. The absolute captures at the fall of the two cities were, however, not dissimilar. Napoleon took thirty thousand prisoners, and sixty guns; Grant, as has been seen, nearly thirty-two thousand men, and a hundred and seventy cannon. In each case the prisoners were paroled. Napoleon, surrounded by a numerous and magnificent staff, witnessed the march of the imperial troops as they defiled before him to lay down their arms. Grant was not present when his prisoners marched out of Vicksburg, and only saw Pemberton when it was necessary to arrange the terms of the capitulation, or on other indispensable business.

Halleck's first dispatch to Grant, after the fall of Vicksburg, was a rebuke and a countermand. "July 8th. I fear your paroling the prisoners at Vicksburg, without actual delivery to a proper agent, as required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that these men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. Such has been the case else-

where. If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will retain them until further orders." The countermand, however, came too late; the prisoners had already left Vicksburg. The entire garrison, officers and men, had been paroled not to take up arms against the United States until exchanged by the proper authorities; terms which were really more favorable to the government than an unconditional surrender, as Grant thus secured his troops and transports for immediate use, and saved the expense of subsisting thirty thousand prisoners. Had he acted otherwise, the movement against Johnston could not have been so promptly undertaken, and all the steamers on the Mississippi would have been occupied for weeks, conveying the prisoners elsewhere. Besides this, Grant hoped to demoralize the whole interior country still in rebellion, by spreading this dispirited mass of men among the yet unconquered remainder. Having treated them well after capture, he believed that they would lose heart and hate together, and that the leaven of their disaffection might leaven the whole lump of treason.

The consequences of this victory were not long delayed. On the 8th of July, Port Hudson surrendered. As soon as its commander, General Gardner, heard of the fall of Vicksburg, he sent a communication to Banks, who was besieging him: "Having received information from your troops that Vicksburg has been surrendered, I make this communication to ask you to give me the official assurance whether this is true or not; and if true, I ask for a cessation of hostilities with a view to the consideration of terms for surrendering this place." Banks thereupon forwarded to Gardner a copy of Grant's dispatch an-

nouncing the capture of Vicksburg, and Gardner at once proposed the surrender of Port Hudson and its garrison. This event took place the next day. The attempted confederacy was thus cut in twain, and, in the forcible language of Lincoln, the Father of Waters rolled "unvexed to the sea."

On the night of the 4th, Ord and Steele were moved out to join Sherman, and that commander, with about forty thousand men, set out to retrace the route along which Grant had led his soldiers from Jackson to the Mississippi. Champion's hill and the Big Black bridge were the fitting landmarks for the march. "The route travelled by your corps, on coming to Vicksburg," said Grant, "is exactly the route they will travel back. They came by Black River bridge, Edward's station, and Champion's hill. That is the route they now go."

The instructions to Sherman were: "I want you to drive Johnston from the Mississippi Central railroad. Destroy the bridges as far north as Grenada with your cavalry, and do the enemy all the harm possible." Again: "Make your calculations to attack Johnston and destroy the road north of Jackson. I cannot say where you will find the most effective places to strike. I would say, move so as to strike Jackson or Canton, whichever might seem most desirable."

On the 4th, Sherman was informed: "The orders will be made as you suggest, the moment Vicksburg is ours. Ord and Steele have both been notified to move, the moment Vicksburg falls. I will let you know, the moment Pemberton's answer arrives. I have no suggestion or orders to give. I want you to drive Johnston out in your own way, and inflict on

the enemy all the punishment you can. I will support you to the last man that can be spared."

It was the night of the 5th, before all of Sherman's force reached the Big Black river. Bridges were constructed at once, and on the 6th, the troops were all across. On the 7th and 8th, they marched by separate roads to Clinton. The weather was intensely hot, the dust stifling, but the enemy made no serious opposition to their progress. Evidence accumulated at every step that Johnston, with four divisions of infantry, and a large cavalry and artillery force, was now falling back on Jackson. He reached that place on the 7th, and on the 9th, Sherman came up to the familiar ground.

The works had been strengthened since May, and the lines extended so as to reach the Pearl river, both above and below Jackson. No sooner did Sherman become satisfied that the rebels had taken refuge in the place, than he determined to hold them there, while, with cavalry and light columns of infantry, he fulfilled one part of Grant's orders, destroying the railroad north and south, not only for the present, but for all future operations; at the same time, he meant to work gradually around by one flank or the other, threatening to cross Pearl river, and operate on the enemy's only line of communication with the rear. Ord was given the right, Steele the centre, and Parke the left of the line: Lauman was now with Ord, and Sooy Smith, of Washburne's command, with Parke. Both the wing commanders were instructed to approach the Pearl river. The work of railroad destruction went on vigorously, while regular parapets of earth and cotton were constructed in front of the lines. It was no part of the plan to assault the

enemy's fortifications, but skirmishers were pushed close up, and cannonading was continuous.

At first, Johnston hoped that the scarcity of water would compel Sherman to assault, but when he found that Sherman would not gratify this hope, he telegraphed to the rebel president that it was impossible to stand a siege. "If the enemy will not attack, we must, or, at the last moment, withdraw. We cannot attack seriously without risking the army." Brisk skirmishing and light cannonading continued for several days; and on the 12th, an affair occurred in which Lauman's division only was engaged; it resulted in the loss of nearly five hundred men to Sherman, and was occasioned by Lauman's misinterpretation of his orders. On the 13th, both flanks of the army extended to the Pearl river, and Sherman sent back for ammunition for a siege. On the 12th and 13th, three thousand rounds of ammunition were thrown into Jackson, and on the 14th, Johnston telegraphed that he should be compelled to abandon the place. "It would be madness to attack."

Meanwhile, Sherman sent out expeditions to the right and left, destroying the railroads in every direction—cars, locomotives, turn-tables, and shops, as well as tracks and bridges—and driving off various bodies of cavalry. Some of his troops travelled as far as sixty miles, marking their whole route with devastation. The parapets and rifle-pits, in front of Jackson, were strengthened, to be ready for a general attack, as soon as the ammunition train should arrive from the rear. This did not reach camp till late in the night of the 16th, too late to distribute the ammunition. Information of its approach was obtained by Johnston during the 16th, and he at once determined

to evacuate the place. All night, Sherman heard the sound of wagons, but nothing that indicated evacuation, for the picks and shovels were at work till midnight; but, at dawn of day, it became evident that the enemy had withdrawn across the Pearl river. The rebels had burned all the bridges in retreating, and placed loaded shells and torpedoes on the roads leading out from the river. All the material of war had been removed, in advance of the retreat, by means of the railroad running east.

Sherman was convinced that pursuit across a country ninety miles in extent, destitute of water, and under the intense heat of a July sun, would be more destructive to his own command than fruitful in results; he therefore determined not to follow Johnston any farther. He remained two or three days completing the work of destruction, and on the 20th, sent part of his force back to Vicksburg. Two days more were spent in attempting to relieve the condition of the inhabitants, whose homes had been ruined by the war, and whose supplies were utterly exhausted by the demands of two hostile armies. Sherman shared his stock of provisions freely with them; and, with Grant's approval, issued orders for the distribution of two hundred barrels of flour and one hundred barrels of pork. On the 23d, he moved to Clinton, where again the utter exhaustion of the provisions of the country compelled him to supply the hospitals of the enemy, as well as the country people. Supplies for five hundred people for thirty days were left here, in charge of responsible citizens, who pledged themselves that these provisions should be kept sacred to the use of the impoverished inhabitants. On the 24th, he moved to Champion's hill,

and on the 25th, recrossed the Big Black river, and once more went into camp near Vicksburg.

On the 4th of July, the great mass of troops employed on this expedition were in the trenches before Vicksburg, where for two months they had been toiling under a hot sun in close and stifling rifle-pits. Without stopping to enjoy for a moment the great success which there had crowned their labors, they marched again, in heat and dust, for fifty miles, with no water, save that they found in muddy creeks, or cisterns already once exhausted, or in the surface-ponds, which the enemy in his retreat had purposely tainted with dead cattle and hogs. They crossed the Big Black river on bridges of their own construction, and then had to deal with an army under a leader of great renown—an army specially formed to raise the siege of Vicksburg, little inferior to Sherman's in infantry or artillery, and far superior to his in cavalry. They drove Johnston fifty miles, and left him in full retreat; they destroyed the great arteries of travel which alone could enable him to reassemble troops and molest Grant's possession of the Mississippi; and they so exhausted the country through which they passed that no army could exist there again, during that season, without hauling all its supplies. The campaign was a fitting supplement to the conquest of the Mississippi, and, indeed, was necessary to perfect the achievements of Grant.

Sherman's whole loss was less than a thousand men. He took more than that number of prisoners; and Johnston lost, according to his own account, during the siege alone, seventy-one killed and five hundred and four wounded, besides large numbers by desertion and straggling.

The result of the entire Vicksburg campaign was, the defeat of the rebels in five battles outside of Vicksburg, the occupation of Jackson, and the capture of Vicksburg and its garrison and munitions of war; a loss to the enemy of forty thousand prisoners, at least twelve thousand killed and wounded, and thousands of stragglers, who were never collected and re-organized; in all an army of sixty thousand soldiers.*

* The records of the commissary-general of prisoners show a total of forty-two thousand and fifty-nine prisoners captured during the Vicksburg campaign, after the 1st of May. As Grant lost in that time nearly nine thousand men in killed and wounded, it is fair to suppose that Pemberton and Johnston, so repeatedly and disastrously beaten, lost twelve thousand. Any one who has seen war is aware how small an estimate six thousand is for the stragglers in an unsuccessful campaign. The calculation is simple.

42,000	Prisoners.
12,000	Killed and wounded.
6,000	Stragglers.
<hr/>	
60,000	Total.

This estimate is proof of Pemberton's force at the beginning of the campaign. He surrendered thirty-two thousand men at Vicksburg; three thousand were captured at Champion's hill; nearly two thousand at the Big Black bridge, and at least two thousand others at Port Gibson and Raymond, and during the campaign and siege; while those who escaped with Loring, from Champion's hill, could not have been fewer than four thousand.

32,000	Surrendered at Vicksburg.
3,000	Captured at Champion's hill.
2,000	" " Big Black bridge.
2,000	" " Port Gibson, etc.
4,000	Loring.
10,000	Killed and wounded in Pemberton's command.
3,000	Stragglers.
<hr/>	
56,000	Total.

There can no longer be a doubt that many rebel officials persistently and designedly misstated the numbers and losses in their armies. Doubtless, in this, they persuaded themselves that the end justified the means. But the possession of the records of both parties to the

A large amount of public property, consisting of railroads, locomotives, cars, steamers, cotton, etc., fell into Grant's hands, and much was destroyed to prevent its capture; while arms and munitions of war for a hundred thousand men departed from the rebellion forever.

Grant's loss in the entire series of battles and assaults, including the casualties of the siege, was twelve hundred and forty-three killed, seven thousand and ninety-five wounded, and five hundred and thirty-five missing; total, eight thousand eight hundred and seventy-three. Of the wounded, many were but slightly hurt, and continued on duty; many more required but a few days or weeks for their recovery: not more than half of the wounded were permanently disabled.

When this success became known, the satisfaction of the government was supreme, and the joy of the loyal people knew no bounds. On the 13th of July, the President wrote the following characteristic and magnanimous letter to Grant:

"My dear General: I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. I wish to say a word further. When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did—march the troops across the neck, run

contest, makes the fact plain. In this very instance, Pemberton stated, in his official report, that his effective strength, at the beginning of the siege, was eighteen thousand five hundred men; and (May 14) that his whole available force, at the time of the battle of Champion's hill, was sixteen thousand in the field, while seven thousand eight hundred were left to hold Vicksburg. He lost at least fifteen thousand men after this, and had thirty-two thousand to surrender, two months later.

the batteries with the transports, and thus go below; and I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo pass expedition and the like could succeed. When you got below and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks; and when you turned northward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make a personal acknowledgment that you were right and I was wrong."

Halleck was almost equally generous in his praise of a campaign which he had once disapproved. The following letter reflects as much credit on the writer as it can possibly confer on the recipient: "Your report, dated July 6th, of your campaign in Mississippi, ending in the capitulation of Vicksburg, was received last evening. Your narration of the campaign, like the operations themselves, is brief, soldierly, and in every respect creditable and satisfactory. In boldness of plan, rapidity of execution, and brilliancy of routes, these operations will compare most favorably with those of Napoleon about Ulm. You and your army have well deserved the gratitude of your country, and it will be the boast of your children that their fathers were of the heroic army which reopened the Mississippi river."

The grade of major-general in the regular army was immediately conferred on the successful soldier, and other honors, votes of thanks, and costly gifts were showered upon him. The country rang with applause, and the victory of Gettysburg occurring on the same day, the spirit of the people rose at once from the gloom and depression into which it had fallen, to an elation and confidence like that it had

known after the capture of Donelson. No such success, indeed, had shone on the national cause in all the weary interval of nearly seventeen months.

The rebellion never fully recovered from the blow that was dealt it at Vicksburg; communication thus severed, between the trans-Mississippi region and the eastern bank of the mighty river, was never again uninterrupted or secure. The demoralized and dispirited soldiers who straggled all over the South from the captured stronghold, could not be got together again as one army; they were depressed with their long series of sufferings, diseased and weakened in body and mind, and their depression was contagious. The exulting confidence the rebels once had known did not return, but there came instead a grim determination not to lose all. For the contest lasted long, and many furious battles were fought after Vicksburg fell.

CHAPTER X.

Grant recommends Sherman and McPherson for promotion—Characteristics of American soldiers—Army of the Tennessee—Organization of negro troops—Trade with the conquered regions—Grant urges movement against Mobile—Halleck disapproves—Grant's army broken up—Condition of troops—Feeling of citizens—Thirteenth corps sent to Banks—Grant visits New Orleans—Thrown from his horse—Reënforcements ordered to Rosecrans—A corps sent to Rosecrans—Grant ordered to Cairo—Meets the Secretary of War—Proceeds to Louisville—Placed in command of Military Division of the Mississippi.

IMMEDIATELY after the second capture of Jackson, Grant recommended both Sherman and McPherson for the rank of brigadier-general in the regular army.* "The first reason for this," he said, "is their great fitness for any command that it may ever become necessary to intrust to them. Second: their great purity of character, and disinterestedness in any thing except the faithful performance of their duty and the success of every one engaged in the great battle for the preservation of the Union. Third: they have honorably

* During the entire war, the regular and volunteer armies of the United States remained distinct organizations, many officers holding commissions in both services. Promotion in the regular army was more prized by professional soldiers, because it was permanent, while the volunteer organization, it was known, would cease with the war.

won this distinction upon many well-fought battle-fields. The promotion of such men as Sherman and McPherson always adds strength to our army." These promotions were promptly made. Grant also recommended other officers for advancement, both in the regular army and in the volunteers. The general-in-chief was favorable, and most of the recommendations were approved. The government, indeed, seemed anxious to fully reward all who had been conspicuous in the great campaigns which resulted in opening the Mississippi river.

This approbation was not confined to corps commanders, nor to officers who were graduates of the Military Academy. There were only seven general officers in the army of the Tennessee who had studied their profession at West Point;* all the others had entered the volunteer service without the advantage of a military education, or the spur of a lifetime ambition; they went to war, as the soldiers of the whole army did, because the country was in danger. These men studied hard in the school of experience; Belmont, Donelson, Shiloh, Corinth, and Iuka were their instructors; their lessons were learned under the eyes of Grant and Sherman and McPherson: and, at the fall of Vicksburg, the commanders of divisions and brigades, whether on the march or the battle-field, in siege operations or in garrison, were equal to the emergency. Their practical knowledge of a commander's duties was gained; their energy, promptness, subordination, and gallantry were qualities

* Besides Grant, Sherman, and McPherson, these were Ord, who commanded the Thirteenth corps after the 26th of June, and Steele, Carr, and A. J. Smith, commanding divisions; all of whom distinguished themselves, and did good service to the country

without which, neither their own advancement, nor the continued and brilliant successes of the army to which they belonged, could ever have been attained.

The same spirit that animated them extended to regimental officers, and even to private soldiers. The rank and file, especially, were not fighting for fame. They knew that most of them could have no chance for promotion. Although, here and there, those who distinguished themselves might rise, and did rise, yet, doubtless, gallant deeds were constantly done that never found a chronicler; doubtless, undeveloped talent lay hidden, during all these campaigns, under many a private's coat; doubtless, glory was often won, and the costly price not paid. This the soldiers knew had been, and felt must be again; yet they fought, and marched, and worked, and died, as willingly as those to whom the great prizes were the incentives. They did this, not only under the stimulating enthusiasm which drove them to the field in the first days of the war, but in the weary months of that long spring of 1863, under the piercing blasts and pelting storms of Donelson, and in the scorching heats and sickening atmosphere of Vicksburg. Without the excitement of danger, as well as in the very presence of quick-coming death, they persisted in doing all that was necessary to accomplish the end they set out to gain.

Nor was this simply what every soldier does in war. It is not national partiality which declares that the combination of traits that made this army what it was, and enabled it to do what it did, was essentially American. The mingling of sturdy independence with individual intelligence, of patriotic

feeling with practical talent was American. These men were not more gallant, nor more devoted than the misguided countrymen they fought; nor do I believe that their courage or endurance was greater than has often been displayed on European fields. But it is seldom in the history of war that a race has sprung to arms like that which won the battles of the Union. Not, indeed, a highly-cultivated people, but one in whom general education was more widely diffused than in any that ever fought. It was the appreciation each man had of the objects of the war, and his determination to accomplish them; his intelligent love for the Union, inspiring an adventurous manliness often acquired in the Western woods and on the Indian frontier, and combined with the American practicalness—itself often the result of a frontier life—that produced the American soldier.

That soldier had a devotion and a gallantry which equalled any displayed on the most famous fields in war; but to these were added a peculiar faculty of applying his intelligence to the every-day means and the ordinary events of a campaign or a siege, enabling him to persevere amid extraordinary difficulties as well as dangers, and, when one means failed to try another, and, when all means seemed lacking, to create means himself, and with these to achieve victory. This quality was conspicuous in the men who conquered Vicksburg. This made soldiers and officers, and division generals and corps commanders all act as one, all coöperate with their chief, hold up his hands, carry out his plans, act, indeed, as the body of which he was the head; he, the brain to conceive and the will to direct, while they were the means, the limbs and nerves and muscles, to execute.

For Grant himself shared this same combination of traits. His military character was thoroughly the result of American life and American institutions. The same devotion to an idea, which was manifest, not in words nor in enthusiastic expression, but in the deeds of every day; the same intensity of purpose, that was betrayed more in achievement, even than in effort; the practical determination, the self-reliance, rather than self-assertion; the heating of the iron white-hot, rather than red—to blaze not, but to burn more; all these traits he shared with the soldiers whom he led to victory. He was a fitting chief for the Army of the Tennessee.

His child, almost his creation—bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh, growing with his growth and strengthening with his strength, sharing his trials, and dangers, and difficulties, and victories; his spirit had infused it, in return its successes had inspired him, and urged him on to greater effort and more complete fulfilment. He was to leave that army soon, to assume more difficult positions, to direct grander operations, but he never forgot his old associates. For he still commanded them, though further off; he directed whither they should march, and where they should conquer, as long as they were an army. And amid all the varied chances and splendid successes that afterwards befell that army, he watched its career with a solicitude that was prompted by the early trials and triumphs they had shared together.

On the 1st of January, 1863, the President had issued his proclamation declaring the slaves in the rebellious states, with some few exceptions, “thenceforward, forever free.” Emancipation, however, had practically begun with the war: wherever the na-

tional armies appeared, the slaves were really freed. The measure of arming the blacks followed hard upon that of emancipation, and, in April, the adjutant-general of the army was sent to the Department of the Tennessee, for the purpose of organizing negro troops. The proposition, however, met with serious opposition from many warm adherents of the national cause at the North, and was violently discussed even in the armies.

At the outbreak of the rebellion, Grant was not an abolitionist.* His object was simply the salvation of the Union; the question of slavery he regarded as subordinate and incidental, not paramount. But slavery was, in his eyes, completely and really subordinate; its interests, like all other interests, were inconsiderable, in comparison with those of the Union; and when the government determined first to free, and then to arm the blacks, Grant was ready to coöperate. Like most of the successful soldiers of the war, he avoided all political action or even discussion; but, as soon as he received orders to arm and organize the slaves, he set about obeying. His purposes were military, and, from this time, he never hesitated to use this means to accomplish his purposes, as freely as any other that was put into his hands. At first, the negroes were employed principally in guarding places that had already fallen into his hands. He believed, at that time, that they would prove more effective for defence than in the open field. The influences, whether of race or of their recent condition, seemed to cling to them in some degree; and, apparently, they fought better behind

* Those in favor of the abolition of slavery had long been known to the United States as abolitionists.

bulwarks. It has often happened that white men did the same.*

On the 11th of July, he said to the adjutant-general of the army: "I am anxious to get as many of these negro regiments as possible, and to have them full, and completely equipped. . . . I am particularly desirous of organizing a regiment of heavy artillerists from the negroes, to garrison this place, and shall do so as soon as possible." On the 24th of July: "The negro troops are easier to preserve discipline among than our white troops, and I doubt not will prove equally good for garrison duty. All that have been tried have fought bravely."

The rebels at first refused to recognize black troops as soldiers, and threatened that, if captured, neither they nor their white officers should receive the treatment of prisoners of war; the former were to be regarded as runaway slaves, the latter as thieves and robbers, having stolen and appropriated slave property. Grant, however, was determined to protect all those whom he commanded; and, when it was reported to him that a white captain and some negro soldiers, captured at Milliken's bend, had been hung, he wrote to General Richard Taylor, then commanding the rebel forces in Louisiana: "I feel no

* On the 9th of August, the President wrote to Grant: "General Thomas has gone again to the Mississippi valley, with the view of raising colored troops. I have no doubt that you are doing what you reasonably can upon the same subject. I believe it is a resource which, if vigorously applied now, will soon close this contest. It works doubly; weakening the enemy, and strengthening us. We were not fully ripe for it until the river was opened. Now, I think, at least one hundred thousand can, and ought to be organized along its shores, relieving all the white troops to serve elsewhere. Mr. Davis understands you as believing that the emancipation proclamation has helped some in your military operations. I am very glad if this is so."

inclination to retaliate for the offences of irresponsible persons, but, if it is the policy of any general intrusted with the command of troops to show no quarter, or to punish with death prisoners taken in battle, I will accept the issue. It may be you propose a different line of policy towards black troops and officers commanding them to that practised towards white troops. If so, I can assure you that these colored troops are regularly mustered into the service of the United States. The government, and all officers under the government, are bound to give the same protection to these troops that they do to any other troops." *

The Secretary of the Treasury, Honorable Salmon P. Chase, was strongly in favor of allowing trade to be carried on in the conquered regions. On the 4th of July, he wrote to Grant: "I find that a rigorous line within districts occupied by our military forces, from beyond which no cotton or other produce can be brought, and within which no trade can be carried on, gives rise to serious and to some apparently well-founded complaints." The secretary, therefore, urged the propriety of "substituting bonds, to be given by all persons receiving permits, for the rigorous line now established; or, at least, of substituting them partially." Grant, however, had always been averse to the policy of trading with the rebellious states, and replied at once: "No matter what the restrictions thrown around trade, if any whatever is al-

* General Taylor replied that he would punish all such acts, "disgraceful alike to humanity and the reputation of soldiers;" but declared that officers of the "Confederate states' army" were required to turn over to the civil authorities, to be dealt with according to the laws of the states wherein such were captured, all negroes captured in arms.

lowed, it will be made the means of supplying the enemy with all they want. Restrictions, if lived up to, make trade unprofitable, and hence none but dishonest men go into it. I will venture that no honest man has made money in West Tennessee in the last year, whilst many fortunes have been made there during that time. The people in the Mississippi valley are now nearly subjugated. Keep trade out but for a few months, and I doubt not but that the work of subjugation will be so complete that trade can be opened freely with the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, and Mississippi." He concluded: "*No theory of my own will ever stand in the way of my executing in good faith any order I may receive from those in authority over me; but my position has given me an opportunity of seeing what could not be known by persons away from the scene of war, and I venture, therefore, great caution in opening trade with rebels.*"

Throughout the war these views were urged upon the government, whenever there seemed occasion for Grant to express an opinion on the subject. He believed that trade supplied the enemy with the means of carrying on the war, offered opportunities for spies and scouts to obtain contraband information, demoralized the army itself, by inviting officers to pervert their positions and introducing among them unprincipled civilians, and protracted the operations which alone could produce the object at which the nation was aiming. He was firm in the conviction that only military success could end the war, and that, therefore, no political or commercial considerations should at any time be paramount to military ones. For these reasons, Grant was invariably and inflexibly op-

posed to any extension of commercial facilities, any relaxation of the restrictions on trade.

On the 26th of July, he said: "I am very much opposed to any trade whatever, until the rebellion in this part of the country is entirely crushed out. Secretary Chase differs, however." On the 13th of August: "My opinion is, that all trade with any enemy with whom we are at war is calculated to weaken us indirectly. I am opposed to selling or buying from them whilst war exists, except those within our lines." And, on the 26th of August, he addressed the Secretary of War: "If trade is opened under any general rule, all sorts of dishonest men will engage in it, taking any oath or obligation necessary to secure the privilege. Smuggling will at once commence, as it did at Memphis, Helena, and every other place where trade has been allowed within the disloyal states, and the armed enemy will be enabled to procure from Northern markets every article they require." Notwithstanding these arguments, a limited trade was opened with the rebels, and the consequences predicted by Grant followed rapidly. During the whole war, he was hampered by the operations of civilians, some of them, intent only on their own gains, others using trade merely as a cloak, under which they could carry on communication with the enemy. In this matter the government never could be induced to carry out his views.*

* "The moment purchasers of cotton are allowed in the market, that moment all the cotton in the Southern states becomes the property of that class of persons who are authorized to sell and receive pay. More than half of the cotton now in the South is the property of the so-called Southern Confederacy, for their benefit. This, of all others, will find its way to market, and will be sold by actual agents of the so-called Confederate government for their benefit. Thus, while

On the 18th of July, Grant announced to Halleck the fall of Jackson and the completion of the Vicksburg campaign. In the same dispatch, he said: "It seems to me, now, that Mobile should be captured, the expedition starting from Lake Ponchartrain." But Halleck had other plans, and, on the 22d, he replied: "Before attempting Mobile, I think it will be best to clean up a little. Johnston should be disposed of, also Price and Marmaduke, so as to hold line of Arkansas river. This will enable us to withdraw troops from Missouri. Vicksburg and Port Hudson should be repaired, so as to be tenable by small garrisons; also, assist Banks in clearing out western Louisiana. When these things are accomplished, there will be a large available force to operate either on Mobile or Texas. Navy is not ready for coöperation; should Sumter fall, then iron-clads can be sent to assist at Mobile."

This strategy was in accordance with Halleck's habit of scattering his forces and energies upon comparatively unimportant objects, leaving the great and decisive aims to be accomplished last. He seemed unable to appreciate the fact, that if the main objects of the war were gained, the lesser ones were sure to follow; or even the purely military maxim, that strategic points of the highest consequence should be first secured. Had Grant's suggestion been acted on, and a campaign against Mobile promptly authorized, before the rebels had time to recover from the stun-

we are making such efforts to close their ports, we will be opening a better market for them. Our money, being always worth a known price in New York city, will have a commercial value in Europe. This will enable the South to ship at much less risk the means of exchange for imported articles, than by sending the bulky article of cotton."—*Grant to Mr. Mellen, Treasury Agent, August 13, 1863.*

ning effects of the blow dealt them at Vicksburg, the only port then closed to national vessels in the Gulf of Mexico would undoubtedly have fallen at once, and a base have been secured for important operations towards the north. It is not improbable that the capture of Mobile, at that time, would have shortened the war by a year. But this was not allowed.

On the 24th of July, Grant renewed his suggestion: "It seems to me that Mobile is the point deserving the most immediate attention." And, on the 1st of August, he telegraphed to Halleck: "Mobile can be taken from the Gulf Department, with only one or two gunboats to protect the debarkation. I can send the necessary force. With your leave I would like to visit New Orleans, particularly if the movement against Mobile is authorized." The leave was not granted, the movement was not authorized, and the golden opportunity was slipping by. Grant got restive under this restraint, and, on the 25th of September, he returned to the subject: "I am confident that Mobile could now be taken, with comparatively a small force. At least, a demonstration in that direction would either result in the abandonment of the city, or force the enemy to weaken Bragg's army to hold it." On the 30th, he once more urged: "I regret that I have not got a movable force with which to attack Mobile or the river above. As I am situated, however, I must be content with guarding territory already taken from the enemy. I do not say this complainingly, but simply regret that advantage cannot be taken of so fine an opportunity of dealing the enemy a heavy blow."

Halleck replied to this, on the 11th of October: "I regret equally with yourself that you could not

have forces to move on Mobile, but there were certain reasons, which I cannot now explain, which prevented such an attempt." The President himself had written to Grant on the subject somewhat earlier: "I see by a dispatch of yours that you incline strongly towards an expedition against Mobile. This would appear tempting to me also, were it not that, in view of recent events in Mexico, I am greatly impressed with the importance of reëstablishing the national authority in western Texas as soon as possible. I am not making an order, however; that I leave, for the present at least, to the general-in-chief."

As Grant's views were not accepted, he conformed to those of his superiors, and, immediately after the fall of Jackson, sent Banks a division of troops numbering four thousand men; five thousand others were ordered to Schofield, to operate against Price, in Arkansas, and the Ninth corps was returned to Burnside, in East Kentucky. Troops were also sent to Natchez, and that place was permanently occupied; large quantities of ammunition and five thousand head of cattle, for the rebel armies, here fell into possession of the national commander; the latter was a serious loss to the enemy.

The troops which had been engaged in the various operations of the campaign and siege of Vicksburg were now greatly exhausted, and "entirely unfit for any duty requiring much marching," but "by selecting any duty of immediate pressing importance," said Grant, "it could be done." He had already sent troops and transports to Banks, with which that officer "could find no difficulty in keeping the river open from Port Hudson down. Above that," said Grant, "I will take care of the river." Various ex-

peditions were sent out to drive away and break up the guerrilla bands that infested the Mississippi banks, and others to destroy the rolling-stock of the railroads outside of the command. These expeditions were all successful, meeting with little organized opposition.

Grant at this time sent supplies of medicine and provisions to the rebel sick at Raymond, at their own request, and informed Sherman, when families had been deprived of all their subsistence by national troops, it was only fair the same articles should be issued in return. "It should be our policy now," he said, "to make as favorable an impression upon the people of this state as possible. Impress upon the men the importance of going through the state in an orderly manner, refraining from taking any thing not absolutely necessary for their subsistence while travelling. They should try to create as favorable an impression as possible upon the people, and advise them, if it will do any good, to make efforts to have law and order established within the Union." The country in the rear of Vicksburg was full of paroled prisoners, swearing that they would not take up arms again if they were exchanged. Pemberton was reported to have but four thousand men left together. "The army that was paroled," said one, "was virtually discharged from the rebel service." Thousands crossed the Mississippi and went west; many begged a passage to the north, and quite a number expressed a strong anxiety to enter the national service; but this, of course, was not allowed. Johnston's army also was greatly demoralized, and the men deserted by thousands. Even a political movement was started by citizens, west of Pearl river, to bring Mississippi

back into the Union. This state of affairs, however, was not destined to last long.

On the 7th of August, in obedience to orders from Washington, Grant sent Ord's entire command, the Thirteenth corps, to Banks, and was himself directed to coöperate with that commander, by sending a small force from Natchez into Louisiana. Banks was to ascend the Red river to Shreveport, and to move thence into Texas, or from Natchitoches against Nacogdoches. Grant was informed: "General Banks has been left at liberty to select his own objective point in Texas, and may determine to move by sea. If so, your movement will not have his support, and should be conducted with caution. You will confer on this matter freely with General Banks. The government is exceedingly anxious that our troops should occupy some points in Texas with the least possible delay." *

On the 30th of August, accordingly, Grant started in person for New Orleans, notifying Halleck of his departure: "General Banks is not yet off, and I am desirous of seeing him before he starts, to learn his

* This anxiety for an early occupation of Texas arose from the hostility towards the United States, evinced early in the war by the French and English governments, and the extraordinary steps taken by those governments in consequence. The accordance of belligerent rights to the rebels, almost before there was a rebellion, the proposition to mediate between a sovereign state and its insurgent citizens, and, above all, the invasion of Mexico with the avowed purpose of reëstablishing the Latin race in power on the American continent—all these indicated a complete sympathy on the part of foreign powers with those who were seeking the overthrow of the Union, and threatened active interference in behalf of the rebellion. It was because of the imminence of this danger that the American government was so anxious to obtain a footing in Texas, which borders on Mexico, and presented the only probable avenue through which foreign armies would attempt to invade the Union.

plans and see how I may help him." Sherman was next in rank, and Grant proposed, of course, to leave him in command; but Sherman suggested that it might facilitate public business if the routine of headquarters remained unchanged. During Grant's absence, therefore, all orders were issued in his name and by his chief-of-staff, but with the advice and concurrence of Sherman. One of these orders happened to be of importance. Directions were received from Halleck for the immediate reënforcement of Steele, then commanding the movement in Arkansas, intended to coöperate with Banks's campaign. General Rawlins, Grant's chief-of-staff, thereupon consulted with both Sherman and McPherson, and John E. Smith's division of the Seventeenth corps was sent to the assistance of Steele. This was but one among many instances of the remarkable harmony which prevailed in the command. "With such men," said Grant, as Sherman and McPherson, 'commanding corps or armies, there will never be any jealousies or lack of hearty coöperation. Between the two I would have no choice, and the army does not afford an officer superior to either, in my estimation."

While at New Orleans, Grant was thrown from his horse, at a review, and severely injured. He was twenty days confined to one position, and could not return to Vicksburg until the 16th of September. On the 19th, he wrote: "I am still confined to my bed, being flat on my back. My injuries are severe, but still not dangerous. . . . I will still endeavor to perform my duties, and hope soon to recover, that I may be able to take the field at any time I may be called upon to do so." He was, however, compelled to keep his bed until the 25th of September, and for

two months afterwards was unable to walk without the aid of crutches.

On the 13th of September, Halleck telegraphed: "All of Major-General Grant's available force should be sent to Memphis, thence to Corinth and Tusculum, to coöperate with General Rosecrans." Rosecrans, with an army of about sixty thousand men, was at this time operating in Tennessee and northern Georgia, where he had just obtained possession of Chattanooga, the most important strategic position between Richmond and the Mississippi river; while the rebels, under Bragg, were apparently attempting to move west of him through northern Alabama, and, by turning the right wing of the national army, to cut off all communication with Nashville, the base of his supplies. Halleck's dispatch, ordering reënforcements from Grant, was delayed ten days on the Mississippi, between Cairo and Memphis. Communication was by telegraph from Washington to Cairo, and thence dispatches were conveyed by steamer to Memphis and Vicksburg. The messenger to whom this package was intrusted failed to deliver it promptly.

On the 15th, Halleck telegraphed again: "All the troops that can possibly be spared in West Tennessee and on the Mississippi river should be sent, without delay, to assist General Rosecrans on the Tennessee river. . . . Information just received indicates that a part of Lee's army have been sent to reënforce Bragg." This was sent to Hurlbut, in the absence of Grant; but, when it reached Vicksburg, on the 22d, Grant had returned. He still kept his bed, but instantly directed Sherman: "Order at once one division of your army corps to proceed to reënforce Rosecrans, moving from here by brigade as fast

as transportation can be had." Orders were also issued to detain all steamers then at Vicksburg, or that might arrive there, until a sufficient number should be collected for this purpose. The division from McPherson's corps, which had started for Steele, was recalled, and ordered to Rosecrans. It was already aboard transports and on its way to Helena, but a staff-officer was dispatched to turn these troops northward; they were directed to move at once to Memphis and report to Hurlbut. The last-named officer was instructed to forward not only this division of McPherson's corps, but two divisions from his own command, and whatever troops might return from the expedition to Arkansas, which had now ended. General Halleck was notified of these movements, and informed: "Should more troops be required from here for Rosecrans, there is sufficient time for orders to reach me before transportation can be had."

Banks had just applied to Grant for another division of troops, but he was furnished with a copy of Halleck's dispatch, and informed: "This will necessarily prevent further reënforcements being sent from here to you, until word is heard from the general-in-chief. *We must make no disposition of troops that will endanger the success of Rosecrans.*" All of these orders were made on the 22d, the day that Halleck's dispatch arrived. His orders were received on the morning of the 22d; Osterhaus's division of Sherman's corps was then at the Big Black bridge, fifteen miles off, but the whole command reached Vicksburg during the night of the same day; most of it was embarked within twenty-four hours, and all of it was sailing up the river, within forty-eight hours from the receipt of the order. On the 25th, Grant wrote: "I

am just out of bed, and find that I can write only with great difficulty. During the twenty days that I have been confined to one position on my back, I have apparently been in the most perfect health, but now that I am up on crutches I find myself very weak."

On the same day, Halleck's dispatches of the 13th arrived, and Grant replied: "I will now send Sherman to West Tennessee, with two more divisions of his corps. This leaves one division of Sherman's corps here, but it is replaced by one of McPherson's, already above." Sherman was accordingly notified to hold his command in readiness to move to the support of Rosecrans. It was some days before the requisite transportation could be obtained, although every steamer on the river was again detained for the purpose; but, on the 27th, Sherman embarked in person for Memphis, followed by a fleet of boats, conveying Morgan L. Smith and Hugh Ewing's divisions. Tuttle's division of the Fifteenth corps was to remain with McPherson, in exchange for that of John E. Smith, which had already started for Memphis, from Helena, and of which, also, Sherman was to assume command.

As it was certain that the rebels would soon become aware of the movement of Sherman's column, and in all probability attempt at once to prevent or obstruct it, Grant now ordered McPherson to send an expedition to Canton and Jackson. This was designed to distract the enemy, and threaten other points still further east, so that, if possible, all the hostile force in Mississippi might be recalled to McPherson's front, and the march of Sherman from Memphis by way of Corinth, Tusculumbia, and Deca-

tur left undisturbed.* Sherman was informed of these operations in his favor. He reached Memphis on the 2d of October, and, by the 4th, his entire command had arrived there.

Meanwhile, the blow which Halleck had foreseen, and striven to avert, had fallen heavily. On the 19th and 20th of September, Rosecrans suffered a severe repulse on the Chickamauga river, nine miles from Chattanooga, and was compelled to retire into the latter place, with a heavy loss of artillery and the sacrifice of immense strategic advantages. In Chattanooga, he was nearly surrounded by a superior rebel army, and his only line of communication almost entirely cut off. On the 29th, Halleck telegraphed to Grant: "The enemy seems to have concentrated on Rosecrans all his available force from every direction. To meet him, it is necessary that all the forces that can be spared in your department be sent to Rosecrans's assistance. . . . An able commander like Sherman or McPherson should be selected. As soon as your health will permit, I think you should go to Nashville, and take the direction of this movement. On the 28th, Grant wrote: "I am now ready for the field, or any duty I may be called on to perform." On the 30th, he said: "All I believe is now moving according to your wishes. I have ten thousand five hundred men to hold the river from here to Bayou Sara" (near Port Hudson).

The same day he said: "I regret that there should be an apparent tardiness in complying with your orders; but I assure you that, as soon as your wishes were known, troops were forwarded as rapidly as transportation could be procured." To this Hal-

* For Sherman's route, see Map of the Theatre of War.

leek replied: "Although the reënforcements from your army for General Rosecrans did not move as soon or as rapidly as was expected, no blame whatever attaches to you. I know your promptness too well to think for a moment that this delay was any fault of yours." The delay was occasioned by the confusion occurring in the transmission of Halleck's orders, as already explained.

In consequence of this confusion, Grant now sent a staff-officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, to Cairo, to communicate direct with the government, and, on the 3d of October, the following dispatch was received: "Convey, as soon as possible, to General Grant the following: 'It is the wish of the Secretary of War that, as soon as General Grant is able to take the field, he will come to Cairo, and report by telegraph.'" Grant replied from Columbus, Kentucky: "Your dispatch from Cairo of the 3d, directing me to report from Cairo, was received at eleven thirty, on the 10th. Left the same day with staff and headquarters, and am here, *en route* for Cairo." On the 16th, he telegraphed from Cairo: "I have just arrived, and report in pursuance with your instructions of the 3d instant. My staff and headquarters are with me." Halleck answered: "You will immediately proceed to the Galt House, Louisville, Kentucky, where you will meet an officer of the War Department with your orders and instructions. You will take with you your staff, etc., for immediate operations in the field." This was received on the 17th, and Grant started immediately for Louisville, by rail.

At Indianapolis, he was met by the Secretary of War, Honorable Edwin M. Stanton, who brought with him from Washington an order creating for

Grant a new command—the Military Division of the Mississippi; this was to include all the territory between the Alleghanies and the Mississippi river, excepting such as might be occupied by Banks: the three departments of the Tennessee, the Cumberland, and the Ohio were all to be subordinate to Grant. At this time, Rosecrans was in command of the Department of the Cumberland, and Burnside of that of the Ohio. The imperative necessity for coöperation between these various commands had been made painfully manifest to the government. Hitherto, each army had seemed to have a separate object, and apparently, in each department, a campaign was carried on without reference to the operations of the others. Within the last few months, indeed, Halleck had striven hard to compel Rosecrans to coöperate with Grant, but found himself utterly unable to accomplish the task; and it was now determined to cut the knot of Rosecrans's obstinacy and insubordination, by giving to Grant almost absolute control of the forces and operations west of the Alleghanies. The disaster which Rosecrans had suffered at Chickamauga hastened this decision, and the course suggested by Grant, nearly a year before, was at last forced upon the government—the concentration and combination of all the western armies under a single head, and for a single aim. Grant was to be allowed to make his own campaigns, to use the troops to accomplish his own purposes. It was a great responsibility to put upon him, but there was nothing better to do; no other general had accomplished as much as he; his past successes were the best guaranty for future ones; the danger at Chattanooga was imminent, and increasing daily; it was necessary to act at once; and trem-

blingly, doubtless, but still almost hopefully, the great trust was committed to his hands.

The Secretary of War brought also two other orders which he showed to Grant. One of these left Rosecrans in his previous command, of the Army and Department of the Cumberland; the other relieved him, and substituted Major-General Geo. H. Thomas, the next in rank in that army. Grant was offered his choice of the orders, and did not hesitate a moment; his past experience with Rosecrans made him certain that he could get no complete coöperation from that officer, and he asked at once for his removal. The government, indeed, preferred this. The defeat of Rosecrans had been so disastrous, and its results were so alarming, that the confidence felt in his talent and military character was shaken, perhaps, even more than was deserved. Intense anxiety was entertained lest he should abandon Chattanooga, or even surrender his army, now in the closest straits; and Grant's action was fully approved. He was directed to proceed at once to his new command.

The Secretary of War accompanied him as far as Louisville; there both remained a day, discussing the situation of affairs, and Grant gathering the views of the government. During this day, the minister received a dispatch from Mr. C. A. Dana, his subordinate,* at Chattanooga, intimating that the danger of an abandonment of Chattanooga was instant; that Rosecrans was absolutely preparing for such a movement. The secretary at once directed Grant to immediately assume his new command, and to relieve Rosecrans before it was possible for the apprehended mischief to be consummated. Grant accordingly telegraphed to Rosecrans and Thomas, from Louis-

* Afterwards Assistant Secretary of War.

ville, assuming command of the military division. He sent also, at the same time, an order assigning Thomas to the Department of the Cumberland. On the 19th of October, he started, by rail, for Chattanooga.

CHAPTER XI.

Natural features of Chattanooga—Strategical importance—Relations to East Tennessee—Chickamauga campaign—Defeat of Rosecrans—Retreat into Chattanooga—Abandonment of Lookout mountain—Investment of Chattanooga—Sufferings of Army of the Cumberland—Hooker sent west to support Rosecrans—Burnside's movement into East Tennessee—Difficulties of supply—Grant starts for Chattanooga—Directions to his three armies—Arrival at Chattanooga—Thomas's magnanimity—Lookout valley—Brown's ferry—Plan of operations to recover Lookout valley—Seizure of Brown's ferry—March of Hooker from Bridgeport—Battle of Wauhatchie—Repulse of rebels—Lookout valley secured—Communication reopened—Elation of soldiers—Further difficulties in supply—Sherman's march from Memphis—Long lines of communication—Sherman's magnanimity—Grant hurries Sherman—Alarming situation of Burnside—Anxiety of government—Grant's calmness—Longstreet moves against Burnside—Grant's counter-plan—Dispatches of Grant to Halleck and Burnside—Thomas ordered to attack Bragg—Thomas not ready—Movement postponed till Sherman's arrival—Great anxiety about Burnside—Road from Nashville to Decatur opened—Supplies ordered to Burnside by Cumberland river—Difficulties of Sherman's route—Critical condition of Grant's armies—Extent of his operations—Halleck still anxious about Burnside—Grant impresses on Burnside necessity of holding out—Confidence of Burnside—Arrival of Sherman at Bridgeport—Reconnoissance by Grant, Sherman, and Thomas—Orders issued for battle of Chattanooga.

THE Cumberland mountains constitute the natural boundary between what are called the cotton states—the semi-tropical region of the American Union—and the vast grain-growing plains of Kentucky and Tennessee. Several important ranges cluster just where the three great states of Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama approach nearest to each other; the

mountains crowding close, as if to watch the scene where the destinies of mountains and states were both to be decided. From some of the highest points in this vicinity the territory of seven different states can be distinctly seen. Here, also, the Tennessee river breaks through from the east, hemmed in at times on every hand, but making the mountains give it room, and, forcing its way in a hundred windings, until, at last, it eludes or overcomes every barrier, and finds a passage to more western fields.

At one of the most abrupt of all its angles, the hills recede so as to leave an open but uneven space, not more than five or six miles square, bounded on the north by the Tennessee, begirt on every side with rugged peaks, and guarded on the west by a grim and almost perpendicular height, that rises directly from the water's edge more than two thousand feet. This point was once the boundary and the barrier of the Indian country. The southern limit of the field is known as Missionary ridge, called so by the Indians, who allowed the missionaries to pass no further; a gorge in the mountains, opening south, is still named Rossville gap, after the famous Cherokee chief, John Ross; while the lofty crest that looks out over the rugged valley was called Chatanooga—the Eagle's Nest. The whole region was a mighty bulwark, covering one of the most important avenues for access to the South, between the Mississippi and the Atlantic coast.

Away, at the centre of the continent, these precipitous heights, this lonely valley, and this tortuous stream seemed the very spot where the eagles might build their nests, and the aborigines pitch their camps, secure from the intruding step of the white

man. But, first, the Tennessee river itself tempted the adventurous pioneer; and, when the tide of trade and the growth of the republic could no longer be stayed, even the mountains were forced to open their gates. A railroad must be built, connecting the Mississippi with the Atlantic, and the only route through these almost inaccessible hills was along the valley of the Tennessee. Then, the South must be connected with its brother North; and the line of travel stretched out from Mobile, and all the great railways from the interior of the cotton region, from Mississippi, and Georgia, and Alabama, and South Carolina, centred at Atlanta, and reached up along one line, through ridges and ranges, penetrating them by tunnels when Nature afforded no pathway, until, under the shadow of the Chattanooga mountain, the junction with the great eastern line was formed. Where the railroads from Memphis and Charleston and Richmond and Nashville and Atlanta meet, a town sprang up, of course, and was named from the mountain at whose base it was built, Chattanooga; while the acclivity itself now received an English name, and was henceforth known as the Lookout mountain.

When the rebellion broke out, it was at once perceived by military men that Chattanooga must become one of the important strategic positions of the war. The great railway lines converging here afforded the rebels immense opportunities for concentrating and supplying their armies—opportunities which were seized and enjoyed to their full extent. Connecting the extreme eastern and the western portions of the would-be confederacy, these roads enabled its authorities, again and again, to move troops with facility and promptness from one part of the theatre

of war to another, at some critical moment; and, for years, they furnished the principal route by which the eastern armies received their revenues of grain and beef, from the prolific regions of Georgia, Florida, and Alabama. In a word, they became interior strategic lines for all important military operations, and were absolutely vital to the interests of the rebellion. As long as the rebels held Chattanooga, these lines were secure; when it passed into national hands, all this internal communication ceased, or was rendered infinitely more difficult, and the door was thrown open for an advance into the very heart of the so-called Confederacy.

But, there was still another consideration which made possession of this region important to the national cause. The inhabitants of the mountain country were strongly loyal; like mountaineers all over the world, their love of liberty and independence and republicanism was intense. Their rough hillsides and sterile soil were unfitted for slave-labor, and the institution which was the origin and cause of the rebellion had never flourished among these beetling cliffs, nor in the rugged valleys that lay between. The masses all through East Tennessee and West Virginia, in the western part of North Carolina, and the northern portions of Georgia and Alabama, were never false to the Union. They were hunted by rebel mobs and proscribed by rebel authorities, were persecuted and driven to caves, imprisoned, starved, tortured, put to death, but remained firm in their allegiance. It was a sacred duty of the government to go to the rescue of these people, as well as its plainest policy to reëstablish among them the authority, which, it was asserted, the whole South was so anxious to

overthrow. Here would be a nucleus for loyalty, here was a population ready to defend and support and assist the national armies, instead of what was found everywhere else at the South, one determined to oppose and obstruct and betray.

Chattanooga was in the heart of this region and in the midst of this population. Its possession would protect these people, and secure these advantages. Next after Richmond, the great political focus of the rebellion, and Vicksburg, that fortress and menace of the Mississippi valley, Chattanooga loomed up before the nation and the military authorities, as absolutely indispensable to success, and, when once gained, the foundation and forerunner of final victories.

As early as January, 1862, McClellan, then general-in-chief, wrote to Buell, who was in command in Kentucky: "There are few things I have more at heart than the prompt movement of a strong column into Eastern Tennessee. . . . My own general plans for the prosecution of the war make the speedy occupation of East Tennessee and its lines of railway, matters of absolute necessity." And again: "Interesting as Nashville may be to the Louisville interests, it strikes me that its possession is of very secondary importance, in comparison with the immense results that would arise from the adherence to our cause of the masses in East Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, northern Georgia and Alabama—results that I feel assured would ere long follow from the movement alluded to."

No positive movement, however, was made in this direction, until after the evacuation of Corinth, in May, 1862, when Halleck sent Buell, with more than forty thousand men, across the states of Alabama and

Tennessee, to Chattanooga. But, Bragg started for the same point, nearly as soon as Buell, and, by a series of skilful manœuvres, compelled that general to fall back to the Ohio; after months of marching and fighting, Buell was further from his goal than when he set out from Corinth, and, accordingly, was relieved. Rosecrans then took command of the Army of the Cumberland, with Chattanooga still as the objective point. He manœuvred from summer till winter, and from January again until June, fighting the battle of Murfreesboro on the first days of 1863, when the national troops were left in possession of the field; but, thereafter, he remained immovable for months.

While Grant was operating behind Vicksburg, he had urged that Rosecrans should be directed to make some movement in his favor, to distract the enemy, and at least prevent the troops of Bragg, who was in front of Rosecrans, from being sent to reënforce Johnston.* But, although he was greatly superior to Bragg in numbers, Rosecrans refused to budge.† When Halleck gave him orders to advance, he held a council of war, and replied that it was a military maxim not to fight two decisive battles at the same time. So Bragg was depleted and Johnston reënforced, and the siege of Vicksburg prolonged. When Vicksburg fell, the rebels of course brought back to Bragg the troops that they were no longer able to use in front of Grant.‡ They were good strategists. Having fewer forces and resources than the govern-

* See page 227.

† See Halleck's report, as general-in-chief, for 1863.

‡ The fact of these movements was shown conclusively at the time, by the reports of prisoners, as well as by scouts and spies from the various national armies.

ment, they earlier learned to husband and concentrate the means which were at their command.

On the 24th of June, Rosecrans finally started from Murfreesboro, with about seventy thousand effective men;* Bragg was still in his front with an inferior force, and retreated before him. Rosecrans crossed the Tennessee at Stevenson, and marched south among the mountains, threatening to isolate Bragg, who was thus compelled to follow. The Army of the Cumberland was absolutely thrust between Bragg and Georgia, and, unless intercepted, would have surrounded the rebel general, who had fallen back to Chattanooga. In order to prevent this disaster, Bragg was obliged to give up the prize of the campaign, having been fairly outgeneralled. Chattanooga was occupied by the national troops, on the 9th of September.

Bragg, however, meant that this occupation should be temporary only, and having been largely reënforced, determined to give battle to Rosecrans. The rebel army was now at least sixty thousand strong;† while that of Rosecrans was reduced to about forty-five thousand effective men.‡ The Army of the Cumberland

* Rosecrans's strength when he started for Chickamauga was probably seventy thousand men; but he was obliged to leave garrisons at the various towns he took, as well as to guard the railroads as he advanced. This speedily reduced his moving column.

† On the 31st of August, 1863, Bragg's effective strength was officially reported as forty-five thousand and forty-one men. This did not include Longstreet's corps, which, on the 20th of October, was reported at fifteen thousand two hundred and twenty-one (effective), nor Buckner's, which numbered nine thousand two hundred and seven; both of these forces participated in the battle of Chickamauga, so that Bragg's active force in that battle must have been fully sixty thousand men.

‡ No formal return of the troops engaged under Rosecrans in this battle was made to the adjutant-general's office. One was compiled

had been widely separated in the movements that procured possession of Chattanooga. It was composed of three corps, under Major-Generals Thomas, McCook, and Crittenden. Crittenden held Chattanooga, while the other corps were moving east and south, through the mountains, separated by intervals of nearly twenty miles; the extreme right of Rosecrans was forty miles from the left of his army, with almost impenetrable mountains between. While in this position, he was threatened by Bragg, but got his forces together at Chickamauga creek by the 19th of September, although with infinite difficulty. Here Bragg attacked, and after two days' fighting, succeeded in piercing the national centre, and demolishing the right wing of the army. Rosecrans himself hurried to Chattanooga, to prepare for its defence, and McCook and Crittenden also left the field. But Thomas held on, and although the whole bulk of the rebel army was now precipitated upon his single corps,* in the hope of getting between him and Chattanooga, Bragg was unable to accomplish this object, and finally abandoned the attempt. In the battle of Chickamauga, Rosecrans lost thirty-six cannon, and more than sixteen thousand men. But for the gallantry and de-

for me, from other returns, to cover this date, according to which Rosecrans had over eighty-two thousand men present; deducting one-third, the usual allowance for sick, extra-duty men, etc., would leave about sixty thousand. This statement, however, must be inaccurate, as it conflicts with the returns of Thomas, made a month later, and with the positive recollection of various officers of rank, who would have been likely to know.

* Major-General Gordon Granger came upon the field with a division of about five thousand men, during the battle, and went at once, without orders, to the critical point, where his troops were of great use in resisting the onslaught of the rebels. His numbers are included in the estimate of forty-five thousand men as Rosecrans's strength in this fight.

termination of Thomas and his command, the army would have been absolutely destroyed, and Chattanooga lost. The position, however, was saved.

But the position alone. When Rosecrans discovered the extent of his misfortune, he determined, if possible, to hold Chattanooga, but thought himself unable to do more. The whole army was at once withdrawn into the town, and, in two days, a formidable line of works was thrown up, so close that some of the houses were left outside. Missionary ridge, immediately south and east of Chattanooga, is about four hundred feet high, and three miles from the Tennessee. This was instantly occupied by Bragg, who followed Thomas rapidly on the 21st. Lookout mountain, on the west, is twenty-two hundred feet high, and about three miles off. It is a rugged, narrow ridge, a hundred and fifty miles long, but not more than a mile or two across. Its northern and eastern front looks down on Chattanooga, while on its western side lies a narrow valley, hardly two miles wide, the bed of Lookout river. Still west of this valley, Raccoon mountain rises, another lofty and wooded ridge, reaching far off into Alabama. The Nashville and Chattanooga railroad, by which all supplies were brought to the national army, runs along the southern bank of the Tennessee, and immediately under the Lookout mountain, then crosses the entrance to Lookout valley, and turns south and west towards Stevenson.

This valley and mountain, in an evil hour, Rosecrans determined to abandon. He supposed that it would be impossible to maintain communication with the troops that were stationed there, and of course impossible for troops to exist without communication

and supplies. Bragg was already closing around him in a semicircle; and, unmindful or neglectful of its extreme importance, Rosecrans withdrew the force on Lookout mountain. From that moment the Army of the Cumberland was besieged. The rebels instantly occupied the point so unwisely yielded, perceiving it to be the key to the whole position; they placed batteries so as to command the railroad and the river; they seized the railroad itself, and all supplies were at once cut off. Rosecrans could only maintain communication with Nashville, by wagoning sixty miles over the rough mountain-roads, and through the rugged gaps on the north side of the Tennessee. The country there is as impracticable as on the southern side. Walden's ridge is steep and wild; there is but one road, and that circuitous and bad. The route was from Chattanooga to Anderson, from Anderson back again to Jasper, and from Jasper to Bridgeport. Thence the railroad was open to Nashville. To supply an army of forty thousand men by such a route, for any length of time, was an impossibility; and there seemed no other possible mode.

Bragg's line now extended from the river above the town to the river again below, so that Chattanooga was practically invested. Securely seated on Missionary ridge, the rebel general watched every movement of the national army, and from the point of Lookout mountain, threw shells into Rosecrans's camp. He fortified himself upon the hills, and his outworks reached a mile from their base, where the pickets of the two armies were within hail of each other; both drawing water from Chattanooga creek. After the first few days, the roads on the north side

of the Tennessee became so bad, by reason of the fall rains, that it was impossible for the supply-trains from Bridgeport to cross the mountains. The whole command was put on half rations; three thousand wounded soldiers* lay in the camps and hospitals, suffering and dying from lack of proper sustenance; forage for the animals could not be procured, and ten thousand mules and horses died in and around Chattanooga. All officers were reduced to half an allowance of forage for a single horse; all the artillery-horses were sent back to Bridgeport, over the mountain, one-third dying on the road. Retreat itself thus became impossible, unless the artillery was abandoned. Every few days, between the rain-storms, an attempt would be made to get a supply-train through; but Bragg sent a cavalry expedition around, over Walden's ridge, north of Chattanooga, and cut off a train bringing medical supplies and stores for the wounded, and another with ordnance stores. The stock of ammunition, after this, was just large enough to supply each man for one more battle—not half the ordinary allowance for an army.

And here the Army of the Cumberland lay, in the hot sun and chilly nights of September, and under the heavy rains of autumn; without sufficient food, with few tents, half supplied with ammunition; the camp-streets filled with dead and dying animals; with few blankets, and no extra clothing, for when Rosecrans started on his campaign he expected it to

* About nine thousand national soldiers had been wounded at the battle of Chickamauga. There was no water on the battle-field, and the wounded were all taken six miles to the rear, to Crawfish springs, where they were laid on the ground, as near the spring as possible. The enemy broke through, near here, and captured thousands of these, unable to defend themselves.

be a short and successful one, and ordered the men to take but one blanket apiece, and no overcoats. In the battle and flight, blankets were thrown aside; and after Chattanooga was besieged, it was a question whether food could be procured; there was no thought of bringing blankets over the mountain-roads. The enemy only refrained from attacking because he thought his prey already caged.* It was unnecessary to assault and lose life in the attempt to take what was secure. All Bragg had to do was to wait, and Chattanooga would fall without a battle; starvation would soon reduce the besieged, and retreat or reënforcement was impossible. This was the situation of the Army of the Cumberland, when Grant took command of it, on the 19th of October, 1863. No other of the national armies was reduced to such straits during the war.

But Chattanooga was only the centre of Grant's new front; his operations must necessarily extend to Bridgeport, about thirty miles to the right, where the railroad from Nashville strikes the Tennessee, and formed his solitary line of communication with the North; while, on the left, the whole region watered by the Tennessee was to be defended. This important valley is forty or fifty miles wide, and runs in a southwesterly direction, from Virginia through East Tennessee. Above Chattanooga, the river itself formed one of the main defences of the national forces, in fact, the ditch to their fortifications, for their line was established behind it. Holding the Tennes-

* "These dispositions faithfully sustained, insured the enemy's speedy evacuation of Chattanooga, for want of food and forage. Possessed of the shortest route to his depot, and the one by which reënforcements must reach him, we held him at our mercy, and his destruction was only a question of time."—*Bragg's Report*.

see and its branches, they effectually closed the rich valley to the rebels, who were greatly in need of its abundant supplies of grain and beef, and who, besides, had more than once issued through this sally-port on devastating raids, as far north even as the Ohio. Chattanooga, therefore, was an immense bastion at the centre of Grant's line, flanked on one side by the Tennessee valley, and on the other by the mountains of northern Georgia and Alabama. In its front, but a hundred and fifty miles south, lay Atlanta, at the junction of as many important railroads as Chattanooga; and, covered by Atlanta, were Selma, with its arsenals, Montgomery, with its great stores of cotton, Macon, Mobile, and all the rich central valley that extends from the Cumberland mountains to the Gulf of Mexico.

On the 23d of September, immediately after the defeat of Rosecrans, Halleck detached the Eleventh and Twelfth corps from the Army of the Potomac, and sent them by rail, under command of Major-General Hooker, to protect Rosecrans's railroad line of communication between Bridgeport and Nashville. These troops, however, were not ordered further than Bridgeport, as their presence at Chattanooga would only have increased the embarrassment of those who could not themselves be fully supplied. The Army of the Cumberland, therefore, knew that two corps of national troops lay within fifty miles, but unable to afford them succor; indeed, that the arrival of reinforcements would only aggravate their difficulties.

At this time, Major-General Burnside was in command of the Department of the Ohio, which included Eastern Tennessee and Kentucky. Early in August,

he had been directed to begin a campaign in East Tennessee, and coöperate with the movements of Rosecrans; and, before the Ninth corps was returned to him by Grant, Burnside had taken the field, moving by three roads, upon Kingston and Knoxville. On the 2d of September, he seized Knoxville, a hundred and ten miles from Chattanooga, where the Tennessee river, the railroad, and many important country roads converge. Possession of the entire region of East Tennessee, from Cumberland gap to Loudon, was speedily secured, without any heavy fighting. Burnside was then ordered to concentrate his troops on the Tennessee, west of Loudon, and to connect with Rosecrans. This junction was repeatedly urged upon him by Halleck, but although the Ninth corps joined him by the 1st of October, the movement was never made. Burnside was threatened by a rebel force in West Virginia, and replied that he thought the coöperation with Rosecrans unnecessary. After Chickamauga, the enemy pushed a column into East Tennessee, driving Burnside back as far as Loudon.

On the 20th of October, Halleck wrote to Grant, at length, informing him of the objects aimed at in the movements of Rosecrans and Burnside, and of the measures directed by himself in order to attain those objects. "Your difficulty," he said, "will not be in the want of men, but in the means of supplying them at this season of the year. . . . If you reoccupy the passes of Lookout mountain, which should never have been given up, you will be able to use the railroad and river from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. This seems to me a matter of vital importance, and should receive your early attention. . . . Whatever measures you may deem proper to adopt under exist-

ing circumstances, will receive all possible assistance from the authorities at Washington." This promise of coöperation and support, from the government and the general-in-chief, was kept to the letter, in the operations which ensued.

Grant himself, however, never asked for reënforcements. He was accustomed to state his condition fully, and then to leave it for his superiors to decide whether they would supply his wants. I have not been able to find a single request from him for troops, unless he had been previously directed to state his needs. If, after he had made known his condition and plans, the government did not see fit, or was unable to supply him further, he went to work with whatever means he had, and did the best he knew how. But there never had been any lack of material assistance, when it was possible to be bestowed; and, as has been seen, the moral support afforded him had almost always been cordial. Halleck seldom frustrated any of Grant's schemes, and never did more than, as commanding officer, he had a perfect right to do. When he did interfere, it was doubtless with good intentions, and supposing his own judgment to be better than that of his subordinate. His judgment, indeed, was often at fault, but the patriotism of his motives was unquestioned by Grant. From this time, however, the chief deferred to the judgment of his successful subordinate.

At the same time that Grant telegraphed to Thomas the order to assume command of the Department of the Cumberland, he sent him the following dispatch from Louisville: "October 19, 11.30 P. M. Hold Chattanooga at all hazards. I will be there as soon as possible." Thomas replied at once:

“I will hold the town till we starve!”—an answer worthy of the soldier whose individual energy had infused his own corps, and saved an entire army from annihilation, at the battle of Chickamauga.

On the morning of the 20th, Grant started from Louisville, by rail. He arrived at Nashville the same night, and, at half-past eleven, he telegraphed to Burnside, who was then at Knoxville: “Have you tools for fortifying? Important points in East Tennessee should be put in condition to be held by the smallest number of men, as soon as possible. . . . I will be in Stevenson to-morrow night, and Chattanooga the next night.” From Nashville, he also telegraphed to Admiral Porter, at Cairo: “General Sherman’s advance was at Eastport, on the 15th. The sooner a gunboat can be got to him the better. Boats must now be on the way from St. Louis, with supplies to go up the Tennessee, for Sherman.” Of Thomas, he asked: “Should not large working-parties be put upon the road between Bridgeport and Chattanooga, at once?” At Stevenson, he met Rosecrans, who had received the order relieving him, and was now on his way to the North. Their interview was short; but Rosecrans was cordial, and volunteered information about the condition of affairs. At Bridgeport, Grant telegraphed for the commissary of subsistence at Nashville, to “send to the front, as speedily as possible, vegetables for the army. Beans and hominy are especially required.”

From this point, the party started by horse, for Chattanooga: the roads were almost impassable, by reason of the rain, which rolled in torrents, sometimes a foot deep, down the sides of the mountain. Great precipices rose and descended on either hand; the

ground was slippery, and the hillsides were strewn with the wrecks of wagons, and the carcasses of animals that had fallen over the bluffs, or died on the road. Frequently, the whole party had to dismount and lead their horses across difficult places; and Grant, who was still lame and suffering, was carried in the arms of soldiers, over the spots unsafe or impossible to cross on horseback. At Jasper, there was a halt, and, from there, he telegraphed to Burnside, by way of Louisville and Lexington: "Every effort should be made to increase your small-arm ammunition to five hundred rounds per man, and artillery to five hundred rounds." And thus the crippled commander travelled to the front, by steam and horse, and carried in the arms of his soldiers; telegraphing to Halleck, and to Sherman, to Porter, and to Thomas, and to Burnside, on the way; attending to the supplies, and directing the movements of his three armies; ordering vegetables to Chattanooga, and ammunition to Knoxville, securing gunboats to protect Sherman, and directing working-parties to remake Thomas's roads.

When the party reached Chattanooga it was just dark. The rain still fell in torrents; they were cold, and hungry, and drenched, and tired; the rebel lines absolutely enclosed the national camp, and Lookout mountain, like a gigantic jailer, stood guard below the town, preventing all egress by the beleaguered army. The officers and soldiers they met were downcast, if not desponding; hemmed in on every side by the enemy, whose pickets came so close upon their own; without the possibility either of holding out much longer, or of escaping through the impassable defiles in their rear; a river at their back, in case they were attacked, and short supplies

of ammunition; in front, a rebel force larger than their own, fortified on what seemed impregnable ridges, and mountains formed by Nature to resist assault. Their strength and spirits were depleted by the lack of food; they could not use artillery, for the horses were all dead or sent away; and they could not even be reënforced, for, with no means of supplying themselves, it was worse than mockery to send more troops to consume the scanty rations that were now doled out. The gloom of that night seemed impenetrable.

Grant went at once to Thomas's headquarters, and at half-past nine p. m. on the 23d, he telegraphed to Halleck: "Have just arrived. I will write to-morrow. Please approve order placing Sherman in command of Department of the Tennessee, with headquarters in the field." This request was promptly acceded to, and Sherman was placed in Grant's old command. Thomas behaved with great magnanimity; he said there had been rumors that an independent command was intended for him when Rosecrans should be relieved, but that he would not have accepted it; he thought it should be given to Grant, or to some one else whose name was connected with success. The arrangement that had been made, however, giving him the Army of the Cumberland, but making Grant supreme, was perfectly satisfactory.

That night, Grant learned that Thomas had already ordered the concentration of Hooker's command, at Bridgeport. This was with a view to securing the Tennessee river, and the main wagon-road on its northern bank, between Bridgeport and Chattanooga. At present, this road was commanded by rebel sharpshooters, and unsafe even for couriers. The next morning, Grant rode out in company with Thomas

and Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer of the Department of the Cumberland, and made a reconnoissance on the north side of the river and at the mouth of Lookout valley, as well as of a crossing of the Tennessee, known as Brown's ferry.

A bend in the Tennessee, just below Chattanooga, shapes the northern shore into a singular peninsula, called Moccasin point, from its resemblance to an Indian moccasin. This point runs out immediately under Lookout mountain; and, at its narrowest part, about three miles below the mouth of Lookout creek, Brown's ferry is situated. Moccasin point was still in the hands of the national army, but the opposite bank, from Chattanooga creek to Kelly's ferry, was occupied by the rebels. A sharp range of hills, whose base is washed by the Tennessee, extends along the southern shore, below the mouth of Lookout river, and is broken at Brown's ferry by a narrow gorge, through which a road runs to Kelly's ferry, on the western side of Raccoon mountain. The valley between this ridge and the Raccoon mountain is narrow, and a lodgment effected there would seriously interrupt the communications of the enemy up Lookout valley, as well as give complete command of the Kelly's ferry road. Now, from Kelly's ferry to Bridgeport, the river was free from the rebels. The ridge was thinly picketed, and the valley apparently unoccupied by any large force of the enemy. It seemed, therefore, quite practicable to take by surprise what, if strongly defended, could not have been carried by assault.

It was proposed that Hooker should concentrate at Bridgeport, and move east, while a force from Chattanooga, coöperating, was to establish a bridge across

the river at Brown's ferry, and seize the heights on the southern side, thus giving Hooker an open road to Chattanooga, when his forces should arrive in Lookout valley. As the rebels held the north end of Lookout valley with a brigade of troops, as well as the road leading around the foot of the mountain from their main camp in Chattanooga valley, they would have had but little difficulty in concentrating a sufficient force to defeat Hooker and drive him back. To prevent this, the seizure of the range of hills at the mouth of Lookout valley, and covering the Brown's ferry road, was deemed of the highest importance. By the use of pontoon bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's ferry, and of the north bank of the river across Moccasin point, a shorter line could be secured to reënforce the troops in Lookout valley, than was afforded to the rebels by the narrow and tortuous road around the foot of Lookout mountain.

Accordingly, Grant directed that Hooker should cross, at Bridgeport, to the south side of the Tennessee, with all the force that could be spared from guarding the railroad in his rear, and move along the main wagon-road, by way of Whitesides, to Wauhatchie, in the Lookout valley. Major-General John M. Palmer, commanding a division of the Fourth corps, in the Army of the Cumberland, was moved to a position opposite Chattanooga. From there, he was to march by the Jasper road, the only practicable route north of the Tennessee, to a point on the north bank, opposite Whitesides; then, to cross to the south side and hold the road passed over by Hooker. In the mean time, and before the enemy could be apprised of the intention, a force under W. F. Smith was to be thrown across the river, at Brown's ferry,

and to seize the range of hills at the mouth of Look-out valley, covering the Kelly's ferry road.

In these operations, the absolute necessity of gaining some means of supporting the army was the first and paramount consideration with Grant. This, every one saw, must demand the first attention. Every one also saw that the means now to be attempted was that which promised relief, if relief was to be secured at all. In case of success, the river would be open from Kelly's ferry to Bridgeport, and the road on the north side clear; so that either steamboats or wagons could be used to bring up supplies. Rosecrans had contemplated some movement of this sort, and had ordered a pontoon bridge to be prepared, but had been content with such remote preliminaries.* Smith, too, had suggested the plan, which, however, suggested itself to every soldier; Halleck had proposed it, and Thomas had determined on it, and even given some directions in the matter, before Grant arrived. When Grant visited the ferry, the importance of the position was at once evident to him, and, that day, he issued positive orders for the movement.

Smith was instructed to make all necessary arrangements for the expedition which was to effect a lodgment at Brown's ferry. Four thousand men were detailed, and the force to throw the bridge was organized on the 24th, the day of Grant's reconnoissance; the pontoon bridge was ready in two days more; and Smith, meanwhile, examined the ground with his brigade commanders, and gave the requisite orders. Eighteen hundred men, under Brigadier-General Hazen, were to embark in boats, and pass down the

* Rosecrans had begun the construction of a steamboat, to be used in case the river was ever reopened.

river about nine miles, seven of which would be under fire of the rebel pickets. This risk was taken rather than launch the pontoons near the ferry, because the boats would move more rapidly than intelligence could be carried by the infantry pickets of the enemy; and, although the rebels might be alarmed, they could not know where the landing was to be attempted, and therefore could not concentrate with certainty against the landing.

By sundown on the 26th, all was ready. The night was dark and foggy, and at three A. M., on the 27th, sixty pontoon boats, each containing thirty armed men, floated quietly from Chattanooga. The current was so strong, that there was no need of oars, and by keeping well under the opposite shore, they passed the rebel pickets undiscovered; then rounded the foot of Lookout mountain, and landed on the south side of the river, at Brown's ferry. Here, a volley was fired by the rebel pickets, who had now taken the alarm; some slight skirmishing ensued, but, by five o'clock, Smith had seized the hills covering the ferry, without the loss of a man killed, and but four or five wounded. The remainder of the troops and the material for a bridge were moved, by the north bank of the river, across Moccasin point to Brown's ferry, without attracting the attention of the enemy; and, before day dawned, the whole force was ferried to the south bank of the stream, and the almost inaccessible heights rising from Lookout valley, at its outlet to the river, were secured. The men carried axes, to be used in cutting an abatis for defence, as soon as the ridge was gained; and, in two hours, the command was sufficiently protected to withstand any attack likely to be made. As soon as the last of the troops

were over, the bridge was begun, and, by ten o'clock, an excellent pontoon bridge was laid, thus securing the end of the desired road nearest the enemy's forces, and a shorter line than the rebels could have, by which to move reënforcements, if a battle became inevitable. Positions were taken, from which the troops could not have been driven except by vastly superior forces; and artillery was placed to command the roads leading, around Lookout mountain, to the enemy's camps in Chattanooga valley.

On the morning of the 26th, Hooker crossed the Tennessee, by the pontoon bridge at Bridgeport, with the greater part of the Eleventh corps, under Major-General Howard, and a portion of the Twelfth corps, under Brigadier-General Geary. He took up his line of march along the railroad, by way of Whitesides to Wauhatchie. The rebel pickets fell back as he advanced; and, marching along the western base of Raccoon mountain, he finally descended through a narrow gorge into Lookout valley, leaving troops to protect the passes along the route. As the column emerged into the valley, its advance was arrested by an irregular fire of musketry; but Hooker at once deployed his troops, and all opposition ceased, the enemy flying before him. The rebels now detected the movement, from their signal-stations on Lookout mountain, and threw shells into the column as it marched below. This, however, caused no serious interruption; and Hooker kept on down the valley. He met no further resistance; and at six o'clock, p.m., on the 28th, the command was halted for the night, and went into camp within a mile of Brown's ferry. Howard had the advance, and, as it was necessary to hold both the roads to Kelly's ferry, Geary

was encamped at Wauhatchie, about three miles from the position occupied by Howard's corps.

The rebels, however, were fully aware of the condition of affairs in Chattanooga, and of the necessity for Grant's establishing a new and shorter line of supplies. They knew, also, the importance, to themselves, of keeping him from this line; and, when it was suddenly snatched from them, in a manner they had never dreamed of, an attempt was instantly made to regain possession of the vital point. The night after Hooker's arrival, Longstreet's corps attacked him in force.* The battle began at one o'clock, with a fierce assault on Geary, at Wauhatchie. Howard was at once directed to move his nearest division to the support of Geary. He moved promptly; but, before reaching Geary, found a rebel force strongly posted on a range of hills on the left, which commanded his line of march. His second division soon came up, and an assault was made in the night, against these hills. They were steep and wooded, and entirely unknown to the national soldiers; but Howard scaled them under a heavy fire, and carried them by storm, capturing many prisoners. The rebels had already begun to build works on the summit, evidently intending to hold the position permanently.

Geary, meanwhile, had been fighting for three hours, without assistance, and, although at one time almost enveloped on three sides, finally succeeded in completely repelling the assault on his front. The moon shone fitfully into the valley, and the commands could often distinguish each other only by

* The rebel prisoners universally stated that all of Longstreet's corps was engaged. I have no other authority for the statement, as no rebel report of this battle is in possession of the government.

the flashes of their fire-arms. The strange echoes of the cannon among the hills, and the muttering of musketry from every quarter, alarmed the teamsters of Geary's wagon-train, who deserted their mules, and in the darkness and noise, the animals became more frightened than their drivers; they soon broke loose, and, with their tackle dangling and rattling about their heels, rushed in a body directly towards the enemy. This augmented the confusion of the rebels, who supposed it to be an attack of cavalry, and their rout was rendered inglorious by the assistance of a pack of mules.

By four o'clock, the battle was over, and the enemy repelled at every point. Hooker had nearly * seven thousand men engaged; his loss was four hundred and sixteen, in killed and wounded; he took more than a hundred prisoners. Geary buried one hundred and fifty-three rebels, on his front alone; but the whole loss of the enemy is not certainly known.† The heights which had been carried by Howard were fortified at once, and the entire position made secure against any further assault. Hooker, thereafter, remained undisturbed. Flanked as he was by mountain and river, on either hand, it was useless for the rebels to repeat the attempt at surprise. Every advantage they could hope for in an assault, they had already enjoyed at Wauhatchie—the night, the surprise, Hooker unfortified, and unfamiliar with the country; and yet they had failed; while, in case of another effort, Grant had a shorter line by which

* Hooker's force was ten thousand one hundred and eighty, present for duty; but not all of this was engaged.

† Hooker estimates Longstreet's loss at fifteen hundred. I have no means of verifying or disputing this.

to reënforce his subordinate, than the rebels themselves possessed around the base of the mountain. The fate of Lookout valley was decided.

The force which had started for Whitesides, under command of Palmer, reached its destination at the appointed time, and took up the position intended in the original plan of the movement; so that two good lines were now secured, by which to obtain supplies from the railroad at Bridgeport; namely, the main wagon-road by way of Whitesides, Wauhatchie, and Brown's ferry, a distance of twenty-eight miles; and the Kelly's ferry and Brown's ferry road, by use of which, and of the river from Bridgeport to Kelly's ferry, the distance for wagoning was reduced to eight miles.

The road to Nashville was thus opened in five days after Grant's arrival at the front, and the command rescued from all immediate danger. The rebel authorities were greatly chagrined at this achievement, and their newspapers were full of lamentations. Mr. Jefferson Davis had visited Lookout mountain only a week before, and feasted his eyes with the sight of the national army, shut up among the hills, like an animal ready for slaughter; and now, at a single stroke, the prey had been snatched from his grasp. The door for relief was opened, and, from a besieged and isolated army, the force in Chattanooga had suddenly become the assailant. It was Bragg who was now on the defensive. Not only were supplies of rations and ammunition brought in, but two corps had been added to the strength of the national army, and Hooker threatened the rebel position on Lookout mountain. Horses and ammunition were hurried at once to Chattanooga; steamboats were

constantly conveying stores from Bridgeport to Kelly's ferry, and full rations were speedily issued once more.

The army felt as if it had been miraculously relieved. Its spirit revived at once; the depression of Chickamauga was shaken off, and the unshackled giant stood erect. The soldiers saw that they had a commander who could perceive and relieve their necessities. They became buoyant and hopeful, and the very men who had dragged themselves sick and half-despairing around their camps only two days before, were now quite ready, at Grant's command, to assault the rebels on Missionary ridge. On the 28th, Grant said: "If the rebels give us one week more time, I think all danger of losing territory now held by us will have passed away, and preparations may commence for active operations."

But, although the immediate emergency was met at Chattanooga, there were still other and instant needs which required the attention of the new commander. His military division reached from Natchez to Knoxville, more than a thousand miles, and included two hundred thousand soldiers. Burnside's army, numbering nearly twenty-five thousand men, was more than a hundred miles from any navigable river by which it could be supplied, and still further from a railroad. He needed rations and ammunition and clothing at once, and the problem of providing these was difficult. They were ordered from St. Louis, up the Mississippi and the Ohio rivers, to the mouth of the Cumberland, and thence, convoyed by gunboats five hundred miles, up the Cumberland to Big South fork; there Burnside was to meet them, and transport them, in wagons, a hundred miles

further, to the front of operations in East Tennessee. This varied and complicated business was superintended directly by Grant. He first ordered the stores, on Burnside's demand; then wrote to Admiral Porter for the gunboat convoy; then instructed Burnside when and where to meet the supplies, and all the while was urging his subordinates to greater diligence, in order to secure the speedy transportation of material, without which he could not even begin his triple campaign.

For, while Thomas was to be relieved from the danger which threatened to engulf his army at Chattanooga, and Burnside was to be made ready to protect East Tennessee, and coöperate in the strategy which should direct the Army of the Cumberland, Sherman was marching across the continent, four hundred miles, from the Mississippi valley. He started from Vicksburg on the 27th of September, and arrived at Memphis on the 2d of October. It was then his duty to conduct the Fifteenth army corps, and such other troops as could be spared from Hurlbut's command, to the support of Rosecrans, marching by way of Corinth, Tuscumbia, and Decatur, to Athens, Alabama. During this long and tedious march, he was to look to Rosecrans for no supplies, and was, therefore, obliged to repair the railroad from Memphis east, as he advanced: so Halleck had ordered. But, when Grant assumed command of the military division, he at once ordered supplies from St. Louis to meet Sherman at Eastport, on the Tennessee. These were sent up the river on transports, Grant requesting Admiral Porter to convey the steamers which conveyed them.

During all these campaigns, the national forces

were operating amidst a hostile population. At this stage of the war, the rebellious spirit was rampant over almost the entire South; and, even when armies were conquered and territory was occupied, partisan bands were formed, which constantly threatened the long lines by which the national armies were obliged to advance. Guerillas and sharpshooters infested the rivers and roads on every route. The railroads in rear were torn up, bridges were destroyed, steamboats were burned or attacked, whenever they touched the shore; and no difficulty, that beset the loyal commanders during the war, was more constant or more momentous than that of protecting their extended lines of supply. As they penetrated further into the rebellious region, these difficulties increased, so that success itself seemed to enhance their dangers; and now, when Grant's three armies had advanced many hundred miles from their bases, into a region bitterly hostile to the government, every mile of that advance had to be guarded, while his supplies of food and clothing and ammunition were pushed on. But when Sherman's advance reached Eastport, he found that Grant's prevision had secured supplies.

The same remarkable relations which had so long existed between Grant and his great subordinate were displayed at this juncture, as they had been on every other occasion when their display was proper, during the war. When Grant sent Sherman north, from Vicksburg, he said: "I hope you will be in time to aid in giving the rebels the worst, or best thrashing they have had in this war. I have constantly had the feeling that I shall lose you from this command entirely. Of course I do not object to seeing your sphere of usefulness enlarged, and think it

should have been enlarged long ago, having an eye to the public good alone. But it needs no assurance from me, general, that, taking a more selfish view, while I would heartily approve such a change, I would deeply regret it on my own account." Grant, at this time, supposed that Sherman was to relieve Rosecrans of the command of the Army of the Cumberland; and, although Halleck had previously intimated that Grant himself might be sent to Nashville, this apparent substitution of his subordinate gave him no pain. His only regret was in parting with his friend and faithful coadjutor.*

At Memphis, however, Sherman heard that Grant also had been ordered north, and, with the wonderful unselfishness he had always manifested towards his chief, he wrote, on the 14th of October, nearly a week before the Military Division of the Mississippi was created: "Accept the command of the great army of the centre; don't hesitate. By your presence at Nashville you will unite all discordant elements, and impress the enemy in proportion. All success and honor to you!" And again, on the 15th: "I am very anxious you should go to Nashville, as foreshadowed by Halleck, and chiefly as you can harmonize all conflicts of feeling that may exist in that vast crowd. Rosecrans and Burnside and Sherman, with their subordinates, would be ashamed of petty quarrels, if you were behind and near them, between them and Washington. Next, the union of such armies, and the direction of it, is worthy your ambition. I shall await news from you with great anxiety."

At one or two points on the route, Sherman had

* In fact, Grant had not been ordered to send Sherman in person, but preferred to place him thus in the way of advancement.

encountered severe opposition ; not enough to overthrow him, or really turn him from his course, but quite enough to delay him seriously. Rebel forces were assembled at various stations, and, at Colliersville, Mississippi, a heavy attack was made on the body of troops with which Sherman himself was moving. This, however, was repulsed ; a bridge was built over Bear creek, and at Tusculumbia, whither Sherman sent Blair's division in advance, still another rebel force was dispersed. Skirmishing continued all along the route, but, about the middle of October, Sherman struck the Tennessee, at Eastport, where the river is nearly a mile wide. The gunboats Grant had asked for, and a coal-barge, at first were used for ferriage ; but, in a day or two, the steamers also arrived with rations, and, as the various detachments of the army came up, they were successively fed, and ferried across.

Up to this time, Sherman had literally obeyed the instructions of Halleck, and pushed forward the repairs of the railroad in his rear. But, after assuming command, on the 19th of October, Grant's first orders to Sherman were : "Increase to the greatest possible strength your moving column, and, at the same time, secure your communications to your base of supplies. Communicate with Steele, and urge the necessity of his sending you the division of Kimball, of the Sixteenth corps." Sherman was also ordered to bring forward the troops at Paducah, and any that could be spared from guarding the line of railroad from Memphis to Corinth : "Assign them to strengthen divisions already at the front." On the 24th, the day after he arrived at Chattanooga, Grant telegraphed to Sherman : "Drop every thing east of Bear creek, and

move with your entire force towards Stevenson, until you receive further orders. The enemy are evidently moving a large force towards Cleveland, and may break through our lines and move on Nashville, in which event your troops are the only forces at command that could beat them there." The dispatch was sent by a messenger, who floated down over the Muscle shoals, in the Tennessee river, landed at Tusculumbia, and was sent on to Sherman, at Iuka. He received the order on the 27th, and instantly proceeded to obey.

In compliance with Halleck's previous instructions, Blair had been advanced as far as Tusculumbia, on the south side of the Tennessee, repairing the railroad; but, "dropping every thing," Sherman now reversed this column, and turned all his troops to Eastport, the only place where he could cross the Tennessee. The work of crossing was pushed with all the vigor possible, and on the 1st of November, Sherman, in person, passed to the head of the column, at Florence, leaving Blair to follow with the rear division. Grant now ordered Tuttle's division, of McPherson's corps, to be sent forward to report to Sherman. Delays were occasioned by the destruction of bridges across the Elk river, and long detours were made; for there was not time either to ferry, or to build new bridges; and, on the 5th, Grant again dispatched to Sherman: "Leave Dodge's command" (of Hurlbut's corps) "at Athens, until further orders, and come with the remainder of your command to Stevenson, or until you receive other instructions." Again, on the 7th: "The enemy have moved a great part of their force from this front towards Burnside. I have to make an immediate move from here towards their

lines of communication, to bring them back if possible. I am anxious to see your old corps here at the earliest moment." When Sherman reached Fayetteville, he received still further instructions: "Come on to Stevenson and Bridgeport, with your four divisions. I want your command to aid in a movement to force the enemy back from their present position, and to make Burnside secure in his." He proceeded at once with his four divisions, along different roads, and, on the 13th, at night, arrived at Bridgeport. From that point, he immediately telegraphed his arrival to the commanding general, and was summoned in person to Chattanooga.

This urgency of Grant had been caused by the movements of Bragg. As soon as the rebel general discovered that his negligence had allowed Grant to secure communications with Nashville, he turned his attention towards Burnside, who was isolated among the mountains and rivers of East Tennessee, a hundred miles from Chattanooga. Bragg held the railroad as far as Loudon, and, of course, had a much shorter line than Grant, for communication with East Tennessee; he first moved one division, under Stevenson, as far as Cleveland and Sweetwater. At the same time, Halleck, who had always felt the greatest uneasiness about Burnside, telegraphed to Grant that the rebels had sent a corps of twenty thousand or twenty-five thousand men into East Tennessee, by way of Abingdon, Virginia. "As Burnside will be obliged to move all his forces up the valley, you must guard against Bragg's army getting into East Tennessee, above Chattanooga." But, Grant had already foreseen this emergency, and replied: "I have sent orders to Sherman to move east towards Stevenson, leaving

every thing unguarded, except by the cavalry of the Army of the Cumberland, east of Bear creek. The possibility of the enemy's breaking through our lines east of this, and present inability to follow him from here, if he should, is the cause of this."

The rebel movement from Abingdon proved not to be important, but that from Bragg was more threatening; the column dispatched to Cleveland and towards Loudon was promptly reported to Grant, who announced it to Halleck, on the 1st of November, and at the same time remarked: "At present, lack of forage and provisions entirely precludes the idea of moving from here, in that direction; but I will endeavor to make an advance up Lookout valley, and threaten the enemy from here, in front, at the same time, to force a return of these troops. If Sherman gets here," he said, "before the enemy disturbs Burnside's position, I think I will be able to make him take a respectful distance south of us."

At the same time, he informed Halleck: "Steamers ply regularly between Kelly's ferry and Bridgeport, thus nearly settling the rations and forage question." This, however, did not satisfy the general-in-chief, who telegraphed the next day: "I have serious fears about concentrating more troops near Chattanooga, lest they perish for want of supplies. This matter requires the most serious consideration." He was anxious about Burnside, too, and said: "Burnside cannot receive any more troops in East Tennessee, and has great apprehensions about feeding his present army." Grant, however, had already given orders to open the road from Nashville to Decatur, and soothed the fears of his chief by informing him: "A portion of Sherman's command will remain

on the Nashville and Decatur road, till that is finished. With two roads from Nashville, I think there can be no difficulty about supplies." He now directed Burnside to collect all the stores he could from the country, and the loyal Tennesseans gladly brought in corn, and beef, and forage.

The rebels, meanwhile, were not idle. On the 3d of November, Lieutenant-General Longstreet, one of the ablest officers of the enemy, and who at this time commanded the most famous corps in Bragg's army, was summoned to a council of war, where he received instructions to move his command at once against Burnside. Accordingly, on the morning of the 4th, he marched to Tyner's station, there to take cars for Sweetwater. His orders were, to drive Burnside out of East Tennessee, or, if possible, to capture or destroy him.* Longstreet's effective force was a little more than fifteen thousand men, besides Wheeler's cavalry, perhaps five thousand strong; † eighty guns were also ordered to accompany him. The rebel leaders were confident of success. On the 11th, Longstreet said to Bragg, from Sweetwater: "There are many reasons for anticipating great results from the expedition against General Burnside's army. His force should not be allowed to escape without an effort to destroy it. With the balance of my corps, or any good marching division, I think we may make a great campaign." Bragg, however, refused to give Longstreet more than the two divisions of Hood and

* See Appendix, for Bragg's instructions to Longstreet entire.

† Longstreet reported his effective strength as about fifteen thousand. On the 31st of August, Wheeler's cavalry numbered ten thousand six hundred and twenty-two effective men. Wheeler stated in his report that he took with him on this campaign, "portions of five brigades."

McLaws, although the corps commander begged hard for an increase, and said: "I think you greatly overestimate the enemy's force at and around Chattanooga. I have seen the force every day for the time it has been here, and *cannot think it exceeds your force, without Stevenson's division.*"

But these arguments were urged in vain, and Longstreet finally remarked: "As my orders were to drive the enemy out of East Tennessee, or if possible capture him, I determined that the only possible chance of succeeding in either or both, was to move and act as though I had a sufficient force to do either. I endeavored, therefore, to do as I should have done, had the twenty thousand men that I asked for been given me."

Owing to some of the thousand delays and disappointments of war, although this force started promptly from Missionary ridge, on the 4th of November, it was unable to leave Sweetwater, until the 13th of the month. Grant, however, was instantly informed of the movement, and, on the 7th, he telegraphed to Halleck: "In addition to the forces threatening Burnside from the east, there is but little doubt that Longstreet is moving to join them. I have ordered Thomas to attack the north end of Missionary ridge, and, when that is carried, to threaten or attack the enemy's line of communications between Cleveland and Dalton. This movement will be made by Monday morning. I expect Sherman will reach Huntsville to-day." Cleveland and Dalton are on the railroad between Tennessee and Georgia.

As early as the 26th of October, three days after his arrival at the front, Grant had foreseen the chance

of such a movement as the enemy had now undertaken, and telegraphed to Burnside: "Do you hear of any of Bragg's army threatening you from the southwest? Thomas's command is in bad condition to use, for want of animals of sufficient strength to move his artillery, and for want of rations. If you are threatened with a force beyond what you can compete with, efforts must be made to assist you. Answer." On the 28th, he said to Burnside: "It is particularly desirable that all the territory you now have should be held; but, if any portion must be given up, let it be to the east, and keep your army so that it and Thomas's army can support each other. It is better that you should be forced from the eastern end of the valley than from the west. Thomas is in no condition to move from his present position." On the 31st, three days before the movement was suggested to Longstreet, Grant informed Burnside: "It is reported, on the authority of a Union man, that a large force of Bragg's army is moving towards you." Again, on the 1st of November: "Should the enemy break through below Kingston, move in force to Sparta and McMinnville, and hang on to him with all your force, and such as I can send you from Bridgeport and Stevenson, until he is beaten and turned back." On the 5th, Longstreet's movement having actually begun the day before, Grant said to Burnside: "I will endeavor, from here, to bring the enemy back from your right flank as soon as possible. Should you discover him leaving, you should annoy him all you can with your cavalry, and in fact with all the troops you can bring to bear. Sherman's advance will be at Bridgeport about Monday next. Whether Thomas makes any demonstration before

his arrival, will depend upon advices of the enemy's movements."

On the 7th, the orders were issued to Thomas to attack Bragg's army. "The news," said Grant, "is of such a nature, that it becomes an imperative duty for your force to draw the attention of the enemy from Burnside to your own front. I deem the best movement to attack the enemy to be, an attack on the northern end of Missionary ridge, with all the force you can bring to bear against it; and, when that is carried, to threaten and even attack, if possible, the enemy's line of communication between Dalton and Cleveland. Rations should be ready to issue a sufficiency to last four days, the moment Missionary ridge is in our possession; rations to be carried in haversacks. *Where there are not horses to move the artillery, mules must be taken from the teams, or horses from ambulances; or, if necessary, officers dismounted, and their horses taken.* Immediate preparations should be made to carry these directions into execution. The movement should not be made a moment later than to-morrow morning." On the same day, Grant said to Burnside: "I have ordered an immediate move from here to carry Missionary ridge, and to threaten or attack the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton. This must have the effect to draw the enemy back from your western front."

But Thomas announced that he had not horses to move his artillery, and declared himself entirely and absolutely unable to move, until Sherman should arrive to coöperate. Grant was, therefore, forced to leave Burnside to contend against superior forces, until the arrival of Sherman with his men and means of transportation. In the mean time, reconnoissances

were made and plans matured for operations; dispatches were sent to Sherman, informing him of the movement of Longstreet, and of the necessity of his immediate presence at Chattanooga. Grant, however, did not despair, and said, at this juncture: "Although a large force has gone up the Tennessee valley that may annoy us, I feel that a decisive movement of the enemy must prove a disaster to them."

Nevertheless, Thomas's delay was a great disappointment. A prompt movement on the part of that commander would undoubtedly have had the effect to recall Longstreet; but, now, it was possible that the troops sent into East Tennessee might succeed in overthrowing the occupation which was so important. The greatest possible anxiety existed for the safety of Burnside. He was so far off, and so inaccessible, that he might be cut off and surrounded, or perhaps destroyed, before he could be relieved. Longstreet could reach him, long before assistance could get to Knoxville from Grant's army; indeed, there was no way whatever of sending reënforcements to Burnside, and no possibility of supplying them, if they were sent. It was not known how large a force Longstreet had taken with him, but supposed that his whole corps of twenty thousand men had started, as well as Wheeler's cavalry; besides which, Stevenson's division of the rebel army had certainly been at Cleveland, for more than a week, in advance. In addition to all this, indications were not wanting that a large force was moving from Virginia, on the left flank of the Army of the Ohio, which thus seemed likely to be overwhelmed.

The government felt even an acuter anxiety, in this matter, than Grant; partly, because Grant was

always sanguine, amid the greatest difficulties and dangers; and partly, perhaps, because the authorities at Washington had an especial distrust of Burnside. It was not a year since the battle of Fredericksburg, and the memory of that disaster was still fresh with the general-in-chief. The dispatches from the President and from Halleck alike indicate the greatest alarm, lest Burnside should be destroyed, or even surrender. Grant at once sent a staff-officer to East Tennessee, to learn exactly the condition of affairs, and to impress his own views and wishes upon the commander of the Army of the Ohio.

Meanwhile, he was vigorously at work, repairing and reconstructing railroads and bridges, ordering and forwarding supplies, first to one and then to another of his widely-separated departments. When the line was first opened from Brown's ferry, he said to Thomas: "The steamer Point of Rocks should by all means be got down to Brown's ferry, before morning, even if a house has to be torn down to get the necessary fuel." He directed the superintendent of military railroads, to send "thirty, and, if possible, more cars through to Stevenson and Bridgeport, daily, loaded with rations. The road should be run to its utmost capacity." The chief commissary of subsistence, at St. Louis, was asked: "Have you sent any stores *via* river, to Nashville? I wish you to send all you can, while the river is navigable." On the 3d, he said again to the manager of the railroad: "Complaints are made of stores not coming fast enough over Louisville and Nashville road. If stores do not come up the Cumberland in steamers, the Louisville road must send at least forty car-loads of provisions daily, besides quartermaster's stores."

There was a deficiency of steamers and of locomotives, and, accordingly, Grant said to Burnside: "If you have any steamers, I think you had better protect the pilot and engine from sharp-shooters, by casemating with oak plank, and send them down here;" while, to McPherson, now in command at Vicksburg, he said: "Send without delay, *via* the Tennessee river to Danville, Tennessee, all the locomotives at Vicksburg, with the exception of two, and all the cars, with the exception of ten. Let the locomotives and cars be the best you have. They are required for immediate use." To Anderson, the railroad superintendent: "There are now six bridges at Louisville, belonging to government, ready made, that can be brought forward. I have ordered three locomotives and all the cars, but ten, from the southern road, Vicksburg;" and again: "Those ordered by Colonel Parsons, for Memphis, can also come. There are more cars now on the West Tennessee roads than are required."

But all this was not sufficient, and, on the 4th, Grant declared: "The road from Nashville to Decatur will have to be put in running order." Sherman was ordered to leave Dodge's division, of Hurlbut's command, at Athens. "I have given directions for putting the railroad from Nashville to Decatur in running order. That road is now only guarded to Columbia, and the force left by you will have to guard the balance, with the aid of Thomas's command, until further arrangements can be made." Sherman was informed, however: "It is not my intention to leave any portion of your army to guard roads in the Department of the Cumberland, when an advance is made." At the same time, Grant ordered

the discontinuance of the railroads and telegraphs between Memphis and Columbus, in order to avail himself of the material on the roads, and, especially, of the troops who were compelled to guard them.

He contemplated supplying all three of his armies from Chattanooga, when the concentration should take place, and said to Burnside: "With the Nashville and Decatur road built, and full possession of the river, you can be supplied by this line. It will be impossible, however, for a single-track railroad to supply your army and this. I will telegraph immediately, to find if rations can be sent up the Cumberland." Three hundred thousand rations of salt meat, and a million of all other rations, were, accordingly, directed to be sent, in barges, towed by light-draught steamers, up the Cumberland, to the Big South fork, Admiral Porter promising to send gunboats to convey them. Every exertion was made to hasten the transportation of these supplies. "Make any order," said Grant to his adjutant-general, at Nashville, "make any order necessary to secure this result in the promptest manner." At the same time, he repeated his injunctions to Anderson: "It is of vast importance that the railroad from Nashville to Decatur should be opened as soon as possible. Make contracts with different bridge-builders, so as to get this work done in the shortest possible time. Extra bridges should also be in readiness at all times, to replace any that may be destroyed. Keep me advised of what you do in this matter."

On the 7th, he got word from Sherman, and telegraphed at once, to send a train loaded with provisions for him, to Fayetteville: "General Sherman will reach Fayetteville, to-morrow, without any thing to

eat. See the shipping commissary, and direct him to secure transportation, and send one hundred thousand rations to-morrow morning." He watched over Sherman carefully, not only providing supplies to meet him along the route, and sending him ferry-boats with which to cross the Tennessee, and requesting Admiral Porter to order up gunboats to protect the crossing, but even studying and directing the routes by which he wished Sherman to march. On the 10th, he instructed that commander: "I learn that, by the way of Newmarket and Maysville, you will avoid the heavy mountains, and find abundance of forage. If a part of your command is now at Winchester and a part back, that portion behind had better be turned on the Newmarket route."

It was important indeed to him that Sherman should arrive in good condition, and as speedily as possible. He could not move Thomas, the wheels of whose cannon were heavy and held him fast; Burnside could not be relieved until Sherman came up; and the completion of the design which Grant had entertained ever since his arrival at Chattanooga, was also necessarily deferred, till the Army of the Tennessee should be present. Then, the general of the three armies meant to make them coöperate, in a movement which should realize the advantages which Chattanooga had so long promised to the national armies. He wanted to convert it into a base for offensive operations; to drive off the enemy who ventured to threaten him from Lookout mountain and Missionary ridge; and, not only to relieve Burnside, but to throw open the door for grander operations into the interior of Georgia. All this he was waiting and planning to do. He deemed it nothing

that he should have lifted the Army of the Cumberland out of the sloughs and straits in which he found it struggling; he chafed at being confined by hostile mountains and impassable rivers; he was all unused to these defensive lines.

But Thomas's artillery must be furnished with horses; and Burnside, instead of moving offensively, was himself threatened with destruction. And, what was most tantalizing of all, the opportunity, which a confident enemy had offered to his watchful antagonist, could not be seized. Bragg had dared to detach an entire corps from his army, in the very face of Grant; and Grant, beholding this blunder, could not avail himself of the chance. This galled him; he was anxious indeed for Burnside, but still more anxious lest Sherman should not arrive in time to take advantage of Bragg's foolhardiness. Every day it seemed as if Sherman must arrive; every day he feared lest Longstreet might return. Pent up behind the mountains, like a lion in its cage, he watched the weakness of his prey, almost within his grasp; and yet, chained by necessities that would not let him strike, he could only wait till those necessities were past.

Yet Sherman was doing splendidly. There was no thought of censure for him. He had steamed four hundred miles, and was now marching four hundred more, along a hostile country. Fighting, skirmishing, bridging rivers, wading creeks, climbing mountains, building railroads, the army that had taken Vicksburg hurried to the relief of its old commander; ready to come at his call, anxious to fight again under his banners: while the Army of the Cumberland, conscious of its real courage and soldierly qualities, and aware that it had never yet been able to win all

the renown which it had fairly earned, was waiting for the moment to show these men from the further West, that it too could achieve victories and conquer difficulties. Eastern troops also were gathering, under the command of this captain from Illinois. Two corps from the Army of the Potomac had already watered with their blood the Western battle-fields; their mettle had been tried at Wauhatchie, and in the depths of the forest and of the night, they had resisted surprise and scaled the unfamiliar hills.

The continent shook with the tramp of advancing armies. Bridges were built in Eastern cities, for these soldiers to march over; engines were brought from Western towns, to transport their supplies. The greatest rivers of the republic—the Tennessee, and the Cumberland, and the Mississippi, and the Ohio—were crowded with steamers bringing clothes and shoes to those who were wearing out their garments in mighty marches; and ammunition and food to replace what had already been expended in the campaigns for Chattanooga. Over half the territory in rebellion, through these great mountain-ranges, and by the side of these rushing streams, along the desolated corn-fields, and amid the startled recesses of primeval forests, the bustle and the stir of war were rife. Two hundred thousand soldiers were concentrating from the East and the West, either in motion for this one battle-field, or guarding its approaches, or bringing up supplies, or waiting anxiously for those who were, with them, to fight the battle of Chattanooga. And over all these preparations, and all these armies, the spirit of one man was dominant.

On the 14th of November, Halleck telegraphed: “Advices received from East Tennessee indicate that

Burnside intends to abandon the defence of Little Tennessee river, and fall back before Longstreet, towards Cumberland gap and the upper valley. Longstreet is said to be near the Little Tennessee, with from twenty to forty thousand men; Burnside has about thirty thousand in all, and can hold his position; he ought not to retreat. I fear further delay may result in Burnside's abandonment of East Tennessee. This would be a terrible misfortune, and must be averted if possible." To this Grant replied, reassuringly: "Burnside certainly can detain Longstreet in the Tennessee valley, until we can make such moves, here, as will entirely free him from present dangers. I have asked him if he could hold the Knoxville and Clinton line for one week; if so, we can make moves here, that will save all danger in East Tennessee. Sherman is now at Bridgeport. He will commence moving to-morrow or next day.* . . . If Burnside can hold the line from Knoxville to Clinton, as I have asked him, for six days, I believe Bragg will be started back for south side of Oostanaula, and Longstreet cut off."

On the 16th, Halleck telegraphed that Burnside was hesitating whether to fight or retreat. "I fear he will not fight, although strongly urged to do so. Unless you can give him immediate assistance, he

* "Sherman is now at Bridgeport. He will commence moving to-morrow or next day, throwing one brigade from Whiteside into Trenton, thus threatening the enemy's left flank. The remainder of his force will pass over by Kelly's ferry, evading view from Lookout, and march up to the mouth of Chickamauga. pontoons are made and making, to throw across at that point, over which it is intended that Sherman's force, and one division of Thomas's, shall pass. This force will attack Missionary ridge, with the left flank of Thomas supporting, from here. In the mean time, Hooker will attack Lookout, and carry it if possible. If Burnside can hold the line," etc.

will surrender his position to the enemy. I have offered to give him more troops from Kentucky, but he says he cannot supply them. Immediate aid from you is of vital importance." The reply to this was on the same day: "I am pushing every thing to give Burnside early aid. I have impressed on him in the strongest terms, the necessity of holding on to his position. Sherman's troops are now at Bridgeport. They will march to-morrow, and an effort will be made to get a column between Bragg and Longstreet, as soon as possible."

Halleck's distrust of Burnside was not deserved. That officer's dispatches all indicate an intention to defend himself. On the 3d, he said: "The season is so far advanced, that I fear there must be great suffering in this command, unless we are fortunate enough to occupy Cleveland, and the line of railroad from here to Chattanooga." This did not look like falling back. "We will endeavor to check them, if they attempt to cross the Tennessee river. . . . It is clear to me that it will be a hard task to hold East Tennessee, with the enemy's forces as they are now situated, unless he is constantly occupied by forces immediately in his front. There are reports of very large bodies of troops concentrating against me, but I believe them all exaggerated." Burnside, indeed, was always sanguine; his fault was rather to under-rate difficulties, and to overestimate his own powers or means of conquering them, than to be cowed by what opposed him. He was more likely to risk too much, than to withdraw.

On the 12th, he said: "We will endeavor to hold in check any force that comes against us, until Thomas is ready. . . . This country certainly ought

to be held, if possible, until Thomas can force the enemy back." Just at this time, the telegraph lines were cut between Grant and Burnside, so that communication was interrupted for a day or two; it was, however, soon renewed. Burnside now held as far east as Bull's gap, and, south of that, he picketed the Tennessee river, from Washington to Kingston. His main force was stationed between Kingston and Knoxville, and all the country south of the Holston was occupied. "The command," said Burnside, "is in good health and spirits; very short of clothing, and on quarter rations of every thing but meat and bread. By running the mills in our possession, we keep a few days' supply of flour on hand, and have plenty of beef cattle. Unless our forces succeed in getting the railroad from Bridgeport to this place, we will probably suffer very much during the winter, even if we are able to keep possession of the country. We are threatened by a considerable force of the enemy on each flank, but I have no serious apprehension of immediate trouble."

On the 13th, he informed Grant that Longstreet was certainly on the Tennessee, opposite Loudon, with Wheeler's cavalry, and intending to cross the river. Burnside, accordingly, proposed to concentrate his forces and fall back, so as to draw Longstreet as far as possible from Bragg. "If we concentrate in the neighborhood of Loudon," he said, "the enemy will have the advantage of being able to reënforce from the rear; whereas, if we concentrate near this place" (Knoxville), "not only the present force of the enemy, but all reënforcements would have to march forty miles" (from Loudon) "before fighting.*

* The rebels held the railroad as far as Loudon.

Should he cross either river, and move to attack us in this neighborhood, he will be so far from the main body of Bragg's army, that he cannot be recalled in time to assist it, in case Thomas finds himself in condition to make an attack, after Sherman gets up."

On the 14th, Grant telegraphed him: "Sherman's advance has reached Bridgeport. His whole force will be ready to move from there, by Tuesday at furthest. *If you can hold Longstreet in check, until he gets up, or, by skirmishing and falling back, can avoid serious loss to yourself, and gain time, I will be able to force the enemy back from here, and place a force between Longstreet and Bragg that must inevitably make the former take to the mountain-passes by every available road, to get to his supplies.** Sherman would have been here before this, but for high water in Elk river, driving him some thirty miles up that river, to cross." On the same day, he again telegraphed to Burnside: "Can you hold the line from Knoxville to Clinton, for seven days? If so, I think the whole Tennessee valley can be secured from present danger." And again, at ten o'clock that night: "It is of the most vital importance that East Tennessee should be held. Take immediate steps to that end. Evacuate Kingston, if you think best. As I said in a previous dispatch, I think seven days more will enable us to make such movements as to make the whole valley secure, if you hold on that time." On the 15th, he said again: "I do not know how to impress on you the necessity of holding on to East Tennessee, in strong enough terms. Hold on to Knoxville, and that portion of the valley which you will necessarily

* The whole campaign which followed could hardly be better described than it was thus mapped out in advance.

possess, holding to that point. Should Longstreet move his whole force across the Little Tennessee river, an effort should be made to cut his pontoons on the stream, *even if it sacrificed half the cavalry of the Ohio army.* By holding on, and placing Longstreet between the Little Tennessee and Knoxville, he should not be allowed to escape with an army capable of doing any thing this winter. I can hardly conceive the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee. If I did so at all, it would be after losing most of the army. *I will not attempt to lay out a line of retreat.* I would harass and embarrass progress in every way possible, reflecting on the fact that *the Army of the Ohio is not the only army to resist the onward progress of the enemy."*

On the 17th, he said: "I have not heard from you since the 14th. What progress is Longstreet making, and what are your chances for defending yourself? Sherman's forces have commenced their movement from Bridgeport, threatening the enemy. This alone may turn Longstreet back, and if it does not, the attack will be prosecuted until we reach the roads over which all their supplies have to pass, while you hold East Tennessee." Later on the same day: "Your dispatch received. You are doing exactly what appears to me to be right. I want the enemy's progress retarded at every point, all it can be, only giving up each place when it becomes evident that it cannot longer be held, without endangering your force to capture. I think our movements, here, must cause Longstreet's recall within a day or two, if he is not successful before that time. Sherman moved this morning from Bridgeport, with one division. The remainder of his command moves in the

morning. *There will be no halt until a severe battle is fought*, or the railroads cut supplying the enemy."

On the night of the 14th, Sherman took the first boat from Bridgeport for Kelly's ferry, and rode into Chattanooga on the 15th, reporting to Grant. He then learned the part assigned to him in the coming drama; and, on the 16th, he rode out in company with Grant, Thomas, and other officers, to the hills on the north bank of the Tennessee, from which could be seen the camps of the enemy compassing Chattanooga, and the line of Missionary ridge, with its eastern terminus on Chickamauga creek, the point which Sherman was expected to take, and hold, and fortify. A mighty amphitheatre, where the actors were nearly ready to assume their parts, with distant mountains for spectators, while cloud-capped hills, and valleys shrouded in mist that was lifted to display the movements of armies, formed the stage.

All in Chattanooga were impatient for action; the apprehension for Burnside's safety had become acute, and the long expectation of Sherman's arrival was at last almost painful. The Army of the Tennessee had marched from Memphis, and been pushed as fast as the roads and the distance would permit; it was fatigued with its extraordinary exertions; many of the troops were shoeless; but Sherman saw enough of the condition of men and animals in Chattanooga, to inspire him with renewed energy. He returned at once to Bridgeport, to bring up his army, rowing a boat himself from Kelly's ferry.

On the 18th, Grant telegraphed to Halleck: "Dispatches from General Burnside received at ten p. m. yesterday. Troops had got back to Knoxville. Sherman's advance reached Lookout mountain to-day.

Movements will progress, threatening enemy's left flank, until forces can be got up, and thrown across the river to attack their right flank and Missionary ridge. A battle or a falling back of the enemy is inevitable, by Saturday, at the furthest. Burnside speaks hopefully."

That day, the written orders were issued to Sherman and Thomas, for the battle of Chattanooga.

CHAPTER XII.

Reconnoissances—Orders for battle of Chattanooga—Anxiety of government for Burnside—Difficulties and delays of Sherman—Battle-field of Chattanooga—Movement of Granger and Palmer—Capture of Orchard knoll—Advance of Thomas's line—Preparations for bridging the Tennessee—Arrival of Sherman at North Chickamauga—Seizure of mouth of South Chickamauga—Laying of pontoon bridge—Crossing of Sherman's army—Arrival of Howard—Sherman moves on Missionary hills—Seizes first heights—Intrenches—Position of rebels on Lookout mountain—Position of Hooker—Difficulty of ascent—Seizure of base—Ascent of mountain—Battle on mountain—Capture of mountain—Thomas connects with Hooker—Grant's dispatches on night of 24th—Rebels evacuate Lookout point—Position of troops on 25th—Sherman's battle-ground—Sherman's assaults—Bragg reinforces against Sherman—Weakening of rebel centre—Assault on rebel centre—Thomas's troops scale Missionary ridge—Rebel centre pierced—Missionary ridge carried—Rout of rebels—Large capture of men and guns—Hooker turns rebel left—Further captures—Rebel flight to Chickamauga—Sheridan's pursuit to Mission mills—Rebels withdraw from front of Sherman—Grant pushes out on 26th—Demoralization of rebels—Pursuit to Ringgold—Battle-field of Ringgold—Rebel resistance—Final retreat of rebels—Pursuit discontinued—Destruction of railroads and stores—Return of Thomas's command to Chattanooga—Sherman ordered to the Hiwassee—Summary of losses and gains—Character of battle of Chattanooga—Results.

GRANT had fully reconnoitred the country opposite Chattanooga, and north of the Tennessee, as far east as the mouth of the South Chickamauga; he had thus discovered that good roads existed from Brown's ferry up the river, and back of the first range of hills opposite Chattanooga, out of view of the rebel positions. Troops, crossing the bridge at Brown's ferry, could

be seen, and their numbers estimated, by the enemy; but, as soon as they passed in rear of the hills, Bragg must be at a loss to know whether they were moving to Knoxville, or were held on the north side of the river, for further operations at Chattanooga. It was also known that the north end of Missionary ridge was imperfectly guarded; and, that the left bank of the Tennessee, from the mouth of South Chickamauga creek westward, to the main rebel line in front of Chattanooga, was watched by a small cavalry picket only. These facts determined Grant's plan of operations. As his main object was to mass all the forces possible against Missionary ridge, converging towards its northern end, which covered Chickamauga station, Bragg's depot of supplies, Grant finally deemed it best to countermand Hooker's attack on Lookout mountain, and bring most of the troops intended for that operation, to the other end of the line.

The instructions to Thomas were in these words: "All preparations should be made for attacking the enemy's position on Missionary ridge, by Saturday morning, at daylight. . . . The general plan is for Sherman, with the force brought with him, strengthened by a division from your command, to effect a crossing of the Tennessee river, just below the mouth of the Chickamauga; his crossing to be protected by artillery from the heights of the north bank of the river (to be located by your chief of artillery), and to secure the heights" (Missionary ridge) "from the northern extremity to about the railroad tunnel, before the enemy can concentrate against him. You will coöperate with Sherman. The troops in Chattanooga valley should all be concentrated on your left flank, leaving only the necessary force to defend for-

tifications on the right and centre, and a movable column of one division, in readiness to move wherever ordered. This division should show itself as threateningly as possible, on the most practicable line for making an attack up the valley. Your effort, then, will be to form a junction with Sherman, making your advance well towards the northern end of Missionary ridge, and moving as near simultaneously with him as possible. The junction once formed, and the ridge carried, connection will be at once established between the two armies, by roads on the south bank of the river. Further movements will then depend on those of the enemy.

"Lookout valley, I think, will be easily held by Geary's division, and what troops you may still have there, of the old Army of the Cumberland. Howard's corps can then be held in readiness to act, either with you at Chattanooga, or with Sherman. It should be marched, on Friday night, to a position on the north side of the river, not lower down than the first pontoon bridge" (at Chattanooga); "and then held in readiness for such orders as may become necessary. All these troops will be provided with two days' cooked rations, in haversacks, and one hundred rounds of ammunition, on the person of each infantry soldier. . . ."

A copy of these instructions was forwarded to Sherman, for his guidance, and he was also informed: "It is particularly desirable that a force should be got through to the railroad, between Cleveland and Dalton, and Longstreet thus cut off from communication with the south; but, being confronted by a large force here, strongly located, it is not easy to tell how this is to be effected, until the result of our first

effort is known." Grant always refused to hamper either himself or his subordinates with complicated plans of battle, in advance. He knew too well the constant and unexpected chances of war, and had too often availed himself of these, to do more than direct the positions and opening movements of his troops. He got his machinery in order, and touched the springs; but, after that, he expected to guide its action by the light and aid of events, as they occurred.

As soon as Sherman reached Bridgeport, he set about moving his army to the front. As Bragg seemed to be looking for an attack on his left flank, Grant attempted to confirm this notion, and ordered Sherman to march his leading division direct from Whiteside to Trenton. From there, its position was advanced each day, the old camp-fires being kept up at night, and new ones built when the command rested, so as to give the appearance of concentrating a large force in that direction. A portion of the division even ascended the western slope of Lookout mountain. The remainder of Sherman's force was ordered to pass over a new road just made, from Whiteside to Kelly's ferry; this was concealed from the rebels, and it was hoped they would suppose that Sherman's whole force was moving up Lookout valley.

On the 21st, Halleck telegraphed that dispatches from Tennessee, east of Knoxville, contained rumors that Burnside was surrounded. "At any rate, we have no communication with him. The President seems very anxious that some immediate move should be made for his relief. You, however, as fully understand the exigencies of the case as any one here

possibly can. Longstreet's force may be larger than was supposed." Communication with Burnside was, indeed, quite cut off; Grant knew, from other sources than Halleck, that fighting had begun in East Tennessee, and that Burnside had been driven into Knoxville, and attacked there; but this was all he could learn.

Troops had been moving night and day, ever since Sherman's arrival at Bridgeport, but the bridge of boats at Brown's ferry was frail, and, although it was used without the intermission of an hour, Sherman's passage was slow. The roads from the ferry to Chattanooga were greatly cut up, as well as encumbered with the wagons of other troops, stationed along the road; but on the afternoon of the 20th, Sherman reached Hooker's headquarters, and there met Grant's orders for a general attack on the following day. It was simply impossible for him to obey. Only one division, John E. Smith's, was in position. Ewing was still in Trenton, and the other two were toiling along the miserable roads from Shell-mound to Chattanooga. No troops were ever in better condition or labored harder to fulfil their part. But Sherman was obliged to notify Grant of the impossibility of performing it, and the attack was again postponed.

To Halleck, Grant said: "I ordered an attack here, two weeks ago, but it was impossible to move artillery;" and, now, Thomas had to borrow teams from Sherman, in order to move a portion of his artillery to the places where it was to be used. Sherman had used almost superhuman efforts to get up, and still was delayed; and Thomas could take only about one gun with each battery. "I have never

felt," said Grant, "such restlessness before, as I have at the fixed and immovable condition of the Army of the Cumberland. The quartermaster-general states that the loss of animals here will exceed ten thousand. Those left are scarcely able to carry themselves."

It looked, indeed, as if Burnside was to be lost. These unavoidable delays and difficulties still chained Grant to his position, while the Army of the Ohio had begun the battle for its existence. The supplies that had at last reached Nashville, for Burnside, were stopped, as they might never be needed: "General Burnside is now engaged with the enemy. You need not start the clothing for him, until the result is known." "The rations for General Burnside could not be sent, now, even if there was water enough in the Cumberland, until the result of present movements by Longstreet is known. I think it better, therefore, to let the boats now loaded, discharge and return."

On the 20th, Grant wrote to Sherman: "To-morrow morning, I had first set for your attack. I see now it cannot possibly be made then; but can you not get up for the following morning? Order Ewing down" (from Trenton), "immediately, fixing the time for his starting so that the roads and bridges may be full all the time. Every effort must be made to get up in time to attack, on Sunday morning."

A heavy rain-storm occurring on the 20th, and lasting all of the 21st, still further delayed Sherman. On the 21st, he got his second division over Brown's ferry bridge, and Ewing was up from Trenton; but, the bridge broke repeatedly, and delays occurred which no human sagacity could have prevented or foreseen. All labored, night and day; and, on Sun-

day, while Sherman was bringing up his troops, behind the hills on the north side of the Tennessee, Thomas, in order to conceal the real nature of this movement, brought Howard's corps, which had come up from Lookout valley in advance of Sherman, across into Chattanooga. This was done that the rebels might suppose the troops at Brown's ferry were reënforcing Chattanooga. Howard, accordingly, crossed on Sunday, and took up a position in full view of the enemy, who, from his commanding position on Missionary ridge, looked down on all of the movements in the valley. Those, however, which affected him most closely, were made behind the hills. The operations of this day, at Chattanooga, were like those scenes in a play, which fill up the time and distract the attention of the audience, while preparations for the real climax are going on in the rear.

At this crisis, Brigadier-General Wilcox, who was in the eastern part of the Tennessee valley, dispatched to Grant that he too was in trouble, threatened by movements from Virginia, and unable to get orders or aid from Burnside, his immediate commander. Grant replied, on the 20th: "If you can communicate with General Burnside, say to him that our attack on Bragg will commence in the morning. If successful, such a move will be made as, I think, will relieve East Tennessee, if he can hold out. . . . If you receive no further instructions from General Burnside, follow those he has given you. Retreat should not be allowed. . . . Can you not concentrate your forces and raise the siege at Knoxville?"

Once more, on the 21st, Grant was obliged to say to Thomas: "I have just received a report of the

position of Sherman's forces. The rain, last night, has thrown them back so much, that it will be impossible to get into position for action to-morrow morning. He will be up, however, against all calamities that can be foreseen, to commence on Monday morning." But the very elements conspired to protract Grant's anxiety. The heavy rains caused a rise in the Tennessee, and the bridges at Chattanooga and Brown's ferry were swept away; and, on the 22d, yet once more, Grant said to the commander of the Army of the Cumberland: "The bridges at Brown's ferry being down to-day, and the excessively bad roads since the last rain, will render it impossible for Sherman to get up either of his remaining two divisions, in time for the attack to-morrow morning. You can make your arrangements for this delay."

In his dispatch to Sherman, on this day, Grant said: ". . . . Let me know, to-morrow, at as early an hour as you can, if you will be entirely ready for Tuesday morning." At this juncture, he violated military etiquette, and sent a dispatch direct to Wood, who commanded a division in Sherman's army: "You must get up with your force to-morrow, without fail. Pass the wagon-train, and leave it to follow with rear-guard. If you cannot get up with your artillery, come without it, leaving it to follow. I will expect the head of your column at Brown's ferry, by ten A. M. to-morrow, without fail."

But there proved to be compensations for all this anxiety and all these postponements. On the night of the 22d, a deserter came in from the rebel army, and reported that Bragg was falling back from Missionary ridge. Grant had received a letter from

Bragg, on the 20th, which seemed to corroborate this: "As there may still be some non-combatants in Chattanooga, I deem it proper to notify you that prudence would dictate their early withdrawal." The artifice was too palpable: no general would so ostentatiously notify an antagonist of his intention to attack. But the news brought by the deserter precipitated the battle that had been trembling on the verge so long. Grant was unwilling to allow Bragg to withdraw in good order; and, early on the morning of the 23d, he instructed Thomas to "ascertain at once the truth or falsity of this report. If Bragg is really falling back, Sherman can commence at once laying his pontoon trains" (at the mouth of the South Chickamauga), "and we can save a day." Thomas, accordingly, directed a demonstration, in order to drive in the rebel pickets, and develop the enemy's real line.

Four streams empty into the Tennessee, near Chattanooga, bounding and dividing what was destined to be the battle-field. Lookout creek was near the extreme right of Grant's line, and west of Lookout mountain; about half a mile east of the mountain, runs Chattanooga creek; then, Citico creek, some two miles further east; and, away at the northern end of Missionary ridge, the South Chickamauga. Still north and east of this, but on the north side of the Tennessee, the North Chickamauga mingles its waters with those of the great stream which receives all the affluents of this region. Missionary ridge runs nearly north and south, and these various currents, breaking through its gorges or those of Lookout mountain, flow north and west. The course of the North Chickamauga, however, is directly oppo-

site to that of the rivers on the south side of the Tennessee.

Thomas's line, in front of Chattanooga, reached from the Chattanooga creek to the Citico, and was about a mile out from the town. It had been rendered formidable, during the two months which had elapsed since the defeat of Rosecrans; advantage had been taken of various hills in Chattanooga valley; and, at the highest and most advanced point on the line, a strong redoubt had been erected, called Fort Wood. Twenty-two heavy guns were in position along this line. The rebel pickets in front of Fort Wood came into close contact with the national outguards, and nearly a mile beyond them, was the first rebel line.*

In obedience to Grant's instructions, Thomas ordered Major-General Gordon Granger, commanding the Fourth corps, to form his troops, and advance directly in front of Fort Wood, and thus develop the strength of the enemy. Major-General Palmer, commanding the Fourteenth corps, was directed to support Granger's right with Baird's division, refused and in echelon; and Johnson's division, of the same corps, was held under arms, in the intrenchments, in readiness to reënforce at any point. Howard's corps was formed in mass, behind the centre of Granger.

* Grant often rode out on the picket line, and once was on the eastern bank of Chattanooga creek, when a party of rebel soldiers were drawing water on the other side. They wore blue coats; and, thinking they were his own men, Grant asked them to whose command they belonged. They answered, "Longstreet's corps;" whereupon Grant called out: "What are you doing in those coats, then?" The rebels replied: "Oh! all our corps wear blue." This was a fact, which Grant had forgotten. The rebels then scrambled up on their own side of the stream, little thinking that they had been talking with the commander of the national army.

The two divisions of Granger's command, Sheridan* and Wood's, were accordingly formed in front of Fort Wood, Sheridan on the right, Wood on the left, with his left extending nearly to Citico creek. The formation was complete by two P. M.

At an early hour, the heavy guns in Fort Wood and the smaller works, began to wake the echoes of the valley; the national cannon on Moccasin point also opened on the enemy, who replied from the top of Lookout mountain, and from his formidable line along the crest of Missionary ridge. The idlest looker-on in Chattanooga could perceive that the long-expected drama was about to open, and the day be made historical.

At a given signal, Granger moved forward into the plain, in front and on the right of Fort Wood. The fog that had lain in the valley all day was lifted, and the rays of the sun glanced back from twenty thousand bayonets. The superb pageant went on, under the eyes of curious crowds on Missionary ridge; but the troops moved with such precision, that the enemy mistook their evolutions for a parade. The rebel pickets leaned on their muskets, and quietly watched the advance of Thomas's battalions. This unmeant deception was heightened by the troops remaining nearly half an hour in position, and in full view of the rebel army, before they received the final order to advance. At last, a dozen shots of the national skirmishers scattered the rebel pickets, who fled in haste through a strip of timber, lying between the open ground and some secondary eminences, or which the first line of rebel rifle-pits was built.

* Major-General P. H. Sheridan, who in this battle, for the first time, fought a division immediately under the eye of Grant.

Wood followed rapidly, directly towards the front, driving, not only the rebel pickets, but their reserves. A heavy fire of musketry was poured upon the advancing troops as they entered the strip of woods: but they fell rapidly upon the grand guards stationed on the first line of Bragg's rifle-pits, captured about two hundred men, and secured themselves in their new positions, before the enemy had sufficiently recovered from his surprise to attempt to send reënforcements from his main camp on the ridge. Sheridan now moved up rapidly on Wood's right, and in fifteen minutes, the rebels had abandoned their whole advanced line: nothing remained to them west of the ridge, but the rifle-pits at its foot. This secured to Grant a mound of some importance, known as Orchard knoll, and a low range of hills running south, about half way between Chattanooga and Missionary ridge. These points were fortified during the night; breast-works were erected, and artillery was put in position; strong pickets were thrown out to the front, and Howard's corps was moved up, in line with Granger's left, and his position also fortified. Twenty thousand men of the national army were thus in line of battle, a full mile in advance of the outposts which, at noon of that day, had been occupied by the enemy. One hundred and eleven men had been killed or wounded; perhaps as many of the enemy fell,* and over two hundred prisoners were left in Thomas's hands.

But the effect of this day's fighting cannot be measured by the casualties. The enemy had been driven from his front line of intrenchments; his

* I have been unable to find any rebel report of the losses on this day.

prestige was shaken; his demoralization was begun; while, on the other hand, a wonderful confidence was diffused throughout the Army of the Cumberland, which had met once more and driven back its earliest antagonist; the spot on its escutcheon was already cleared; and the men lay down upon their arms, anxious for the renewal of the combat, when their old and splendid reputation should be fully redeemed. Until nightfall, the cannon on Missionary ridge vied with the artillery of Fort Wood; but at last the uproar ceased, and the great hosts slept calmly among the hills.

The report of the deserter was evidently not intended to deceive; but he had mistaken Bragg's movements. Buckner's division had gone to join Longstreet on the 22d, and another had started, but was brought back in consequence of this attack.*

Meanwhile, Sherman was still laboring up amid almost impassable difficulties. His rear division, Osterhaus's, was entirely cut off by the broken bridge; but Grant ordered him to go into battle with the other three, supported by Jefferson C. Davis's division, of the Fourteenth corps, which was sent to Sherman, from Thomas's army. Osterhaus, being detained on the south side of the Tennessee, was ordered, unless he could get across by eight o'clock on the morning of the 24th, to report to Hooker, who was instructed, in this event, to attack Lookout mountain, as contemplated in the original plan. All these various orders emanated from Grant. Sometimes, merely verbal instructions were given by him to Thomas or Sherman; but no movement of a

* See General B. R. Johnson's (rebel) report of operations of Buckner's division.

division was made, during the campaign, which was not expressly directed by the commander of the triple army. He was on every part of the field, at the immediate front; and from Fort Wood, the highest point in the national fortifications, had watched the assault of Granger's corps. He was so frequently exposed to fire, that great anxiety was felt for his safety.

At last, on the night of the 23d, Sherman's third division arrived opposite the mouth of the South Chickamauga, about four miles above Chattanooga. Davis's division was waiting for him on the north bank of the Tennessee, where the crossing was to be effected. Pontoons were necessary for bridging the river here; and, as it was intended to occupy the north bank of the South Chickamauga, that stream also must be bridged, as well as the Tennessee. The South Chickamauga is a hundred and eighty feet wide, with a sluggish current; and the Tennessee, at the point designated for crossing, is fourteen hundred feet across. At this time, there was, in the whole Department of the Cumberland, only one bridge-train, and that was scattered from Bridgeport to Chattanooga. Saw-mills, however, were kept running night and day; and boats were collected or made, and brought up through the woods, not exposed to the view of the enemy at any point on the route.

By Friday night, November 20th, a hundred and sixteen pontoons were hidden in North Chickamauga creek, which empties into the Tennessee, five miles above the mouth of the South Chickamauga. This stream offered such facilities for launching the boats, that it was determined to put the pontoons in the

water there, and float them down, loaded with soldiers, to the point of crossing—a quicker and quieter operation than that of launching them at the place of passage. The creek was cleared of snags, and all the citizens of the vicinity were put under strict guard, to prevent the transmission of information to the enemy. The remainder of the bridge material was packed behind the river ridge of hills, and within four hundred yards from the place of crossing, entirely concealed from the rebels.* Seven hundred and fifty oarsmen were selected from the two armies; and these, with Giles A. Smith's brigade, were placed at the head of Sherman's column, and marched, under cover of the hills, to the mouth of the North Chickamauga.

Before midnight of the 23d of November, the pontoons were loaded with thirty armed men each; and at two o'clock on the morning of the 24th, the whole fleet, carrying Giles Smith's brigade, pushed carefully out of the North Chickamauga, and then dropped silently down the Tennessee. So perfect were the arrangements, that even the national pickets along the bank of the river did not know when the boats had passed. Floating quietly by the rebel sentinels, before daylight they reached their destination, a point just above the mouth of the South Chickamauga. A small force then jumped ashore, and advancing rapidly, captured the enemy's out-guard, twenty in number, before the rebels were aware of the presence of a foe. Smith then pushed

* All the engineer operations during this entire campaign were under the direction and personal supervision of Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, whom Grant had promoted to be chief engineer of the Military Division of the Mississippi.

rapidly below the mouth of the Chickamauga, disembarked the rest of his brigade, and dispatched the pontoons back for other loads. The remainder of Morgan L. Smith's division was quickly ferried across, that of John E. Smith following. The men at once set to work intrenching themselves, with the industry of beavers; and, by daylight, two divisions, of about eight thousand men, were landed on the south bank of the Tennessee, and had thrown up a good *tête de pont*.

As soon as day dawned, the building of the bridge began. The rise in the river had increased its width, and there were not boats enough for more than one bridge across the Tennessee. Pontoons had to be taken from the ferry, as fast as they were needed for the bridge; but a steamer was also sent up from Chattanooga, which assisted in carrying troops across. All these operations took place under cover of an artillery force from Thomas's army, posted on the northern shore, and the horses for which had been furnished by Sherman.* Sherman's batteries were first brought up to the point of crossing, and the horses then detached and sent back to bring up Thomas's artillery; after which, the same horses were again harnessed to their own guns, and made ready to join the advance of Sherman.

Fourscore boats were plying back and forth across the swollen stream, each one carrying from the northern to the southern shore, from thirty-five to forty soldiers. The pontoon bridge already stretched half way across the river, and the engineers were beginning work on the southern end. Forty pieces

* Brigadier-General J. M. Brannan, Thomas's chief of artillery, had charge of all the artillery operations of importance in this battle.

of artillery * ranged along the northern bank, some on the hills, and others at the edge of the stream, guarded the crossing; and ten thousand soldiers were massed on either shore, waiting to march, or to cross. A column was still coming up over the western hills, and the troops from the North Chickamauga, having protected the pontoon fleet while it lay hidden in that distant stream, were also advancing to the rendezvous. Sherman stood at the centre of the bridge, directing its completion. Just at this moment, Howard appeared in person; having come up with three regiments from Chattanooga, along the southern bank of the Tennessee. The last boat of the bridge was being placed in the centre of the stream, as Howard arrived and introduced himself, across the slight gulf which yet intervened. Sherman was on the northern end, gesticulating and talking eagerly, as was his wont; and, as soon as the boat was put in its place, he sprang across and shook the hand of Howard. The junction between the Armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland was formed.

At twenty minutes past twelve, the bridge was complete; that across the Chickamauga had been finished a little while before, giving communication with the regiments left on the northern shore. Soon after mid-day, Sherman's third division was on the south side of the Tennessee, with men, horses, and artillery; and the whole command was ready to attack the Missionary hills. By three o'clock, a brigade of cavalry (Long's) had crossed both bridges, and was on its march to cut the rebel communication with Chickamauga station.

* Ten batteries.—See Brannan's report.

At one P. M., Sherman marched from the river in three columns, in echelon; the left under Morgan L. Smith, was the column of direction, and followed substantially the course of Chickamauga creek; the centre, John E. Smith, in columns, doubled on the centre, at full brigade intervals, moved to the right and rear; and the right, under Ewing, was in column at the same distance to the right and rear, prepared to deploy to the right, on the supposition that an enemy would be met in that direction. Each head of column was covered by a good line of skirmishers, with supports. A light drizzling rain prevailed, and the clouds hung low, covering Sherman's movements from the enemy's tower of observation on Lookout Mountain; for, from Hooker's position at Wauhatchie to the mouth of the North Chickamauga, a distance of thirteen miles, was now one battle-field.

Sherman soon gained the foot hills; his skirmishers pushed on up the face of the hill, followed by their supports; and by half-past three P. M., the desired point was reached, without loss. A brigade of each division was pushed up rapidly, to the top of the hill; and the enemy, for the first time, seemed aware of the movement. He opened with artillery, but too late, for Sherman was already in possession. Several guns were soon dragged up the steep acclivity, and answered the rebel defiance. The enemy's skirmishers made one or two ineffectual dashes, and, about four, a sharp engagement ensued with musketry and artillery; but, at last, the rebels drew off, leaving Sherman to fortify what he had gained. He had possession of two high points, with a deep depression immediately in his front, between him and the hill over the tunnel, which was his chief objective point.

Until now, he had supposed that Missionary ridge was a continuous hill, but this aperture intervening was sure to cost him dear to cross. A brigade of each division was left on the hill already gained, one closed the gap to Chickamauga creek, two were drawn back to the base of the hill, in reserve; and a division on the right was extended down into the plain. Sherman's line thus crossed the ridge in a general direction, facing southeast.

The Army of the Cumberland, having done, on the 23d, what Grant had intended should be done on the 24th, was now in advance of the movements of Sherman. Thomas, therefore, simply bettered and strengthened his position during Tuesday, and pushed the Eleventh corps forward, across Citico creek, and along the south bank of the Tennessee. Howard had some fighting, but none of a serious character; and, before night, he connected Sherman's new position with the main army at Chattanooga; a brigade was left for this purpose with Sherman, and Howard himself returned to his own corps, further to the right. The next day he reported to Sherman, and remained under his orders during the rest of the campaign.

As night closed in, Sherman ordered Davis to keep one of his brigades at the bridge; another close up to Sherman's main position; and still another intermediate. Thus they passed the night, heavy details being kept at work in the intrenchments on the hill. The thick mist that had overspread Look out, and rolled in immense masses up the river, had gradually filled the entire basin of Chattanooga; so that Sherman, while slowly extending his lines to the right, till at last they came into communication

with the left wing of Howard's corps, had been veiled entirely from the watchful eyes of friend and foe. But, during the night, the clouds cleared away, and a cold frost filled the air; the sky was bright, and his camp-fires now revealed both to the enemy and to the army in Chattanooga, that Sherman was in position on Missionary ridge.

But, while these important operations had been going on all day on the left, others full as interesting were transpiring on Lookout mountain. Since the battle of Wauhatchie, Hooker had remained in Lookout valley, with the Eleventh and a part of the Twelfth corps, opposite the left of the rebel line. The Eleventh corps, however, as has been seen, had been ordered to the national left, on the 22d; and Osterhaus's division was to have followed. But, when it was finally found impossible to rebuild the bridge at Brown's ferry, in time for Osterhaus to cross, Hooker was instructed to attack the point of Lookout mountain, as had been originally intended. His command, now, consisted of Osterhaus's division of the Fourteenth corps, Cruft's of the Fourth, and Geary's of the Twelfth; making an aggregate of about ten thousand men. No one of these divisions had ever fought near the others. Geary was from the Army of the Potomac, Cruft from the Army of the Cumberland, and Osterhaus from the Army of the Tennessee.

At this time, the enemy's pickets formed a continuous line along the right bank of Lookout creek, with his reserves in the valleys, while the main rebel force was encamped in the hollow, half way up the slope of the mountain. The summit itself was held by three brigades of Stevenson's division; and these

were comparatively safe, as the only means of access from the west, was by trails allowing the passage of but a single man at a time, and these trails were held, at the top, by rebel pickets. On the Chattanooga side of the mountain, which is less precipitous, a good mountain-road exists, communicating with the summit by zigzag lines. Hooker believed, if he could gain this road, the rebels must evacuate their position, as it was their only line of communication with Bragg.

The ascent of the mountain is steep and thickly wooded; beetling crags peer out all over its sides from the masses of heavy foliage, and, at the summit, a lofty palisaded crest rises perpendicularly, as many as sixty or eighty feet. On the northern slope, about midway between the summit and the Tennessee, a plateau of open and arable land belts the mountain. There, a continuous line of earthworks had been thrown up; while redoubts, redans, and rifle-pits were scattered lower down the acclivity, to repel assaults from the direction of the river. On each flank were epaulements, walls of stone, and abatis; and, in the valley itself, at the foot of the mountain, long lines of earthworks, of still greater extent. The entire force, for the defence of the mountain, consisted of six brigades, or about seven thousand men.

Hooker's camps were all on the western side of Lookout creek, at the base of Raccoon mountain. Geary's division, supported by Whitaker's brigade of Cruft's division, was ordered to proceed up the valley, cross the creek near Wauhatchie, and then march down, sweeping the rebels from the right bank of the stream. The other brigade (Grose's)

from the Fourth corps, was to seize and repair the bridge across Lookout creek, just below the railroad; while Osterhaus was to march up, from Brown's ferry to the place of crossing, and then support the movement of Geary, or furnish support for the batteries.

Grose advanced promptly to the bridge, drove the enemy away, after some slight skirmishing, and set about repairs. The rebels were attracted by these operations, and did not observe the movements of Geary, which were also concealed by a heavy mist that overhung the mountain. Geary, therefore, crossed the creek at eight o'clock, captured the entire picket of forty-two men stationed to defend it, and commenced to climb directly up the mountain-side. At this very moment, the rebels could be seen from the valley, filing down from their camps on the northern side of the mountain, and moving into their rifle-pits, to resist the movements of Grose. Osterhaus now came up, and skirmished briskly for a while. By eleven o'clock, the bridge was completed; Osterhaus's artillery was in excellent position, and the rebel force at the foot of the hill either fled, or was killed or captured.

Simultaneously with these operations, the troops of Geary were pushing up the mountain; his right passed directly under the muzzles of the enemy's guns on the summit, climbing over ledges and boulders, up hill and down, dislodging the enemy wherever he attempted to make a stand. Finding themselves vigorously pushed by a strong column on their left and rear, the rebels began to fall back; but their resistance was obstinate. Wood and Grose, by this time, had crossed Lookout river, and joined the

left of Geary, as he faced down the valley; and the whole line pressed on, over obstacles of the most extraordinary character. It was twelve o'clock, when Geary's advance rounded the peak of the mountain, and emerged on the plateau of open land where the rebel fortifications were strongest.

The whole column now coming up, Hooker's line was extended from the base of the palisade rock on his right, to the foot of Lookout, near the mouth of Chattanooga creek. The country, here, was so rugged that the fighting was in reality only skirmishing, but continuous fire was kept up for hours. After two or three sharp conflicts, the plateau was cleared, and the enemy driven from his walls and pits, near the only house on the mountain-side. At two o'clock, operations were arrested by the darkness. The clouds, which had hovered over and enveloped the summit, and favored the movements of Hooker, had been gradually settling, lower and lower, and from the moment that the peak of the mountain was rounded, it was only from the rattle of musketry, and the flashes of fire through the clouds, or the occasional glimpses of lines and standards, as the fog rose or fell, that those in the valley could trace the progress of the battle. At four, Hooker informed his immediate superior, that his line was impregnable, and commanded the enemy's defences with an enfilading fire. Lookout mountain was carried.

At a quarter-past five, direct communication was opened with Chattanooga, and Carlin's brigade, from the northern valley, was sent to Hooker's support. Carlin had to cross Chattanooga creek, and did not effect the junction without serious fighting, but finally reported to Hooker, and was assigned to duty on the

left of his line. Thus, on the night of the 24th, the national forces maintained one unbroken line, with open communications from the north end of Lookout mountain, through Chattanooga valley, to the further end of Missionary ridge.

Still, the firing continued in the night, on the mountain. The rebels, at dark, had not left the topmost crest, and their signal-light on the extreme summit, waving to and fro, revealed to the luckless chief on Missionary ridge the extent of his calamity. Every now and then, spluttering discharges of musketry, muffled by distance, could be heard in the valley, and fierce jets of flame, like those once seen on Sinai, seemed to issue from the mountain-side. The long lines of camp-fires marked the advance or retreat of the combatants, and cries of defiance or suffering came down from the clouds, as if supernatural armies were contending in the air. But, finally, all the noise of battle ceased; the wounded, writhing in pain, and the sentinels walking their rounds, were almost the only ones not reposing from the fatigues and excitements of the day, and an unusual quiet settled over the whole long line.

The generals, however, had little time for repose. At midnight, Sherman got his orders from Grant to attack the enemy at dawn, and notice that Thomas also would attack right early. Hooker was instructed to advance in the morning, and endeavor to intercept the rebel retreat from the mountain; if, indeed, the enemy should not have already withdrawn. In that event, Hooker was to move on the Rossville road, carry the pass at Rossville, and operate on the enemy's left and rear. To Wilcox, on the night of the 24th, Grant said: "... Fighting has been go-

ing on here for two days ; and, as soon as possible, I shall send a force up the valley, sufficient to relieve Burnside, if he holds out. If you can communicate this fact to him, do so."

At half-past five, on the 24th, Grant telegraphed to Washington : "The fight to-day progressed favorably. Sherman carried the end of Missionary ridge, and his right is now at the tunnel, and left at Chickamauga creek. Troops from Lookout valley carried the point of the mountain, and now hold the eastern slope and point, high up. Hooker reports two thousand prisoners taken, besides which, a small number have fallen into our hands, from Missionary ridge." The President replied, in person, to this, on the morning of the 25th : "Your dispatches as to fighting on Monday and Tuesday, are here. Well done. Many thanks to all. Remember Burnside." Halleck also telegraphed : "I congratulate you on the success thus far of your plans. I fear that Burnside is hard pushed, and that any further delay may prove fatal. I know that you will do all in your power to relieve him."

During the night of the 24th, the rebels evacuated Lookout mountain, crossing Chattanooga creek, burning the bridges, and retreating, by Rossville gap, to Missionary ridge. When the fog rose, nothing was to be seen in the valley, but the deserted and burning camps of the enemy. On the summit, the national flag was waving ; the Eighth Kentucky volunteers had been foremost to reach the crest, and displayed their colors there at sunrise. Hooker ordered two regiments to hold the mountain, and, at ten o'clock, his main column, with Osterhaus leading, was on the march for Rossville, and sweeping across

Chattanooga valley, now abandoned by the enemy. The destruction of the bridges delayed him, however, for four hours, and Thomas was not to attack until Hooker got into position.

The morning of the 25th of November broke raw and cold, but the sun shone brilliantly from a cloudless sky, and the great battle-field was all disclosed. To the north and east, was the railroad junction of Chattanooga, which gave the position so much of its value; the roads by which Grant sought communication with Burnside, and those along which the rebel general was drawing his supplies. Behind the national forces, the impetuous river made its tortuous way, never for a mile pursuing the same course; while the Cumberland mountains and Walden's ridge formed the massive background. Grant's main line faced south and east, towards Missionary ridge, now not a mile away. Lookout mountain, on the national right, bounded the view, Hooker marching down its sides, and through the valley of Chattanooga creek, to Rossville gap. Sherman had gained the extreme left of the ridge, but immense difficulties in his front were yet to overcome; and, all along the crest, were the batteries and trenches filled with rebel soldiers, in front of the Army of the Cumberland. Bragg's headquarters were plainly visible, on the ridge, at the centre of his now contracted line, while Grant's own position was on the knoll that had been wrested from the rebels, the day before. From this point, the whole battle-field was displayed; trees, houses, fences, all landmarks in the valley had been swept away for camps; and the two antagonists, each from his high position, looked down upon the board where the great game was playing. Thomas,

and various of the corps and division generals of the Army of the Cumberland, were with Grant, on Orchard knoll.

Before dawn, Sherman was in the saddle, and, attended by his staff, rode to the extreme left of his position, near Chickamauga river, and thence up the hill which he had seized the day before. In the dim light of morning, the line of attack lay before him, towards Missionary ridge, his wings supporting him on either flank; but quite a valley yawned between his troops and the next hill of the series. This next hill presented steep sides, the one to the west partially cleared, but the other covered with the native forest. The crest was narrow and wooded. The further point of the hill was held by the rebels, with a breastwork of logs and fresh earth, the breastwork filled with men; and, on a still higher hill, beyond the tunnel, the enemy was seen in yet greater force. From the last-named point, the rebels had a plunging fire on the hill in dispute. The gorge between, through which several roads as well as the railroad tunnel pass, could not be seen from Sherman's position; but it formed a natural place of arms, where the enemy covered his masses, to resist the contemplated movement of turning his right and endangering communication with his depot at Chickamauga.

The sun had already risen before the preparations were complete, and the bugle sounded forward. The three brigades of Cockrell, Alexander, and Lightburn were to hold the hill already gained, as a key-point; Corse, with as much of his brigade as could operate along the narrow ridge, was to attack from the right centre; Morgan L. Smith was to move

along the east base of Missionary ridge; and Loomis, in like manner, along the west base, supported by two reserve brigades, under John E. Smith.

The assaulting force advanced in a deployed line, preceded by strong skirmishers, and moved up the face of the hill to the very rifle-pits of the enemy. About eighty yards from the rebel intrenchments, was a secondary ridge, which was gained at once, and firmly held. The extreme end of the rebel work was also carried, and a strong point made, on the crest of the nearest ridge. Sherman then pressed his attack to within pistol-shot of the main rebel line, and advanced his left division, under Morgan L. Smith, so as to cut off the enemy from the railroad bridge to Chickamauga; but no further advantage was secured. The contest was close, lasting several hours; ground was given and lost, but the first position was all that was attained. Neither, however, could the most determined efforts of the enemy dislodge the national troops from the important point they had gained. Persistently, stubbornly, and well, they fought. Corse was wounded at ten o'clock.

Sherman, at this time, threatened not only the right flank of the enemy, but his rear and stores at Chickamauga station; and Grant's real object was completely gained, for Bragg was forced to weaken his centre to support the rebel right.* Column

* General Sherman told me that he did not consider the hill for which he fought on November 23d, as very important in itself, and therefore used only three regiments, in the original attack; but he made as much noise and show as he could, to alarm Bragg for the safety of that flank, and of the railroad bridge, just in rear. His effort was, to induce Bragg to detach as much as possible from the centre, and so to weaken that, which Sherman knew, from Grant, would be the critical point of the battle. It was, at first, supposed that Bragg, finding Sherman on the end of Missionary ridge, would at once draw from his centre,

after column of the rebels was soon streaming towards Sherman; gun after gun poured a concentric fire from every hill and spur that gave a view of his ground. But Loomis and Corse's commands pressed forward; and, as the right of the assaulting column became exposed, the two brigades of John E. Smith were sent to its support. They moved over an open field, on the mountain-side, and under a heavy fire of musketry and cannon, close up to the works of the enemy. The crest was so narrow that they necessarily occupied the west face of the hill, and, there, for some time, they lay, partially covered from fire. Their right, however, rested near the head of the ravine; and the enemy took advantage of this. Having massed in great strength, at the tunnel gorge, he moved a large force, under cover of the ground and the thick bushes, and suddenly appeared on the right and rear of Smith's command. Unexpectedly attacked from this quarter, Smith fell back across the open field, about two hundred yards, but formed in good order, on the edge of the timber; while the column which had attacked him was speedily driven back to its own intrenchments, by the assaulting column proper. This occurred at about three o'clock in the afternoon.

Grant was watching the progress of the fight from Orchard knoll, and, seeing the danger to which Sherman was exposed, he now ordered Baird's division, of the Fourteenth corps, to support the extreme left; but Sherman sent word that he had all the

to attack vehemently on the right; but this Bragg did not do; and then Grant ordered Sherman to attack Bragg, which evidently produced the same effect—weakening the enemy's line, and facilitating Grant's real object—to break the rebel centre.

force necessary, and Baird was put in position on Thomas's left. Baird, accordingly, marched by the flank, in front of Fort Wood, to take position on Howard's right. This movement was plainly perceived by the enemy, and impressed him with the idea that Grant's main assault was to be made on the rebel right; a massive column of Bragg's forces soon was seen to move northward along the crest of the ridge, regiment after regiment filing towards Sherman.

Meanwhile, the day was waning, and Thomas's attack, which was to relieve Sherman, had not been made. Grant looked eagerly for the advance of Hooker, moving north along the ridge, with his left in Chattanooga valley and his right thrown east of the ridge. This approach was to be the signal for storming the ridge, at the centre, with Thomas's columns. But Hooker was necessarily detained in the construction of the bridges over Chattanooga creek.

Grant had marked the movement of the rebel columns towards his left, and instantly perceived his opportunity. Bragg was attempting the most difficult manœuvre that can be executed in war. He was weakening his centre and making a flank movement in the presence of an enemy. Grant meanwhile had got information from Hooker, and was satisfied that he must be on his way from Rossville, although not yet in sight. He determined to order the assault.

At first, he simply directed Thomas to order the advance; but, seeing the corps commanders near him, Grant repeated to them in person the command. Thomas's force now consisted of four divisions, under Johnson, Sheridan, Wood, and Baird. A double

line of skirmishers was thrown out, followed in easy supporting distance by the whole force. The orders were to carry the rifle-pits at the foot of Missionary ridge; and, when this was done, to re-form the lines, in the rifle-pits, with a view to carrying the top of the ridge.

The ground immediately in front was open timber; then, a smooth and open plain; the distance, to the first line of the enemy's rifle-pits, varying from four hundred to nine hundred yards. Next, was a steep ascent of about five hundred yards, to the top of the ridge, the face of which was rugged and covered with fallen timber. About half way up the hill, or two hundred and fifty yards from the first rifle-pits, was a second but imperfect line of works; and, last of all, the rifle-pits on the crest.

The two corps had been restless and eager all day, and the instant that Grant gave the second order, Granger and Palmer moved their forces down the slope of the hill where they had been posted, and across the lower ground to the left. They marched steadily on, under a tremendous fire of artillery from the ridge; and emerging from the timber, took up the double quick, dashing over the open plain, and at the enemy's first line, with a mass of glistening bayonets that was irresistible. The four divisions reached the foot of the ridge almost simultaneously; not a gun was fired, but the bayonets fairly blazed in the bright afternoon sun;* and

* I asked General Sheridan how he accounted for the ease with which the first line of rifle-pits was carried. He said that he happened to be in advance of his own line as it charged, and, looking back, was impressed with the terrible sight presented by the mass of approaching bayonets. The men were on a run, and the line had become almost a crowd; and the rebels appeared unable to resist the

as the line came closer and closer, the rebels flung themselves prostrate in the trenches, and the national troops rushed over. A thousand prisoners at once were ordered to the rear, and hurried back across the open plain, crouching from the fire of their own comrades on the crest. Others retreated rapidly up the hill.

At this time, according to orders, there should have been a halt, but the men were uncontrollable; shouts of triumph rang along the line, and everywhere the troops began to climb the mountain, waiting for no further orders. The rebel fire now changed from shot and shell to canister and musketry, and the men lay on their faces to avoid the storm, working their way thus up the front of the mountain. Commanders could not order back the troops who were step by step ascending, in this way, and fast approaching the second line of rifle-pits.* First, one flag would be advanced a few feet, then another was thrust forward on a line with this, each striving for the advance. As many as five or six color-bearers were successively shot down, carrying a single flag; but, at last, all along the ridge, the colors were planted on the second line.

Thirty pieces of artillery now opened on the assailants with direct, plunging, cross, and enfilading fires; and a storm of musketry, from the still well-effect upon their imagination or their nerves of this waving, glittering mass of steel.

* When they had got a third of the way up, an aide of Granger's ordered one of Sheridan's brigades down the hill, in conformity with the original plan; but Sheridan soon came up, and saw that the flags were advancing steadily, and that two of his brigades were still mounting the hill. He at once ordered back the troops which had begun to descend. "When I saw those flags going up," he said, "I knew we should carry the ridge, and I took the responsibility."

filled rifle-pits on the summit, was flung into their very faces. But not a break was seen in all the line; neither the toil of the ascent that exhausted their strength, nor the fire of the enemy that thinned their ranks, retarded them. Steadily, rapidly, on they pushed, the enemy in desperate flight before them; until at last the tide reached the highest crest, poured over the works, and carried the hills simultaneously at six different points, so close upon the rebels that crowds were captured in the very trenches. Whole regiments threw down their arms; others fled headlong down the eastern slope, the national soldiers not waiting to reload their pieces, but driving the enemy with stones. Artillerists were bayoneted at their guns, and the cannon were captured before they could be removed or destroyed. The very pieces which a moment before had been thundering against the national army, were turned at once upon the rebel line, enfilading it right and left, and rendering it perfectly untenable. It was fifty-five minutes since the troops had left their places on the plain.*

Such had been the strength of Bragg's position, that he entertained no doubt of his ability to hold it against far superior numbers, and had made every disposition for this purpose. "It was a position," he said himself, "which a line of skirmishers ought to have maintained against any assaulting column." Those who reached the crest were in a condition of exhaustion from the great physical exertion in climbing, which alone ought to have rendered

* Sheridan lost, in this charge, eleven hundred and seventy-nine men, and one hundred and twenty-three officers, out of a force of six thousand. This was nearly half the loss in Thomas's command.

the enemy irresistible. Bragg, indeed, at first thought that the attack had been repulsed; and was riding along the ridge, congratulating his troops, when intelligence was brought him that the line was broken on the right, and the national troops had actually crowned the ridge. He proceeded at once to the rear of the broken line, to rally his retiring soldiers, and return them to the crest; but the disaster was too great to be repaired. At the same moment, the rebel general learned that his extreme left had also given way, and that his position was almost surrounded.

A second line was immediately ordered to be formed in rear, where, by the efforts of Bragg's staff, a nucleus of stragglers had been created, upon which he hoped to rally the fugitives; but firing was again heard in the direction of the left, and another division came tumbling in: the entire rebel left was routed and in rapid flight. Every effort that could be made by Bragg and his staff availed but little; the guns were abandoned by the infantry supports; a panic had seized both officers and men, and each seemed merely struggling for his own personal safety. Orders were given for Hardee on the right, and Breckinridge on the left of the rebel line, to retire their forces upon the depot at Chickamauga. It was now near night, and, fortunately for Bragg, the country and roads in his rear were familiar to him, and equally unknown to his pursuers. His routed left made its way back in great confusion, but the other portions of his command still offered opposition.*

* See Appendix, for Bragg's report in full, from which all my statements in regard to the rebel movements and condition are taken almost *verbatim*.

After halting a few moments, to reorganize the troops, who had become somewhat scattered in the assault, Sheridan pushed forward in pursuit. Bragg himself had barely escaped capture, and his disorganized troops, with a large wagon-train and several pieces of artillery, could be distinctly seen, flying through the valley below, within a distance of half a mile. Sheridan pressed on, to capture the prize. About a mile in rear of Missionary ridge, the road runs along another high and formidable hill, on which the enemy had posted artillery, supported by a heavy force of infantry. The men, however, charged again, clinging to the face of the mountain, as they had done a few hours before, on Missionary ridge. Meanwhile, Sheridan sent regiments on either side to flank the enemy. It was now dark, and, just as the head of one of these columns reached the summit of the hill, the moon rose from behind, and a medallion view of the column was disclosed, as it crossed the disk of the moon, and attacked the enemy. Out-flanked on right and left the rebels fled, leaving the coveted artillery and trains. Those who escaped capture were driven across Chickamauga creek, where they burned the bridges, almost while they passed.

Wood and Baird were more obstinately resisted, by reënforcements from the rebel right, and continued fighting till darkness set in, slowly but steadily driving the enemy before them.

In the mean time, Hooker had completed his bridges, crossed the Chattanooga, and moved north, parallel with the ridge; Osterhaus on his right, Geary on the left, and Cruft having the centre. The rebels had selected for their line of defence, in front of Hooker, the breastworks thrown up by the na-

tional troops in their retreat from Chickamauga; but, such was the impetuosity of Hooker's advance, that their front line was routed before an opportunity was allowed even to prepare a determined resistance. The bulk of the rebel left now sought refuge behind a second line, and thence was again driven out, till the flight became almost a running one. As he moved upon Rossville, Hooker encountered a division under Stuart, which was attempting to escape towards Greysville; but, some of this force, finding their retreat threatened in that quarter, retired in disorder towards their own right, along the crest of the ridge; there they were met by another portion of Hooker's command, and driven by these troops into the very face of Johnson's division, of Palmer's corps, by whom they were nearly all made prisoners. Thus, with the centre pierced, and the left wing rolled in, the whole rebel army was in inextricable confusion.

Grant rode up at once on the ridge, to direct the pursuit, and himself followed, for a mile or two, beyond the hills which so long had obstructed his armies. But, the near approach of night, and ignorance of the roads, prevented any further effective movements, except by Sheridan, who pushed as far as Mission mills, seven miles. The business of the day, however, was ended, and the troops went into bivouac, with cheers which were caught up by other troops, and carried along the ridge for miles, until lost in the distance. Chickamauga was avenged.

As soon as the resistance on Thomas's left was overcome, the enemy, of course, abandoned his position near the railroad tunnel, in front of Sherman, who, however, did not know, until night closed in,

that the troops in Chattanooga had swept across Missionary ridge and broken the enemy's centre. Pursuit was then ordered by him, at once. Morgan L. Smith was directed to feel the tunnel, which was found vacant, save by the rebel and national dead, who lay stark and still, commingled. Davis's reserve was ordered to march at once to the pontoon bridge, across the Chickamauga, at its mouth, and push forward for the depot. Howard had been posted to connect Sherman's left with Chickamauga creek. He was now ordered to repair an old broken bridge, about two miles up the Chickamauga, and to follow Davis at four A. M. on the morrow, while the Fifteenth corps was to march at daylight.

All of the strong positions of Lookout mountain, Chattanooga valley, and Missionary ridge were thus in Grant's possession, together with forty rebel cannon, and six thousand prisoners. Success had been complete on every part of the field. In Sherman's front the results had not been so brilliant, but it was simply because of the stubborn fight made there, that the rebels massed upon him, weakening their left and centre, and giving Grant the coveted opportunity. That night, Grant wrote to Sherman: "No doubt you witnessed the handsome manner in which Thomas's troops carried Missionary ridge, this afternoon, and can feel a just pride, too, in the part taken by the forces under your command, in taking, first, so much of the same range of hills, and, then, in attracting the attention of so many of the enemy as to make Thomas's part certain of success. The next thing now will be to relieve Burnside."

To Wilcox, the same night, he said: "The great defeat Bragg has sustained in the three days' battle

terminating at dusk this evening, and a movement which I will immediately make, I think, will relieve Burnside, if he holds out a few days longer. I shall pursue Bragg, to-morrow, and start a heavy column up the Tennessee valley the day after."

At seven o'clock, Grant was able to report to the general-in-chief: "Although the battle lasted from early dawn until dark this evening, I believe I am not premature in announcing a complete victory over Bragg. Lookout mountain-top, all the rifle-pits in Chattanooga valley, and Missionary ridge entire, have been carried, and are now held by us. I have no idea of finding Bragg here to-morrow." A half-hour later, he dispatched again: "I have heard from Burnside, to the 23d, when he had rations for ten or twelve days, and expected to hold out that time. I shall move a force from here, on to the railroad between Cleveland and Dalton, and send a column of twenty thousand men up the south side of the Tennessee, without wagons, carrying four days' rations, and taking a steamer loaded with rations, from which to draw, on the route. If Burnside holds out until this force gets beyond Kingston, I think the enemy will fly, and with the present state of the roads, must abandon almost every thing. I believe Bragg will lose much of his army by desertion, in consequence of his defeat in the last three days' fight." On the 26th, Halleck replied to Grant's announcement of success: "I congratulate you and your army on the victories of Chattanooga. This is truly a day of thanksgiving."

To Sherman, on the night of the 25th, Grant said: "My plan is to move your forces out gradually, until they reach the railroad between

Cleveland and Dalton. Granger will move up the south side of the Tennessee. We will push Bragg with all our strength, to-morrow, and try if we cannot cut off a good portion of his new troops and trains. His men have manifested a strong desire to desert for some time past, and we will now give them a chance. Move the advance force on the most easterly road taken by the enemy." The same night, Thomas was ordered: "You will start a strong reconnoissance in the morning at seven A. M., to ascertain the position of the enemy. If it is ascertained that the enemy are in full retreat, follow them with all your force, except that which you intend Granger to take to Knoxville. Four days' rations should be got up to the men, between this and morning, and also a supply of ammunition. I shall want Granger's expedition to get off by the day after to-morrow."

On the morning of the 26th, accordingly, Sherman advanced by way of Chickamauga station; and Thomas's force (Hooker and Palmer) moved on the Atlanta road towards Greysville and Ringgold, while Granger's command returned to Chattanooga, with instructions to hold itself in readiness for orders to reënforce Burnside. Grant was with the pursuing column; but, on the night of the battle, Thomas returned to Chattanooga, and did not rejoin his troops. By eleven A. M., Jefferson C. Davis, of Sherman's command, arrived at Chickamauga depot, just in time to see it in flames. He entered with one brigade, and found the enemy partially intrenched, on the hills beyond the depot. This force, however, was soon driven away. The depot presented a scene of desolation such as war alone ex-

hibits. Corn and meal in huge burning piles, broken wagons, abandoned caissons, rifled guns with their carriages burned, pieces of pontoons, barks, chasses, all one mass of flame and destruction. Halting a short time only, the column passed on, over a road lined with the wrecks of the retreating army. Just as the head of the division emerged from a dark and miry swamp, it encountered the rear-guard of the enemy. The fight was sharp, but night closed in so dark that Sherman could not advance. Grant came up with Sherman's column here.

Hooker, meanwhile, had arrived at Chickamauga creek, and found the bridge destroyed; his pontoons were not up, and it was three o'clock before the regiments could begin to cross; the officers swam their horses, and the artillery and ambulances were left behind, to follow as soon as practicable. Palmer, who now reported to Hooker, was sent to Greysville, by the Lafayette road, and the rest of the command proceeded to Ringgold, Cruft's division leading. Palmer came up with the rear of the enemy, on the road from Greysville to Ringgold, and captured three pieces of artillery, with a small number of prisoners. Cruft also advanced, and took possession of the Chickamauga hills, on whose sides the abandoned camp-fires of the enemy were brightly burning. It was now ten o'clock, and Hooker went into bivouac, his artillery not having yet arrived.

Ringgold was five miles off, and the pursuit was renewed at daylight, Osterhaus in the advance. Evidences of the precipitate flight of the rebels were everywhere apparent; the road was strewn with caissons, wagons, ambulances, arms and ammunition, abandoned in the hurry and confusion of flight, and

before the east fork of Chickamauga creek was reached, a large number of prisoners had been taken. Soon the advance came up with the camps that had been occupied the night before, by the rebels; here, also, the fires of the bivouac were still ablaze. The ford, and a bridge south of Ringgold, were both held by rebel cavalry. These discharged their pieces, and quickly gave way before a handful of Hooker's men, who pursued them closely into the town.

Cleburne's division was covering the retreat of Hardee's corps, of the rebel army, and had arrived at the west bank of the East Chickamauga, at ten o'clock on the night of the 26th. At this point he had to ford the river; it was nearly waist-deep, and the night was freezing cold, so the crossing was postponed until morning. But, in the night, Cleburne received orders to take a strong position in the gorge of the mountain, and attempt to check the advance of Hooker. The main rebel force had just passed through Ringgold, sorely pressed, the animals exhausted and the men demoralized. Regimental and company formations were destroyed, and many of the men had thrown away their arms.

Ringgold is a place of two or three thousand inhabitants, and stands on a plain between the East Chickamauga river and the range of hills known as Taylor's ridge; it is on the Western and Atlantic railroad, and about twenty miles southeast of Chattanooga. Taylor's ridge runs north and south, and, immediately back of the town, is a break in the ridge, wide enough to admit the railroad, a wagon-road, and a tributary creek of the Chickamauga. The creek hugs the southern side of the gorge, and the wagon-road and railroad run close to the bank of the

stream. The ridge rises abruptly on either hand, four or five hundred feet, and at its western mouth the gap widens to the breadth of a hundred yards, leaving room for a patch of level wooded land, on either side of the roads. The gap is about half a mile long, and the plain in the rear is so cut up by the windings of the stream, that three bridges or fords have to be crossed, in the first half-mile beyond, on the Dalton road.

Cleburne had been ordered to use the great natural advantages presented by this gap, to check the pursuit of the national army, till the trains and rear of the main column could get well advanced beyond the entanglements, on the other side of the ridge. He accordingly posted some of his troops on the mountain-top; and, behind the fringe of trees at its base, four short lines were formed across the gap. Skirmishers were thrown out as far as the creek, and a battery was placed in the mouth of the gap, screened by withered branches built up in front of the guns; a ravine near by sheltered the artillerists. Cleburne had over four thousand bayonets.

The rebel line of skirmishers was feeble, and Hooker deployed a brigade, under cover of the embankment of the railroad. Soon, a brisk musketry-fire began between the skirmishers. The rebel cavalry at once retreated through the gap on a trot, and the valley in front was clear of Cleburne's troops; but, close in rear of the ridge, an immense wagon-train was still struggling through the fords of the creek, and the deeply cut up roads leading to Dalton. Cleburne's division was the only barrier between the train and the eager advance of the pursuing army.

Shortly after eight o'clock A. M., although his artillery had not yet arrived, Hooker moved his line of battle up, under cover of the skirmish fire. The troops advanced with decision and celerity, but soon became exposed to the rebel artillery, and, after five or six rapid discharges, the right was compelled to retire. The left, however, continued to advance, and made a heavy attack on the ridge. Four regiments were detached half a mile to the left, to ascend the hill, and turn the enemy's right. As they were thrown forward, the rebels appeared in force on the crest, having detected the movement. Four other regiments were then thrown still further to the left, but they also found a large force ready to receive them. Vigorous attacks were made by both these columns, but the advantage of position was too great to overcome. One column took shelter in a depression on the side of the ridge, about fifty paces in rear of its most advanced position; and several renewed attempts were made to carry the ridge, both sides fighting heroically. The rebels threw rocks from their higher position, and in this way sometimes knocked the assailants down the ridge.

Finding himself entirely unable to accomplish his purpose, Hooker at last desisted from the attack, and determined to await the arrival of his artillery. He could not, however, withdraw, without becoming still more exposed, and the men remained in their advanced positions on the mountain-side; but it was deemed unwise to bring up any more troops until the artillery should arrive, as the slaughter would have been great, without the possibility of inflicting on the enemy a loss at all comparable with that re-

ceived. The rebels threw up slight defences, and some desultory fighting occurred, near the mouth of the gap, but without important results.

Between twelve and one o'clock, the artillery came up, not having been able to cross the west fork of the Chickamauga, until eight o'clock that day. A section of howitzers was at once brought to bear on the enemy, in front of Hooker's right, and enfiladed the gap; another section was assigned to silence the rebel battery; and troops and artillery were sent to gain the heights on the southern side of the river, which would give a plunging fire on the enemy in the gorge.

Just as the artillery was opening, Grant arrived on the field. He at once sent orders to Sherman to move down a force on the east side of the ridge, and turn the enemy's position. "It looks as if it will be hard to dislodge them." But the rebels did not wait for this new disposition to be concluded; the artillery had opened with marked effect, the enemy's guns were hauled to the rear, his troops seen moving, and, before one o'clock, Cleburne was in full retreat. One brigade of Hooker pursued across the mountain, and others followed through the gap. The rebels attempted to burn the bridges, but were speedily driven away, and the fires were extinguished. Three pieces of artillery and two hundred and thirty prisoners were captured. Hooker's loss was sixty-five killed, and three hundred and seventy-seven wounded; only about half of the latter so severely as to go into hospital. In the early part of the battle, a few of his wounded had fallen into the enemy's hands, but they were soon recaptured. One hundred and thirty rebels were left dead on the field; Cle-

burne, however, reported only twenty killed, a hundred and ninety wounded, and eleven missing. But the rebels secured the escape of their train, which was all they were fighting for.

Sherman had resumed his march at daylight, and, at Greysville, came up with Palmer's corps. The roads, in advance, were filled with as many troops as they could accommodate, and, in obedience to Grant's order, Sherman now turned east, to break up all communication between Bragg and Longstreet. Howard was directed to move to Parker's gap, and thence to Red Clay, and destroy a large section of the railroad connecting Dalton and Cleveland. This work was completely performed, that day, and Davis's division was moved up close to Ringgold, to be ready to assist Hooker, if need should arise. About noon, Sherman got a message from Hooker, saying that he had had a pretty hard fight, and wanted Sherman to come up and turn the position of the enemy. Howard, however, by moving through Parker's gap to Red Clay, had already turned Ringgold; but, of this, neither Grant nor Hooker was as yet aware. So, Sherman rode on to Ringgold, and found the rebels had already fallen back to Tunnel hill. The enemy was out of the valley of the Chickamauga, and on ground where the waters flow to the Coosa. He was driven from Tennessee.

Grant now directed the pursuit to be discontinued, and, at one p. m., he dispatched to Thomas: "Direct Granger . . . to start at once, marching as rapidly as possible to the relief of Burnside." Had it not been for this imperative necessity of relieving Burnside, Grant would have pursued the demoralized and retreating enemy, as long as supplies could have

been found in the country. But, his advices were that Burnside's supplies could only last till the 3d of December. It was already getting late to afford the necessary relief; so, Grant directed Hooker to hold the position he then occupied, until the night of the 30th, but to go no further south at the expense of a fight. Sherman was instructed to march to the railroad crossing of the Hiawassee, to protect Granger's flank until he should get across that stream; and to prevent further reënforcements being sent, by that route, into East Tennessee.

A reconnoissance was made by Hooker, in the direction of Tunnel hill, the rebel line of retreat; and caissons, wagons, dead and dying men were found strewn along the way, to a horrible extent. The reconnoitring force returned on the night of the 27th, and then went into bivouac. The railroad at Ringgold was thoroughly destroyed, for a distance of two miles; also, the depot, tannery, mills, and all the military material. On the 29th, Palmer returned to Chattanooga, with his command, and the prisoners taken at Ringgold. On the 30th, the enemy sent a flag of truce to Hooker's advanced position at Catoosa, requesting permission to bury the rebel dead and care for the wounded, abandoned in the flight from Ringgold; during that day and the next, the remaining infantry and cavalry of Hooker's command left Ringgold; Geary and Cruft to return to their old camps, in Lookout valley, and Osterhaus, to encamp near Chattanooga.

On the 28th, the Fifteenth corps destroyed the railroad absolutely and effectually, from a point half-way between Greysville and Ringgold, back to the Georgia state line; and, on the 29th, Howard's com-

mand, with two divisions of the Fifteenth corps and Davis's division, moved by different mountain-gorges, and all met at Cleveland, where they again set to work destroying the railroad. On the 30th, Sherman's army marched to Charleston, Howard approaching so rapidly that the rebel force there evacuated in haste, leaving the bridge only partially damaged, and large loads of flour and provision fell into the hands of the national soldiers.

Grant's losses, in these battles, were seven hundred and fifty-seven killed, four thousand five hundred and twenty-nine wounded, and three hundred and thirty missing; total, five thousand six hundred and sixteen. The enemy's losses were fewer in killed and wounded, owing to the fact that he was protected by intrenchments,* while the national soldiers were without cover. Grant captured six thousand one hundred and forty-two prisoners, forty pieces of artillery, sixty-nine artillery carriages and caissons, and seven thousand stands of small-arms; by far the greatest capture, in the open field, which had then been made during the war.

The battle of Chattanooga was the grandest ever fought west of the Alleghanies. It covered an extent of thirteen miles, and Grant had over sixty thousand men engaged. Hooker's force amounted to about ten thousand; Sherman's, including Howard's, to over twenty thousand; and Thomas's command included almost thirty thousand soldiers. The rebels

* The rebel losses were reported at three hundred and sixty-one killed, two thousand one hundred and eighty wounded, and four thousand one hundred and forty-six missing. This statement is certainly inaccurate in one particular, as Grant captured two thousand more men than the rebels reported missing.

numbered only forty-five thousand men,* but they enjoyed immense advantages of position on every part of the field, and, according to all the rules of the military art, a strong defensive position is equivalent to five times an equal number of assailants.

At Vicksburg, it had been the strategy, at Shiloh, the hard fighting, but, at Chattanooga, it was the manœuvring in the presence of the enemy that brought about the result; aided, of course, in the highest possible degree, by the gallantry of the soldiers, without which the greatest of generals is in fact unarmed. Few battles have ever been won so strictly according to the plan laid down; certainly, no battle, during the war of the rebellion, was carried out so completely according to the programme. Grant's instructions in advance would almost serve as a history of the contest. Changes were indeed made in the orders; but, before the battle began, the original plan was resumed. Hooker was to draw attention to the right, to seize and hold Lookout mountain; while Sherman, attacking Missionary ridge on the extreme left, was still further to distract the enemy; and, then, when reënforcements and attention should be drawn to both the rebel flanks, the centre was to be assaulted by the main body of Grant's force under Thomas. Every thing happened exactly as had been foreseen.

* On the 10th of December, Bragg reported fifty-eight thousand seven hundred and fifty-five men present, of whom forty-three thousand and ninety-four were "effective." Of these, however, ten thousand six hundred and twenty-two (effective) belonged to Wheeler's cavalry; and "portions of five brigades" of Wheeler were with Longstreet. Still, the six thousand prisoners, to say nothing of the killed and wounded and stragglers, would bring up Bragg's numbers, on the days of the battle, to at least those stated in the text.

Disturbed, at the start, by the continuous marshalling of vast forces beneath his very eye, Bragg seemed to have lost all ordinary sagacity; and, on the night of the 22d of November, absolutely sent Buckner's division to Longstreet, who was lustily calling for aid, in East Tennessee. A second division had even started on the morning of the battle, but was recalled, by the movement of the 23d. Still, Bragg appeared confused by the manifold manœuvres of Grant. He knew of the arrival of Sherman, one of whose divisions had been advanced far up Lookout valley; he saw the crossing at Brown's ferry, but doubtless hoped that the rains and the rise in the river, and the consequent destruction of the bridges, would delay any rapid operations of his antagonist. Losing sight, too, of Sherman, as soon as that commander crossed at Brown's ferry, it was impossible to know whether he had been sent to the aid of Burnside, or was detained for an assault at Chattanooga. Bragg must have finally concluded that the Army of the Tennessee had gone on to Knoxville; on no other supposition can the subtraction from his own force of two divisions, at this critical juncture, be accounted for.

But, the very next day, occurred the operations which resulted in the capture of Orchard knoll. Grant heard of the dispatch of Buckner's force, and immediately attacked Bragg's centre, lest the whole rebel army should escape. He thus brought back one of the departing divisions, while the other got off just far enough to be out of reach of recall, during the crisis of the next two days. The rebel chief became still more bewildered, and the sight of the immense masses moving in the valley below them, affected the

imagination and depressed the spirits of his soldiers.* The very openness of the display was a proof of audacity, that confounded them.

Bragg had now to decide whether or not he would maintain both flanks with equal determination. Lookout mountain, it is true, commanded the river, and was the key to all operations on the rebel left; but, Missionary ridge, at its northern extremity, covered his base and line of supplies. The demonstration of the 23d boded an attack, and he must make his election, in case the attack occurred. If he decided to hold Chickamauga, he must yield the mountain, and throw his whole force between the encroaching wing of Grant's army and the southern railroad. If he gave the preference to Lookout, then the railroad in his rear, and the depot of his supplies, must be abandoned. In this emergency, he acted with indecision, and weakened his left, without sufficiently strengthening the right; withdrawing one division (Walker's) from Lookout, on the night of the 23d, but leaving still six brigades on the mountain; enough to make a struggle on the left that could only end in failure, while he did not add enough to his right to make that flank secure. He probably could not bring himself to admit that Lookout mountain must really be abandoned; he could not acknowledge to himself and his army, that he was now really on the defensive, before the antagonist whom he had threatened so long.

But the great drama went on. Sherman arrived

*"They had for two days confronted the enemy marshalling his immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their sight such a superiority in numbers, as may have intimidated weak minds and untried soldiers."—*Bragg's Report*.

from behind Walden's ridge, at the appointed crossing of the Tennessee; bridges were built like magic, and the army passed on to its position. Meanwhile, Hooker's veterans scaled the lofty peak that dominated over all the landscape, and, all day, they held in their front the six brigades so much needed elsewhere. Sherman's assault began, and was so determined and at so critical a point, that Bragg threw battalion after battalion to resist the Army of the Tennessee. That army was indeed resisted, was unable to make its way; but this was accomplished only by the sacrifice of all that Bragg was fighting for. The rebel centre, as Grant had foreseen, was weakened to save the right; and then, the whole mass of the Army of the Cumberland was precipitated on the weakened point; the centre was pierced, the heights carried, and the battle of Chattanooga won. Hooker threw his soldiers, flushed with success, on the left of Bragg, and rolled in that flank, and nothing but rout remained.

In all these operations, the enemy had been compelled to do his part almost as if under Grant's control. Bragg had no choice of movements left him: he was forced to weaken his left; he was forced afterwards to defend himself on the right; he was forced to make the very opportunity at his centre which Grant desired. And, although this battle had not been planned according to any immutable design, nor the commanders directed by any orders that were irreversible, yet each event proceeded regularly according to the calculation; each subordinate carried out his part exactly as he had been ordered; each army, brought from a distance, came upon the spot intended, crossed a river, or climbed a

mountain, at the precise moment; and even the unexpected emergencies of the fight contributed to the result, as if anticipated and arranged. In this respect, Chattanooga was one of the most notable battles ever fought.

There were, however, other considerations which rendered it extraordinary. Not only was it one of the grandest spectacles in modern war; not only was it so peculiar in plan and development, and so important in results, but it had a remarkably fortunate effect upon the armies engaged. Three hosts combined: one, coming from the valley of the Mississippi, loaded with laurels; another, fresh from the famous fields of the Potomac; and the third was the great Army of the Cumberland, whose foot was on its native hills, but which, through two long years that it had been struggling for this very advantage, had met with only incomplete success. Once or twice, after bloody battle, it had indeed remained master of the field, but the full advantages of victory it had never reaped; for, although it had really won Chattanooga, the possession of the prize had remained insecure; the fruits of its labor had been turned into ashes before they could be enjoyed. But, now, Fortune's bandage seemed to have fallen from her eyes, and she distributed rewards with an impartial hand. The Eastern troops had carried the most conspicuous position on the field, and won a strange and picturesque renown, forever associating their names with the mighty mountain that stands at the gate of the South; the Western army had fought harder and longer, and with less brilliant results than either of the others, but, by its persistent gallantry, had rendered possible the great success of the day; while

it was fitly reserved for the Army of the Cumberland to win the crowning victory over its old enemy, to carry the heights that had confronted it so long, and, in sight of Chickamauga, to accomplish that which Chickamauga had disastrously delayed.

For, the way was now thrown open to Atlanta, and all the rich country in its rear; the very heart of the rebellion was laid bare; the great bulwark of the would-be Confederacy was broken down, was become, instead, a sally-port for the national armies; the rebel hosts, that had stood in the way, were thrust aside, and Chattanooga, thenceforth, was as terrible a menace to rebellion, as in times past it had been defiant to loyalty.

CHAPTER XIII.

Knoxville still in danger—Granger sent to Burnside—Granger moves reluctantly—Sherman sent to Burnside—Sherman moves with vigor—Burnside falls back before Longstreet—Battle at Campbell's station—Retreat to Knoxville—Defences of Knoxville—Siege of Knoxville—Aid from loyal Tennesseans—Longstreet determines to assault—Strength and position of Fort Sanders—Assault of Fort Sanders—Repulse of Longstreet—Approach of Sherman—Raising of siege—Retreat of Longstreet—Burnside sends Sherman back to Hiawassee—Parke's pursuit of Longstreet—Burnside relieved by Foster—Results of entire campaign—Congratulations of President—Thanks of Congress—Miscalculation of Burnside—Battle of Bean's station—Success of Longstreet—Longstreet winters in Tennessee—Disappointment of Grant—Grant proposes movement against Mobile—Bragg relieved by Hardee—Furloughing of veterans—Grant's visit to Knoxville—Impossibility of winter campaign—Germ of Meridian raid—Distribution of forces for winter—Sherman sent to Vicksburg—Grant's plan for ensuing year—Mobile and Atlanta objective and intermediate points—Sooy Smith's orders—Sherman's march from Vicksburg—Seizure of Meridian—Destruction of railroad—Failure of Smith to coöperate—Sherman returns to Vicksburg—Smith retreats to Memphis—Results of Meridian raid—Coöperation of Thomas—Johnston in command of rebel army—Movements in East Tennessee—Grant ordered to Washington.

BUT the task that had been set for Grant was even yet not fully performed. Bragg had indeed been driven back, and Chattanooga made secure, but Burnside was still threatened by a redoubtable force, and the capture of Knoxville was imminent. On the 28th of November, Grant returned from the front, to Chattanooga, and found that Granger's corps had not yet started for the relief of Burnside. A whole day

had thus been lost, when every hour was invaluable, and Grant at once hurried off to Knoxville the reinforcements so much needed there.

Meanwhile, Major-General John G. Foster had been sent from Washington, to supersede Burnside, and went direct to Cumberland gap, where there were about three thousand national soldiers. He could not, however, approach nearer to Knoxville, now so closely besieged. On the 28th, Grant telegraphed to Foster: "The Fourth corps, Major-General Granger commanding, left here to-day, with orders to push with all possible speed through to Knoxville. Sherman is already in motion for Hiwassee, and will go all the way, if necessary. . . . Communicate this information to Burnside, as soon as possible, and at any cost; with directions to hold to the very last moment, and we shall not only relieve him, but destroy Longstreet." The next day, he wrote to Granger, at length: ". . . . On the 23d instant, General Burnside telegraphed that his rations would hold out ten or twelve days; at the end of this time, unless relieved from the outside, he must surrender or retreat. The latter will be an impossibility. You are now going for the purpose of relieving this garrison. You see the short time in which relief must be afforded or be too late, and hence the necessity for forced marches. I want to urge upon you, in the strongest possible manner, the necessity of reaching Burnside in the shortest possible time. . . ."

But Granger moved with reluctance and complaint, and, on the 29th, Grant said to Sherman: "Granger is on the way to Burnside's relief, but I have lost all faith in his energy and capacity to

manage an expedition of the importance of this one. I am inclined to think, therefore, that I shall have to send you. Push, as rapidly as you can, to the Hiawasse, and determine for yourself what force to take with you from that point. Granger has his corps with him, from which you will select, in conjunction with the forces now with you. In plain words, you will assume command of all the forces now moving up the Tennessee."

At the same time, he sent a dispatch, in duplicate, to the officer in command at Kingston; one copy was to be let "fall into the hands of the enemy, without fail." The other "you must get to General Burnside, at all hazards, and at the earliest possible moment." The dispatch was in these words: "I congratulate you on the tenacity with which you have thus far held out against vastly superior forces. Do not be forced into a surrender by short rations. Take all the citizens have, to enable you to hold out yet a few days longer. As soon as you are relieved from the presence of the enemy, you can replace to them every thing taken from them. Within a few days you will be relieved. There are now three columns in motion for your relief. One, from here, moving up the south bank of the river, under Sherman; one from Decherd, under Elliott,* and one from Cumberland gap, under Foster. These three columns will be able to crush Longstreet's forces, or drive them from the valley, and must all of them be within twenty-four hours' march of you, by the time this reaches you, supposing you to get it on Tuesday, the 1st instant."

* The movements of Elliott were delayed, and had no effect upon the subsequent operations.

Sherman had hardly entered the town of Charleston, when he received Grant's letter of the 29th, directing him to take command of all troops moving to the relief of Burnside. Seven days before, the Fifteenth corps had left its camps on the other side of the Tennessee, with two days' rations, and stripped for the fight; with but a single blanket or coat apiece, from the commander down to the private soldier. They had no provisions, save what they gathered on the road; a poor supply for such a march. But, twelve thousand of their brethren were beleaguered in the mountain town of Knoxville, eighty miles away; relief was needed, and within three days; and no man murmured.

That night, Howard repaired and planked the railroad bridge, and, at daylight, the army passed the Hiawassee, and marched to Athens, fifteen miles. On the 1st of December, Sherman sent word to Granger, who was a day in advance, and had arrived at Decatur, that he must strike across to Philadelphia, with his command, and form a junction there. On the 2d, the army moved rapidly north towards Loudon, twenty-six miles further. The cavalry passed to the head of the column, in order to save, if possible, a pontoon-bridge across the Tennessee, at that place; but, a rebel brigade with artillery in position prevented this, and darkness closed in, before the infantry arrived. The rebels, however, deserted the place in the night, destroying the pontoons, and running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into the Tennessee; they also abandoned four guns and large stores of material, which Howard seized at daylight. But the river is seventeen hundred feet across, at Loudon, and the bridge was gone. Sherman was

forced to turn his column east, and trust to Burnside's bridge at Knoxville.

Only one day remained of the time which Burnside had promised to hold out, and it was now all-important that he should be notified of Sherman's approach. A cavalry force under Long was, therefore, ordered to start at once, and to ford the Little Tennessee, and push into Knoxville, at whatever cost of life or horse-flesh. The distance was forty miles, and the roads execrable.

Before dawn, the cavalry was off, and at daylight, the Fifteenth corps turned from Philadelphia to the Little Tennessee, at Morgantown, expecting to find a ford. But the river was too deep, and the water freezing cold; the width was two hundred and forty yards. A bridge was indispensable. There were no pioneers, and only such tools as axes, picks, and spades; but a bridge was constructed, with crib-work and trestles made of the houses of the late town of Morgantown; and, by dark, of December 4th, troops and animals were passing. The Fifteenth corps was across before daylight; but the bridge broke, and Granger's corps with Davis's division was left on the western side.

At this juncture, word was received from Burnside. On the 14th of November, the bulk of his force was distributed between Kingston, Knoxville, Loudon, and Lenoir. He now knew, certainly, that Longstreet's corps was moving up against him; he had conferred with General Wilson, of Grant's staff, and with Mr. Dana, of the War Department, whom Grant had sent to him for this purpose; and decided that he could better carry out Grant's views, by drawing Longstreet further away from the rebel army

at Chattanooga, than by checking him at Loudon. Early on the morning of the 15th, therefore, Burnside withdrew from Loudon, and fell back leisurely in the direction of Knoxville, the trains being sent in advance. That night, he encamped at Lenoir; on the 16th, he again started for Knoxville, by way of Campbell's station. But, by this time, Longstreet had crossed the Tennessee, on a pontoon bridge brought up to Loudon; and, taking a shorter road, which Burnside ought to have held, endeavored to reach Campbell's station first, and thus cut off the national forces from Knoxville. Burnside had, with him, only about five thousand troops, and, making a forced march, he succeeded in reaching Campbell's station first; and at once took steps to hold the forks of the roads, while the trains passed on. A serious fight occurred here, the rebels numbering at least ten thousand men; and Burnside was driven back about a mile, but no other damage was sustained. He held the important point, and most of his wagons were secured. His loss, in killed, wounded and missing, was about three hundred. That of the rebels is not known.* During the night, the national troops fell back to Knoxville, fourteen miles; but Longstreet did not advance until daylight.

A line of works was at once established at Knoxville; and the troops were called in from all the surrounding country. Of these, however, many were raw, and many others were simply loyal Tennesseans, without organization or discipline, who crowded in to defend their mountain fortress. The defensive line extended from the Holston river on the left, across

* Longstreet does not mention his losses in this battle, in his official report.

the railroad, to the river again, on the right. Detached works were also built on the hills on the southern side of the Holston. The rebel front extended only on the north side of the Holston, though Longstreet's cavalry made excursions to the rear of the town. The enemy, however, could not move across the Holston, without exposing his own line of communication with Loudon. Still, Burnside was practically besieged. His force was now about twelve thousand effective men, exclusive of the loyal Tennesseans, who amounted to at least three thousand more. Before the end of the siege, Longstreet had between twenty and twenty-three thousand men, including cavalry.

Many of the citizens and farmers, who had been driven in by the enemy, volunteered to work in the trenches, and did good service; while those who, from disloyalty, were disinclined, were compelled to the unwelcome task. The negroes were particularly willing, during the entire siege. All the beef-cattle and hogs belonging to the commissary department, and many belonging to citizens, were driven into the town, where they were slaughtered and salted. Orders were issued reducing the rations; and, within three or four days, the issue of small rations was entirely discontinued; * the supply being so small that it was necessary to reserve it exclusively for the hospitals. All useless animals were killed and thrown into the river, to save forage. Efforts were made to collect forage and supplies, along the French Broad river and the Sevierville road, which remained open to the besieged; and loyal farmers sent down

* The essential part of a ration is meat and bread; whatever else is issued is called the *small ration*, though no such name is known to the law.

the river, on flats, large amounts of grain and meat, under cover of the dense fogs which prevailed at night, at that period. Nothing else saved the garrison from absolute want.

By the 20th of November, the line was in such condition that entire confidence was felt by both commander and troops in their ability to hold it. Every possible means of strengthening the defences was still, however, resorted to. Creeks were dammed, and the back water from them created formidable ditches, in front of a large portion of the line; abatis, chevaux-de-frise, and wire entanglements were constructed, wherever necessary. A pontoon-bridge across the Holston facilitated all of Burnside's movements; and when the rebel cavalry, above, floated rafts down the Holston, to break this bridge, the engineers built a boom which effectually defeated the attempt. Longstreet, meanwhile, did nothing but establish his own line, make reconnoissances, feel Burnside's force, and fight various skirmishes. More than a week elapsed without any movement of importance, except a feeble attempt to gain the heights on the southern side of the river, which was easily repulsed. During this time, Burnside continued to strengthen his fortifications; especially a work at the northwest angle of his line, known as Fort Sanders. His problem was simple. He had only to hold out until his fate was decided at Chattanooga. There, the battle was to be fought which should save or destroy the Army of the Ohio.

Longstreet, at last, got word from Bragg, that Grant was about to attack him, on Missionary ridge. After this, two brigades of cavalry reënforced Longstreet, from the rebel command in the eastern part of

the valley ; and, on the 27th, two brigades of Buckner's force reached him from Bragg's army. Then, rumors came thick, to the rebel leader, of a battle at Chattanooga, and, finally, reports that Bragg had fallen back to Tunnel hill. Longstreet at once determined to assault the works of Knoxville. He considered, that in the event of Bragg's defeat, the only safety for the rebels was to achieve success in Tennessee. His generals protested, and wished to withdraw towards Virginia ; but Longstreet was firm, and said : " Our only safety is in making the assault upon the enemy's position. . . . It is a great mistake in supposing that there is any safety for us in going to Virginia, if General Bragg has been defeated, for we leave him at the mercy of his victors ; and, with his army destroyed, our own had better be also, for we must not only be destroyed, but disgraced. There is neither safety nor honor in any other course than the one which I have already chosen and ordered." In this magnificent spirit, which it is impossible not to admire, even in an enemy, Longstreet ordered an assault on Fort Sanders.*

This fort stood on high ground west of Knoxville, between the Holston river and the railroad. The location had been originally selected by the rebels, but a new work was perfected, after the national occupation, by the efforts of the engineers ; and named after a gallant officer who fell on the second day of the siege. Fort Sanders was chosen as the

* Longstreet's correspondence, both with Bragg and with his inferiors, breathes everywhere the truest soldierly spirit, and makes one regret that so fine a nature should have been enlisted in an unworthy cause.

point of attack by Longstreet, because success, here, involved the destruction, if not the capture, of Knoxville; while, to assault anywhere else, would leave his line of communication exposed to counter-attack. Besides this, Burnside had a double line of works extending from the fort to the Holston; and, on the north side of the town, the damming of the creeks and consequent overflow had rendered the country impracticable. So, although Fort Sanders was in reality the strongest point on Burnside's line, it also offered great advantages to the attacking party.

At dark, on the 28th, the rebel line of sharpshooters was advanced to within rifle-range of the national line, and ordered to sink rifle-pits during the night, in this advanced position, so that, all along the line, the enemy might engage on an equal footing with the besieged, while the columns were making the assault on the fort. Sixty or seventy prisoners fell into the hands of the rebels, before morning; and, this, with other developments, made the besieged fully aware that an assault was contemplated. Preparations were accordingly made to resist.

At about half-past six, A. M., on the 29th, the enemy opened a furious artillery fire on the fort; the national batteries remained silent, the men quietly awaiting the assault. The fort was so protected by traverses, that only one man was injured during this heavy fire. Two companies of the Second Michigan infantry were stationed in the ditch, at the salient, to pick off the rebels when they approached. In about twenty minutes, the cannonading ceased, and a fire of musketry was opened by the enemy; at the same time, a heavy column, which had been concentrated during the night, charged on the bastion, at a run. Great numbers

fell, in passing over the entanglements; but the weight of the column was such as to force forward the advance; and, in two or three minutes, it had reached the ditch and attempted to scale the parapet. The Michigan soldiers, in the ditch, at once ran back on each side of the salient; and the national guns opened on the rebels with triple rounds of canister; while the infantry either shot or knocked back with their muskets, all those whose heads appeared above the parapet. The forces placed on the flanks of the fort had also a cross-fire on the ground over which the enemy approached.

The rebels, in utter confusion, strove to return, but the first column of attack was speedily reënforced by a second, which pushed up to the forts as desperately as the other. It also was driven back, and with equal slaughter. Most of those who reached the ditch were killed, or mortally wounded; and such as could not retreat, surrendered; of these last, as many as five hundred. Only one rebel got over the parapet alive. The ground between the fort and the rebel line was strewn with the dead, and the wounded crying for help; and, after the repulse was fully established, Burnside tendered to the enemy a flag of truce, for the purpose of burying the dead and caring for the wounded. The rebels lost over a thousand men,* and Burnside only thirteen.

In this assault, Longstreet had at first three brigades actually engaged, and, subsequently, a fourth; besides the two brigades of Buckner's division, which

* I have been obliged to take my estimate of rebel losses from Burnside's report, as Longstreet's contains no statement of his losses. The description of the assault is made up from both reports, between which there is no discrepancy.

were in support, but not actually put into battle. These were, however, exposed to the artillery fire from the fort. Burnside's force was two hundred and twenty men, and eleven guns. The infantry was composed of portions of the Seventy-ninth New York and the Second Michigan volunteers, under Brigadier-General Ferrero; the artillery, consisting of Benjamin's light battery, Second United States artillery, and a part of Buckley's volunteer battery, was commanded by Lieutenant Samuel Benjamin, who in reality inspired and directed the whole defence of the fort. The coolness of the men, however, was admirable. To this, in a great measure, was due the remarkable disparity in losses. The rebels were obliged to advance about two hundred and fifty yards, without cover; and the defendants waited until they were absolutely at the ditch, before delivering fire. All the engineer operations, during the siege, were under the charge of Captain (now Brevet Brigadier-General) O. M. Poe.*

About half an hour after the repulse, Longstreet received a dispatch from Mr. Jefferson Davis, the pretended rebel president, announcing the defeat of Bragg, and directing Longstreet to coöperate with the retreating columns from Chattanooga. He at once ordered his trains to be put in motion for Loudon, so that his army might follow as soon as possible, to rejoin Bragg. But, getting reports, soon after, of an advance of national troops from Cleveland, to interrupt this junction, Longstreet recalled his trains, and determined to continue the siege, until heavy reënforce-

* Captain Poe was assisted by Lieutenant-Colonel (now Brevet-Brigadier-General) O. E. Babcock, captain of engineers, who, although on duty as inspector-general, performed important service as engineer.

ments should arrive for Burnside. He reasoned that Grant would thus be obliged to desist from the pursuit of Bragg, in order to save Knoxville; and he reasoned well.

On the 1st of December, Grant's dispatch to Burnside, which had been intended to fall into Longstreet's hands, was captured by the rebel scouts, and the enemy thus got information of the advance of Sherman. Longstreet himself was now cut off from all supplies, and driven to subsist off the country. The rebel command at Loudon was at once ordered to fall back on Knoxville.

On the 2d, Burnside got information of Sherman's approach; and, the same day, Longstreet determined to abandon the siege, and retreat in the direction of Virginia; his trains were put in motion on the 3d, to cross the Holston, at Strawberry plains; and, on the night of the 4th, the troops withdrew from the west side of Knoxville, and marched around to the east side, where they took up a line of march along the north bank of the Holston. This movement was unmolested by Burnside, and was made in remarkably good order.

Sherman, meanwhile, had repaired the bridge at Morgantown, and marched to Marysville; Howard constructing a bridge out of the rebel wagons left at Loudon, over which he crossed his men. On the 5th, all the heads of columns communicated, at Marysville, where Sherman received word from Burnside that Longstreet had raised the siege, and was in full retreat to Virginia. Sherman had previously sent the following note to Burnside, who was his senior: "Marysville, December 5, 1863. I am here, and can bring twenty-five thousand men into Knoxville to-morrow;

but Longstreet having retreated, I feel disposed to stop, for a stern chase is a long one. But I will do all that is possible. Without you specify that you want troops, I will let mine rest to-morrow, and ride to see you...."

On the 6th, accordingly, Sherman rode over to Burnside's headquarters, ordering all his troops to halt, except the two divisions of Granger, which were directed to move forward to Little river, and Granger to report in person to Burnside, for orders.

Burnside declared that he needed nothing from Sherman but Granger's command, which had been originally designed to reënforce him; and suggested that Sherman should return to the Hiawassee, with the rest of his army, lest Bragg should take advantage of the absence of so large a force, to assume the offensive.* Accordingly, having seen Burnside move out of Knoxville, in pursuit of Longstreet, and Granger move in, Sherman put his own command in mo-

* *Major-General W. T. SHERMAN, commanding, etc.*

GENERAL: I desire to express to you and your command, my most hearty thanks and gratitude, for your promptness in coming to our relief during the siege of Knoxville; and I am satisfied your approach served to raise the siege.

The emergency having passed, I do not deem for the present any other portion of your command, but the corps of General Granger, necessary for operations in this section; and, inasmuch as General Grant has weakened the force immediately with him, in order to relieve us, thereby rendering the position of General Thomas less secure, I deem it advisable that all the troops now here, save those commanded by General Granger, should return at once to within supporting distance of the forces in front of Bragg's army.

In behalf of my command, I desire again to thank you and your command for the kindness you have done us.

I am, general, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

A. E. BURNSIDE,

Major-General commanding.

tion to return. His approach had served to raise the siege.

On the morning of the 7th, the commands of Potter and Manson started out in pursuit of Longstreet, under Major-General Parke, Burnside's chief of staff; and, on the 10th, Foster arrived at Knoxville, from Cumberland gap. On the 11th, he assumed command of the Department of the Ohio. Burnside left Knoxville, on the 12th, for Cincinnati.

On the 8th, the President sent the following dispatch to Grant: "Understanding that your lodgment at Chattanooga and at Knoxville is now secure, I wish to tender you and all under your command my more than thanks, my profoundest gratitude for the skill, courage, and perseverance, with which you and they, over so great difficulties, have effected that important object. God bless you all."

And so, at last, the work was really achieved. The occupation and liberation of Tennessee were accomplished; the whole rebel line was driven back; the rebel communication between the Atlantic and the Mississippi forever broken; the mountains and rivers which had been the fortress and defences of the would-be confederacy were captured or turned; the fertile plains, which had yielded it supplies, were converted into granaries for the government; the besieged towns were relieved; the endangered armies rendered in their turn formidable to the enemy; and the loyal population of East Tennessee made henceforth safe from the persecutions of disloyalty.

Again the nation's heart was lifted up in hope and gratitude. On the 7th of December, the Presi-

dent issued a proclamation, recommending all loyal people to assemble in their places of worship, and return thanks to God for this great advancement of the national cause. On the 17th of the same month, Congress unanimously voted a resolution of "thanks to Major-General Ulysses S. Grant, and the officers and soldiers who have fought under his command, during this rebellion;" and a gold medal was struck, which it was provided that the President should present to Grant, "in the name of the people of the United States of America." Grant declared, in his official report, that "the Armies of the Cumberland and the Tennessee, for their energy and unsurpassed bravery in the three days' battle of Chattanooga, their patient endurance in marching to the relief of Knoxville; and the Army of the Ohio, for its masterly defence of Knoxville and repeated repulses of Longstreet's assaults upon that place, are deserving of the gratitude of their country;" a meed which their country did not fail to bestow.

Grant had given all his generals in East Tennessee repeated and positive orders to drive Longstreet's army completely out of the state. His whole plan was, either to annihilate that command, or to place it where it could do no further mischief to any part of his military division. On the 30th of November, he said to Foster, then at Cumberland gap: "If Longstreet is retreating up the valley, would it not be well to strike for Abingdon?" To Sherman, on the 1st of December, he wrote: "When you start upon your return to this place, after it is known that East Tennessee is cleared of all formidable bodies of the enemy," etc. To Foster, on the 2d: "Sherman will reach Knoxville to-morrow, or the day following.

His force is large, and Longstreet must retreat before it, without much fighting. I do not see how his route can be any other than up the valley. You will, no doubt, be able to inflict a heavy blow upon his retreating column." Again, on the 6th, to Foster: "Instruct your cavalry to follow Longstreet to the last minute. It is not necessary that they should attack the main force, but follow up the rear, hasten the retreat, pick up stragglers, and destroy the road as far east as possible. If your troops can get as far as Saltville" (*in Virginia*) "and destroy the works there, it will be an immense loss to the enemy." And on the 8th, to Sherman: "Keep your troops in the valley of the Tennessee, until it seems clear that the enemy have entirely abandoned the state." To Foster, on the 12th: "Drive Longstreet to the furthest point east you can." And on the 14th: "Do all you can to harass the enemy and drive him as far to the east as possible." Verbal instructions to the same effect were sent to Burnside, by a staff officer.

But Burnside miscalculated entirely the needs of his own command, and the intentions and abilities of the enemy. Supposing that Longstreet would evacuate the state, he sent Sherman back to the Hiawassee, retaining only Granger's command, for pursuit of Longstreet; and the opportunity for destroying that commander was lost. Longstreet was too able, not to perceive the mistake of his antagonist; and, before the mistake could be rectified, the mischief was irremediable. Sherman moved back towards Chattanooga, under the instructions of Burnside; and, on the 7th, after three days' delay, Parke was sent out after the fleeing enemy.

Longstreet had been ordered, some days before, to

send back Wheeler's cavalry to Bragg's army; but, at the moment of raising the siege, he judged it unsafe to obey; finding, however, that he was not hard pressed, he dismissed his cavalry, on the 8th, to Georgia, and marched himself for Rogersville. His column reached that place on the 9th. Here, he discovered that the resources of the country were abundant to subsist him for the winter, and sent out his trains to collect provisions. Receiving discretionary orders, he, next day, recalled one brigade of Wheeler's cavalry. On the 12th, he learned that a portion of Burnside's force had returned to Chattanooga, and that a small body of troops, principally cavalry, was scattered between Rutledge and Bean's station; Parke's main force being as far off as Blain's cross-roads, twenty miles. He, accordingly, fell upon the national cavalry at Bean's station, with a superior force, and compelled it to retreat, handling it roughly, and capturing a wagon-train loaded with supplies. The troops were thus subjected to the mortification of retreat, at the very moment when they should have been pushing the enemy into Virginia. Parke's advance fell back as far as Blain's roads.

Longstreet then moved to the south side of the Holston, at Russellville, and ordered his command to make shelters for the winter. The country was rich, abounding in grain and meat. The rebels had suffered greatly for want of rations and forage, and nothing more fortunate for them could have occurred, than that this corps should remain in East Tennessee. There, all winter, Longstreet did remain, threatening Foster, and subsisting off of a population for the most part loyal. His position occasioned great anxiety to the government and to Grant. It rendered posses-

sion of Knoxville, if not insecure, at least less certain: and the season, which is extremely inclement among these mountains, was now too far advanced for further military operations. It was useless to send other troops to Knoxville, as the advantage that had been lost could not be regained, before spring; and the rebels were left with this fulcrum for movements whenever the campaign of next year should begin. The retention of Sherman's column a week or two longer in East Tennessee would, undoubtedly, have obviated this disarrangement of Grant's plans.*

On the 7th of December, Grant announced: "It may now safely be assumed that the enemy are driven from the front, or, at least, that they no longer threaten it in formidable numbers." He, therefore, that day, renewed his suggestion of a campaign against Mobile. "The country south of this is extremely mountainous, affording but little for the support of an army; the roads are bad, at all times, and the season is so far advanced that an effective campaign from here, this winter, may be looked upon as impossible. Our supplies and means of transportation would not admit of a very early campaign, if the season did. . . . I pro-

* On the 20th of January, Grant said to Halleck: "It was a great oversight, in the first place, to have ever permitted Longstreet to come to a stop within the state of Tennessee, after the siege was raised. My instructions were full and complete on this subject. Sherman was sent with forces sufficient alone, to defeat Longstreet; and, notwithstanding the long distance the troops had marched, proposed to go on and carry out my instructions in full. General Burnside was sanguine that no stop would be made by the enemy in the valley. Sherman then proposed to leave any amount of force Burnside thought might be necessary to make his position perfectly secure. He deemed two divisions ample. . . . I write this now particularly to show that the latter named officer" (Sherman) "is in no wise to blame for the existing state of affairs in East Tennessee."

pose, with the concurrence of higher authority, to move by way of New Orleans and Pascagoula, on Mobile. I would hope to secure that place, or its investment, by the last of January."

The government, however, did not see fit to authorize the movement, and Grant himself ceased to urge it, when he discovered that Longstreet was likely to winter in Tennessee. On the 17th, he said: "I feel deeply interested in moving the enemy beyond Saltville, this winter, so as to be able to select my own campaign in the spring, instead of having the enemy dictate it for me." This was in harmony with the constant habit and purpose of Grant. In all his campaigns, he strove to take the initiative; experience had taught him that thus he was far more likely to succeed; but, before his experience began, he had acted on the same principle; his instincts prompted this course. His philosophy, like that of most men, was in accord with his character and temperament, and, probably, as much the result of these as the product of thought or experience. At Paducah, Belmont, Donelson, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga, he had been able to act on this plan; at Shiloh, Corinth, and Iuka, the enemy had taken the initiative. In the first cases, success amply confirmed his views; and, in the latter, the added difficulties which the course of the rebels imposed, were fully as strong corroboration.

Immediately after the battle of Chattanooga, Bragg was relieved from the command of his army, and temporarily succeeded by Lieutenant-General Hardee. It is a little singular to remark how often this fate befell the rebel commanders who were opposed to Grant. In different parts of the theatre of war, he had been met by Floyd, Pillow, Buckner,

Van Dorn, Price, Pemberton, and Bragg; every one of whom was either superseded soon after an important battle, or captured. The parallel was destined not to cease at Chattanooga.

During the autumn and winter of 1863, the terms of service of most of the volunteer troops expired; and, in order to induce the men to reenlist, large bounties were offered them, and a furlough of sixty days. The consequence was, that a very large proportion renewed their engagement with the government; but the immediate effect experienced by commanders in the field was unfavorable. The great deduction made from their forces, by the furloughing, reduced the effective strength, sometimes, ten or twenty thousand men at a time, in a single army. Grant, commanding so many armies, was of course proportionately hampered by what, however, was sure to be a benefit in the end. Still, the season for active operations, except at the extreme south, was in reality past.

About Christmas, Grant went in person to Knoxville, to inspect the country and the command, and intending to take such steps as would effectually drive out Longstreet from the valley. He found, however, a large part of Foster's command suffering for clothing, especially shoes; so that not more than two-thirds of the men could be taken in any advance. The weather was extremely inclement, and many of the troops stood in line with only a blanket to cover their nakedness. The difficulties of supplying the command were so prodigious that great suffering ensued. No railroad could be built under two months, at soonest; the fall in the rivers frequently interfered with the transportation of supplies; and, now, that the

roads had become well-nigh impassable, by reason of snow and ice, to send reënforcements would only be to put more men on insufficient rations. Under these circumstances, Grant made only such changes in the position of troops as would place Foster nearer the rebels, whenever he should be in a condition to move, and as would open to the national forces new foraging-grounds, at the same time reducing those of the enemy. "Troops," he said to Halleck, "must depend for subsistence on what they can get from the country, and the little we can send from Chattanooga."

Soon after this, Foster was relieved from duty at his own request, an old wound received in the Mexican war having reopened; and Major-General John M. Schofield was, at Grant's desire, appointed to the command of the Department of the Ohio. Schofield, however, did not arrive at Knoxville till the 9th of February.

On the 11th of December, Grant wrote to McPherson, who had been left in command at Vicksburg: "I shall start a cavalry force through Mississippi, in about two weeks, to clean out the state entirely of all rebels." This was the germ of what has been known as the Meridian raid. On the 23d, he said to Halleck: "I am now collecting as large a cavalry force as can be spared, at Savannah, Tennessee, to cross the Tennessee river, and coöperate with the cavalry from Hurlbut's command, in clearing out entirely the forces now collecting in West Tennessee, under Forrest. It is the design, that the cavalry, after finishing the work they first start upon, shall push south, through East Mississippi, and destroy the Mobile road, as far south as they can. Sherman goes to Memphis and Vicksburg, in person, and will have Gre-

nada visited, and such other points on the Mississippi Central railroad as may require it. . . . I want the state of Mississippi so visited that large armies cannot traverse there, this winter."

The force which Sherman had brought from Vicksburg, was now distributed, under Logan, between Stevenson and Decatur, guarding the railroad, while Dodge's division, of Hurlbut's command, was posted west of Decatur and along the line of the Nashville and Decatur road. Sherman in person started for his new campaign. Howard's corps and Davis's division having been returned to the Army of the Cumberland, the Eleventh and Twelfth corps were ordered to guard the railroad from Nashville to Chattanooga; the Fourteenth corps was left at Chattanooga; and Granger's force remained all winter, stretched out between Cleveland and Knoxville.

On the 13th of January, Grant returned from his tour to Knoxville, by way of Cumberland gap and Lexington, to Nashville, where his headquarters were now established. On the 15th, he said to Halleck: "Sherman has gone down the Mississippi to collect, at Vicksburg, all the force that can be spared for a separate movement from the Mississippi. He will probably have ready, by the 24th of this month, a force of twenty thousand men. . . . I shall direct Sherman, therefore, to move out to Meridian, with his spare force, the cavalry going from Corinth; and destroy the roads east and south of there so effectually, that the enemy will not attempt to rebuild them during the rebellion. He will then return, unless opportunity of going into Mobile with the force he has, appears perfectly plain. Owing to the large number of veterans furloughed, I will not be able to

do more, at Chattanooga, than to threaten an advance, and try to detain the force now in Thomas's front. Sherman will be instructed, whilst left with these large discretionary powers, to take no extra hazard of losing his army, or of getting it crippled too much for efficient service in the spring."

The same letter contained an exposition of Grant's plan of campaign for the following spring. "I look upon the next line for me to secure to be *that from Chattanooga to Mobile; Montgomery and Atlanta* being the important *intermediate* points. To do this, large supplies must be secured on the Tennessee river, so as to *be independent of the railroad from here*" (Nashville) "*to the Tennessee, for a considerable length of time.* Mobile would be a second base. The destruction which Sherman will do to the roads around Meridian will be of material importance to us, in preventing the enemy from drawing supplies from Mississippi, and in clearing that section of all large bodies of rebel troops. . . . I do not look upon any points, except Mobile in the south, and the Tennessee river in the north, as presenting practicable starting-points from which to operate against Atlanta and Montgomery." *

The grand movements dictated to Sherman, months

* Grant then went on to say: "They are objectionable as starting-points, to be all under one command, from the fact that the time it will take to communicate from one to the other will be so great. But Sherman or McPherson, either one of whom could be intrusted with the distant command, are officers of such experience and reliability, that all objections on this score, except that of enabling the two armies to act as a unit, would be removed." Further and interesting discussions occurred, at this time, between Grant and the general-in-chief, relative to Banks's Red river campaign, then in contemplation, and to the operations east of the Alleghanies. But I omit these subjects at present, as they pertain so closely to the themes of a future volume.

afterwards, and by him so grandly executed, were already marked out by the chief for himself, thus long in advance.

A copy of this letter was sent to Sherman, with the remark: "The letter contains all the instructions I deem necessary in your present move Nearly all the troops in Thomas's and Dodge's command, having less than one year to serve, have reënlisted, and many of them have been furloughed. This, with the fact that Longstreet's force in East Tennessee makes it necessary for me to keep ready a force to meet them, will prevent my doing much more than is indicated in my letter to General Halleck. I will have, however, both Dodge and Logan ready, so that, if the enemy should weaken himself much in front, they can advance."

On the 19th, Thomas also was informed of Sherman's contemplated movement, and of the probability that no active operations in East Tennessee would be undertaken before the opening of spring. "To coöperate with this movement," said Grant, "you want to keep up the appearance of preparation for an advance from Chattanooga. It may be necessary even to move a column as far as La Fayette. . . . Logan will also be instructed to move at the same time what force he can from Bellefontaine towards Rome. We will want to be ready at the earliest possible moment in the spring, for a general advance. I look upon the line for this army to secure, in its next campaign, to be that from Chattanooga to Mobile; Atlanta and Montgomery being the important intermediate points."

The complicated movements of Grant's three armies now reached over an extent of more than a

thousand miles. Thomas, at the centre, was confronting Johnston, Schofield was balancing Longstreet; and in order to distract the rebels, and thus relieve East Tennessee, as well as to secure the safety of the contemplated movement into Georgia, during the ensuing spring, Sherman was ordered to advance into the interior of Mississippi, hundreds of miles from either of the armies that were coöperating with him.

Brigadier-General William Sooy Smith was at this time placed in command of seven thousand cavalry, at Memphis, and ordered to move out by the 1st of February, marching by way of Pontotoc, Okalona, and Columbus junction, to Meridian, a distance of two hundred and fifty miles; Sherman instructed him to disregard all minor objects, but to destroy railroads, bridges, corn not wanted, and to strike quick and well every enemy that should offer opposition. He was to reach Meridian by the 10th of February. Sherman himself was to move at the same time, with four divisions of infantry and artillery, on the road from Vicksburg to Meridian, one hundred and fifty miles.

Sherman left Vicksburg, on the 3d of February, with two columns under Hurlbut and McPherson; he reached Jackson on the 5th, after continuous skirmishing for eighteen miles, driving a force estimated at twelve thousand soldiers, under Loring and French. This command was marching to form a junction at Jackson* with Lee's cavalry, supposed to be four thousand strong; but the rapidity of Sherman's move-

* All my statements of the rebel strength and movements, as well as of Sherman's operations, during the Meridian raid, are taken from Sherman's report. I have seen no rebel official report of the campaign.

ment prevented the junction. He then pushed on at once, by the direct road to Meridian; the enemy's cavalry hanging on his flanks, but giving him no concern. About twenty miles from Meridian, the road was obstructed with fallen timber, in order to afford the rebels time to cover the removal of railroad property from Meridian. Sherman at once left his trains, guarded with good escorts, and pushed on, over all obstructions, straight for the Ocktibbeha, where he found the bridge already burning. A gin-house, near by, supplied material for a new bridge, and at half past three P. M. on the 14th, he entered Meridian with but little opposition. The retreat of the rebels was covered by their cavalry. The rolling-stock had been removed to Selma, or Mobile.

Sherman could not have overtaken the enemy, before reaching the Tombigbee river, and, in fact, was willing to gain his point without battle, at so great a distance from the Mississippi, where the care of the wounded would have so taxed his ability to provide for them. He, therefore, rested his army, on the 15th, and, on the 16th, began a systematic and thorough destruction of the railroads centering at Meridian. Axes, crowbars, sledges, clawbars, were used, with fire; and the depots, storehouses, arsenals, hospitals, offices, hotels, and cantonments of Meridian were soon no more. For five days, ten thousand men were engaged in this work. Sixty miles of railroad were destroyed, on the north and east of the town, ties burned and iron bent; and on the south and west, fifty-five miles. Sixty-one bridges and culverts were burned; also six thousand feet of trestle-work across a swamp. Twenty locomotives, twenty-eight cars, and three saw-mills were destroyed. The enemy

could not use these roads to the same advantage again, during the war.*

The rebels had crossed the Tombigbee, and were in great alarm lest Sherman intended a march on Mobile. His numbers were magnified; and, Admiral Farragut, at the same time making a demonstration against the forts at the entrance of Mobile harbor,† immense excitement was produced. Two brigades were sent from Mobile to the Tombigbee, and a force was withdrawn from Johnston's army, in front of Thomas. Never before had a national army penetrated so far into the interior of the so-called confederacy. The places that had fancied themselves perfectly secure were entirely exposed, and the inmost lines of communication of the rebels were attacked and destroyed. Still, Sherman had moved without a base, and the rebels had great hopes of being able to cut him off, if he proceeded further. Thus far, his force had been too large for them to have any hope of withstanding it; but, if he advanced, they determined to bring troops from all parts of their territory, and, if possible, destroy him.

He did not give them the chance; but, on the 20th, ordered McPherson to march slowly back on the main road; whilst he himself proceeded northward, with Hurlbut's column, to feel for Sooy Smith, who had failed to make the junction ordered. Sherman marched as far as Union, and then sent a cavalry force

* In 1865, the time consumed by the enemy in wagoning around these breaks, detained Hood, at Florence, nearly a month; giving Thomas time to bring his reinforcements up from every point, even from Missouri; and thus materially aided in the great success achieved at Nashville.

† This demonstration was made at the request of Sherman.

of three regiments, under Colonel Winslow, to scour the whole region in search of Smith. On the 23d, the two infantry columns came together, at Hillsboro, after which, they marched, by separate roads, to the Pearl river. On the 26th, they bivouacked at Canton, to which place Winslow had been directed to lead Sooy Smith's command. Winslow was there, but had got no tidings of Smith. The rebels had not troubled Sherman, on the march from Meridian to Canton, and, on the 28th, he rode into Vicksburg. His army remained at Canton till the 3d of March.

Smith had not started from Memphis till the 11th of February, a delay which Sherman pronounced unpardonable; he advanced only as far as West Point, and turned back on the 22d, before a force inferior to his own; his orders having been peremptory to fight any cavalry he met. His march back to Memphis was too rapid for a good effect, and he was closely followed by Forrest's cavalry, before whom he had retreated at West Point. He reported having destroyed thirty miles of railroad, and great stores of cotton and corn; also the capture of two hundred prisoners and three thousand horses; but he entirely failed to accomplish the object of his expedition, or to satisfy his commanders.* His losses were not reported, but were probably slight.

Sherman, however, had driven the enemy out of Mississippi, destroyed the only remaining railroads in the state, the only roads by which the rebels could maintain an army in Mississippi, or threaten the

* Sherman dismissed Smith's part of the operation with these words: "General Smith had not started from Memphis at all, till the 11th of February, had only reached West Point, and turned back on the 22d, the march back to Memphis being too rapid for a good effect."

national forces on the main river. He had subsisted his army and animals chiefly on the rebel stores, brought away four hundred prisoners and five thousand negroes, about a thousand white refugees, and three thousand animals. He had marched between three hundred and fifty and four hundred and fifty miles, in the shortest month of the year, and his men were in better condition and health than when they started from Vicksburg. His losses were twenty-one men killed, sixty-eight wounded, and eighty-one missing.

On the 24th of January, Grant got permission to visit St. Louis, where his eldest son was lying dangerously ill. He was directed, however, by the Secretary of War, to retain direct command of all his forces, and communication both with them and with the government, during his absence from the front. On the 24th, he was at Chattanooga, and gave orders to Thomas, and to Logan, who was at Scottsboro, Alabama, to keep up a threatened advance on Rome, with the view of detaining as large a force of the enemy as possible in their fronts, and thus favor the operations of Sherman. "It is not expected to move forward at this time, but the movements of the enemy might change this." . . . To Logan he said: "Should General Thomas inform you, at any time, that he is going to make a reconnoissance to the front, and ask you to move in the coöperation, do so, without waiting further orders from these headquarters. Report the fact, however."

Thomas moved out on the 29th, and caused the enemy, now commanded by Joseph E. Johnston, who had succeeded Hardee, to fall back from Tunnel hill. On the 1st of February, it was learned that a

whole division and a brigade had been sent from Johnston, in the direction of Mobile. On the 5th, Grant was back at Nashville; and, the next day, receiving reports that two divisions from Johnston had been sent to Longstreet, he directed Thomas to send at least ten thousand men, besides Stanley's division, into East Tennessee. Logan was also ordered to hold himself in readiness to move, with all the force in his command that could be spared. Schofield was now in command of the Department of the Ohio, and Grant at once informed him of these preparations, and that he wanted "to drive Longstreet out immediately, so as to. . . prepare for a spring campaign of our own choosing, instead of permitting the enemy to dictate it for us." At the same time, he wrote: "We will have some sharp fighting, in the spring, and, if successful, I believe the war will be ended within the year."

Further news from Schofield decided Grant that it would be unadvisable to make the contemplated campaign against Longstreet. The reasons for this change in his plan were suggested by Foster, who returned home by way of Nashville, and urged them upon Grant. Schofield's possession of that portion of East Tennessee now held, was perfectly secure; and the condition of the loyal people within the rebel lines could not be much improved, even by a change, for they had already lost all. If Grant sent an overwhelming force against Longstreet, the enemy would simply fall back towards Virginia, until he could be reënforced or take an impregnable position. The country was exhausted, and all the national supplies would have to be carried, from Knoxville, the whole distance advanced; so that, whether the ob

ject of the expedition was accomplished or not, the troops must advance rapidly, and return soon ; Longstreet could then return with impunity, on the heels of the national column, at least as far down the valley as he could supply himself from the road in his rear. Schofield agreed in these views of Foster ; and Grant, thinking the reasons sufficient, gave orders to suspend the movement. He directed, however, that the troops should be turned against Dalton, which he hoped to gain and hold, as one step towards a spring campaign.

On the 12th, accordingly, Thomas was ordered to "make a formidable reconnoissance towards Dalton, and, if successful in driving the enemy out, occupy that place and complete the railroad up to it, this winter. Start at the earliest practicable moment." On the 17th, Grant said again to Thomas : "Make your contemplated movement, as soon as possible." And, on the 18th : "By all means, send the expedition. I think it of vast importance it should move as early as possible, for the effect it will have in favor of Sherman, and also on affairs in East Tennessee. I regret you cannot go." On the 21st : "Do your troops move to-morrow ? It is important that at least a demonstration be made, at once."

On the 25th, he telegraphed to Halleck : "Thomas's forces left Chattanooga, last Monday, to demonstrate against Dalton, to prevent forces being sent from there against Sherman. Our troops have Tunnel hill." Longstreet, at the same time, made a retrograde movement, and Schofield started immediately in pursuit. On the 25th, Thomas reported to Grant, from Tunnel hill : "Davis and Johnson" (two of his division commanders) "occupy the pass at Buz-

zard's roost. They have a force equal to theirs in their front, who outnumber them in artillery. It is not possible to carry the place by assault. Palmer made the attempt to turn it yesterday with Baird's and Cruft's divisions, but was met by an equal force, and in an equally strong position as at Buzzard's roost. After expending nearly all his ammunition, he retired, during the night, to Catoosa platform. Our transportation is poor and limited. We are not able to carry more than sixty rounds per man. Artillery-horses so poor that General Palmer could bring but sixteen pieces. The country is stripped entirely of subsistence and forage. The enemy's cavalry is much superior to ours. Prisoners taken yesterday report that a portion of Cleburne's division* . . . I will wait the developments of this day, and advise you further."

To this, Grant sent the following reply: "It is of the highest importance that the enemy should be held in full belief that an advance into the heart of the South is intended, until the fate of Sherman is fully known. The difficulties of supplies can be overcome by keeping your trains running between Chattanooga and your position. . . ." Thomas, accordingly, remained in force near Dalton, as long as he could supply himself. On the 29th, Grant reported to Halleck: "He is back now to Dalton, where he hopes to be able to haul supplies until the railroad can be completed to him." Schofield could not follow Longstreet further than Strawberry plains, because every step took him from

* The MS. here is imperfect. Probably the words "has returned" should be supplied.

his supplies, while Longstreet was falling back on his.

On the 2d of March, Grant got word through rebel sources of Sherman's success, but not of his return; and, on the 3d of March, Grant was ordered to Washington.

CHAPTER XIV.

Military situation early in 1864—Political situation—Need of one real head to the army—Grant made lieutenant-general—His predecessors in that grade—Action of the government—Grant's quiescence—Instructions to Sherman—Private correspondence between Grant and Sherman—Dispatches from Halleck—Journey to Washington—Arrival—Presentation of commission—Speeches of President and of Grant.

EARLY in 1864, the civil war in America had reached one of its most important crises. The political and the military situation of affairs were equally grave. The rebellion had assumed proportions that transcend comparison. The Southern people seemed all swept into the current, and whatever dissent had originally existed among them, was long since, to outside apprehension, swallowed up in the maelstrom of events. Ten states resisted with all their force, civil and military, and apparently with the additional armament of unanimity and popular enthusiasm, the whole strength of the national government. New Orleans, the greatest city of the would-be Confederacy, had, indeed, early fallen into the hands of the government; but Mobile, Wilmington, and Charleston, the next three commercial towns of importance, although blockaded and besieged by sea, held out as bravely and as stubbornly as ever. The Mississippi

had been opened to national vessels, though hardly yet to national trade, and the severest blow the rebellion had sustained was undoubtedly dealt when Vicksburg fell. Still, the snake, if scotched, was not killed; it had been cut violently in twain, but the severed parts retained each a convulsive life, while the more important portion, though shorn of its strength and resources, seemed to have lost none at all of its vitality. Kentucky and Tennessee, although in the possession of national forces, were yet debatable ground, and suffered all the ills of border territory in time of civil war; and Grant, ordered to the command of the entire region between the Mississippi and the Alleghanies, had checked the advance of Bragg, it is true, but even he had not yet driven the great rebel army of the West far beyond the northern boundaries of Georgia; for Johnston, the successor of the unlucky Bragg, still confronted the most formidable force that the government could accumulate in all its Western territory, and Longstreet occasionally threatened to assume the offensive in East Tennessee.

In the Eastern theatre of war, no real progress had been made during three disastrous years. The first Bull Run early taught the nation that it had to contend with skilful, brave, and determined foes. Then came McClellan's labors in the organization of an army, and his sad campaign on the Richmond Peninsula; after this, the still heavier reverses of Pope's career—heavier, because they followed so close on the heels of earlier defeats. Antietam saved the North from the perils of invasion, but, although a positive victory, it had only negative results. Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville were positive enough,

but made terrible drafts on the endurance of the nation, as well as on the life-blood of its soldiers. Gettysburg again stayed the tide of invasion; and, on the soil of the Northern states, a battle was fought, in the third year of the war, on whose result depended, for three long summer days, the fate of the second city in the land. This hardly seemed like the easy progress that had been anticipated for the national arms. Gettysburg saved Washington and Philadelphia; but even this victory had not resulted in the destruction of Lee; for, in the succeeding January, the rebel chief, with undiminished legions and audacity, still lay closer to the national capital than to Richmond; and Washington was in nearly as great danger as before the first Bull Run.

Halleck, succeeding McClellan in the ostensible command of all the armies, if he really exercised supreme control, had failed. It seemed as if, when successes came, they were oftener the result of blind courage on the part of the troops, than of brilliant combinations on the part of their commanders; and that the victories of a great general in one theatre of operations were sure to be neutralized by the disasters of an unsuccessful one on the other side of the continent. Success, it was evident, could only come from greater unity of plan and greater concentration of effort. The veriest tyro, or the stupidest critic, could see that all the strength of the national armies must be made coöperative, and that this had never yet been done. The need of one head, of a master-mind, to perceive and to do, to grasp all the varied necessities, to control all the varied operations, to evolve order out of chaos, to make generals and armies and marches and battles all tend to the ac-

complishment of one great and decisive object, this need was universally felt and acknowledged. But there was no such head; no such master-mind controlled the military policy.

It is not to be denied that the spirit of the nation was sorely tried by all these misfortunes. Political dissensions were rife, and those in opposition to the administration did not fail to exaggerate the disasters in the field. Accusations of political or personal interference with the movements of troops and the dispositions of generals, abounded, and were listened to by many; the frequent changes in important commands gave color to such charges, and were certainly discouraging; a large number of the political sympathizers with the administration were personally hostile to the President, or to members of his government; a presidential election was at hand, and even the presence of a terrible and still uncertain civil war, was insufficient to calm the outcries of partisans or suppress the aspirations of place-seekers. It was said that in the very cabinet of the President, cabals and dissensions found place; that he had his rivals among his own ministers; while, among his generals, whether off duty or on, not one of prominence but was mentioned, in some quarters, as the probable successor of the head of the government. The grave questions of the rights of states and the freedom of the person, of the abolition of slavery, and of finance, as well as those of a purely military character, were violently debated all over the North; great anxiety was felt as to the ability or disposition of the country to continue the supply of its resources; the draft was unpopular, and the temper of foreign nations unfavorable, if not hostile.

It was true, the South must be approaching exhaustion, but its devotion and heroism seemed to supply the lack of all resources. It is true, the nation was really as determined as ever, but all these considerations that have been mentioned, were gloomy in their character, and seemed to defer indefinitely the wished-for consummation.

Under these circumstances, a bill was introduced in the House of Representatives, by the Honorable Elihu B. Washburne, to revive the grade of lieutenant-general in the armies of the United States, with the idea of conferring this rank upon Grant, and giving him command of all the military forces of the country. The proposition was debated for several months, but finally, on the 26th day of February, 1864, it received the sanction of both Houses of Congress. On the 1st of March, the President approved the bill, and nominated Grant to the office; and on the 2d, the Senate confirmed the most important appointment ever made in America.

By this bill it was provided that "the grade of lieutenant-general be, and the same is hereby, revived in the Army of the United States of America: and the President is hereby authorized, whenever he shall deem it expedient, to appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a commander of the army, to be selected during war, from among those officers in the military service of the United States, not below the grade of major-general, most distinguished for courage, skill, and ability; and who being commissioned as lieutenant-general, shall be authorized, under the direction of the President, to *command the armies of the United States.*"

Grant had but two predecessors in this exalted

rank. In 1798, the grade was created for Washington, who held it but one year; and upon his death, it was discontinued, but conferred by brevet, in 1855, upon Major-General Winfield Scott.

The government had neither favored nor opposed the bill. During the long debate, its influence had been entirely passive. Apparently, the administration had become convinced that, in purely military matters, it was better for civilians not to attempt to interfere; and, the terrible responsibility thus sought to be laid on a single man, neither the President nor his cabinet assisted to impose. They simply left the matter in the hands of the representatives of the people, and these, after full consideration, decided by a majority that raised the measure entirely out of the domain of politics.*

Grant himself used no influence, wrote no line, spoke no word to bring about the result. I was with him while the bill was being debated, and spoke to him more than once on the subject. He never manifested any anxiety or even desire for the success of the bill; nor did he ever seem to shrink from the responsibilities it would impose upon him. If the country chose to call him to higher spheres and more important services, whatever ability or energy he possessed he was willing to devote to the task. If, on the contrary, he had been left at the post which he then held, he would not have felt a pang of disappointed pride.

The Honorable Mr. Washburne said of him, during the debates on the bill: "No man with his consent has ever mentioned his name in connection with any

* The vote in the House of Representatives, where the bill originated, was one hundred and seventeen to nineteen.

position. I say what I know to be true, when I allege that every promotion he has received since he first entered the service to put down this rebellion, was moved without his knowledge or consent. And in regard to this very matter of lieutenant-general, after the bill was introduced and his name mentioned in connection therewith, he wrote me, and admonished me that he had been highly honored by the government, and did not ask or deserve any thing more in the shape of honors or promotion; and that a success over the enemy was what he craved above every thing else; that he only desired to hold such an influence over those under his command, as to use them to the best advantage to secure that end."

On the 3d of March, Halleck sent the following dispatch to Grant: "The Secretary of War directs that you will report in person to the War Department, as early as practicable, considering the condition of your command. If necessary, you will keep up telegraphic communication with your command, while *en route* to Washington." The next day Grant started for the capital.

At the same time he sent instructions to Sherman, now on his return from Meridian. That commander was directed to use the negro troops, as far as practicable, to guard the Mississippi river; and, adding to this element what he deemed necessary for the protection of the river, to assemble the remainder of his command at Memphis. "Have them in readiness to join your column on this front, in the spring campaign." This was with a view to the movement against Atlanta and Mobile, which, notwithstanding his promotion, Grant still intended to lead in person. This operation had now been frequently explained

by him to his staff. It was his plan, at this time, to fight his way to Atlanta, and then, holding that place and the line between it and Chattanooga, to cut loose with his army, either for Mobile or Savannah, which ever events should designate as the most practicable objective point. He meant to concentrate Sherman, Thomas, and Schofield's armies for this purpose, and entertained no doubt whatever of entire success. When he started for Washington, it was his firm intention to return to Chattanooga, and, while he retained control of all the armies, to lead in person those which moved towards the sea. On the 3d of March, he said to Sherman, "I am ordered to Washington; but as I am directed to keep up telegraphic communication with this command, I shall expect, in the course of ten or twelve days, to return to it."

I carried these instructions to Sherman, and with them, also, the following extraordinary private letter:

DEAR SHERMAN,—The bill reviving the grade of lieutenant-general in the Army has become a law, and my name has been sent to the Senate for the place. I now receive orders to report to Washington immediately, *in person*, which indicates a confirmation, or a likelihood of confirmation. I start in the morning to comply with the order.

"Whilst I have been eminently successful in this war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I, how much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and the harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me.

"There are many officers to whom these remarks

are applicable to a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what I want is, to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success.

"How far your advice and assistance have been of help to me, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given to you to do, entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you cannot know as well as I.

"I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction.

"The word *you* I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also. I should write to him, and will some day, but starting in the morning, I do not know that I will find time just now.

"Your friend,

"U. S. GRANT

"Major-General."

Sherman received this letter near Memphis, on the 10th of March, and immediately replied :

"DEAR GENERAL,—I have your more than kind and characteristic letter of the 4th instant. I will send a copy to General McPherson at once.

"You do yourself injustice, and us too much honor, in assigning to us too large a share of the merits which have led to your high advancement. I know you approve the friendship I have ever professed to you, and will permit me to continue, as heretofore, to manifest it on all proper occasions.

"You are now Washington's legitimate successor, and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation ;

but, if you can continue, as heretofore, to be your self, simple, honest, and unpretending, you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends and the homage of millions of human beings, that will award you a large share in securing to them and their descendants a government of law and stability.

“I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much honor. At Belmont, you manifested your traits—neither of us being near. At Donelson, also, you illustrated your whole character. I was not near, and General McPherson in too subordinate a capacity to influence you.

“Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by the terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves at every point; but that admitted a ray of light I have followed since. I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just, as the great prototype Washington—as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest as a man should be—but the chief characteristic is the simple faith in success you have always manifested, which I can liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in the Saviour.

“This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also, when you have completed your best preparations, you go into battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga—no doubts—no reserves; and I tell you, it was this that made us act with confidence. I knew, wherever I was, that you thought of me, and if I got in a tight place you would help me out, if alive.

“My only point of doubt was, in your knowledge of grand strategy, and of books of science and his

tory; but, I confess, your common-sense seems to have supplied all these.

"Now, as to the future. Don't stay in Washington. Come West: take to yourself the whole Mississippi valley. Let us make it dead-sure—and I tell you, the Atlantic slopes and Pacific shores will follow its destiny, as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk. We have done much, but still much remains. Time, and time's influences, are with us. We could almost afford to sit still, and let these influences work.

"Here lies the seat of the coming empire; and from the West, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic.*

"Your sincere friend."

Before Grant reached Washington, he received the following magnanimous dispatch from the man whom he was about to supersede: "The Secretary of War directs me to say that your commission as

* On the 29th of December, Sherman had written to Grant: "In relation to the conversation we had in General Granger's office, the day before I left Nashville, I repeat, you occupy a position of more power than Halleck or the President. There are similar instances in European history, but none in ours. For the sake of future generations, risk nothing. Let *us* risk—and when you strike, let it be as at Vicksburg and Chattanooga. Your reputation as a general is now far above that of any man living, and partisans will manœuvre for your influence; but, if you can escape them, as you have hitherto done, you will be more powerful for good than it is possible to measure. You said that you were surprised at my assertion on this point, but I repeat that from what I have seen and heard here, I am more and more convinced of the truth of what I told you. Do as you have heretofore done, preserve a plain military character; and let others manœuvre as they will, you will beat them, not only in fame, but in doing good in the closing scenes of this war, when somebody must heal and mend up the breaches made by war."

lieutenant-general is signed, and will be delivered to you, on your arrival at the War Department. I sincerely congratulate you on this recognition of your distinguished and meritorious services." His journey to Washington was made as rapidly as possible, and by special trains; but wherever the people knew of his approach, they thronged around the railway stations in prodigious crowds; cheering, and struggling to catch a glimpse of the new commander of their armies.

On the 8th of March, he arrived at the capital, where he had never spent more than one day before. The President had never seen his face, and the Secretary of War had met him, for the first time, at Louisville, in the October preceding.

At one o'clock, on the 9th of March, Grant was formally received by the President, in the cabinet chamber. There were present all the members of his cabinet, Major-General Halleck, general-in-chief, two members of General Grant's staff,* the President's secretary, a single member of Congress, and Grant's eldest son, who had been with him at Jackson, and Vicksburg, and at Champion's hill.

After Grant had been presented to the members of the cabinet, Mr. Lincoln read the following words: "General Grant, the nation's appreciation of what you have done, and its reliance upon you for what remains to be done in the existing great struggle, are now presented, with this commission constituting you lieutenant-general in the Army of the United States. With this high honor, devolves upon you, also, a corresponding responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so, under God, it will sustain you.

* Brigadier-General Rawlins and Lieutenant-Colonel Comstock.

I scarcely need to add, that, with what I here speak for the nation, goes my own hearty personal concurrence."

Grant read, from a paper, this reply: "Mr. President, I accept the commission, with gratitude, for the high honor conferred. With the aid of the noble armies that have fought in so many fields, for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations. I feel the full weight of the responsibilities now devolving on me; and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies, and above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men."



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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I.

CORRESPONDENCE IN RELATION TO THE BATTLE OF BELMONT

St. Louis, November 1, 1861.

General GRANT, commanding at Cairo :

You are hereby directed to hold your whole command ready to march at an hour's notice, until further orders ; and you will take particular care to be amply supplied with transportation and ammunition. You are also directed to make demonstrations with your troops along both sides of the river towards Charleston, Norfolk, and Blandville, and to keep your columns constantly moving back and forward against these places, without, however, attacking the enemy.

Very respectfully, etc.,

CHAUNCEY McKEEVER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

St. Louis, November 2, 1861.

To Brigadier-General GRANT :

Jeff Thompson is at Indian ford of the St. Francois river, twenty-five miles below Greenville, with about three thousand men. Colonel Carlin has started with force from Pilot Knob. Send a force from Cape Girardeau and Bird's Point to assist Carlin in driving Thompson into Arkansas.

By order of

Major-General FREMONT.

C. McKEEVER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT SOUTHEAST MISSOURI, }
CAIRO, November 3, 1861. }

Colonel R. J. OGLESBY, *commanding, etc.,*

Bird's Point, Missouri:

You will take command of an expedition, consisting of your regiment, four companies of the Eleventh Illinois, all of the Eighteenth and Twenty-ninth, three companies of cavalry from Bird's point (to be selected and notified by yourself), and a section of Swartz's battery, artillery, and proceed by steamboats to Commerce, Missouri. From Commerce you will strike for Sikeston, Mr. Cropper acting as guide. From there you will go in pursuit of a rebel force, understood to be three thousand strong, under Jeff Thompson, now at Indian ford, on the St. Francis river.

An expedition has already left Ironton, Missouri, to attack this force. Should they learn that they have left that place, it will not be necessary for you to go there, but pursue the enemy in any direction he may go, always being cautious not to fall in with an unlooked-for foe, too strong for the command under you.

The object of the expedition is to destroy this force, and the manner of doing it is left largely at your discretion, believing it better not to trammel you with instructions.

Transportation will be furnished you for fourteen days' rations and four or five days' forage. All you may require outside of this must be furnished by the country through which you pass. In taking supplies, you will be careful to select a proper officer to press them, and require a receipt to be given, and the articles pressed accounted for in the same manner as if purchased.

You are particularly enjoined to allow no foraging by your men. It is demoralizing in the extreme, and is apt to make open enemies where they would not otherwise exist.

U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General.

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT SOUTHEAST MISSOURI, }
CAIRO, November 5, 1861. }

Brigadier-General C. F. SMITH, commanding, etc.,

Paducah, Kentucky:

In pursuance of directions from headquarters, Western Department, I have sent from here a force of about three thou-

sand men, of all arms, towards Indian ford, on the St. Francis river, and also a force of one regiment from Cape Girardeau in the same direction.

I am now, under the same instructions, fitting out an expedition to menace Belmont, and will take all the force proper to spare from here, probably not more than three thousand men.

If you can make a demonstration towards Columbus at the same time with a portion of your command, it would probably keep the enemy from throwing over the river much more force than they now have there, and might enable me to drive those they now have out of Missouri. The principal point to gain is, to prevent the enemy from sending a force to fall in the rear of those now out from this command. I will leave here to-morrow night, and will land some twelve miles below.

U. S. GRANT,

Brigadier-General commanding.

CAIRO, November 6, 1861.

Colonel R. J. OGLESBY, commanding expedition :

On receipt of this, turn your column towards New Madrid. When you arrive at the nearest point to Columbus, from which there is a road to that place, communicate with me at Belmont.

U. S. GRANT,

Brigadier-General.

CAIRO, November 6, 1861.

Colonel W. H. L. WALLACE, Bird's Point, Missouri :

Herewith I send you an order to Colonel Oglesby, to change the direction of his column towards New Madrid, halting to communicate with me at Belmont from the nearest point on his road.

I desire you to get up the Charleston expedition ordered for to-morrow, to start to-night, taking two days' rations with them. You will accompany them to Charleston, and get Colonel Oglesby's instructions to him by a messenger, if practicable, and when he is near enough you may join him. For this purpose you may substitute the remainder of your regiment in place of an equal amount from Colonel Marsh's. The two days' rations carried with your men in haversacks will en-

able you to join Colonel Oglesby's command, and there you will find rations enough for several days more should they be necessary. You may take a limited number of tents, and at Charleston press wagons to carry them to the main column. There you will find sufficient transportation to release the pressed wagons.

U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General.

ON BOARD STEAMER BELLE OF MEMPHIS, }
November 7, 1861, 2 o'clock A. M. }

Special Order.

The troops composing the present expedition from this place will move promptly at six o'clock this morning. The gunboats will take the advance, and be followed by the First brigade, under command of Brigadier-General John A. McClelland, composed of all the troops from Cairo and Fort Holt. The Second brigade, comprising the remainder of the troops of the expedition, commanded by Colonel John Dougherty, will follow. The entire force will debark at the lowest point on the Missouri shore, where a landing can be effected in security from the rebel batteries. The point of debarkation will be designated by Captain Walke, commanding naval forces.

By order of

U. S. GRANT,
Brigadier-General

JOHN A. RAWLINS,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER II

MAJOR-GENERAL MCCLELLAN TO MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, }
WASHINGTON, D. C., January 3, 1862. }

Major-General H. W. HALLECK,
commanding Department of Missouri:

GENERAL: It is of the greatest importance that the rebel troops in western Kentucky be prevented from moving to the support of the force in front of General Buell. To accomplish this, an expedition should be sent up the Cumberland river (to act in concert with General Buell's command), of sufficient strength to defeat any force that may be brought against it. The gunboats should be supported by at least one, and perhaps two, divisions of your best infantry, taken from Paducah and other points from which they can best be spared; at the same time, such a demonstration should be made on Columbus as will prevent the removal of any troops from that place; and if a sufficient number have already been withdrawn, the place should be taken. It may be well, also, to make a feint on the Tennessee river, with a command sufficient to prevent disaster under any circumstances.

As our success in Kentucky depends in a great measure on our preventing reinforcements from joining Buckner and Johnston, not a moment's time should be lost in preparing these expeditions.

I desire that you give me at once your views in full as to the best method of accomplishing our object, at the same time stating the nature and strength of the force that you can use for the purpose, and the time necessary to prepare.

Very respectfully,

G. B. McCLELLAN, *Major-General commanding.*

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK TO BRIGADIER-GENERAL GRANT.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI, }
St. Louis, January 6, 1862. }

Brigadier-General U. S. GRANT, Cairo, Ill.:

I wish you to make a demonstration in force on Mayfield, and in the direction of Murray. Forces from Paducah and Fort Holt should meet it and threaten "Camp Beauregard" and Murray, letting it be understood that Dover is the object of your attack. But don't advance far enough to expose your flank or rear to an attack from Columbus, and by all means avoid a serious engagement.

Make a great fuss about moving all your force towards Nashville, and let it be so reported by the newspapers.

Take proper precautions to deceive your own men as well as the enemy. Let no one, not even a member of your own staff, know the real object. I will send you some forces from this place to increase the deception. Let it be understood that twenty or thirty thousand men are expected from Missouri, and that your force is merely the advanced guard to the main column of attack. The object is to prevent reinforcements being sent to Buckner. Having accomplished this, you will slowly retire to your former positions, but if possible keep up the idea of a general advance. Be very careful, however, to avoid a battle. We are not ready for that. But cut off detached parties, and give your men a little experience in skirmishing.

If Commodore Foote can make a gunboat demonstration at the same time, it will assist in carrying out the deception.

H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General.*

TWO LETTERS OF INSTRUCTIONS FROM MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK TO
BRIGADIER-GENERAL GRANT, FOR MOVEMENT AGAINST FORT HENRY.HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI, }
St. Louis, January 30, 1862. }*Brigadier-General U. S. GRANT, Cairo, Ill.:*

You will immediately prepare to send forward to Fort Henry, on the Tennessee river, all your available force from Smithland, Paducah, Cairo, Fort Holt, Bird's Point, etc. Sufficient garrisons must be left to hold these places against an attack from Columbus. As the roads are now almost impassable for large forces, and as your command is very deficient in transportation, the troops will be taken in steamers up the Tennessee river as far as practicable. Supplies will also be taken up in steamers as far as possible. Flag-Officer Foote will protect the transports with his gunboats. The Benton, and perhaps some others, should be left for the defence of Cairo. Fort Henry should be taken and held at all hazards. I shall immediately send you three additional companies of artillery from this place. The river front of the fort is armed with 20-pounders. It may be necessary for you to take some guns of large calibre, and establish a battery on the other side of the river. It is believed that the guns on the land side are of small calibre, and can be silenced by our field artillery. It is said that the north side of the river, below the fort, is favorable for landing. If so, you will land and rapidly occupy the road to Dover, and fully invest the place, so as to cut off the retreat of the garrison. Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, U. S. Engineers, will immediately report to you, to act as chief engineer of the expedition. It is very probable that an attempt will be made from Columbus to reënforce Fort Henry, also from Fort Donelson at Dover. If you can occupy the road to Dover, you can prevent the latter. The steamers will give you the means of crossing from one side of the river to the other. It is said that there is a masked battery opposite the island, below Fort Henry. If this cannot be avoided or turned, it must be taken.

Having invested Fort Henry, a cavalry force will be sent forward to break up the railroad from Paris to Dover. The bridges should be rendered impassable, but not destroyed.

A telegram from Washington says that Beauregard left Manassas four days ago, with fifteen regiments for the line of Columbus and Bowling Green. It is, therefore, of the greatest importance that we cut that line before he arrives. You will move with the least delay possible. You will furnish Commodore Foote with a copy of this letter. A telegraph line will be extended as rapidly as possible from Paducah, east of Tennessee river, to Fort Henry. Wires and operators will be sent from St. Louis.

H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General*.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI, }
St. Louis, February 1, 1862. }

Brigadier-General U. S. GRANT, Cairo, Ill.:

You are authorized to withdraw Colonel Ross's regiment, Seventeenth Illinois volunteers, from Cape Girardeau for the Tennessee expedition as soon as they are wanted. The remaining forces are sufficient for that place. Your requisitions for horses, mules, wagons, etc., cannot be filled immediately. By using steamers on the river, and as the troops will not move far from their supplies and water transportation, much of the usual trains can be dispensed with for several weeks. Don't cumber up the expedition with too large a train. The object is to move rapidly and promptly by steamers, and to reduce the place before any large reënforcements can arrive.

H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General*.

FIELD ORDER FOR ATTACK ON FORT HENRY.

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF CAIRO, }
CAMP IN FIELD NEAR FORT HENRY, February 5, 1862. }

General Field Orders, No. 1.

The First division, General John A. McClernand commanding, will move at eleven o'clock A. M. to-morrow, under the guidance of Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson, and take a position on the roads from Fort Henry to Fort Donelson and Dover.

It will be the special duty of this command to prevent all reënforcements to Fort Henry or escape from it. Also, to be

held in readiness to charge and take Fort Henry by storm, promptly, on the receipt of orders.

Two brigades of the Second division, General C. F. Smith commanding, will start at the same hour from the west bank of the river, and take and occupy the heights commanding Fort Henry. This point will be held by so much artillery as can be made available, and such other troops as in the opinion of the general commanding Second division may be necessary for its protection.

The Third brigade, Second division, will advance up the east bank of the Tennessee river, as fast as it can be securely done, and be in readiness to charge upon the fort, or move to the support of the First division, as may be necessary.

All of the forces on the west bank of the river, not required to hold the heights commanding Fort Henry, will return to their transports, cross the river, and follow the First division as rapidly as possible.

The west bank of the Tennessee river not having been reconnoitred, the commanding officer intrusted with taking possession of the enemy's works there, will proceed with great caution, and such information as can be gathered, and such guides as can be found in the time intervening before eleven o'clock to-morrow.

The troops will move with two days' rations of bread and meat in their haversacks.

One company of the Second division, armed with rifles, will be ordered to report to Flag-Officer Foote, as sharpshooters, on board the gunboats.

By order : U. S. GRANT, *Brigadier-General commanding.*

GRANT'S REPORT OF CAPTURE OF FORT HENRY.

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF CAIRO, {
FORT HENRY, *February 6, 1862.* }

Captain J. C. KELTON, St. Louis, Mo. :

Enclosed I send you my orders for the attack upon Fort Henry.

Owing to dispatches received from Major-General Halleck, and corroborating information here, to the effect that the enemy were rapidly reënforcing, I thought it imperatively necessary

that the fort should be carried to-day. My forces were not up at eleven o'clock last night, when my orders were written, therefore I did not deem it practicable to set an earlier hour than eleven o'clock to-day to commence the investment. The gunboats started the same hour to commence the attack, and engaged the enemy at not over six hundred yards.

In a little over one hour all the batteries were silenced, and the fort surrendered at discretion to Flag-Officer Foote, giving us all their guns, camp equipage, etc. The prisoners taken were General Tilghman and staff, Captain Taylor and company, and the sick. The garrison, I think, must have commenced the retreat last night, or at an early hour this morning. Had I not felt it an imperative duty to attack Fort Henry to-day, I should have made the investment complete, and delayed until to-morrow, so as to have secured the garrison. I do not now believe, however, that the result would have been any more satisfactory.

The gunboats have proved themselves well able to resist a severe cannonading. All the iron-clads received more or less shots—the flag-ship some twenty-eight—without any serious damage to any except the Essex. This vessel received one shot in her boilers that disabled her, killing and wounding some thirty-two men, Captain Porter among the wounded.

I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th, and return to Fort Henry with the forces employed, unless it looks possible to occupy the place with a small force, that could retreat easily to the main body. I shall regard it more in the light of an advanced grand guard than as a permanent post.

For the character of the works at Fort Henry, I will refer you to reports of the engineers, which will be required.

Owing to the intolerable state of the roads, no transportation will be taken to Fort Donelson, and but little artillery, and that with double teams.

Hoping that what has been done will meet with the approval of the major-general commanding the department, I remain, etc.

U. S. GRANT, *Brigadier-General*.

FIELD ORDER FOR MARCH TO FORT DONELSON.

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF CAIRO,)
 FORT HENRY, February 10, 1862. }

General Field Orders, No. 7.

The troops from Forts Henry and Heiman will hold themselves in readiness to move on Wednesday, the 12th instant, at as early an hour as practicable. Neither tents nor baggage will be taken, except such as the troops can carry. Brigade and regimental commanders will see that all their men are supplied with forty rounds of ammunition in their cartridge-boxes, and two days' rations in their haversacks. Three days' additional rations may be put in wagons to follow the expedition, but will not impede the progress of the main column.

Two regiments of infantry will remain at Fort Henry, to be designated from the First division, and one brigade at Fort Heiman, Kentucky, to be designated by General Smith commanding.

By order of

Brigadier-General GRANT.

JOHN A. RAWLINS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

SECOND FIELD ORDER FOR MARCH TO FORT DONELSON.

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF CAIRO,)
 FORT HENRY, TENNESSEE, February 10, 1862. }

General Field Orders, No. 11.

The troops designated in General Field Orders, No. 7, will move to-morrow as rapidly as possible in the following order:

One brigade of the First division will move by the Telegraph road, directly upon Fort Donelson, halting for further orders, at a distance of two miles from the fort. The other brigades of the First division will move by the Dover or Ridge road and halt at the same distance from the fort, and throw out troops so as to form a continuous line, between the two wings.

The two brigades of the Second division, now at Fort Henry, will follow as rapidly as practicable, by the Dover road and will be followed by the troops from Fort Heiman, as fast as they can be ferried across the river.

One brigade of the Second division should be thrown into

Dover to cut off all retreat by the river, if found practicable to do so.

The force of the enemy being so variously reported, it is impossible to give exact details of attack, but the necessary orders will be given on the field.

By order of *Brigadier-General* U. S. GRANT, *commanding*.
JOHN A. RAWLINS, *Assistant Adjutant-General*.

GENERAL BUCKNER TO GENERAL GRANT.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT DONELSON, }
February 16, 1862. }

SIR: In consideration of all the circumstances governing the present situation of affairs at this station, I propose to the commanding officer of the Federal forces, the appointment of commissioners, to agree upon terms of capitulation of the forces and post under my command, and in that view suggest an armistice until twelve o'clock to-day.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
S. B. BUCKNER, *Brigadier-General C. S. A.*

To Brigadier-General U. S. GRANT,
commanding United States Forces near Fort Donelson.

ORDER OF GENERAL BUCKNER.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT DONELSON, }
February 16, 1862. }

Major Crosby will take or send by an officer to the enemy the accompanying communication to General Grant, and request information of the point where further communications will reach him. Also inform him that my headquarters will be for the present in Dover.

Have the white flag hoisted on Fort Donelson, not on the batteries.

S. B. BUCKNER, *Brigadier-General*.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL BUCKNER.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY IN THE FIELD, }
 FORT DONELSON, *February 16, 1862.* }

General S. B. BUCKNER, Confederate Army:

SIR: Yours of this date proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received. No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works. I am, sir, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *Brigadier-General commanding.*

GENERAL BUCKNER TO GENERAL GRANT.

HEADQUARTERS, DOVER, TENNESSEE, }
February 16, 1862. }

To Brigadier-General GRANT, United States Army:

SIR: The distribution of the forces under my command, incident to an unexpected change of commanders, and the overwhelming force under your command, compel me, notwithstanding the brilliant success of the Confederate arms yesterday, to accept the ungenerous and unclivalrous terms which you propose. I am, sir, your very obedient servant,

S. B. BUCKNER, *Brigadier-General commanding C. S. A.*

MESSAGE FROM MR. JEFFERSON DAVIS TO HIS CONGRESS.

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT, *March 11, 1862.*

To the Speaker of the House of Representatives:

I transmit herewith copies of such official reports as have been received at the War Department of the defence and fall of Fort Donelson.

They will be found incomplete and unsatisfactory. Instructions have been given to furnish further information upon the several points not made intelligible by the reports. It is not stated that reinforcements were at any time asked for; nor is it demonstrated to have been impossible to have saved the army by evacuating the position; nor is it known by what

means it was found practicable to withdraw a part of the garrison, leaving the remainder to surrender; nor upon what authority or principles of action the senior generals abandoned responsibility by transferring the command to a junior officer.

In a former communication to Congress, I presented the propriety of a suspension of judgment in relation to the disaster at Fort Donelson, until official reports could be received. I regret that the information now furnished is so defective. In the mean time, hopeful that satisfactory explanation may be made, I have directed, upon the exhibition of the case as presented by the two senior generals, that they should be relieved from command, to await further orders whenever a reliable judgment can be rendered on the merits of the case.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

GRANT'S REPORT OF THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, }
FORT DONELSON, *February 16, 1862.* }

Brigadier-General GEORGE W. CULLUM,

Chief of Staff, Department of the Missouri:

I am pleased to announce to you the unconditional surrender, this morning, of Fort Donelson, with twelve to fifteen thousand prisoners, at least forty pieces of artillery, and a large amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property.

I left Fort Henry on the 12th instant, with a force of about fifteen thousand men, divided into two divisions, under the command of Generals McClelland and Smith. Six regiments were sent around by water the day before, convoyed by a gunboat (or boats), and with instructions not to pass it.

The troops made the march in good order, the head of the column arriving within two miles of the fort at twelve o'clock *p.* At this point the enemy's pickets were met and driven in. The fortifications of the enemy were from this point gradually approached and surrounded, with occasional skirmishing on the line. The following day, owing to the non-arrival of the gunboats and reinforcements sent by water, no attack was made, but the investment was extended on the flanks of the enemy, and drawn closer to his works, with skirmishing all day. On the evening of the 13th, the gunboats and reinforcements

arrived. On the 14th, a gallant attack was made by Flag-Officer Foote upon the enemy's river batteries with his fleet. The engagement lasted probably one hour and a half, and bid fair to result favorably, when two unlucky shots disabled two of the armored boats, so that they were carried back by the current. The remaining two were very much disabled also, having received a number of heavy shots about the pilot-houses and other parts of the vessels. After these mishaps, I concluded to make the investment of Fort Donelson as perfect as possible, and partially fortify, and await repairs to the gun-boats. This plan was frustrated, however, by the enemy making a most vigorous attack upon our right wing, commanded by Brigadier-General J. A. McClernand, and which consisted of his division and a portion of the force under General L. Wallace.

The enemy were repelled, after a closely contested battle of several hours, in which our loss was heavy. The officers suffered out of proportion. I have not the means of determining our loss, even approximately, but it cannot fall far short of twelve hundred killed, wounded, and missing. Of the latter, I understand, through General Buckner, about two hundred and fifty were taken prisoners. I shall retain here enough of the enemy to exchange for them, as they were immediately shipped off, and not left for recapture.

About the close of this action the ammunition and cartridge-boxes gave out, which, with the loss of many of the field officers, produced great confusion in the ranks. Seeing that the enemy did not take advantage of it, convinced me that equal confusion, and, consequently, great demoralization, existed with him. Taking advantage of this fact, I ordered a charge upon the left (enemy's right) with the division under General C. F. Smith, which was most brilliantly executed, and gave to our arms full assurance of victory. The battle lasted until dark, and gave us possession of part of the intrenchment. An attack was ordered from the other flank after the charge by General Smith was commenced, by the divisions under McClernand and Wallace, which, notwithstanding hours of exposure to a heavy fire in the fore part of the day, was gallantly made, and the enemy further repulsed. At the points thus gained, night having come on, all the troops encamped for the night, feeling that a complete victory would crown their efforts at an

early hour in the morning. This morning, at a very early hour, a note was received from General Buckner, under a flag of truce, proposing an armistice. A copy of the correspondence which ensued is herewith enclosed.

I could mention individuals who especially distinguished themselves, but will leave this to division and brigade commanders, whose reports will be forwarded as soon as received.

Of the division commanders, however, Generals Smith, McClelland, and Wallace, I must do the justice to say that all of them were with their commands in the midst of danger, and were always ready to execute all orders, no matter what the exposure to themselves.

At the hour the attack was made on General McClelland's command, I was absent, having received a note from Flag-Officer Foote, requesting me to go and see him, he being unable to call on me, in consequence of a wound received the day before.

My staff, Colonel J. D. Webster, First Illinois artillery, chief of staff; Captain J. A. Rawlins, assistant adjutant-general; First Lieutenants C. B. Lagow and William S. Hillier, aides; and Lieutenant-Colonel J. B. McPherson, chief engineer, and Colonel John Riffin, junior, volunteer aide, are all deserving of personal mention for their gallantry and services.

For details, see reports of engineers, medical director, and commanders of divisions and brigades, to follow.

U. S. GRANT, *Brigadier-General*.

GRANT'S CONGRATULATORY ORDER AFTER THE CAPTURE OF FORT DONELSON.

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, }
FORT DONELSON, February 17, 1862. }

General Orders, No. 2.

The general commanding takes great pleasure in congratulating the troops of this command for the triumph over rebellion gained by their valor on the 13th, 14th, and 15th inst.

For four successive nights, without shelter during the most inclement weather known in this latitude, they faced an enemy in large force in a position chosen by himself. Though strongly fortified by nature, all the safeguards suggested by science were

added. Without a murmur this was borne, prepared at all times to receive an attack, and with continuous skirmishing by day, resulting ultimately in forcing the enemy to surrender without conditions.

The victory achieved is not only great in breaking down rebellion, but has secured the greatest number of prisoners of war ever taken in one battle on this continent.

Fort Donelson will hereafter be marked in capitals on the maps of our united country, and the men who fought the battle will live in the memory of a grateful people.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General commanding.*

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER III.

TELEGRAM FROM GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.

St. Louis, *March 1, 1862.*

General U. S. GRANT, Fort Henry:

Transports will be sent to you as soon as possible to move your column up the Tennessee river. The main object of this expedition will be to destroy the railroad bridge over Bear creek, near Eastport, Miss., and also the connections at Corinth, Jackson, and Humboldt. It is thought best that these objects be attempted in the order named. Strong detachments of cavalry and light artillery, supported by infantry, may by rapid movements reach these points from the river without very serious opposition. Avoid any general engagement with strong forces. It will be better to retreat than to risk a general battle. This should be strongly impressed upon the officers sent with the expedition from the river. General C. F. Smith, or some very discreet officer, should be selected for such commands. Having accomplished these objects, or such of them as may be practicable, you will return to Danville and move on Paris. Perhaps the troops sent to Jackson and Humboldt can reach Paris as easily by land as to return to the transports. This must depend on the character of the roads and the position of the enemy. All telegraph lines which can be reached must be cut. The gunboats will accompany the transports for their

protection. Any loyal Tennesseans, who desire it, may be enlisted and supplied with arms.

Competent officers should be left to command the garrisons of Forts Henry and Donelson in your absence. I have indicated in general terms the object of this.

H. W. HALLECK, *Major-General.*

CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GENERALS BEAUREGARD AND GRANT.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI,)
Monday, April 8, 1862.)

SIR: At the close of the conflict yesterday, my forces being exhausted by the extraordinary length of time during which they were engaged with yours on that and the preceding day, and it being apparent that you had received and were still receiving reënforcements, I felt it my duty to withdraw my troops from the immediate scene of conflict.

Under these circumstances, in accordance with usages of war, I shall transmit this under a flag of truce, to ask permission to send a mounted party to the battle-field of Shiloh, for the purpose of giving decent interment to my dead.

Certain gentlemen wishing to avail themselves of this to remove the remains of their sons and friends, I must request for them the privilege of accompanying the burial party; and in this connection, I deem it proper to say, I am asking only what I have extended to your own countrymen, under similar circumstances.

General, respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. T. BEAUREGARD, *General commanding.*

*To Major-General U. S. GRANT, commanding
United States forces near Pittsburg, Tennessee.*

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY IN THE FIELD,)
PITTSBURG, April 9, 1862.)

*General G. T. BEAUREGARD, commanding Confederate Army
of the Mississippi, Monterey, Tenn.:*

GENERAL: Your dispatch of yesterday just received. Owing to the warmth of the weather, I deemed it advisable to have all the dead of both parties buried immediately. Heavy details were made for this purpose, and it is now accomplished.

There cannot therefore be any necessity of admitting within our lines the parties you desire to send on the grounds asked. I shall always be glad to extend any courtesy consistent with duty, especially so when dictated by humanity.

I am, General, very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General*

GRANT'S CONGRATULATORY ORDER AFTER SHILOH.

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, }
PITTSBURG, April 8, 1862. }

General Orders, No. 34.

The general commanding congratulates the troops who so gallantly maintained their position, repulsed and routed a numerically superior force of the enemy, composed of the flower of the Southern army, commanded by their ablest generals, and fought by them with all the desperation of despair.

In numbers engaged no such contest ever took place on this continent. In importance of result but few such have taken place in the history of the world.

Whilst congratulating the brave and gallant soldiers, it becomes the duty of the general commanding to make special notice of the brave wounded and those killed upon the field. Whilst they leave friends and relations to mourn their loss, they have won a nation's gratitude and undying laurels not to be forgotten by future generations, who will enjoy the blessings of the best government the sun ever shone upon, preserved by their valor.

By command of

Major-General GRANT.

JOHN A. RAWLINS, *Assistant Adjutant-General.*

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL BUELL.

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, }
PITTSBURG, April 7, 1862. }

Major-General D. C. BUELL, *commanding Army of the Ohio:*

When I left the field this evening, my intention was to occupy the most advanced position possible for the night with the infantry engaged through the day, and follow up our success with cavalry and fresh troops, expected to arrive during

my last absence on the field. The great fatigue of our men, they having been engaged in two days' fight, and subject to a march yesterday and fight to-day, would preclude the idea of making any advance to-night without the arrival of the expected reënforcements. My plan, therefore, will be to feel on in the morning with all the troops on the outer lines, until our cavalry force can be engaged. One regiment of your army will finish crossing soon, and a sufficient artillery and infantry support to follow them are ready for a move.

Under the instructions which I have previously received, and a dispatch also of to-day from Major-General Halleck, it will not then do to advance beyond Pea Ridge, or some point which we can reach and return in a day. General Halleck will probably be here himself to-morrow. Instructions have been sent to the different division commanders not included in your command, to be ready in the morning either to find if an enemy was in front, or to advance.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL BUELL

HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, }
PITTSBURG, April 8, 1862. }

Major-General D. C. BUELL, commanding Army of the Ohio:

In making the reconnoissance ordered for this morning, none of the cavalry belonging to your command were directed to take part. I have directed, if the enemy are found retreating, information will be at once sent to Generals McClelland and Sherman, who will immediately advance with a portion of their forces in support of the reconnoissance. It will not be practicable to move artillery. If the enemy are retreating, and can be made to hasten across the low land between here and Pea Ridge, they will probably be forced to abandon their artillery and baggage. Will you be good enough to order your cavalry to follow on the Corinth roads, and give two or three of your fresh brigades to follow in support?

Information has just reached me that the enemy have retreated.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK, WITH INCLOSURES FROM
GENERAL SHERMAN TO GENERAL GRANT.

SAVANNA, April 5, 1862.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK, St. Louis, Mo. :

The main force of the enemy is at Corinth, with troops at different points east. Small garrisons are also at Bethel, Jackson, and Humboldt. The number at these places seems constantly to change. The number of the enemy at Corinth, and within supporting distance of it, cannot be far from eighty thousand men. Information, obtained through deserters, places their force west at two hundred thousand. One division of Buell's column arrived yesterday. General Buell will be here himself to-day. Some skirmishing took place between our outguards and the enemy's yesterday and the day before.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

SAVANNA, April 5, 1862.

Major-General H. W. HALLECK, St. Louis, Mo. :

General Nelson, of Buell's column, has just arrived. The other two divisions will arrive to-morrow and next day. Some skirmishing took place last night between our advance and the enemy, resulting in four wounded, and four or five men and two officers (of our side) taken prisoners. The enemy lost several killed, and eight prisoners taken.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, {
SAVANNA, April 5, 1862. }*Major-General H. W. HALLECK, St. Louis, Mo. :*

Just as my letter of yesterday, to Captain McLean, Assistant Adjutant-General, was finished, notes from Generals McClelland and Sherman's Assistant Adjutants-General were received, stating that our outposts had been attacked by the enemy, apparently in considerable force. I immediately went up, but found all quiet. The enemy took two officers and four or five of our men prisoners, and wounded four. We took

eight prisoners, and killed several. Number of the enemy's wounded not known.

They had with them three pieces of artillery, and cavalry and infantry. How much, cannot of course be estimated. I have scarcely the faintest idea of an attack (general one) being made upon us, *but will be prepared should such a thing take place.*

General Nelson's division has arrived. The other two, of Buell's column, will arrive to-morrow or next day. It is my present intention to send them to Hamburg, some four miles above Pittsburg, when they all get here. From that point to Corinth the road is good, and a junction can be formed with the troops from Pittsburg at almost any point.

Colonel McPherson has gone with an escort to-day to examine the defensibility of the ground about Hamburg, and to lay out the position of the camps, if advisable to occupy that place.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

PITTSBURG LANDING, TENNESSEE, }
April 5, 1862. }

General GRANT:

SIR,—All is quiet along my lines now. We are in the act of exchanging cavalry according to your orders. The enemy has cavalry in our front, and I think there are two regiments of infantry and one battery of artillery about six miles out. I will send you in ten prisoners of war, and a report of last night's affair, in a few minutes.

W. T. SHERMAN, *Brigadier-General.*

Your note is just received. I have no doubt that nothing will occur to-day more than some picket-firing. The enemy is saucy, but got the worst of it yesterday, and will not press our pickets far. I will not be drawn out far, unless with certainty of advantage; and I do not apprehend any thing like an attack upon our position.

SHERMAN.

LETTER FROM GENERAL SHERMAN TO THE EDITOR OF THE UNITED STATES' SERVICE MAGAZINE.—(PUBLISHED JANUARY, 1863.)

HEADQUARTERS, MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI.

Prof. HENRY COPPÉE, Philadelphia:

DEAR SIR,—In the June number of the United States' Service Magazine, I find a brief sketch of Lieutenant-General U. S. Grant, in which I see you are likely to perpetuate an error, which General Grant may not deem of sufficient importance to correct. To General Buell's noble, able, and gallant conduct you attribute the fact that the disaster of April 6th, at Pittsburg Landing was retrieved, and made the victory of the following day. As General Taylor is said in his later days to have doubted whether he was at the battle of Buena Vista at all, on account of the many things having transpired there, according to the historians, which he did not see, so I begin to doubt whether I was at the battle of Pittsburg Landing, of modern description. But I was at the battles of April 6th and 7th, 1862. General Grant visited my division in person about ten A. M., when the battle raged fiercest. I was then on the right. After some general conversation, he remarked that I was doing right in stubbornly opposing the progress of the enemy; and, in answer to my inquiry as to cartridges, told me he had anticipated their want, and given orders accordingly; he then said his presence was more needed over at the left. About two P. M. of the 6th, the enemy materially slackened his attack on me, and about four P. M. I deliberately made a new line behind McArthur's drill-field, placing batteries on chosen ground, repelled easily a cavalry attack, and watched the cautious approach of the enemy's infantry, that never dislodged me there. I selected that line in advance of a bridge across Snake creek, by which we had all day been expecting the approach of Lewis Wallace's division from Crump's Landing. About five P. M., before the sun set, General Grant came again to me, and after hearing my report of matters, explained to me the situation of affairs on the left, which were not as favorable; still, the enemy had failed to reach the landing of the boats. We agreed that the enemy had expended the *furor* of his attack, and we estimated our loss, and approximated our then strength, including Lewis Wallace's fresh division, ex-

pected each minute. He then ordered me to get all things ready, and at daylight the next day to assume the offensive. That was before General Buell had arrived, but he was known to be near at hand. General Buell's troops took no essential part in the first day's fight, and Grant's army, though collected together hastily, green as militia, some regiments arriving without cartridges even, and nearly all hearing the dread sound of battle for the first time, had successfully withstood and repelled the first day's terrific onset of a superior enemy, well commanded and well handled. I know I had orders from General Grant to assume the offensive before I knew General Buell was on the west side of the Tennessee. I think General Buell, Colonel Fry, and others of General Buell's staff rode up to where I was about sunset, about the time General Grant was leaving me. General Buell asked me many questions, and got of me a small map, which I had made for my own use, and told me that by daylight he could have eighteen thousand fresh men, which I knew would settle the matter.

I understood Grant's forces were to advance on the right of the Corinth road, and Buell's on the left; and accordingly, at daylight, I advanced my division by the flank, the resistance being trivial, up to the very spot where the day before the battle had been most severe, and then waited till near noon for Buell's troops to get up abreast, when the entire line advanced and recovered all the ground we had ever held. I know that, with the exception of one or two severe struggles, the fighting of April 7th was easy as compared with that of April 6th.

I never was disposed, nor am I now, to question any thing done by General Buell and his army, and know that approaching our field of battle from the rear, he encountered that sickening crowd of laggards and fugitives that excited his contempt, and that of his army, who never gave full credit to those in the front line, who did fight hard, and who had, at four P. M. checked the enemy, and were preparing the next day to assume the offensive. I remember the fact the better from General Grant's anecdote of his Donelson battle, which he told me then for the first time—that, at a certain period of the battle he saw that either side was ready to give way, if the other showed a bold front, and he determined to do that very thing, to advance on the enemy, when, as he prognosticated, the enemy surrendered. At four P. M. of April 6th, he thought

the appearances the same, and he judged, with Lewis Wallace's fresh division and such of our startled troops as had recovered their equilibrium, he would be justified in dropping the defensive and assuming the offensive in the morning. And, I repeat, I received such orders before I knew General Buell's troops were at the river. I admit that I was glad Buell was there, because I knew his troops were older than ours, and better systematized and drilled, and his arrival made that certain, which before was uncertain. I have heard this question much discussed, and must say, that the officers of Buell's army dwelt too much on the stampede of some of our raw troops, and gave us too little credit for the fact that for one whole day, weakened as we were by the absence of Buell's army, long expected, of Lewis Wallace's division, only four miles off, and of the fugitives from our ranks, we had beaten off our assailants for the time. At the same time, our Army of the Tennessee have indulged in severe criticisms at the slow approach of that army which knew the danger that threatened us from the concentrated armies of Johnston, Beauregard, and Bragg, that lay at Corinth. In a war like this, where opportunities for personal prowess are as plenty as blackberries, to those who seek them at the front, all such criminations should be frowned down; and were it not for the military character of your journal, I would not venture to offer a correction to a very popular error.

I will also avail myself of this occasion to correct another very common mistake, in attributing to General Grant the selection of that battle-field. It was chosen by that veteran soldier, Major-General Charles F. Smith, who ordered my division to disembark there, and strike for the Charleston railroad. This order was subsequently modified, by his ordering Hurlbut's division to disembark there, and mine higher up the Tennessee, to the mouth of Yellow creek, to strike the railroad at Burnsville. But floods prevented our reaching the railroad, when General Smith ordered me in person also to disembark at Pittsburg Landing, and take post well out, so as to make plenty of room, with Snake and Lick creeks the flanks of a camp for the grand army of invasion.

It was General Smith who selected that field of battle, and it was well chosen. On any other we surely would have been overwhelmed, as both Lick and Snake creeks forced the enemy

to confine his movement to a direct front attack, which new troops are better qualified to resist than where the flanks are exposed to a real or chimerical danger. Even the divisions of that army were arranged in that camp by General Smith's order, my division forming, as it were, the outlying picket, whilst McClelland and Prentiss's were the real line of battle, with W. H. L. Wallace in support of the right wing, and Hurlbut of the left; Lewis Wallace's division being detached. All these subordinate dispositions were made by the order of General Smith, before General Grant succeeded him to the command of all the forces up the Tennessee—headquarters, Savanna. If there were any error in putting that army on the west side of the Tennessee, exposed to the superior force of the enemy also assembling at Corinth, the mistake was not General Grant's; but there was no mistake. It was necessary that a combat, fierce and bitter, to test the manhood of the two armies, should come off, and that was as good a place as any. It was not then a question of military skill and strategy, but of courage and pluck, and I am convinced that every life lost that day to us was necessary, for otherwise at Corinth, at Memphis, at Vicksburg, we would have found harder resistance, had we not shown our enemies that, rude and untutored as we then were, we could fight as well as they.

Excuse so long a letter, which is very unusual from me; but of course my life is liable to cease at any moment, and I happen to be a witness to certain truths which are now beginning to pass out of memory, and form what is called history.

I also take great pleasure in adding, that nearly all the new troops that at Shiloh drew from me official censure, have more than redeemed their good name; among them, that very regiment which first broke, the 53d Ohio, Colonel Appen. Under another leader, Colonel Jones, it has shared every campaign and expedition of mine since, is with me now, and can march, and bivouac, and fight as well as the best regiment in this or any army. Its reputation now is equal to that of any from the state of Ohio.

I am, with respect, yours truly,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General*.

EXTRACTS FROM REPORTS OF GENERALS BUELL AND NELSON, AND COLONELS AMMEN, GROSE, ANDERSON, AND JONES, OF THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

“General Nelson arrived with Colonel Ammen’s brigade at this opportune moment. It was immediately posted to meet the attack at that point, and, with a battery of artillery which happened to be on the ground and was brought into action, opened fire upon the enemy and repulsed him. The action of the gunboats also contributed very much to that result. The attack at that point was not renewed, night having come on, and the firing ceased on both sides.”—*General Buell’s Report.*

“At five, the head of my column marched up the bank of Pittsburg Landing and took up its position in the road under the fire of the rebel artillery, so close had they approached the landing. I found a semicircle of artillery totally unsupported by infantry, whose fire was the only check to the audacious approach of the enemy. The Sixth Ohio and Thirty-sixth Indiana regiments had scarcely deployed when the left of the artillery was completely turned by the enemy, and the gunners fled from their pieces. The gallantry of the Thirty-sixth Indiana, supported by the Sixth Ohio, under the able conduct of Colonel Ammen, commanding Tenth brigade, drove back the enemy, and restored the line of battle. This was at 6.30 P. M., and soon after, the enemy withdrew, owing, I suppose, to the darkness.”—*General Nelson’s Report.*

So much for Buell and Nelson. Now read what their subordinates, who were actually engaged, reported :

“Reaching the top of the bank with the Thirty-sixth Indiana, *General Grant* directed me to send the regiment to support a battery less than a quarter of a mile from the landing. The Thirty-sixth marched promptly, and had been placed in position but a few minutes, when the enemy attacked the battery, and was repulsed. The enemy continued to assail the battery until the close of the day with a large force, but was repulsed by the Thirty-sixth with great coolness and gallantry. The Twenty-fourth and Sixth Ohio crossed the river as speedily as possible, and arriving at the top of the bank, the Twenty-fourth was ordered by *General Grant* to repair to a point one-half mile to the right, on a part of the line threatened by the

enemy. The Sixth Ohio was *held in reserve*. During the night," etc.—*Colonel Ammen's Report*.

"On arriving on the south side of the river, under circumstances that looked discouraging to new troops, my regiment was formed (the eight companies *about four hundred strong*), amid great commotion and excitement. While forming the regiment *one* of my men was killed by a ball of the enemy. As soon as formed, I was ordered to advance to support Captain Stone's battery, about one hundred and fifty yards distant from my place of forming, which was done in tolerable order, and as soon as the regiment was in place the firing commenced, and continued until near dark. *I there lost another man killed, and one wounded*. During the first part of the night," etc.—*Report of Colonel Grose, Thirty-sixth Indiana Volunteers*.

"I formed line of battle, under your directions, some two hundred yards from the river to support a battery then in danger of being charged by the enemy. The regiment laid on arms all night," etc.—*Report of Colonel Anderson, Sixth Ohio Volunteers*.

"We landed at this place about five and a half o'clock, P. M., of the 6th, and were immediately formed in line of battle on the river hill. *After the repulse of the enemy* at this point, the regiment was moved by your direction about three-quarters of a mile to the right, and were then ordered *by General Grant* to advance into the woods a short distance, to ascertain, if possible, the position of the enemy's lines. Having scoured the woods for half a mile to the front, and finding no enemy, and the shells from our gunboats falling but a few feet in front of us, we halted and remained in position until about midnight."—*Report of Lieutenant-Colonel Jones, Twenty-fourth Ohio Volunteers*.

From all which it will be seen that Grant put two of Buell's regiments in support of a battery, and that one of these regiments lost two men killed and one wounded; and that this was the amount of fighting done by Buell on the 6th of April.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER V.

EXTRACT OF A CONFIDENTIAL ORDER, ISSUED ON OCTOBER 21, 1862, BY
EDWIN M. STANTON, SECRETARY OF WAR, FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT
AT WASHINGTON CITY.

“ORDERED, that Major-General McClelland be, and he is directed to proceed to the states of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, to organize the troops remaining in those states and to be raised by volunteering or draft, and forward them with all dispatch to Memphis, Cairo, or such other points as may hereafter be designated by the General-in-chief, to the end that, when a sufficient force, not required by the operations of General Grant's command, shall be raised, an expedition may be organized under General McClelland's command, against Vicksburg, and to clear the Mississippi river and open navigation to New Orleans.”

Indorsement: “This order, though marked ‘confidential,’ may be shown by General McClelland to governors, and even others, when, in his discretion, he believes so doing to be indispensable to the progress of the expedition. I add, that I feel deep interest in the success of the expedition, and desire it to be pushed forward with all possible dispatch, consistently with the other parts of the military service.

“A. LINCOLN.”

In his letter of January 30, 1862, to General Grant, General McClelland remarks that the above order of the Secretary of War was made “under the personal direction of the President.”

EXTRACT FROM A LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OF WAR TO MAJOR-GENERAL JOHN A. McCLEARNAND, UNDER DATE OCTOBER 29, 1862.

"GENERAL: The importance of the expedition on the Mississippi is every day becoming more manifest, and there will be the utmost endeavor, on the part of the Government, to give it aid and strength.

"In conversing with you, I indicated the importance of a coastwise expedition against Texas to aid you, and create a diversion of the enemy's force.

"Major-General Banks is now organizing an expedition for that purpose, which will be in condition to coöperate with any movement that may be made, after you have succeeded in clearing the Mississippi river."

GENERAL McCLEARNAND TO GENERAL GRANT.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE, }
POST ARKANSAS, January 16, 1863. }

Major-General U. S. GRANT,
commanding Department of the Tennessee:

GENERAL,—Your dispatch of the 16th inst. came to hand at six o'clock P. M. this day, and I hasten, at the same moment, to answer it.

I take the responsibility of the expedition against Post Arkansas, and had anticipated your approval of the complete and signal success which crowned it, rather than your condemnation.

In saying that I could not have effected the reduction of Vicksburg with the limited force under my command, after its repulse near that place under General Sherman, I only repeat what was contained in a previous dispatch to you. *From the moment you fell back from Oxford*, and the purpose of a front attack upon the enemy's works near Vicksburg was thus deprived of coöperation, the Mississippi river expedition was doomed to eventuate in a failure.

I had heard nothing of General Banks when I left Miliken's Bend on the 4th inst.; and *if, as you say*, Port Hudson has been made "very strong," it will be some time before he

will be in a situation to receive the coöperation of the Mississippi river expedition, *unless he should prove more successful than the latter.*

Had I remained idle and inactive at Milliken's Bend with the army under my command until now, I should have felt myself guilty of a great crime. Rather had I accepted the consequences of the imputed guilt of using it profitably and successfully upon my own responsibility.

The officer who, in the present strait of the country, will not assume a proper responsibility to save it, is unworthy of public trust.

Having successfully accomplished the object of this expedition, I will return to Milliken's Bend, according to my intention, communicated to you in a previous dispatch, unless otherwise ordered by you. Respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN A. McCCLERNAND,

Major-General commanding.

GENERAL McCCLERNAND TO GENERAL GRANT.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, }
BEFORE VICKSBURG, MISS., *January 30, 1863.* }

Major-General U. S. GRANT,

commanding Department of the Tennessee :

Your order directing me to move the camp of the Fifty-fourth Indiana volunteers outside the limits of the camp hospital, and to furnish guards for said hospital, is received.

The officer who brought you a complaint upon this subject, should not have troubled you, but should have come to me, or, having come to you, I think ought, regularly, to have been referred to me.

I denounce his complaint as an act of insubordination. Please advise me who made the complaint.

If I am to be held responsible for the safety of this camp, I must be permitted to dispose of the forces within it as I may think proper. The internal organization of the camp, and the disposition of its forces, are matters that properly belong to me as their immediate commander.

The Fifty-fourth Indiana was assigned to the position, coveted by the medical director or hospital surgeon, for strate-

gie reasons, before the camp hospital was located. Those reasons are, in part, explained by the correspondence, a copy of which is herewith enclosed. Nevertheless, upon the application of the medical director, or rather upon my own suggestion, the huts occupied by the Fifty-fourth were vacated by them, and assigned for hospital uses, and the regiment ordered to encamp as far away as was consistent with strategic considerations. This they did.

Still complaint came. The surgeon objected to the neighborhood of the regiment; the colonel complained of the insolence of the surgeon, and stated that his men had voluntarily cared for the sick, who had been brought out and left on the ground uncared for. I settled the question, as already mentioned, by giving the huts and necessary space to the surgeon, and moving the regiment as far away as was considered proper.

With this statement, it remains for you to decide what ought to be done in the premises. The enforcement of your order will be the subversion of my authority at the instance of an inferior, who deserves to be arrested for his indirection and spirit of insubordination.

And having said this much, general, it is proper that I should add one or two other words. I understand that orders are being issued from your headquarters directly to army corps commanders, and not through me. As I am invested, by order of the Secretary of War, indorsed by the President, and by order of the President communicated to you by the General-in-chief, with the command of all the forces operating on the Mississippi river, I claim that all orders affecting the condition or operation of those forces should pass through these headquarters. Otherwise I must lose a knowledge of current business, and dangerous confusion ensue. If different views are entertained by you, then the question should be immediately referred to Washington, and one or other, or both of us, relieved.

One thing is certain: two generals cannot command this army, issuing independent and direct orders to subordinate officers, and the public service be promoted.

Your obedient servant,

JOHN A. McCLERNAND, *Major-General commanding.*

GENERAL McCLEARNAND TO GENERAL GRANT.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, }
 DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, }
 BEFORE VICKSBURG, January 30, 1863. }

Major-General U. S. GRANT,
commanding Department of the Tennessee:

General Orders, No. 13, is this moment received. I hasten to inquire whether its purpose is to relieve me from the command of all, or any portion of the forces composing the Mississippi river expedition, or, in other words, whether its purpose is to limit my command to the Thirteenth army corps.

I am led to make this inquiry, because, while such seems to be the intention, it conflicts with the order of the Secretary of War, made under the personal direction of the President, bearing date October 31, 1862, of which the following is an extract:

"Major-General McClelland is directed to proceed to the states of Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa, to organize the troops remaining in those states and forward them to Memphis, Cairo, or such other points as may hereafter be designated, to the end that, when a sufficient force, not required by the operations of General Grant's command [then in West Tennessee], shall be raised, an expedition may be organized, under General McClelland's command, against Vicksburg, and to clear the Mississippi to New Orleans."

Also, with the order of the General-in-chief to you, dated December 18, 1862, of which the following is an extract:

"It is the wish of the President, that General McClelland's corps shall constitute a part of the river expedition, and that he shall have the *immediate command under your direction*." *

Also, with your communication of the same date, based on the preceding order, and giving me command of the expedition; and with your verbal assurance of yesterday, that my relations to the forces here would continue undisturbed.

I repeat that I respectfully ask for an explanation of this seeming conflict of authority and orders, that I may be enabled to guide my action intelligently. By General Orders, No. 22, you extend your command as far west from the Mississippi river as your orders may reach. By General Orders, No. 13, you

* The italics are McClelland's.

charge the Thirteenth army corps with garrisoning Helena and other points south. Is it to be understood that my command west of the Mississippi is coextensive with the purview of General Orders, No. 22?

Again, you charge the Thirteenth army corps with garrisoning the west bank of the Mississippi. Am I to understand that I am to act on my own judgment in fixing the number, strength, and location of those garrisons, or simply by your directions?

It is quite obvious that the whole, or a large portion of the Thirteenth army corps must be absorbed by these garrisons, if the purpose is to afford complete protection to all lawful vessels navigating the river; and thus, while having projected the Mississippi river expedition, and having been by a series of orders assigned to the command of it, I may be entirely withdrawn from it.

For the reason last stated, and because the portion of the Thirteenth army corps taking part in this expedition is very much smaller than any other corps of your command, and because my forces are here, and those of others have yet to come; why not detach from the latter to garrison the river shore, and relieve all those here from liability to that charge?

Your obedient servant,

JOHN A. McCLERNAND, *Major-General commanding.*

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL McCLERNAND.

YOUNG'S POINT, LA., *January 31, 1863.*

*Major-General J. A. McCLERNAND, commanding
Thirteenth Army Corps:*

The intention of General Order, No. 13, is that I will take direct command of the Mississippi river expedition, which necessarily limits your command to the Thirteenth army corps.

* * * * *

I regard the President as Commander-in-chief of the army, and will obey every order of his; but as yet I have seen no order to prevent my taking immediate command in the field; and since the dispatch referred to in your note, I have received another from the General-in-chief of the army, authorizing me directly to take charge of this army.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

GENERAL McCLEARNAND TO GENERAL GRANT.

HEADQUARTERS, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, }
BEFORE VICKSBURG, *February 1, 1863.* }

GENERAL: Your dispatch of this date, in answer to mine of yesterday, is received.

You announce it to be the intention of General Orders, No. 13, to relieve me from the command of the Mississippi river expedition, and to circumscribe my command to the Thirteenth army corps; and undertake to justify the order by authority granted by the General-in-chief.

I acquiesced in the order for the purpose of avoiding a conflict of authority in the presence of the enemy, but for reasons set forth in my dispatch of yesterday (which, for any thing disclosed, I still hold good) I protest against its competency and justice; and respectfully request that this my protest, together with the accompanying paper, may be forwarded to the General-in-chief, and through him to the Secretary of War, and the President.

I request this not only in respect for the President and the Secretary, under whose express authority I claim the right to command the expedition, but in justice to myself as its author and active promoter. Your obedient servant,

JOHN A. McCLEARNAND,

Major-General commanding.

Major-General U. S. GRANT,

commanding Department of the Tennessee.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, }
BEFORE VICKSBURG, *February 1, 1863.* }

Herewith I enclose you copy of General Orders, No. 13, from these headquarters, and the correspondence between General McClelland and myself growing out of it.

It is due to myself to state that I am not ambitious to have this or any other command; I am willing to do all in my power in any position assigned me. General McClelland was assigned to duty in this department, with instructions to me to assign him to an army corps on the Mississippi river, and to

give him the chief command under my direction. This I did; but subsequently receiving authority to assign the command to any one I thought most competent, or to take it myself, I determined at least to be present with the expedition.

If General Sherman had been left in command here, such is my confidence in him that I would not have thought my presence necessary. But whether I do injustice to General McClelland or not, I have not confidence in his ability as a soldier to conduct an expedition of the magnitude of this successfully. In this opinion I have no doubt but that I am borne out by a majority of the officers of the expedition, though I have not questioned one of them on the subject.

I respectfully submit this whole matter to the General-in-chief and the President. Whatever the decision made by them, I will cheerfully submit to and give a hearty support.

GENERAL McCLELLAND TO GENERAL GRANT.—(EXTRACT.)

“January 24.

. . . “Great prudence needs to be exercised in detaching transports from this fleet to return to Memphis, as the Mississippi river is rising rapidly, and may deluge our troops at any time. You will at once perceive the great importance of this caution, as it involves the very existence of the army here. . . .

“Before closing this dispatch, I wish to say that the transports ordered back to Memphis should be returned here at the earliest possible moment, if the Mississippi river continues to rise.”

These letters, it will be remembered, are addressed by a subordinate to his commanding officer.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VI.

[I AM indebted to General Sherman for a copy of the following interesting letter, the original not having been preserved by General Grant. I give it entire, with the exception of the concluding paragraph, which adds nothing to the elucidation of General Sherman's views, and contains simply a confidential remark, entirely distinct from the remainder of the letter.]

GENERAL SHERMAN TO COLONEL RAWLINS.

HEADQUARTERS, FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, }
CAMP NEAR VICKSBURG, *April 8, 1863.* }

Colonel J. A. RAWLINS, A. A. G. to General GRANT:

SIR,—I would most respectfully suggest, for reasons which I will not name, that General Grant call on his corps commanders for their opinions, concise and positive, on the best general plan of campaign. Unless this be done, there are men who will, in any result falling below the popular standard, claim that their advice was unheeded, and that fatal consequences resulted therefrom. My own opinions are:

1. That the Army of the Tennessee is far in advance of the other grand armies.
2. That a corps from Missouri should forthwith be moved

from St. Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock, Arkansas, supplies collected while the river is full, and land communication with Memphis opened *via* Des Ark on the White, and Madison on the St. Francis rivers.

3. That as much of Yazoo pass, Coldwater, and Tallahatchie rivers as can be gained and fortified be held, and the main army be transported thither by land and water; that the road back to Memphis be secured and reopened; and as soon as the waters subside, Grenada be attacked, and the swamp road across to Helena be patrolled by cavalry.

4. That the line of the Yallabusha be the base from which to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central crosses Big Black above Canton, and lastly where the Vicksburg and Jackson railroad crosses the same river.

The capture of Vicksburg would result.

5. That a force be left in this vicinity, not to exceed ten thousand men, with only enough steamboats to float and transport them to any direct point. This force to be held always near enough to act with the gunboats, when the main army is known to be near Vicksburg, Haine's bluff, or Yazoo City.

6. I do doubt the capacity of Willow bayou (which I estimate to be fifty miles long and very tortuous) for a military channel, capable of supporting an army large enough to operate against Jackson, Mississippi, or Black river bridge; and such a channel will be very valuable to a force coming from the west, which we must expect. Yet this canal will be most useful as the way to convey coals and supplies to a fleet that should navigate the reach between Vicksburg and Red river.

7. The chief reason for operating *solely* by water, was the season of the year and high water in Tallahatchie and Yallabusha. The spring is now here, and soon these streams will be no serious obstacle, save the ambuscades of the forest, and whatever works the enemy may have erected at or near Grenada. North Mississippi is too valuable to allow them to hold and make crops.

I make these suggestions, with the request that General Grant simply read them, and give them, as I know he will, a share of his thoughts. I would prefer he should not answer them, but merely give them as much or as little weight as they deserve.

Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from

me the same zealous coöperation and energetic support, as though conceived by myself.

* * * * *

I am, etc.,

W. T. SHERMAN, *Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, }
MILLIKEN'S BEND, LA., *April 20, 1863.* }

Special Orders, No. 110.

* * * * *

VIII. The following orders are published for the information and guidance of the "Army in the Field," in its present movement to obtain a foothold on the east bank of the Mississippi river, from which Vicksburg can be approached by practicable roads:

1. The Thirteenth army corps, Major-General John A. McClernand commanding, will constitute the right wing.

2. The Fifteenth army corps, Major-General W. T. Sherman commanding, will constitute the left wing.

3. The Seventeenth army corps, Major-General James B. McPherson commanding, will constitute the centre.

4. The order of march to New Carthage will be from right to left.

5. Reserves will be formed by divisions from each army corps, or an entire army corps will be held as a reserve, as necessity may require. When the reserve is formed by divisions, each division will remain under the immediate command of its respective corps commanders, unless otherwise specially ordered, for a particular emergency.

6. Troops will be required to bivouac, until proper facilities can be afforded for the transportation of camp equipage.

7. In the present movement, one tent will be allowed to each company for the protection of rations from rain; one wall tent for each regimental headquarters; one wall tent for each brigade headquarters, and one wall tent for each division headquarters. Corps commanders having the books and blanks of their respective commands to provide for, are authorized to take such tents as are absolutely necessary, but not to exceed the number allowed by General Orders, No. 160, A. G. O., Series of 1862

8. All the teams of the three army corps, under the immediate charge of the quartermasters bearing them on their returns, will constitute a train for carrying supplies and ordnance, and the authorized camp equipage of the army.

9. As fast as the Thirteenth army corps advances, the Seventeenth army corps will take its place; and it, in turn, will be followed in like manner by the Fifteenth army corps.

10. Two regiments from each army corps will be detailed by corps commanders, to guard the lines from Richmond to New Carthage.

11. General hospitals will be established, by the medical director, between Duckport and Milliken's bend. All sick and disabled soldiers will be left in these hospitals. Surgeons in charge of hospitals will report convalescents, as fast as they become fit for duty. Each corps commander will detail an intelligent and good drill officer, to remain behind to take charge of the convalescents of their respective corps; officers so detailed will organize the men under their charge into squads and companies, without regard to the regiments they belong to; and in the absence of convalescent commissioned officers to command them, will appoint non-commissioned officers or privates. The force so organized will constitute the guard of the line from Duckport to Milliken's bend. They will furnish all the guards and details required for general hospitals, and with the contrabands that may be about the camps, will furnish all the details for loading and unloading boats.

12. The movement of troops from Milliken's bend to New Carthage will be so conducted as to allow the transportation of ten days' supply of rations, and one-half the allowance of ordnance required by previous orders.

13. Commanders are authorized and enjoined to collect all the beef cattle, corn, and other necessary supplies on the line of march; but wanton destruction of property, taking of articles useless for military purposes, insulting citizens, going into and searching houses without proper orders from division commanders, are positively prohibited. All such irregularities must be summarily punished.

14. Brigadier-General J. C. Sullivan is appointed to the command of all the forces detailed for the protection of the line from here to New Carthage. His particular attention is

called to General Orders No. 69, from Adjutant-General's office, Washington, of date March 20, 1863.

By order of

Major-General U. S. GRANT.

JOHN A. RAWLINS, *Assistant-Adjutant General*.

SMITH'S PLANTATION, LA., *April* 18, 1863.

Major-General J. A. McCLEARNAN,
commanding Thirteenth Army Corps:

I would still repeat former instructions, that possession be got of Grand Gulf at the very earliest possible moment. Once there, no risk should be taken in following the enemy until our forces are concentrated. Troops first there should intrench themselves for safety, and the whole of your corps be concentrated as rapidly as our means of transportation will permit. General McPherson will be closing upon you as rapidly as your troops can be got away, and rations supplied.

I see that great caution will have to be observed in getting barges past the crevasse near Carthage, and I apprehend a loss of some artillery may be encountered.

I will send over at once the pontoon train, with men to lay it. It can, at least, be thrown across Bayou Vidal, opposite your headquarters, to enable troops and artillery to march a good portion of the way to Carthage. If it can possibly be laid so as to cross the levee crevasse near Carthage, it would be of much greater service. Should we succeed in getting steamers past Vicksburg, they will bring you a further supply of rations. In the mean time, all the wagons, including all the regimental trains, should be kept constantly on the road between here and Milliken's bend. The number of wagons available is increasing daily. Troops guarding the different points between here and Richmond, should gather all the beef cattle and forage within reach of them, and destroy no more than they can use.

I will be over here in a few days again, and hope it will be my good fortune to find you in safe possession of Grand Gulf.

You do not want to start, however, without feeling yourself secure in the necessary transportation.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General*.

IN THE FIELD, *April 24, 1863.*

Major-General W. T. SHERMAN,
commanding Fifteenth Army Corps:

In company with Admiral Porter I made to-day a reconnoissance of Grand Gulf. My impressions are, that if an attack can be made within the next two days, the place will easily fall. But the difficulties of getting from here (Smith's Plantation) to the river are great.

I foresee great difficulties in our present position, but it will not do to let these retard any movements. In the first place, if a battle should take place, we are necessarily very destitute of all preparations for taking care of wounded men. All the little extras for this purpose were put on board the *Tigress*, the only boat that was lost. The line from here to Milliken's bend is a long one for the transportation of supplies, and to defend, and an impossible one for the transportation of wounded men. The water in the bayous is falling very rapidly, out of all proportion to the fall in the river, so that it is exceedingly doubtful whether they can be made use of for the purposes of navigation. One inch fall in the river diminishes the supply of water to the bayous to a very great extent, while their capacity for carrying it away remains the same. Should the river fall sufficiently to draw off all the water on the point where you are encamped, our line will have to be by wagons across to below the Warrenton batteries.

Whilst there I wish you would watch matters, and should the water fall sufficiently, make the necessary roads for this purpose. You need not move any portion of your corps more than is necessary for the protection of the road to Richmond until ordered. It may possibly happen that the enemy may so weaken his forces about Vicksburg and Haine's bluff, as to make the latter vulnerable, particularly with a fall of water to give an extended landing. I leave the management of affairs at your end of the line to you.

I shall send Surgeon Hewitt to the bend to-morrow, to consult with the medical director about the best policy to pursue for caring for our sick and wounded.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, }
IN THE FIELD, April 24, 1863. }

Major-General J. A. McCLEARNAND,
commanding Thirteenth Army Corps:

I would like to have General Osterhaus make a reconnoissance, in person, to a point on the Mississippi, opposite the mouth of Bayou Pierre, and a short distance below, to where there is a road leading from the river to Grand Gulf. The map shows such a road.

It is desirable to learn if there is a landing at that point, and, if it can be done by inquiry, to learn also the condition of the road on the opposite side. If a landing cannot be made in front at Grand Gulf, it may be necessary to reach there by this route. The map shows this road, and also a good road from the same point to Port Gibson.

It is also important to know if there is a road on the west bank of the river from here to a point below Grand Gulf. Should any of our gunboats get below the Gulf, and not be able to return, it could be used in communicating with them.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

PERKINS'S PLANTATION, LA., April 27, 1863.

Major-General J. A. McCLEARNAND,
commanding Thirteenth Army Corps:

Commence immediately the embarkation of your corps, or so much of it as there is transportation for. Have put aboard the artillery, and every article authorized in orders limiting baggage, except the men, and hold them in readiness, with their places assigned, to be moved at a moment's warning.

All the troops you may have, except those ordered to remain behind, send to a point nearly opposite Grand Gulf, where you will see, by special orders of this date, General McPherson is ordered to send one division.

The plan of the attack will be for the navy to attack and silence all the batteries commanding the river. Your corps will be in the river, ready to run to and debark on the nearest eligible land below the promontory first brought to view passing down the river. Once on shore, have each commander in-

structed beforehand to form his men the best the ground will admit of, and take possession of the most commanding points, but avoid separating your command so that it cannot support itself. The first object is to get a foothold where our troops can maintain themselves until such time as preparations can be made and troops collected for a forward movement.

Admiral Porter has proposed to place his boats in the position indicated to you a few days ago, and to bring over with them such troops as may be below the city after the guns of the enemy are silenced.

It may be that the enemy will occupy positions back from the city, out of range of the gunboats, so as to make it desirable to run past Grand Gulf, and land at Rodney. In case this should prove the plan, a signal will be arranged, and you duly informed, when the transports are to start with this view. Or, it may be expedient for the boats to run past, but not the men. In this case, then, the transports would have to be brought back to where the men could land, and move by forced marches to below Grand Gulf, reëmbark rapidly and proceed to the latter place. There will be required, then, three signals; one, to indicate that the transports can run down and debark the troops at Grand Gulf; one, that the transports can run by without the troops; and the last, that transports can run by with the troops on board.

Should the men have to march, all baggage and artillery will be left to run the blockade.

If not already directed, require your men to keep three days' rations in their haversacks, not to be touched until a movement commences.

U. S. GRANT, *Major-General.*

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER VII

[At the risk of some repetition, I have determined to furnish complete copies of all the dispatches that passed between General Grant and General Halleck, or any member of the Government, during the entire Vicksburg campaign, from the day that Grant first visited the fleet at the mouth of the Arkansas, to the date of the second capture of Jackson. The only omitted portions of this correspondence are the dispatches referring to mere routine business, and a few extracts having no reference whatever to military operations. Whenever a dispatch is not given in full, the omission is indicated by points. I have not given General Grant's formal report, which is already published, and is for the most part a synopsis or repetition of the dispatches that were sent from day to day during the campaign.]

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

MEMPHIS, TENN., *January 16, 1863.*

I start immediately for the fleet. My design is to get such information from them as I find it impossible to get here. I will return here in a few days, and in the mean time reinforcements will be forwarded with all dispatch.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

NAPOLEON, ARK., *January 18, 1863.*

General McClernaud's command is at this place. Will move down the river to-day. Should Banks pass Port Hudson, this force will be ready to coöperate on Vicksburg at any time.

What may be necessary to reduce the place I do not yet know, but since the late rains I think our troops must get below the city, to be used effectively.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

MEMPHIS, *January 20, 1863.*

I found the Mississippi expedition at mouth of Arkansas river, and started them immediately to Young's point. A canal will be at once surveyed and cut. The weather is highly unfavorable for operations. Streams are all very high, and it is still raining. The work of reducing Vicksburg will take time and men, but can be accomplished. Gorman has gone up White river with a great part of his force. So many boats being kept there makes it almost impossible to get transportation for troops. Both banks of the Mississippi should be under one commander, at least during present operations.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

MEMPHIS, TENN., *January 20, 1863.*

I returned here last night from a visit to the expedition under General McClermand.

I had a conversation with Admiral Porter, General McClermand, and General Sherman. The former and latter, who have had the best opportunity of studying the enemy's position and plans, agree that the work of reducing Vicksburg is one of time, and will require a large force in the final struggle. With what troops I have already designated from here, no more forces will be required for the present, but I will suggest whether it would not be well to know beforehand where they are to come from when required, if required at all.

The enemy have the bluffs from Haine's bluff, on the Yazoo (this is where the raft across the river is constructed), to the Mississippi, and down until they recede from the river, completely and thoroughly fortified.

I propose running a canal through, starting far enough above the old one commenced last summer, to receive the stream where it impinges against the shore with the greatest velocity. The old canal left the river in an eddy, and in a line

perpendicular to the stream, and also to the crest of the hills opposite with a battery directed against the outlet. This new canal will debouch below the bluffs on the opposite side of the river, and give our gunboats a fair chance against any fortifications that may be placed to oppose them.

But for the intolerable rains that we have had, and which have filled the swamps and bayous so that they cannot dry up again this winter, a landing might be effected at Milliken's bend; and roads constructed through to the Yazoo above the raft or Haine's bluff, and the enemy's works turned from that point. Once back of the intrenchments on the crest of the bluffs, the enemy would be compelled to come out and give us an open field fight, or submit to having all his communications cut and be left to starve out.

I would make no suggestions unasked, if you were here to see for yourself, or if I did not know that as much of your time is taken up with each of several other departments as with this. As, however, I control only the troops in a limited department, and can only draw reënforcements from elsewhere by making application through Washington, and as a demonstration, made upon any part of the old District of West Tennessee, might force me to withdraw a large part of the force from the vicinity of Vicksburg, I would respectfully ask if it would not be policy to combine the four departments in the West under one commander. As I am the senior department commander in the West, I will state that I have no desire whatever for such combined command, but would prefer the command I now have to any other that can be given.

I regard it as my duty to state that I found there was not sufficient confidence felt in General McClelland as a commander, either by the army or navy, to insure him success. Of course all would coöperate to the best of their ability, but still with a distrust. This is a matter I made no inquiries about, but it was forced upon me. As it is my intention to command in person, unless otherwise directed, there is no special necessity of mentioning this matter; but I want you to know that others besides myself agree in the necessity of the course I had already determined upon pursuing. Admiral Porter told me he had written freely to the Secretary of the Navy, with the request that what he said might be shown to the Secretary of War.

General Gorman had gone up White river, with most of his force, taking a great deal of the river transportation with him. I find great difficulty in getting boats to transport the troops. With the orders I gave, however, to release boats as fast as they can be dispensed with, I hope to remedy all difficulty of this kind.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.—(LETTER.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 21, 1863.*

The President has directed that as much of Arkansas as you may desire to control, be temporarily attached to your department. This will give you control of both banks of the river.

In your operations down the Mississippi, you must not rely too confidently upon any direct coöperation of General Banks and the lower flotilla, as it is possible that they may not be able to pass or reduce Port Hudson. They, however, will do every thing in their power to form a junction with you at Vicksburg. If they should not be able to effect this, they will at least occupy a portion of the enemy's forces, and prevent them from reënforcing Vicksburg. I hope, however, that they will do still better, and be able to join you.

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GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.—(TELEGRAM.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 25, 2.40 P. M.*

Forts Henry and Donelson have been transferred to the Department of the Cumberland.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

MEMPHIS, TENN., *January 25, 1863.*

I leave for the fleet at Vicksburg to-morrow. Since leaving there (one week ago) I have not heard one word from them. The constant rains and tremendous rise in the river may operate against us for the time being.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., *January 25, 1863, 10.40 P. M.*

Direct your attention particularly to the canal proposed across the point. The President attaches much importance to this.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, MISS., *January 29, 1863.*

Water in the canal is five feet deep, and river rising. There is no wash, however, and no signs of it enlarging. I will let the water in from higher up and try the effect. I have ordered troops from Helena, escorted by a gunboat, the whole in charge of Colonel Wilson, Topographical Engineers, to cut the levee across Yazoo pass, and to explore through to Coldwater, if possible.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *January 31, 1863.*

I am pushing every thing to gain a passage, avoiding Vicksburg. Prospects not flattering by the canal of last summer. Other routes are being prospected, and work in the mean time progresses in the old canal.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *February 3, 1863.*

One of the rams ran the blockade this morning. This is of vast importance, cutting off the enemy's communication with the west bank of the river. One steamer lying at Vicksburg was run into, but not sunk. Work on the canal is progressing as rapidly as possible.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.—(TELEGRAM.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 3, 1863.*

Send any reliable information you may have received in regard to the steamer *Indianola*. Was she sunk or not?

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *February 4, 1863.*

Herewith I enclose you reports from Colonel Deitzler and Lieutenant-Colonel Duff, from Lake Providence, fifty odd miles above here.

On examining the route of the present canal, I lost all faith in its ever leading to any practical results. The canal is at right angles with the thread of the current at both ends, and both ends are in an eddy, the lower coming out under bluffs completely commanding it. Warrenton, a few miles below, is capable of as strong defences as Vicksburg, and the enemy, seeing us at work here, have turned their attention to that point. Our labor, however, has had the effect of making the enemy divide his forces, and spread their big guns over a great deal of country. They are now fortified from Haine's bluff to Warrenton.

Taking the views I did, I immediately, on my arrival here, commenced or ordered other routes prospected. One of these is by the way of Yazoo pass into Coldwater, the Tallahatchie, and Yazoo rivers. This is conducted by Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, from whom no report is yet received. This route, if practicable, would enable us to get higher ground above Haine's bluff, and would turn all the enemy's river batteries. Another is by Lake Providence, and the network of bayous connecting it with Red river. The accompanying reports show the feasibility of this route. A third is by the way of Willow and Roundaway bayous, leaving the Mississippi at Milliken's bend and coming in at Carthage. There is no question but this route is much more practicable than the present undertaking, and would have been accomplished with much less labor if commenced before the water had got all over the country.

The work on the present canal is being pushed. New inlets and outlets are being made, so that the water will be received where the current strikes the shore, and will be carried through in a current.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *February 6, 1863.*

Enclosed I send you report by Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson, of the prospect of effecting a safe passage into the Yazoo river by the way of Yazoo pass. Admiral Porter will have this pass thoroughly explored by light-draught gunboats, upon which I am putting six hundred riflemen from the army.

It is to be hoped that this expedition will be able to capture all the transports in the Yazoo and tributaries, and destroy two gunboats said to be in course of construction. They will also attempt to ascend the Yallahusha to Grenada, and if possible destroy the railroad bridges.

The ram that ran the blockade on the 2d inst. has returned to the lower end of the peninsula, opposite Vicksburg. She went as far as Red river, and some miles up it, capturing and destroying three steamboats loaded with commissary stores, and about sixty prisoners.

I send dispatches every day or two, to be telegraphed from Memphis, but as I do not know that they get through, think it necessary to notify you of the fact.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *February 9, 1863.*

The continuous rise in the river has kept the army busy to keep out of the water, and much retarded work on the canal. I hope to be able to say something definite, in a day or so, of the practicability of the other routes mentioned in previous dispatches.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.—(TELEGRAM.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., *February 13, 1863.*

Cannot dredge-boats be used with advantage in the canal? There are four lying idle at Louisville, belonging to Barton, Robinson & Co., canal contractors.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(TELEGRAM.)

YOUNG'S POINT, LA., *February 17, 1863.*

We have one dredging-machine here, and another ordered. More than two could not be advantageously used.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *February 18, 1863.*

The work upon the canal here is progressing as well as possible, with the excessively bad weather and high water we have had to contend against. Most of the time that troops could be out at all, has been expended in keeping water out of our camps. Five good working days would enable the force here to complete the canal sixty feet wide, and of sufficient depth to admit any vessel here. Judging from the past, it is fair to calculate that it will take from ten to twelve days to get those five days. Three more, perhaps, should be allowed, from the fact that the work is being done by soldiers, the most of whom, under the most favorable circumstances, could not come up to the calculations of the engineer officers.

McPherson's army corps is at Lake Providence, prosecuting the work there. They could not be of any service in helping on the work here, because there are already as many men as can be employed on it; and then, he would have to go five or six miles above, to find land above water to encamp on.

I am using a few hundred contrabands on the work here, but have been compelled to prohibit any more coming in. Humanity dictates this policy.

Planters have mostly deserted their plantations, taking with them all their able-bodied negroes, and leaving the old and very young. Here, they could not have shelter, nor means of transportation when we leave.

I have sent a division of troops from Helena to join the Yazoo expedition, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson. His last report was sent you a few days ago. If successful, they will destroy the railroad bridges at Grenada, and capture or destroy all the transports in the Yazoo and tributaries.

The health of this command is not what is represented in the public journals. It is as good as any previous calculations

could have prognosticated. I believe, too, that there is the best of feeling and greatest confidence of success amongst them. The greatest drawback to the spirits of the troops has been the great delay in paying them. Many of them have families at home, who are no doubt in a suffering condition for want of the amount due them, and they are bound for their support.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *February 25, 1863.*

The Queen of the West is now at Warrenton, with the rebel flag flying. Distant firing was heard, lasting from four p. m. yesterday until one this morning. It is supposed to have been between the Queen and Indianola. Apprehension is felt for the safety of the Indianola.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

YOUNG'S POINT, LA., *February 27, 1863.*

News is just received that the Queen of the West and Webb attacked the Indianola about thirty-five miles below Vicksburg, on the night of the 24th, and, after an engagement of about forty minutes, captured her, with the most of her crew. It is said the Indianola afterwards sunk.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *March 2, 1863.*

I have received no forces from the Department of the Missouri, except those at Helena. Are any more to come?

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

WASHINGTON, 2 P. M., *March 5, 1863.*

It is of great importance to your command that transports be returned from you so far as possible, otherwise you will be short of supplies. Steam vessels on the upper rivers are very

scarce. Vessels in the fleet, between Memphis and Vicksburg, should go in fleets, under convoy. Make your requisition on Admiral Porter for convoys. The necessary detention of convoy down the Mississippi river is a matter of the most serious importance, and requires immediate attention.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

YOUNG'S POINT, LA., *March 6, 1863.*

The dredge-boats are here. They work to a charm, doing the work of three hundred men per day each hour.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *March 7, 1863.*

I telegraphed you yesterday the near approach to completion of the canal. The water is extremely high, several feet above the highest ground inside the levee. Last night one of the dams across the upper end of the canal gave way, filling up where men were at work getting out stumps, and thus setting back the work for several days. I hope yet, however, to have this work completed as early as I could possibly take advantage of it if it was already done.

The troops expected from St. Louis are not yet heard from, and all that I am bringing from West Tennessee are not yet down.

The work of getting through Lake Providence and Bayou Maçon there is but little possibility of proving successful. If the work had been commenced in time, however, there is but little question of the success of the enterprise. The land from Lake Providence and also from Bayou Maçon recedes until the lowest interval between the two widens out into a cypress swamp, where Bayou Baxter, which connects the two, is lost. This flat is now filled to the depth of several feet with water, making the work of clearing out the timber exceedingly slow, and rendering it impracticable to make an artificial channel.

The Yazoo pass expedition is a much greater success. Admiral Porter sent in four gunboats, and I sent a fleet of transports with about six thousand men. They were to clear the

Yazoo and tributaries of all steamboats and embryo gunboats, and if possible destroy the railroad bridge at Grenada. The gunboats were to approach as near Haine's bluff as possible, and fire signal-guns to warn the squadron in the mouth of the Yazoo of their presence. Last night Admiral Porter sent me word that the signal agreed upon had been heard.

I am now sending General McPherson with his army corps, and enough other troops to make full twenty-five thousand effective men, to effect a lodgment on the high ground on the east bank of the Yazoo. Once there, he will move down in transports and by land to the vicinity of Haine's bluff. Before moving down, however, below Yazoo City, General McPherson will be made acquainted with the full plan of attack that may then be determined upon, and the time will be so arranged that there will be full coöperation of my entire force. Our movements have evidently served to distract the enemy and make him scatter his heavy guns. His forces are also scattered, but they, with the light artillery, can be got to any one point.

The health of this command is good, and the greatest confidence is felt by officers and men. The most ample provision I ever saw has been made for the comfort of the sick.

The dredging-machines, brought here by Colonel G. G. Pride, work to a charm. After the accident of last night all work would have had to be suspended until there was a fall of at least three feet, (the river is yet rising), but for these machines. Much credit is due Colonel Pride for his selection of them. But for his personal attention, old and worn-out ones would have been sent, and the result, probably, would have been that they would have given out before their work was half done.

GENERAL GRANT TO SURGEON-GENERAL HAMMOND.—(LETTER.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *March 12, 1863.*

Surgeon J. R. Smith's letter of the 20th February is just received, inquiring into the sanitary condition of this command, and asking for suggestions for its improvement. I know a great deal has been said to impress the public generally, and all officials particularly, with the idea that this army was in a suffering condition, and mostly from neglect. This is most erroneous. The health of this command will compare favorably

with that of any army in the field, I venture to say, and every preparation is made for the sick that could be desired. I venture the assertion that no army ever went into the field with better arranged preparations for receiving sick and wounded soldiers than this. We have hospital-boats expressly fitted up, and with the Government and volunteer sanitary supplies, it is a great question whether one person in ten can be so well taken care of at their homes as the army can here.

I will refer Surgeon Smith's letter to my medical director for a full report of the condition of the medical department here.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *March 17, 1863.*

Since the giving way of the dam at the upper end of the canal, work with the dredges has progressed favorably, but all attempts to stop the rush of water into the canal have proved abortive. If required, however, the canal can be made to pass boats of ordinary size in a few days.

The enemy were busily engaged firing from the opposite heights yesterday, and last night at the dredge-boat nearest the lower end of the canal. Their shots did no damage, though many of the large ones reached half way across the point.

Ordinary Ohio river boats can now pass from Lake Providence into Bayou Maçon, and thence by easy navigation to the mouth of Red river. I make no calculations upon using this route for the present, but it may be turned to practical use after effecting present plans. *The same may be said of the canal across the point.*

I learn from Jackson (Mississippi) papers of the 14th, that one of our gunboats had run down to Grenada, and exchanged a few shots with the fort at that point. Further information from the enemy shows that several thousand troops have gone from Vicksburg up the Yazoo river. Besides four gunboats (one iron-clad), I have a division of troops there now, and Quimby's division in the pass, on their way down. One division from Memphis should also be on their way now. The great difficulty of getting small-class steamers, adapted to this service, has retarded movements by the way of Yazoo pass materially.

To hem in the enemy on the Yazoo, Admiral Porter has gone into Deer creek by the way of Steele's bayou and Little Black bayou. From there he can get into Yazoo either by running up Deer creek to Rolling Fork, thence through the fork and down the Big Sunflower, all of which is navigable, or down Deer creek to the Yazoo.

Admiral Porter and myself went up Steele's bayou to Little Black bayou on the 15th. With the exception of overhanging trees in some places, the navigation was good for the gunboat General Price. I am having those obstructions removed. We were preceded by four of the old iron-clads that found no difficulty in the navigation. I returned in the evening for the purpose of hurrying up men and means for clearing the channel. I also sent Sherman to make a reconnoissance in company of the gunboats, with the view of effecting a landing with troops on high ground, on the east bank of the Yazoo, from which we may act against Haine's bluff.

Last night I received a dispatch from Admiral Porter, saying that the iron-clads had pushed into Black bayou, and had reached to within a fourth of a mile of Deer creek, where they had become entangled in the timber, and could not move until it was cut out, and asking me for a force of three thousand men to act with him. Fortunately, I had already sent all that the boats at hand, suitable for that navigation, and immediately available, could carry. I am now sending the remainder of Sherman's old division, and will push troops through, if Sherman reports favorably, as fast as our means will permit. These troops go up the Mississippi river in large transports about thirty miles, and to where Steele's Bayou comes within one mile of the Mississippi. The small-class boats can ferry them from that point, and thus save the distance from the mouth of the Yazoo to, and also the most difficult part of the navigation in, Steele's bayou.

There is evident indication of considerable excitement in Vicksburg. I think they are removing many of their troops, but cannot satisfy myself to what points. Some, we know, have gone up the Yazoo, and it may be that others are going to Port Hudson. I have no means of learning any thing from below, except what is occasionally learned through Southern papers.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *March 24, 1863.*

At last accounts Yazoo pass expedition was yet at Greenwood. Porter and Sherman are attempting to get into the Yazoo below Yazoo City. No news from there for several days. Admiral Farragut holds the river above Port Hudson.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.—(TELEGRAM)

WASHINGTON, D. C., *March 24, 1863.*

I must again call your attention to the importance of your not retaining so many steamers in the Mississippi river. It is absolutely necessary that some of those boats be returned. We cannot otherwise supply our armies in Tennessee and Kentucky. This matter must be attended to at once.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *March 25, 1863.*

Two rams attempted to run the blockade this morning; one succeeded in a damaged condition. They were intended to strengthen Admiral Farragut, Admiral Porter is returning. Did not succeed in reaching the Yazoo.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *March 27, 1863.*

All work, excepting repairing the crevasse in the canal levee, has been suspended for several days, the enemy having driven the dredges entirely out. The canal may be useful in passing boats through at night, to be used below, but nothing further.

Admiral Porter has returned from his attempt to reach the Yazoo river below Yazoo City. The difficult navigation of the bayous from the Yazoo river, through Black bayou and Deer creek, caused so much time to be consumed, that the enemy got wind of the movement in time to blockade the creek just

where the boats would leave it. As the enemy occupied the ground in considerable force, where they could prevent the clearing out of these obstructions, the admiral was forced to desist from further efforts to proceed when within a few hundred yards of clear sailing to the Yazoo. Rolling Fork and Sunflower are navigable, steamers having come by this route to within sight of our gunboats whilst they were in Deer creek.

The moment I heard that Admiral Porter had started on his return, I sent orders for the return of the Yazoo pass expedition from Fort Greenwood. From information I have, other and greater difficulties would be found in navigating the Yazoo below Greenwood. Considerable preparation has been made to receive our forces coming by that route.

I get papers and deserters frequently from Vicksburg, but am not able to arrive at any definite conclusion as to their numbers. I do not anticipate any trouble, however, if a landing can be effected.

On the morning of the 25th, General Ellet sent two rams, the Switzerland and the Lancaster, to join Admiral Farragut. The last-named ram received a shot in the boiler long before reaching the front of the city. She floated down, however, receiving many more shots, but without materially further disabling her. She will be ready for service before to-morrow night, and is a fine vessel. The other boat received a shot, and immediately went to pieces. A large part, containing the machinery, tipped over, spilling it in the river; the wreck floated down, and lodged at our lower pickets, bottom up. She was very rotten and worthless. The shot received would not have damaged a sound vessel seriously; this is what Admiral Farragut, and army officers who have examined the wreck, report to me. Since no casualties occurred, it was fortunate that she was lost, for had she not been at this time she might have been at some other time, when more valuable vessels might have been risked, relying on this boat for assistance. It is almost certain that had she made one run into another vessel, she would have closed up like a spy-glass, encompassing all on board.

I have just learned from a reliable source, that most of the forces from Vicksburg are now up the Yazoo, leaving not to exceed ten thousand in the city to-day. The batteries are the

same, however, and would cause the same difficulty in landing that would be experienced against a heavy force. Besides, the very cause of the absence of so many troops from Vicksburg, our gunboats and troops in and towards the Yazoo, prevents our taking advantage of the circumstance. I have no doubt of the truth of my information, because it is substantiated by Southern papers and by deserters, so far as the sending of a large force up the Yazoo is concerned.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *March 29, 1863.*

A dispatch to release boats, and letter on the subject of the Yazoo expedition, are both just received, the letter also enjoining me to keep you constantly informed of the situation by telegraph. I have been very particular to write and telegraph often, even when there was nothing important to say, knowing that you would feel anxious to be constantly posted. The letters I suppose reached, but the dispatches in many instances have failed.

In regard to sending back boats from here, I gave and reiterated the order to General McClelland to do so, before leaving Memphis. On my arrival, however, I found the river rising so rapidly, that there was no telling at what moment all hands might be driven to the boats. As soon as this danger was passed so many boats were released, that I could have moved but a small force at one time.

I wrote you fully on the subject of the Yazoo expedition a few days ago.

If you do not receive at least one letter and two dispatches per week from me, general, be assured that some of them miscarried. In addition, I will telegraph as often as any thing may occur of importance.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(TELEGRAM.)

YOUNG'S POINT, LA., *March 31, 1863.*

I have ordered the release of all boats that can be spared, for General Rosecrans.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

YOUNG'S POINT, LA., *April 2, 1863.*

In two weeks I expect to be able to collect all my forces and turn the enemy's left. With present high water the extent of ground upon which troops could land at Haine's bluff is so limited that the place is impregnable. I reconnoitred the place yesterday with Admiral Porter and General Sherman.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.—(LETTER.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 2, 1863.*

Your dispatch of March 17th, and also your telegrams of March 24th and 25th, were received yesterday.

While working upon the canal, the division of your forces into several eccentric operations may have been very proper, for the purpose of reconnoitring the country; but it is very important that, when you strike any blow, you should have troops sufficiently concentrated to make that blow effective. The division of your army into small expeditions destroys your strength, and that, when in the presence of an enemy, is very dangerous.

What is most desired (and your attention is again called to this object) is, that your forces and those of General Banks should be brought into coöperation as early as possible. If he cannot get up to coöperate with you on Vicksburg, cannot you get troops down to help him on Port Hudson? Or at least can you not destroy Grand Gulf before it becomes too strong?

I know that you can judge of these matters there much better than I can here; but as the President, who seems to be rather impatient about matters on the Mississippi, has several times asked me these questions, I repeat them to you.

As the season when we can do very little on the lower Mississippi is rapidly advancing, I hope you will push matters with all possible dispatch.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *April 4, 1863.*

From information from the south by way of Corinth, I learn that the enemy in front of Rosecrans have been reënforced from Richmond, Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, and a few from Vicksburg. They have also collected a cavalry force of twenty thousand men. All the bridges eastward from Savannah, and north from Florence, are being rapidly repaired. Chalmers is put in command of north Mississippi, and is collecting all the partisan rangers and loose, independent companies of cavalry that have been operating in this department. He is now occupying the line of the Tallahatchie. This portends preparations to attack Rosecrans, and to be able to follow up any success with rapidity. Also, to make a simultaneous raid into West Tennessee both from north Mississippi and by crossing the Tennessee river.

To counteract this, Admiral Porter has consented to send the marine brigade up the Tennessee river, to coöperate with General Dodge at Corinth. I have also ordered an additional regiment of cavalry from Helena to West Tennessee.

I enclose with this a letter from Major-General Hurlbut, giving a programme which he wishes to carry out; and so much of it as to drive the enemy from the Tallahatchie, and cutting the roads where they have been repaired, I think can be successfully executed. I will instruct him not to scatter his forces so as to risk losing them.

I have placed one division of troops on Deer creek, with communication back to the Mississippi river just above Lake Washington. The object of this move is to keep the enemy from drawing supplies from that rich region (and use them ourselves), and to attract the attention of the enemy in that direction. The navigation is practicable for our iron-clads and small steamers through to the Yazoo river, by the route lately tried by Admiral Porter, with the exception of a few hundred yards in Deer creek, near Rolling Fork. This was obstructed by the enemy, and they are now guarding and fortifying there. This move will have a tendency to make them throw in an additional force there, and move some of their guns. My force had as well be there as here, until I want to use them.

A reconnoissance to Haine's bluff demonstrates the imprac-

ticability of attacking that place during the present stage of water. The west bank of the river is densely wooded and under water; the east bank only runs up to the bluff for a short distance below the raft, then diverges, leaving a bottom widening all the way down, in most parts covered by water and next to the bluffs, all of it so covered. The hill-sides are lined with rifle-pits, with embrasures here and there for field artillery. To storm this but a small force could be used at the outset. With the present batteries of the enemy, the canal across the point can be of but little use. There is a system of bayous running from Milliken's bend, and also from near the river at this point, that are navigable for large and small steamers passing around by Richmond to New Carthage. There is also a good wagon-road from Milliken's bend to New Carthage. The dredges are now engaged cutting a canal from here into these bayous. I am having all the empty coal and other barges prepared for carrying troops and artillery, and have written to Colonel Allen for some more, and also for six tugs to tow these. With them it would be easy to carry supplies to New Carthage and any point south of that.

My expectation is, for some of the naval fleet to run the batteries of Vicksburg, whilst the army moves through by this new route. Once there, I will move to Warrenton or Grand Gulf, probably the latter. From either of these points there are good roads to Jackson and the Black River bridge, without crossing Black river.

This is the only move I now see as practicable, and I hope it will meet your approval. I will keep my army together, and see to it that I am not cut off from my supplies, or beat in any other way than a fair fight. The discipline and health of this army is now good, and I am satisfied the greatest confidence of success prevails.

I have directed General Webster to commence the reconstruction of the railroad between Grand Junction and Corinth. The labor will be performed by the engineer regiment and contrabands, thus saving additional expense. The streams will be crossed on piles. In this way the work should be done by the first of May.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.—(LETTER.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., *April 9, 1863.*

Yours of March 29th is just received. Your explanation in regard to sending back steamers is satisfactory. I hope you will keep in mind the great importance of not unnecessarily detaining them, on account of the great entanglement it causes the quartermaster department in supplying our Western armies.

In regard to your dispatches, it is very probable that many fail to reach here in time. It is exceedingly important that General Banks should be kept advised of every thing that is done in your vicinity, and the only way he can get this information is through these headquarters.

You are too well advised of the anxiety of the Government for your success, and its disappointment at the delay, to render it necessary to urge upon you the importance of early action. I am confident that you will do every thing possible to open the Mississippi river. In my opinion this is the most important operation of the war, and nothing must be neglected to insure success.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

MILLIKEN'S BEND, LA., *April 11, 1863.*

The Yazoo expedition has reached the Mississippi. My forces in a few days will be all concentrated here. Grand Gulf is the point at which I expect to strike, and send an army corps to Port Hudson, to coöperate with Banks. Will reach the Mississippi at New Carthage, now in my possession, with wagon road, and canal, and bayous navigable for tugs and barges, between here and there

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

MILLIKEN'S BEND, LA., *April 12, 1863.*

There is nothing in the way now of my throwing troops into Grand Gulf, and destroying the works there, and then sending them on to Port Hudson to coöperate with General Banks in

the reduction of that place, but the danger of overflowing the road from here to New Carthage, where the water is let into the new canal, connecting the river there with the bayous coming out at Carthage. One division of troops is now at Carthage and another on the way. By turning the water into the canal, water communication can be opened between the two places in a very few days for barges and tugs. Of the former I have but fifteen as yet, and of the latter but three, suitable for this navigation. To use this route, therefore, it is absolutely necessary to keep open the wagon-road to take the artillery and to march the troops.

In about three nights from this time Admiral Porter will run the Vicksburg batteries, with so much of his fleet as he desires to take below, and I will send four steamers (the machinery protected from shot by hay-bales and sand-bags), to be used in transporting troops and in towing barges.

The wagon-road (this work must now be early completed), by filling up the lowest ground, will be about twenty inches above the water in the swamps. The river, where it is to be let into the canal, is four and eight-tenths feet above the land. This, however, is fifteen miles by river below where the dirt-road starts out. Had I seen nothing of the effect of crevasses in the back country, I should not doubt the effect would be to overflow the whole country through which we pass. But there has been a large crevasse just below where the canal leaves the river for a long time, through which the water has been pouring in great volume. I cannot see that this additional crevasse is going to have much other effect than to increase the breaks in the bayou levees, so as to make the discharge equal to the supply.

I will have a map of this section made to send to you by next mail, which will make this move intelligible. The embarrassment I have had to contend against, on account of extreme high water, cannot be appreciated by any one not present to witness it. I think, however, you will receive favorable reports of the condition and feeling of this army from every impartial judge, and from all who have been sent from Washington to look after its welfare.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

MILLIKEN'S BEND, LA., *April 12, 1863.*

Herewith I send you reports of Major-General Sherman, and the division and brigade commanders under him, of the late reconnoissance through Steele and Black bayous and Deer creek, made by them in conjunction with a portion of Admiral Porter's fleet, commanded by himself in person. The object of the expedition was to find a practicable passage to the Yazoo river, without passing the enemy's batteries at Haine's bluff; to liberate our fleet and troops then held above Greenwood; and, if found sufficiently practicable, to enable me to land most of my forces east of the Yazoo, at some point from which Haine's bluff and Vicksburg could be reached by high land. The accompanying reports show the impracticability of the route. This expedition, however, was not without its result. It carried our troops into the heart of the granary from which the Vicksburg forces are now being fed. It caused great alarm among the enemy, and led them to move a number of their guns from batteries on the river. The citizens fled from their plantations, and burnt several thousand bales of cotton; some not burnt was brought away by the gunboats. Much of their beef, bacon, and poultry was consumed by our troops, and distributed by the negroes. A scow, loaded with bacon for the enemy, was destroyed, and probably two hundred thousand bushels of corn was burned up. Several hundred negroes also returned with the troops.

The recent expedition of General Steele to the neighborhood of Rolling Fork, shows that the enemy is still holding that position. He also destroyed several hundred thousand bushels of corn, and brought off about a thousand head of stock and a number of the laboring class.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL BANKS.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

MILLIKEN'S BEND, LA., *April 14, 1863.*

I am concentrating my forces at Grand Gulf. Will send an army corps to Bayou Sara by the 25th, to coöperate with you on Port Hudson. Can you aid me and send troops after the reduction of Port Hudson to assist at Vicksburg?

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(TELEGRAM.)

MILLIKEN'S BEND, LA., *April 17, 1863.*

Seven gunboats and three transports ran the Vicksburg batteries last night. The crew of steamer Henry Clay, excepting the pilot, deserted soon after getting under fire. The boat took fire and burned up; one other transport slightly damaged. One man killed and three wounded on the Benton. No further casualties reported. A number of barges were also sent down.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

MILLIKEN'S BEND, LA., *April 17, 1863.*

I go to Carthage to-day. If it is possible, I will occupy Grand Gulf within four days.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

MILLIKEN'S BEND, LA., *April 19, 1863.*

I returned last night from New Carthage, at and near which place Admiral Porter's fleet is lying (six iron-clads and the ram General Price, together with two divisions of General McClernand's corps). The whole of his corps is between Richmond and New Carthage.

I had all the empty barges here prepared for the transportation of troops and artillery, and sent ten of them by the Vicksburg batteries with the fleet. Whilst under the guns of the enemy's batteries they were cut loose, and I fear that some of them have been permitted to run past New Carthage undiscovered. They were relied upon to aid in the transportation of troops to take Grand Gulf.

The wagon-road from here to within two miles of New Carthage is good for artillery. From that point on the bayou the levee is broken in a number of places, making cross-currents in the bayou; hence it is difficult to navigate with barges. I think, however, steamers will be able to run from where the wagon-road ends to the river. By clearing out the bayous

from timber, there will be good navigation from here to New Carthage for tugs and barges, also small stern-wheel steamers. This navigation can be kept good, I think, by using our dredges constantly, until there is twenty feet fall. On this subject, however, I have not taken the opinion of an engineer officer, nor have I formed it upon sufficient investigation to warrant me in speaking positively.

Our experiment of running the batteries at Vicksburg, I think has demonstrated the entire practicability of doing so with but little risk. On this occasion our vessels went down even slower than the current, using their wheels principally for backing. Two of the steamers were drawn into the eddy, and ran over a part of the distance in front of Vicksburg three times. I shall send six more steamers by the batteries as soon as they can possibly be got ready.

I sent a dispatch to General Banks that I thought I could send an army corps to Bayou Sara, to coöperate with him on Port Hudson by the 25th. This now will be impossible. There shall be no unnecessary delay, however, in my movements. I hope very soon to be able to report our possession of Grand Gulf, with a practicable and safe route to furnish supplies to the troops. Once there, I do not feel a doubt of success in the entire clearing out of the enemy from the banks of the river.

At least three of my army corps commanders take hold of the new policy of arming the negroes, and using them against the enemy with a will. They at least are so much of soldiers as to feel themselves under obligations to carry out a policy (which they would not inaugurate), in the same good faith and with the same zeal as if it was of their own choosing. You may rely on me carrying out any policy ordered by proper authority, to the best of my ability.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *April 21, 1863.*

I move my headquarters to Carthage to-morrow. Every effort will be exerted to get speedy possession of Grand Gulf, and from that point to open the Mississippi.

If I do not underestimate the enemy, my force is abundant, with a foothold once obtained, to do the work. Six transports will run the Vicksburg batteries to-night.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

MILLIKEN'S BEND, LA., *April 23, 1863.*

Six boats and a number of barges ran the Vicksburg batteries last night. All the boats got by, more or less damaged. The Tigress sank at three A. M., and is a total loss—crew all saved. The Moderator was much damaged. I think all the barges went through safely. Colonel Lagow, of my staff, was on the Tigress, in command of the fleet. Casualties, so far as reported, two men mortally wounded, and several (number not known) more or less severely wounded. About five hundred shots were fired. I look upon this as a great success. At the Warrenton batteries there was heavy firing, but all the boats were sure to go past. What damage was done there is not known.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

NEAR GRAND GULF, MISS., *April 27, 1863.*

Moving troops from Smith's plantation to the Mississippi has been a tedious operation, more so than it should have been. I am now embarking troops for the attack on Grand Gulf. Expect to make it to-morrow.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

NEAR GRAND GULF, *April 29, 1863.*

The gunboats engaged Grand Gulf batteries from eight this morning until one P. M., and from dusk till ten. The army and transports are now below Grand Gulf. A landing will be effected on the east bank of the river to-morrow. I feel now that the battle is more than half over.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

GRAND GULF, MISS., *May 3, 1863.*

On the 29th of April, Admiral Porter attacked the fortifications at this place with seven iron-clads, commencing at eight o'clock A. M., and continuing until half-past one, engaging them at very close quarters, many times not being more than one hundred yards from the enemy's guns. During this time, I had about ten thousand troops on board transports and barges, ready to land them, and carry the place by storm the moment the batteries bearing upon the river were silenced, so as to make the landing practicable. From the great elevation the enemy's batteries had, it proved entirely impracticable to silence them from the river; and when the gunboats were drawn off, I decided immediately upon landing my forces on the Louisiana shore, and march them across the point below Grand Gulf.

At night the gunboats made another vigorous attack, and in the mean time, the transports safely ran the blockade, and on the following day, the whole force with me was transferred to Bruinsburg, the first point of land below Grand Gulf from where the interior can be reached, and the march immediately commenced for Port Gibson. General McClelland was in the advance, with the Thirteenth army corps. About two A. M., on the 1st of May, when about four miles from Port Gibson, he met the enemy. Some little skirmishing took place before daylight, but not to any great extent. The Thirteenth corps was followed by Logan's division of McPherson's corps, which reached the scene of action as soon as the last of the Thirteenth corps was out of the road. The fighting continued all day, and until after dark, over the most broken country I ever saw. The whole country is a series of irregular ridges, divided by deep and impracticable ravines, grown up with heavy timber, undergrowth, and cane. It was impossible to engage any considerable portion of our force at any one time. The enemy were driven, however, from point to point towards Port Gibson, until night closed in, under which, it was evident to me, they intended to retreat. The pursuit was continued after dark, until the enemy was again met by Logan's division, about two miles from Port Gibson. The nature of the country

is such that further pursuit, in the dark, was not deemed prudent or advisable. On the 2d, our troops moved into the town, without finding any enemy except their wounded. The bridge across Bayou Pierre, about two miles from Port Gibson, on the Grand Gulf road, had been destroyed, and also the bridge immediately at Port Gibson, on the Vicksburg road. The enemy retreated over both these routes, leaving a battery and several regiments of infantry at the former, to prevent a reconstruction of the first bridge. One brigade, under General Stevenson, was detached to drive the enemy from this position, or occupy his attention, and a heavy detail set to work, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wilson and Captain Tresillian, to reconstruct the bridge over the other. This work was accomplished, a bridge and roadway (over a hundred and twenty feet long) made, and the whole of McPherson's two divisions marched over before night. This corps then marched to the north fork of Bayou Pierre, rebuilt a bridge over that stream, and was on the march by five and a half A. M. to-day. Soon after crossing the bayou, our troops were opened on by the enemy's artillery. It was soon demonstrated that this was only intended to cover the retreat of the main army. On arriving at Willow Springs, General McPherson was directed to hold the position from there to the Big Black with one division, and General McClelland, on his arrival, to join him in this duty. I immediately started for this place with one brigade of Logan's division and some cavalry (twenty men). The brigade of infantry was left about seven miles from here; contrabands and prisoners taken having stated that the last of the retreating enemy had passed that point. The woods, between here and the crossing of the Big Black, are evidently filled yet with the detachments of the enemy, and some artillery. I am in hopes many of them will be picked up by our forces.

Our loss will not exceed one hundred and fifty killed and five hundred wounded. The enemy's loss is probably about the same. We have, however, some five hundred of their men prisoners, and may pick up many more yet. Many stragglers, particularly from the Missouri troops, no doubt have fallen out, and will never join their regiments again.

The move by Bruinsburg undoubtedly took the enemy much by surprise. General Bowen's (the rebel commander) defence was a good one, and well carried out. My force, how-

ever, was too heavy for his, and composed of well-disciplined and hardy men, who know no defeat and are not willing to learn what it is.

This army is in the finest health and spirits. Since leaving Milliken's bend they have marched as much by night as by day, through mud and rain, without tents or much other baggage, and on irregular rations, without a complaint, and with less straggling than I have ever before witnessed. Where all have done so well, it would be out of place to make invidious distinction.

The country will supply all the forage required for any thing like an active campaign, and the necessary fresh beef; other supplies will have to be drawn from Milliken's bend. This is a long and precarious route, but I have every confidence in succeeding in doing it.

Admiral Porter left here this morning for the mouth of Red river. A letter from Admiral Farragut says that Banks has defeated Taylor, and captured about two thousand prisoners.

Colonel Grierson's raid from La Grange through Mississippi has been the most successful thing of the kind since the breaking out of the rebellion. He was five miles south of Pontotoc on the 19th of April. The next place he turned up at was Newton, about thirty miles east of Jackson. From there he has gone south, touching at Hazlehurst, Bahala, and various places. The Southern papers and Southern people regard it as one of the most daring exploits of the war. I am told the whole state is full of men paroled by Grierson.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(TELEGRAM.)

GRAND GULF, MISS, *May 3, 1863.*

We landed at Bruinsburg, April 30th, moved immediately on Port Gibson, met the enemy, eleven thousand strong, four miles south of Port Gibson at two A. M., and engaged him all day, entirely routing him, with the loss of many killed and about five hundred prisoners, besides the wounded. Our loss about one hundred killed and five hundred wounded. The enemy retreated towards Vicksburg, destroying the bridges over the two forks of Bayou Pierre. These were rebuilt, and pursuit continued till the present time. Besides the heavy

artillery at this place, four fieldpieces were captured certain, some stores, and the enemy driven to destroy much more. The country is the most broken and difficult to operate in I ever saw. Our victory has been most complete, and the enemy thoroughly demoralized.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL L. THOMAS.

HANKINSON'S FERRY, MISS., *May 5, 1863.*

I have the honor to request that Captain Adam Badeau, A. A. D. C., be ordered to report to me for duty on my staff.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

HANKINSON'S FERRY, MISS., *May 6, 1863.*

Ferrying land transportation and rations to Grand Gulf is detaining me on the Black river. I will move as soon as three days' rations are secured, and send the wagons back to the Gulf for more to follow. Information from the other side leads me to believe the enemy are bringing forces from Tullahoma. Should not Rosecrans at least make a demonstration of advancing?

HON. E. M. STANTON TO C. A. DANA, ESQ.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., *May 6, 1863.*

General Grant has full and absolute authority to enforce his own commands, and to remove any person who by ignorance in action or any cause interferes with or delays his operations. He has the full confidence of the Government, is expected to enforce his authority, and will be firmly and heartily supported, but he will be responsible for any failure to exert his powers. You may communicate this to him.

HON. E. M. STANTON TO GENERAL GRANT.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *May 7, 1863.*

The President and general-in-chief have just returned from the Army of the Potomac. The principal operation of General

Hooker failed, but there has been no serious disaster to the organization and efficiency of the army. It is now occupying its former position on the Rappahannock, having recrossed the river without any loss in the movement. Not more than one-third of General Hooker's force was engaged. General Stoneman's operations have been a brilliant success. A part of his force advanced to within two miles of Richmond, and the enemy's communication has been cut in every direction. The Army of the Potomac will very soon resume offensive operations.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

ROCKY SPRINGS, MISS., *May 8, 1863.*

Our advance is fifteen miles from Edward's station, on Southern railroad. All looks well. Port Hudson is evidently evacuated, except by a small garrison and their heavy artillery.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

CAYUGA, MISS., *May 11, 1863.*

My forces will be this evening as far advanced towards Jackson as Fourteen-mile creek, the left near Black river, and extending in a line as nearly east and west as they can get without bringing on a battle. As I shall communicate with Grand Gulf no more, except it becomes necessary to send a train with heavy escort, you may not hear from me again for several days.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., 11 A. M., *May 11, 1863.*

If possible, the forces of yourself and Banks should be united between Vicksburg and Port Hudson, so as to attack these places separately with the combined forces. The same thing has been urged on Banks. Hooker recrossed to the north side of the river, but he inflicted a greater loss upon the enemy than he received.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

RAYMOND, MISS., *May 14, 1863.*

McPherson took this place on the 12th, after a brisk fight of more than two hours. Our loss, fifty-one killed, and one hundred and eighty wounded; enemy's loss, seventy-five killed, and buried by us. One hundred and eighty-six prisoners, besides wounded.

McPherson is now at Clinton, Sherman on the direct Jackson road, and McClernand bringing up the rear. I will attack the state capital to-day.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

JACKSON, MISS., *May 15, 1863.*

This place fell into our hands yesterday after a fight of about three hours. Jo. Johnston was in command. The enemy retreated north, evidently with the design of joining the Vicksburg force. I am concentrating my force at Bolton to cut them off if possible. A dispatch from Banks showed him to be off in Louisiana, not to return to Baton Rouge until the 10th of May. I could not lose the time. I have taken many prisoners from Port Hudson, who state that it will be evacuated on the appearance of a force in the rear. I sent a special messenger to Banks, giving him the substance of the information I had, and asking him to join me as soon as possible. This message was sent on the 10th.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *May 22, 1863.*

Vicksburg is now completely invested. I have possession of Haine's bluff and the Yazoo, consequently have supplies. To-day an attempt was made to carry the city by assault, but was not entirely successful. We hold possession, however, of two of the enemy's forts, and have skirmishers close under all of them. Our loss was not severe. The nature of the ground about Vicksburg is such that it can only be taken by a siege. It is entirely safe to us in time—I would say one week—if the

enemy do not send a large army upon my rear. With the railroad destroyed to beyond Pearl river, I do not see the hope that the enemy can entertain of such relief. I hear that Davis has promised that if the garrison can hold out for fifteen days he will send one hundred thousand men, if he has to evacuate Tennessee. What shall I do with the prisoners I have?

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(LETTER.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *May 24, 1863.*

My troops are now disposed with the right (Sherman's corps) resting on the Mississippi river, where the bluff strikes the water, we having the first crest and the upper of the enemy's batteries. McClernand is on the left with his corps, his right having one brigade north of the railroad, the rest south of it. One division occupies the roads leading south and southeast from the city.

The position is as strong by nature as can be possibly conceived of, and is well fortified. The garrison the enemy have to defend it I have no means of knowing, but their force is variously estimated at from ten to twenty thousand. I attempted to carry the place by storm on the 22d instant, but was unsuccessful. Our troops were not repulsed from any point, but simply failed to enter the works of the enemy. At several points they got up to the parapets of the enemy's works, and planted their flags on the outer slope of the embankments, where they still have them. The attack was made simultaneously by the three army corps at ten A. M. The loss on our side was not very heavy at first, but receiving repeated dispatches from Major-General McClernand, saying that he was hard pressed on his right and left, and calling for reinforcements, I gave him all of McPherson's corps but four brigades, and caused Sherman to press the enemy on our right, which caused us to double our losses for the day. They will probably reach fifteen hundred killed and wounded. General McClernand's dispatches misled me as to the facts, and caused much of this loss. He is entirely unfit for the position of corps commander, both on the march and on the battle-field. Looking after his corps gives me more labor and infinitely more uneasiness than all the remainder of my department.

The enemy are now undoubtedly in our grasp. The fall of Vicksburg, and the capture of most of the garrison, can only be a question of time. I hear a great deal of the enemy's bringing a large force from the East, to effect the raising of the siege. They may attempt something of the kind, but I do not see how they can do it.

The railroad is effectually destroyed at Jackson, so that it will take thirty days to repair it. This will leave a march of fifty miles over which the enemy will have to subsist an army, and bring their ordnance stores with teams. My position is so strong that I could hold out for several days against a vastly superior force. I do not see how the enemy could possibly maintain a long attack under these circumstances. I will keep a close watch on the enemy, however.

There is a force now at Calhoun station, on the Mississippi Central, about six miles north of Canton. This is the force that escaped from Jackson, augmented by a few thousand men from the coast cities, intending to reach the latter place before the attack, but who failed to reach in time.

In the various battles, from Port Gibson to Black river bridge, we have taken near six thousand prisoners, besides killed, wounded, and scattered a much larger number. The enemy succeeded in retreating to Vicksburg, with only three pieces of artillery. The number captured by us was seventy-four guns, besides what was found at Haine's bluff.

From Jackson to this place I have had no opportunities of communicating with you. Since that, this army fought a heavy battle near Baker's creek on the 16th, beating the enemy badly, killing and capturing not less than four thousand of the enemy, besides capturing most of his artillery. Loring's division was cut off from retreat, and dispersed in every direction. On the 17th, the battle of Black river bridge was fought, the enemy again losing about two thousand prisoners and seventeen pieces of artillery, and many killed and wounded. The bridges and ferries were destroyed. The march from Edward's station to Black river bridge was made, bridges for crossing the army constructed, and much of it over in twenty-four hours. On the 19th, the march to this place was made, and the city invested. When I crossed the Mississippi river, the means of ferriage were so limited and time so important, that I started without teams, and an average of two days' rations in haversacks. Our supplies had to be

hauled about sixty miles, from Milliken's bend to opposite Grand Gulf, and from there to wherever the army marched. We picked up all the teams in the country, and free Africans to drive them. Forage and meat were found in great abundance through the country, so that, although five days' rations were issued in twenty days, yet there was neither suffering nor complaint witnessed in the army.

As soon as reports can be got from corps commanders, I will send in a report, embracing the campaign from Milliken's bend to the investment, if not the capture, of Vicksburg. When I crossed the Mississippi river, it was my intention to detach an army corps, or the necessary force, to coöperate with General Banks, to secure the reduction of Port Hudson and the union of the two armies. But I received a letter from General Banks, stating that he was in Louisiana, and would return to Baton Rouge by the 10th inst. By the reduction of Port Hudson, he could add only twelve thousand to my force. I had certain information that General Jo. Johnston was on his way to Jackson, and that reinforcements were arriving there constantly from Port Hudson and the Southern cities. Under this state of facts I could not afford to delay; beating the enemy too, near Port Gibson, I followed him to Hankinson's ferry on the Black river. This placed my forces fifteen miles on their way from Grand Gulf to this place, Black river bridge, or Jackson, whichever I might turn my attention to.

Altogether, I am satisfied that my course was right, and has given us with comparative ease what would have cost serious battle by delay.

The army is in the finest health and spirits.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., 12.30 P. M., *June 2, 1863.*

Yours of 24th is received. I will do all I can to assist you. I have sent dispatch after dispatch to Banks to join you. Why he does not, I do not understand. His separate operating on Port Hudson is in direct violation of his instructions. If possible, send him this dispatch. My last dispatch from him was May 4th.

PRESIDENT A. LINCOLN TO GENERAL GRANT.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

WASHINGTON, D. C., 6.30 P. M., *June 2, 1863.*

Are you in communication with General Banks? Is he coming towards you, or going farther off? Is there or has there been any thing to hinder his coming directly to you by water?

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *June 3, 1863.*

The approaches are gradually nearing the enemy's fortifications. Five days more should plant our batteries on their parapets. Johnston is still collecting troops at Canton and Jackson. Some are coming over the railroad, and all the country is joining his standard. The destruction of the enemy's artillery and ordnance stores was so complete, that all these must be brought in from a distance. I sent a large force up between the Yazoo and Black rivers. Forage, beef, and bacon was destroyed by our troops, and the stock brought to camp. I am now placing all my spare force on the narrowest part of the land between the rivers, about forty-five miles northeast, with the cavalry watching all the crossings of Black river.

We shell the town a little every day, and keep the enemy constantly on the alert. We but seldom lose a man now. The best of health and spirits prevail among the troops.

GENERAL GRANT TO A. LINCOLN, PRESIDENT U. S.—(TELEGRAM.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *June 8, 1863.*

I send by mail letter from General Banks of June 4th. I am in communication with him, he having Port Hudson closely invested.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(TELEGRAM.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *June 8, 1863.*

It is reported that three divisions have left Bragg's army to join Johnston. Breckenridge is known to have arrived

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *June 8, 1863.*

Vicksburg is closely invested. I have a spare force of about thirty thousand men with which to repel any thing from the rear. This includes all I have ordered from West Tennessee. Johnston is concentrating a force at Canton, and now has a portion of it west of Big Black. My forces have been north as far as Sartartia, and on the ridge back. To that point there is no force yet. I will make a waste of all the country I can between the two rivers. I am fortifying Haine's bluff, and will defend the line from here to there at all hazards.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(TELEGRAM.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *June 11, 1863.*

Reënforcements, other than from my own command, are beginning to arrive. There is every indication that they may be needed. The enemy occupy Yazoo City and Canton with an entire division of cavalry, on the ridge between the two rivers. I am fortifying Haine's bluff, and will have a garrison there of thirteen thousand men, besides the ability to throw an equal amount more there in case of an attack, and still keep up the investment of Vicksburg.

Kirby Smith is showing signs of working to this side of the river, either to operate against Banks or myself. He may find difficulty in crossing the river, but the great number of bayous and little lakes within a short distance of shore in this region, afford such facilities for concealing boats, that the means of crossing an army may still be left the rebels; particularly this may be the case about Natchez. I now fear trouble on the other side of the river between Lake Providence and Milliken's bend.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *June 11, 1863.*

I have reliable information from the entire interior of the South. Johnston has been reënforced by three thousand men

from Mobile and parts of Georgia; by McGowan and Breckenridge's divisions (nine thousand men); and four thousand of Forrest's cavalry from Bragg's army; nine thousand men from Charleston, and two thousand two hundred from Port Hudson. Orders were sent the very day Banks invested Port Hudson, to evacuate it. Garrison there now, eight thousand. Lee's army has not been reduced. Bragg's force now, forty-six thousand infantry and artillery, and fifteen thousand cavalry. Every thing not required for daily use has been removed to Atlanta, Georgia. His army can fall back to Bristol or Chattanooga at a moment's notice, which places, it is thought, he can hold, and spare twenty-five thousand men. Mobile and Savannah are now almost entirely without garrisons, further than men to manage large guns. No forces left in the interior to send to any place. All further reinforcements will have to come from one of the great armies. There is about thirty-two thousand men west of the Mississippi river, exclusive of the forces in Texas. Orders were sent them one week ago by Johnston. The purport of orders not known. Herron has arrived here, and troops from Burnside are looked for to-morrow.

GENERAL GRANT TO ADJUTANT-GENERAL L. THOMAS.—(LETTER.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *June 16, 1863.*

Herewith I have the honor of enclosing Brigadier-General E. S. Dennis's report of the battle of Milliken's bend, fought on the 7th of June, 1863, together with the list of casualties.

In this battle most of the troops engaged were Africans, who had but little experience in the use of arms. Their conduct is said, however, to have been most gallant, and I doubt not but with good officers they will make good troops.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *June 16, 1863.*

Every thing progresses well here. Johnston's force is at Yazoo City, Benton, Brownsville, and Clinton. I am fortifying at Haine's bluff to make my position certain, but believe I could go out with force enough to drive the rebels from be-

tween the two rivers. Deserters come out daily. All reportations short. We scarcely ever lose a man now. Health and condition of troops most excellent.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(TELEGRAM.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *June 19, 1863.*

I have found it necessary to relieve General McClelland, particularly at this time, for his publication of a congratulatory address, calculated to create dissensions and ill-feeling in the army. I should have relieved him long since, for general unfitness for his position. General Ord is appointed to his place, subject to the approval of the President.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(TELEGRAM.)

BEFORE VICKSBURG, *June 26, 1863.*

Yesterday a mine was sprung under the enemy's most commanding fort, producing a crater sufficient to hold two regiments of infantry. Our men took immediate possession and still hold it. The fight for it has been incessant, and thus far we have not been able to establish batteries in the breach. Expect to succeed.

Johnston has removed east of Black river. His movements are mysterious, and may be intended to cover a movement from his rear into East or West Tennessee, or upon Banks. I have Sherman out near his front on the Black, with a large force, watching him. I will use every effort to learn any move Johnston may make, and send troops from here to counteract any change he may make, if I can.

GENERAL GRANT TO ADJUTANT-GENERAL L. THOMAS.—(LETTER.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *June 26, 1863.*

Enclosed I respectfully transmit the letters of Major-Generals W. T. Sherman, commanding the Fifteenth army corps, and James B. McPherson, commanding the Seventeenth army corps, of dates respectively the 17th and 18th inst., relative to the congratulatory order of Major-General John A. McClelland.

nand to his troops, a copy of which order is also transmitted, together with copies of the correspondence relating thereto; and my order relieving General McClernand from the command of the Thirteenth army corps, and assigning Major-General E. O. C. Ord to the command thereof, subject to the approval of the President.

A disposition and earnest desire on my part to do the most I could with the means at my command, without interfering with the assignment to command, which the President alone was authorized to make, made me tolerate General McClernand long after I thought the good of the service demanded his removal. It was only when almost the entire army under my command seemed to demand it that he was relieved. The enclosed letters show the feelings of the army corps serving in the field with the Thirteenth.

The removal of General McClernand from the command of the Thirteenth army corps has given general satisfaction, the Thirteenth army corps sharing perhaps equally in the feeling with other corps of the army.

My action in the relieving of General McClernand from the command of the Thirteenth army corps, and the assignment of Major-General E. O. C. Ord to that command, I trust, will meet the approval of the President.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

NEAR VICKSBURG, *June 27, 1863.*

Johnston has postponed his attack until he can receive ten thousand reënforcements, now on their way from Bragg's army. They are expected next week. I feel strong enough against this increase, and I do not despair of having Vicksburg before they arrive. This latter, however, I may be disappointed in. I may have to abandon protection to the leased plantations from here to Lake Providence, to resist a threatened attack from Kirby Smith's forces. The location of those leased plantations was most unfortunate, and against my judgment. I wanted them put north of White river.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.

VICKSBURG, *July 4, 1863.*

The enemy surrendered this morning. The only terms allowed is their parole as prisoners of war. This I regard as a great advantage to us at this juncture. It saves probably several days in the capture, and leaves troops and transports ready for immediate service.

Sherman, with a large force, moves immediately on Johnston to drive him from the state. I will send troops to the relief of Banks, and return the Ninth Army Corps to Burnside.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

VICKSBURG, *July 6, 1863.*

The number of prisoners and pieces of artillery taken with Vicksburg is greater than was at first supposed. The number proves to be over thirty thousand prisoners, and over one hundred and seventy pieces of artillery. We have found considerable ammunition and about four days' rations of flour and bacon, and two hundred and fifty pounds of sugar. The small-arms are of good quality and over fifty thousand in number.

Sherman is after Johnston, but no news from him to-day.

GENERAL HALLECK TO GENERAL GRANT.—(TELEGRAM.)

WASHINGTON, 4 P. M., *July 8, 1863.*

I fear your parolling the prisoners at Vicksburg without actual delivery to a proper agent, as required by the seventh article of the cartel, may be construed into an absolute release, and that these men will immediately be placed in the ranks of the enemy. Such has been the case elsewhere. If these prisoners have not been allowed to depart, you will retain them until further orders.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(TELEGRAM.)

VICKSBURG, *July 10, 1863.*

The following dispatch is just received from General Banks:

“BEFORE PORT HUDSON, *July 8, 1863.*

“*To Major-General U. S. GRANT,
commanding Department Tennessee, Vicksburg:*

“GENERAL: The Mississippi is now opened. I have the honor to inform you that the garrison of Port Hudson surrendered unconditionally this afternoon. We shall take formal possession at seven o'clock in the morning.”

GENERAL GRANT TO ADJUTANT-GENERAL L. THOMAS.—(LETTER.)

VICKSBURG, MISS., *July 11, 1863.*

* * * * *

The long line of plantations from Lake Providence to Miliken's bend, it has been perfectly impossible to give perfect protection to, during the siege of Vicksburg. Besides the gunboats, negro troops, and six regiments of white troops, left west of the Mississippi river in consequence of these plantations being there, I sent an additional brigade from the investing army, and that at a time when Government was straining every nerve to send me troops to insure the success of the enterprise against Vicksburg. All has not been availing. I can now clean out the Tensas and Bayou Magon country, so that there will be but little difficulty in protecting what is left of the plantations.

* * * * *

The capture of Vicksburg has proved a bigger thing than I supposed it would. There were over thirty thousand rebel troops still left when we entered the city. The number of small-arms will reach fifty thousand stand, I think, and the amount of ordnance and ordnance stores is enormous. Since crossing the Mississippi, an army of sixty thousand men has in the various battles been killed and wounded, captured and scattered, so as to be lost to the Confederacy, and an armament for an army of one hundred thousand men has departed from them forever

My surplus troops were held in a position menacing Johnston, ready to move at a moment's notice when Vicksburg should fall. The moment a surrender was agreed upon, the order was given. I hope to hear to-day that Johnston's forces have been broken to pieces, and much of his munitions of war abandoned. I have not heard from Sherman since the morning of the 9th. He was then near Jackson, skirmishing with the cavalry of the enemy. * * * *

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

VICKSBURG, *July 11, 1863.*

General Banks writes me that he wants from ten to twelve thousand men to enable him to follow up the enemy and to move into Texas. Shall I send them? All my spare troops are now with Sherman, following Johnston. I have had no news since the morning of the 9th. Sherman was then at Clinton, his advance skirmishing with the enemy's cavalry.

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

VICKSBURG, *July 15, 1863.*

Sherman has Jackson invested from Pearl river, on the north, to the river on the south. This has cut off many hundred cars from the Confederacy. Sherman says he has force enough, and feels no apprehension of the result.

Finding Yazoo City was being fortified, I sent Herron there with his division. He captured several hundred prisoners on steamers; five pieces of heavy artillery and all the public stores fell into our hands. The enemy burnt three steamboats on the approach of the gunboats. The De Kalb was blown up and sunk in fifteen feet of water by the explosion of a torpedo. Finding that the enemy were crossing cattle for the rebel army at Natchez, and were said to have several thousand there now, I have sent steamers and troops to collect them, and to destroy their boats and all means for making more.

General Banks has made requisition on me for steamers, coal, and forage, which I have sent. Shall I send the Ninth army corps back to Burnside as soon as Johnston is driven from Jackson?

GENERAL GRANT TO GENERAL HALLECK.—(CIPHER TELEGRAM.)

VICKSBURG, *July 18, 1863.*

Johnston evacuated Jackson the night of the 16th inst. He is now in full retreat east. Sherman says most of his army must perish from the heat, lack of water, and general discouragement. The army parolled here has to a great extent deserted, and are scattered over the country in every direction. Learning that Yazoo City was being fortified, I sent General Herron there. Five guns were captured, many stores and about three hundred prisoners.

General Ransom was sent to Natchez, to stop the crossing of cattle for the eastern army. On arrival he found that a large number had been driven out of the city, to be pastured. Also, that munitions of war had recently been crossed over to the west for Kirby Smith. He mounted about two thousand of his men and sent them in both directions. They captured a number of prisoners and five thousand head of Texas cattle, two thousand head of which were sent to Banks. The balance have been and will be brought here. In Louisiana they captured more prisoners, and a number of teams loaded with ammunition. Over two hundred thousand rounds of musket ammunition were brought back to Natchez, with the teams captured, and two hundred and sixty-eight thousand rounds, besides artillery ammunition, destroyed. It seems to me now that Mobile should be captured, the expedition starting from some point on Lake Pontchartrain. There is much sickness in my command now, from long and excessive marching and labor. I will coöperate with General Schofield as soon as possible, so as to give him possession of the line of the Arkansas. Shall I retain or send back the Ninth army corps?

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER IX.

CONGRATULATORY ORDER OF GENERAL McCLEARNAND.

HEADQUARTERS, THIRTEENTH ARMY CORPS, }
BATTLE-FIELD IN REAR OF VICKSBURG, May 30, 1863. }

General Orders, No. 72.

COMRADES: As your commander, I am proud to congratulate you upon your constancy, valor, and successes. History affords no more brilliant example of soldierly qualities. Your victories have followed in such rapid succession that their echoes have not yet reached the country. They will challenge its grateful and enthusiastic applause. Yourselves striking out a new path, your comrades of the Army of the Tennessee followed, and a way was thus opened for them to redeem previous disappointments. Your march through Louisiana, from Milliken's bend to New Carthage and Perkins's plantation, on the Mississippi river, is one of the most remarkable on record. Bayous and miry roads, threatened with momentary inundation, obstructed your progress. All these were overcome by unceasing labor and unflagging energy. The two thousand feet of bridging which was hastily improvised out of materials created on the spot, and over which you passed, must long be remembered as a marvel. Descending the Mississippi still lower, you were the first to cross the river at Bruin's landing, and to plant our colors in the state of Mississippi below Warrenton. Resuming the advance the same day, you pushed on until you came up to the enemy near Port Gibson, only re-

strained by the darkness of night. You hastened to attack him on the morning of the 1st of May, and, by vigorously pressing him at all points, drove him from his position, taking a large number of prisoners and small-arms, and five pieces of cannon. General Logan's division came up in time to gallantly share in consummating the most valuable victory won since the capture of Fort Donelson.

Taking the lead on the morning of the 2d, you were the first to enter Port Gibson, and hasten the retreat of the enemy from the vicinity of that place. During the ensuing night, as a consequence of the victory at Port Gibson, the enemy spiked his guns at Grand Gulf, and evacuated that place, retiring upon Vicksburg and Edward's station. The fall of Grand Gulf was solely the result of the victory achieved by the land forces at Port Gibson. The armament and public stores captured there are but the just trophies of that victory.

Hastening to bridge the south branch of Bayou Pierre, at Port Gibson, you crossed on the morning of the 3d, and pushed on to Willow springs, Big Sandy, and the main crossing of Fourteen-mile creek, four miles from Edward's station. A detachment of the enemy was immediately driven away from the crossing, and you advanced, passed over, and rested during the night of the 12th, within three miles of the enemy in large force at that station.

On the morning of the 13th, the objective point of the army's movement having been changed from Edward's station to Jackson, in pursuance of an order from the commander of the department, you moved on the north side of Fourteen-mile creek towards Raymond.

This delicate and hazardous movement was executed by a portion of your numbers under cover of Hovey's division, which made a feint of attack, in line of battle, upon Edward's station. Too late to harm you, the enemy attacked the rear of that division, but was promptly and decisively repulsed.

Resting near Raymond that night, on the morning of the 14th, you entered that place—one division moving on to Mississippi springs, near Jackson, in support of General Sherman, another to Clinton, in support of General McPherson—a third remaining at Raymond, and a fourth at Old Auburn, to bring up the army-trains. On the 15th, you again led the advance towards Edward's station, which once more became the objec-

tive point. Expelling the enemy's pickets from Bolton the same day, you seized and held that important position.

On the 16th, you led the advance in three columns upon three roads, against Edward's station; meeting the enemy on the way in strong force, you heavily engaged him near Champion hills, and, after a sanguinary and obstinate battle, with the assistance of General McPherson's corps, beat and routed him, taking many prisoners and small-arms, and several pieces of cannon.

Continuing to lead the advance, you rapidly pursued the enemy to Edward's station, capturing that place, a large quantity of public stores, and many prisoners. Night only stopped you.

At day-dawn, on the 17th, you resumed the advance, and early coming upon the enemy strongly intrenched in elaborate works, both before and behind Big Black river, immediately opened with artillery upon him, followed by a daring and heroic charge at the point of the bayonet, which put him to rout, leaving eighteen pieces of cannon and more than a thousand prisoners in your hands.

By an early hour on the morning of the 18th, you had constructed a bridge across the Big Black, and had commenced the advance upon Vicksburg.

On the 19th, 20th, and 21st, you continued to reconnoitre and skirmish until you had gained a near approach to the enemy's works.

On the 22d, in pursuance of the order of the commander of the department, you assaulted the enemy's defences in front, at ten o'clock A. M., and within thirty minutes had made a lodgment, and planted your colors upon two of his bastions. This partial success called into exercise the highest heroism, and was only gained by a bloody and protracted struggle. Yet it was gained, and was the first and largest success achieved anywhere along the whole line of our army.

For nearly eight hours, under a scorching sun and destructive fire, you firmly held your footing, and only withdrew when the enemy had largely massed their forces and concentrated their attack upon you.

How and why the general assault failed, it would be useless now to explain. The Thirteenth army corps, acknowledging the good intention of all, would scorn indulgence in weak re-

grets and idle criminations. According justice to all, it would only defend itself. If, while the enemy was massing to crush it, assistance was asked for, by a diversion at other points, or by reënforcement, it only asked what in one case General Grant had specifically and peremptorily ordered, namely, simultaneous and persistent attack all along our lines until the enemy's outer works should be carried; and what, in the other, by massing a strong force in time upon a weakened point, would have probably insured success.

Comrades, you have done much, yet something more remains to be done. The enemy's odious defences still block your access to Vicksburg. Treason still rules that rebellious city, and closes the Mississippi river against rightful use by the millions who inhabit its sources and the great Northwest. Shall not our flag float over Vicksburg? Shall not the great Father of Waters be opened to lawful commerce? Methinks the emphatic response of one and all of you is, "It shall be so!" Then let us rise to the level of a crowning trial! Let our common sufferings and glories, while uniting us as a band of brothers, rouse us to new and surpassing efforts! Let us resolve upon success, God helping us! I join with you, comrades, in your sympathy for the wounded and sorrow for the dead. May we not trust—nay, is it not so—that History will associate the martyrs of this sacred struggle for law and order, liberty and justice, with the honored martyrs of Monmouth and Bunker Hill!

JOHN A. McCCLERNAND,
Major-General commanding.

GENERAL SHERMAN TO COLONEL RAWLINS.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTEENTH ARMY CORPS, }
CAMP ON WALNUT HILLS, June 17, 1863. }

Lieutenant-Colonel J. A. RAWLINS,

A. A. General, Department of the Tennessee:

SIR: On my return last evening from an inspection of the new works at Snyder's bluff, General Blair, who commands the second division of my corps, called my attention to the enclosed publication in the *Memphis Evening Bulletin* of June 13th instant, entitled "Congratulatory Order of General McCclernand," with a request that I should notice it, lest the

statements of facts, and inference contained therein, might receive credence from an excited public.

It certainly gives me no pleasure or satisfaction to notice such a catalogue of nonsense, such an effusion of vain-glory and hypocrisy; nor can I believe General McClelland ever published such an order officially to his corps. I know too well that the brave and intelligent soldiers and officers who compose that corps will not be humbugged by such stuff.

If the order be a genuine production, and not a forgery, it is manifestly addressed, not to an army, but to a constituency in Illinois, far distant from the scene of the events attempted to be described, who might innocently be induced to think General McClelland the sagacious leader and bold hero he so complacently paints himself.

But it is barely possible the order is a genuine one, and was actually read to the regiments of the Thirteenth army corps, in which case a copy must have been sent to your office for the information of the commanding general. I beg to call his attention to the requirements of General Orders No. 151, of 1862, which actually forbids the publication of all official letters and reports, and requires the name of the writer to be laid before the President of the United States for dismissal.

The document under question is not technically a letter or report, and, though styled an order, is not an order. It orders nothing, but is in the nature of an address to soldiers, manifestly designed for publication for ulterior political purposes. It perverts the truth, to the ends of flattery and self-glorification, and contains many untruths, among which is one of monstrous falsehood.

It substantially accuses General McPherson and myself with disobeying the orders of General Grant, in not assaulting on the 19th and 22d of May, and allowing, on the latter day, the enemy to mass his forces against the Thirteenth army corps alone. General McPherson is fully able to answer for himself; and for the Fifteenth army corps I answer, that on the 19th and 22d of May, it attacked furiously at three distinct points the enemy's works, at the very hour and minute fixed in General Grant's written orders; that, on both days, we planted our colors on the exterior slope and kept them there till nightfall; that from the first hour of the investment of Vicksburg until now, my corps has been far in advance of General McClelland.

nand; that the general-in-chief, by personal inspection, knows this truth; that tens of thousands of living witnesses beheld and participated in the attack; that General Grant visited me during both assaults, and saw for himself, and is far better qualified to judge whether his orders were obeyed than General McClelland, who was near three miles off; that General McClelland never saw my lines; that he then knew, and still knows nothing about them, and that from his position he had no means of knowing what occurred on this front.

Not only were the assaults made at the time and place, and in the manner prescribed in General Grant's written orders, but about three p. m., five hours after the assault on the 22d began, when my storming-party lay against the exterior slope of the bastion in my front, and Blair's whole division was deployed close up to the parapet, ready to spring to the assault, and all my field-artillery were in good position for the work, General Grant shewed me a note from General McClelland, that moment handed him by an orderly, to the effect that "he had carried three of the enemy's forts, and that the flag of the Union waved over the stronghold of Vicksburg," asking that the enemy should be pressed at all points, lest he should concentrate on him. Not dreaming that a major-general would at such a critical moment make a mere buncombe communication, I ordered instantly Giles A. Smith and Mower's brigades to renew the assault, under cover of Blair's division, and the artillery deployed as before described, and sent an aide to General Steele, about a mile to my right, to convey the same mischievous message, whereby we lost needlessly many of our best officers and men.

I would never have revealed so unwelcome a truth had General McClelland, in his process of self-flattery, confined himself to facts in the reach of his own observation, and not gone out of his way to charge others for results which he seems not to comprehend.

In cases of repulse and failure, congratulatory addresses by subordinate commanders are not common, and are only resorted to by weak and vain men to shift the burden of responsibility from their own to the shoulders of others.

I never make a practice of speaking or writing of others, but, during our assault of the 19th, several of my brigade commanders were under the impression that McClelland's corps

did not even attempt an assault. In the congratulatory order I remark great silence on that subject. Merely to satisfy inquiring parties, I should like to know if McClelland's corps did or did not assault at two p. m. of May 19th, as ordered. I don't believe it did, and I think General McClelland responsible.

With these remarks I leave the matter where it properly belongs, in the hands of the commanding general, who knows his plans and orders, sees with an eye single to success and his country's honor, and not from the narrow and contracted circle of a subordinate commander, who exaggerates the importance of the events that fall under his immediate notice, and is filled with an itching desire for "fame not earned."

With great respect,

Your obedient servant,

W. T. SHERMAN,

Major-General commanding.

GENERAL McPHERSON TO GENERAL GRANT.

HEADQUARTERS SEVENTEENTH ARMY CORPS,
DEPARTMENT OF THE TENNESSEE, }
NEAR VICKSBURG, MISS., June 18, 1863. }

Major-General GRANT,
commanding Department of the Tennessee :

GENERAL: My attention has just been called to an article published in the *Missouri Democrat* of the 10th instant, purporting to be a congratulatory order from Major-General John A. McClelland to his command.

The whole tenor of the order is so ungenerous, and the insinuations and criminations against the other corps of your army are so manifestly at variance with the facts, that a sense of duty to my command, as well as the verbal protest of every one of my division and brigade commanders against allowing such an order to go forth to the public unanswered, require that I should call your attention to it.

After a careful perusal of the order, I cannot help arriving at the conclusion that it was written more to influence public sentiment at the North, and impress the public mind with the magnificent strategy, superior tactics, and brilliant deeds of

the major-general commanding the Thirteenth army corps, than to congratulate his troops upon their well-merited successes.

There is a vain-gloriousness about the order, an ingenious attempt to write himself down the hero, the master-mind, giving life and direction to military operations in this quarter, inconsistent with the high-toned principle of the soldier *sans peur et sans reproche*.

Though "born a warrior," as he himself stated, he has evidently forgotten one of the most essential qualities, viz., that elevated, refined sense of honor, which, while guarding his own rights with jealous care, at all times renders justice to others.

It little becomes Major-General McClermand to complain of want of coöperation on the part of other corps, in the assault on the enemy's works on the 22d ultimo, when twelve hundred and eighteen men of my command were placed *hors du combat* in their resolute and daring attempt to carry the positions assigned to them, and fully one-third of these from General Quimby's division, with the gallant and accomplished Colonel Boomer at their head, fell in front of *his own lines*, where they were left, after being sent two miles to *support him*, to sustain the whole brunt of the battle, from five P. M. until after dark, *his own men being recalled*.

If General McClermand's assaulting columns were not immediately supported when they moved against the enemy's intrenchments, and few of the men succeeded in getting in, it most assuredly was his *own fault*, and *not* the fault of *any other* corps commander.

Each corps commander had the positions assigned to him which he was to attempt to carry, and it remained with him to dispose his troops in such a way as to support promptly and efficiently any column which succeeded in getting in.

The attack was ordered by the major-general commanding the department to be simultaneous at all the points selected; and precisely at the hour, the columns moved, some of them taking a little longer than others to reach the enemy's works, on account of the natural and artificial obstacles to be overcome, but the difference in time was not great enough to allow of any changing or massing of the enemy from one part of the line to the other.

The assault failed, not in my opinion from any want of coöperation or bravery on the part of our troops, but from the

strength of the works, the difficulty of getting close up to them under cover, and the determined character of the assailed.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

JAMES B. McPHERSON,

Major-General.

GLOSSARY OF SIEGE TERMS.

APPROACH.—A ditch dug by the besiegers in their advances, the earth of the ditch being thrown up towards the enemy, as a cover.

BANQUETTE.—A small terrace behind a parapet, on which the soldier stands to deliver his fire.

BASTION.—A projecting part of the main fort, consisting of a face and two flanks.

BOYAU.—A small trench leading direct to a magazine, or any particular point; generally, the boyaux run zigzag, and between the parallels.

COHORN-MORTAR.—A small mortar used in sieges; so small that it can be carried by hand.

COUNTER-MINE.—A gallery under ground, by means of which the mine of the enemy may be watched and destroyed.

COVERED-WAY.—A road, or way, covered from the fire or view of an enemy, by a parapet.

DEBOUCHE.—To issue from a defile.

DEFILE.—To arrange fortifications so as to protect a space on the interior from the fire or view of an enemy.

DEFILADE.—Same as defile.

DOUBLE-SAP.—A sap, protected on both sides by a parapet.

EMBRASURE.—An opening in a parapet, through which cannon are pointed and discharged.

FASCINE.—A bundle of twigs closely bound, ten or twenty inches in diameter, and from ten to twenty feet long, used for revetting, or for filling ditches.

FEATHERED-GRENADE.—A percussion hand-grenade, with paste-board wings to keep the point of percussion foremost.

FIRE-BALL.—A ball filled with powder or other combustibles, to be thrown at the enemy, to light up his works.

GABION.—A basket, cylindrical in form and open at both ends, usually about nine feet long by two wide. It is generally made of twigs or saplings, and, when filled with earth, used to shelter men from an enemy's fire, or in revetting.

HALF-PARALLEL.—A parallel covered only towards the enemy, and open in rear.

HAND-GRENADE.—A small shell, intended to be thrown by hand into the head of a sap.

HEAD OF SAP.—The part of the sap nearest the enemy.

MINE.—A cavity under fortifications, filled with powder, so as to explode it when fired.

PARALLEL.—A wide trench, for communication between the batteries and approaches of the besiegers.

PARAPET.—A wall or rampart, breast-high, covering soldiers from a front attack.

PLACE OF ARMS.—A portion of a work protected from the enemy, and suitable for the assembling of troops.

PLATFORM.—The floor of wood, on which cannon are mounted during a siege, to fire on an enemy.

PROFILE.—A vertical section of a work, generally at right angles with the line of the work.

REËNTRANT.—Pointing or directing inwards—sometimes used as a noun, when it signifies a reëntrant angle.

REJET.—To face or line with masonry or wood, or other material.

SALIENT.—A projecting angle of a fort.

SAP.—A near approach to a fortified place, made by digging under cover of gabions and sap-rollers.

SAPPER.—One employed in digging saps; the sappers usually work on their knees.

SAP-ROLLER.—A large gabion stuffed with fascines, and rolled forward before the sapper, to protect him at his work.

SHOULDER.—The angle of a bastion between the face and the flank.

SIDE-CUTTING.—A road branching out from the main one.

SLING-CART.—A large cart used to transport cannon short dis-

tances, the cannon being slung or suspended, by a chain attached to the axle-tree.

TAMP.—To pack earth or other material in a mine, in order to confine the effects of an explosion.

TRENCH.—An excavation made in a siege, for the purpose of covering troops as they advance. The term includes parallels and approaches.

TRENCH-GUARDS.—Soldiers placed in the trenches to guard the working-parties.

WATTLING.—A platting of twigs.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XI.

INSTRUCTIONS OF GENERAL BRAGG TO GENERAL LONGSTREET.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT TENNESSEE, }
MISSIONARY RIDGE, 4th Nov., '63. }

GENERAL: You will move with your command (McLaw's and Hood's divisions, and Alexander's and Lyden's artillery battalions), as indicated in our conference yesterday. Major-General Wheeler will make the necessary arrangements for the cavalry, and probably accompany it—at least for a time. He is thoroughly acquainted with Middle Tennessee, and many of the officers with him will know the route there, as well as all parts of East Tennessee. Every preparation is ordered to advance you as fast as possible, and the success of the plan depends on rapid movements and sudden blows. The country through which you move, until you strike the mountains, will subsist your command, and forage your animals, besides giving a large supply of breadstuffs. Your object should be to drive Burnside out of East Tennessee first; or, better, to capture or destroy him. Major-General Samuel Jones will be urged to press on him from Northeast Tennessee.

You will please keep open the telegraphic communication with us here, and see to the repair and regular use of railroad to Loudon. The latter is of the first importance, as it may become necessary in an emergency to recall you temporarily.

I hope to hear from you fully and frequently, general, and sincerely wish you the same success which has ever marked your brilliant career.

I am, general,

Very respectfully and truly yours,

BRAXTON BRAGG, *General*.

General JAMES LONGSTREET, *commanding corps*.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER XII.

BRAGG'S REPORT OF BATTLE OF CHATTANOOGA.

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,)
DALTON, GA., *November 30, 1863.* }

SIR: On Monday, the 23d, the enemy advanced in heavy force, and drove in our picket line in front of Missionary ridge, but made no further effort. On Tuesday morning early, they threw over the river a heavy force opposite the north end of the ridge, and just below the mouth of the Chickamauga, at the same time displaying a heavy force in our immediate front.

After visiting the right and making dispositions there for the new development in that direction, I returned towards the left, to find a heavy cannonading going on from the enemy's batteries on our forces occupying the slope of Lookout mountain, between the crest and the river. A very heavy force soon advanced to the assault, and was met by one brigade only—Walthall's, which made a desperate resistance, but was finally compelled to yield ground—why this command was not sustained is yet unexplained. The commander on that part of the field, Major-General Stevenson, had six brigades at his disposal. Upon his urgent appeal, another brigade was dispatched in the afternoon to his support, though it appeared his own forces had not been brought into action, and I proceeded to the scene.

Arriving just before sunset, I found we had lost all the advantages of the position. Orders were immediately given for the ground to be disputed until we could withdraw our forces across Chattanooga creek, and the movement was commenced.

This having been successfully accomplished, our whole forces were concentrated on the ridge, and extended to the right to meet the movement in that direction.

On Wednesday, the 25th, I again visited the extreme right, now under Lieutenant-General Hardee, and threatened by a heavy force, whilst strong columns could be seen marching in that direction. A very heavy force in line of battle confronted our left and centre.

On my return to this point, about eleven A. M., the enemy's forces were being moved in heavy masses from Lookout, and beyond to our front, whilst those in front extended to our right. They formed their lines, with great deliberation, just beyond the range of our guns, and in plain view of our position.

Though greatly outnumbered, such was the strength of our position, that no doubt was entertained of our ability to hold it, and every disposition was made for that purpose.

During this time they had made several attempts on our extreme right, and had been handsomely repulsed with very heavy loss, by Major-General Cleburne's command, under the immediate direction of Lieutenant-General Hardee.

By the road, cross (*sic*) the ridge at Rossville, far to our left, a route was open to our rear. Major-General Breckinridge, commanding on the left, had occupied this with two regiments, and a battery. It being reported to me that a force of the enemy had moved in that direction, the general was ordered to have it reconnoitred, and to make every disposition necessary to secure his flank, which he proceeded to do.

About three and a half P. M., the immense force in the front of our left and centre advanced in three lines, preceded by heavy skirmishers. Our batteries opened with fine effect, and much confusion was produced, before they reached musket range.

In a short time the war of musketry became very heavy, and it was soon apparent the enemy had been repulsed in my immediate front.

Whilst riding along the crest, congratulating the troops, intelligence reached me that our line was broken on my right, and the enemy had crowned the ridge. Assistance was promptly dispatched to that point under Brigadier-General Bate, who had so successfully maintained the ground in my front, and I proceeded to the rear of the broken line to rally

our retiring troops and return them to the crest to drive the enemy back. General Bate found the disaster so great, that his small force could not repair it.

About this time I learned that our extreme left had also given way, and that my position was almost surrounded. Bate was immediately directed to form a second line in the rear, where by the efforts of my staff, a nucleus of stragglers had been formed upon which to rally.

Lieutenant-General Hardee, leaving Major-General Cleburne in command on the extreme right, moved towards the left, when he heard the heavy firing in that direction. He reached the right of Anderson's division just in time to find it had nearly all fallen back, commencing on its left where the enemy had first crowned the ridge. By a prompt and judicious movement, he threw a portion of Cheatham's division directly across the ridge, facing the enemy, who was now moving a strong force immediately on his left flank. By a decided stand here the enemy was entirely checked, and that portion of our force to the right remained intact.

All to the left, however, except a portion of Bate's division was entirely routed, and in rapid flight—nearly all the artillery having been shamefully abandoned by its infantry support.

Every effort which could be made by myself and staff, and by many other mounted officers, availed but little. A panic, which I had never before witnessed, seemed to have seized upon officers and men, and each seemed to be struggling for his personal safety, regardless of his duty or his character.

In this distressing and alarming state of affairs, General Bate was ordered to hold his position, covering the road for the retreat of Breekinridge's command; and orders were immediately sent to Generals Hardee and Breekinridge to retire their forces upon the depot at Chickamunga.

Fortunately, it was now near nightfall, and the country and roads in our rear were fully known to us, but equally unknown to the enemy.

The routed left made its way back in great disorder, effectually covered, however, by Bate's small command, which had a sharp conflict with the enemy's advance, driving it back. After night, all being quiet, Bate retired in good order—the enemy attempting no pursuit.

Lieutenant-General Hardee's command, under his judicious management, retired in good order and unmolested.

As soon as all troops had crossed, the bridges over the Chickamauga were destroyed to impede the enemy, though the stream was fordable at several places.

No satisfactory excuse can possibly be given for the shameful conduct of our troops on the left, in allowing their line to be penetrated. The position was one which ought to have been held by a line of skirmishers against any assaulting column; and wherever resistance was made, the enemy fled in disorder after suffering heavy loss. Those who reached the ridge, did so in a condition of exhaustion from the great physical exertion in climbing, which rendered them powerless; and the slightest effort would have destroyed them.

Having secured much of our artillery, they soon availed themselves of our panic, and turning our guns upon us, enfiladed the lines both right and left, rendering them entirely untenable.

Had all parts of the line been maintained with equal gallantry and persistence, no enemy could ever have dislodged us; and but one possible reason presents itself to my mind, in explanation of this bad conduct in veteran troops, who had never before failed in any duty assigned them, however difficult and hazardous.

They had, for two days, confronted the enemy, marshalling his immense forces in plain view, and exhibiting to their sight such a superiority in numbers, as may have intimidated weak minds and untried soldiers.

But our veterans had so often encountered similar hosts, when the strength of position was against us, and with perfect success, that not a doubt crossed my mind.

As yet I am not fully informed as to the commands which first fled, and brought this great disaster and disgrace upon our arms. Investigation will bring out the truth, however, and full justice shall be done to the good and the bad.

After arriving at Chickamauga, and informing myself of the full condition of affairs, it was decided to put the army in motion for a point farther removed from a powerful and victorious army, that we might have some little time to replenish and recuperate for another struggle. The enemy made pursuit as far as Ringgold, but was so handsomely checked by

Major-General Cleburne and Brigadier-General Gist, in command of their respective divisions, that he gave us but little annoyance.

Lieutenant-General Hardee, as usual, is entitled to my warmest thanks and high commendation for his gallant and judicious conduct during the whole of the trying scenes through which we passed.

Major-General Cleburne, whose command defeated the enemy in every assault on the 25th, and who eventually charged and routed him on that day, capturing several stands of colors and several hundred prisoners, and who afterwards brought up our rear with great success, again charging and routing the pursuing column at Ringgold, on the 27th, is commended to the special notice of the government.

Brigadier-Generals Gist and Bate, commanding divisions, Cumming, Walthall, and Polk, commanding brigades, were distinguished for coolness, gallantry, and successful conduct, throughout the engagements, and in the rear-guard on the retreat.

To my staff, personal and general, my thanks are specially due for their gallant and zealous efforts, under fire, to rally the broken troops and restore order; and for their laborious services in conducting successfully the many and arduous duties of the retreat.

Our losses are not yet ascertained; but in killed and wounded, it is known to have been very small. In prisoners and stragglers, I fear it is much larger.

The chief of artillery reports the loss of forty pieces.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

BRAXTON BRAGG, *General commanding.*

General S. COOPER.

Adjutant-General, C. S. A., Richmond.

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“The merits of Bancroft's ‘History of the United States’ are so well known that little need be said of the new edition, the first volume of which, reaching to 1688, has just been published in very handsome form, except to point out the changes since the revision of 1876. One of the most prominent is the introduction of a division into three parts, beginning respectively at 1492, 1660, and 1688. With each part begins a new numbering of the chapters, and the difference thus created between the editions is increased by the frequent separation of one chapter into two or three. Thus what was chapter two in 1876 becomes chapters two, three, and four, in 1883, and what was chapter twenty-two becomes chapters twelve, thirteen, and fourteen, of part second. In all, instead of twenty-seven chapters there are thirty-eight. The total length is not increased, but rather diminished, since there are many omissions, for instance, of Captain John Smith's apocryphal adventures in Hungary, the evidence for which, coming solely from the hero himself, probably seems weaker than ever to Mr. Bancroft. Among passages which will not be missed is this about the Quaker martyrs: ‘They were like those weeds which were unsightly to the eyes, and which only when trampled give out precious perfumes.’ Another expunged remark is that Episcopalianism ‘separating itself from Protestantism could acknowledge no equal except the Orthodox Greek Church and that of Rome.’ With these sentences have been rejected many whose meaning was given in the context, such curtailment being especially common at the beginning and end of chapters. The account of the character of James I is greatly abridged, and made somewhat less severe. In the place of the charge that Oliver Cromwell's ruling motive was ambition, is the acknowledgment that in his foreign policy he was most certainly faithful to the interests of England. The notice of Luther is rewritten and enlarged, mainly by apt quotations of his own words. There has been less change in the accounts of American than of European matters, but the most important addition, anywhere, is that of two pages describing and praising Captain Smith's government of Virginia. Often, when there appears to be an addition or omission, there is in reality only a transposition. The whole class of changes may be attributed to greater maturity of judgment, rather than to discovery of new material.

especially as no notice is taken of recent controversies ; for instance, whether Columbus really lies buried at Havana or San Domingo ; whether the Pilgrims landed exactly on the day of the winter solstice, as is apparently Bancroft's opinion, and whether 'The King's Missive' was ever sent, as told by Whittier. Other changes aim simply at improvement of style. The volumes are printed in the stately octavo style of the first edition, which seems more appropriate to such a standard work than the cheaper form of the other revision."—*Boston Advertiser*.

"On comparing this work with the corresponding volume of the 'Centenary' edition of 1876, one is surprised to see how extensive changes the author has found desirable, even after so short an interval. The first thing that strikes one is the increased number of chapters, resulting from subdivision. The first volume contains two volumes of the original, and is divided into thirty-eight chapters instead of eighteen. This is in itself an improvement. But the new arrangement is not the result merely of subdivision : the matter is rearranged in such a manner as vastly to increase the lucidity and continuousness of treatment. In the present edition Mr. Bancroft returns to the principle of division into periods, abandoned in the 'Centenary' edition. His division is, however, a new one. As the permanent shape taken by a great historical work, this new arrangement is certainly an improvement."—*The Nation* (*New York*).

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